Queen to yield. If she should still persist and attempt to form a ministry of her own, without the consent of the legislature, she will surely imperil her throne. She is well known to be much more stubborn in character than her brother, the late King, but my present belief is that she will finally yield to the legal and other legitimate forces operative against her present course and place herself in the hands of the conservative and respectable men of the country as the only way to retain her throne.

Early in the spring of 1891 the supreme court decided that the Cabinet of the late King ceased to have legal existence at his death. A new Cabinet was appointed which seemed to give general satisfaction and somewhat to allay earlier apprehensions touching the probable course of the Queen. Mr. Stevens, however, expressed some lack of faith in the minister of finance.

In September, 1891, Mr. Stevens wrote that the prince consort, husband of Queen Liliuokalani, a native of New York and strongly American in his sympathies, had died August 27, 1891.

At the same time the minister reported a project for a revision of the reciprocity treaty between this Government and Hawaii, prompted by the removal of the tariff on sugar, which materially, if not vitally, affected the principal interests of the islands. Late in 1891, Mr. Mott Smith was appointed a special envoy to the United States to negotiate such an agreement, and a legislature favorable to the treaty was elected in February, 1892.

In a confidential communication of March 8, 1892, Mr. Stevens reports revolutionary plans to be held in check solely by the presence of an United States naval vessel, and describes a very general sentiment of hostility to the succession of the "half English" heir to the throne—at the time being educated in England—and a growing inclination among all classes towards annexation to the United States. (Appendix.)

Mr. Stevens's dispatches continue to be of the same tenor. The submission of the Queen to the influences of a half-caste Tahitian of the name of Wilson, and marshal of the Kingdom, since soon after her accession, continued to excite considerable dissatisfaction, and revolutionary schemes were rife throughout the year. The attitude of the Queen and her immediate entourage was one of arrogance. Late in August or early in September the cabinet was voted out, and a deadlock followed between the Queen and the legislature. The new cabinet was objectionable to the better elements, but a vote of want of confidence sufficiently decisive to bring on the crisis was not secured until the 17th October. The minister said in his dispatch of October 19, 1892, on the situation—

My present impression is, that the Queen and her faction will have to yield. Otherwise the entire overthrow of the monarchy could not be long delayed.

In his No. 74, of November 20, Mr. Stevens gave a full statement of the financial, agricultural, social, and political condition of the islands, and said:

One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be followed: Either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a "customs union," an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not necessarily stipulated American protectorate over the islands.

Reports to the Secretary of the Navy—especially those beginning with one from Rear-Admiral Brown, dated September 6, 1892—corroborated the American minister's accounts and forecasts of events in Hawaii until, on the 28th of January, telegraphic news was received from both sources of the accomplishment of a peaceful revolution at Honolulu and the dethronement of the Queen. (Appendix.)