required by regulations, the exception being that our men have not been landed for the purpose of drill since my assumption of command."

(5) "The reply quoted as made by the officers of the Philadelphia 'that no one on board knew what orders would be received,' should convince any reasonable person that no order had been given."

The admiral says in conclusion: "As you are aware, I have studiously avoided doing anything that would have a tendency to increase the excitement prevailing in Honolulu, and I now distinctly state that the naval force under my command is in no way responsible for the feeling now existing."

Your letter referring to the preceding facts makes this frank and just admission: "Up to the time of the arrival of the Corewina * * * no unusual warlike preparations were visible on board." The only warlike preparations seem, therefore, to have been confined to one day—December 15—and these as just shown by Admiral Irwin were not subject to an unfriendly construction.

In this connection it may not be improper to mention the conduct of our naval forces during the trying circumstances succeeding the 24th of last November. The many rumors as to their purpose of landing and attacking your people, the feelings of resentment naturally resulting from the honest belief by a large part of the community that such was their intention, the opprobrious epithets that were freely employed, brought such a dangerous and critical condition that for a time, as Admiral Irwin states, it became necessary for all our officers going ashore to wear their service uniform as a protection against insult and attack. During the whole of this unfortunate and regrettable situation the demeanor of both officers and men was one of forbearance and self-control.

Your paragraph (18) sets forth that "it was known at this time that several of the wives of the U.S. naval officers, temporarily in Honolulu, were packing up their baggage preparatory for immediate removal in view of possible hostilities."

It is true that on the day of the Corewina's arrival, December 14, three ladies, wives of naval officers, in the absence of their husbands on board ship, made preparations to leave. Within a few hours their apprehensions were allayed and they decided to remain where they were. If, however, these ladies had left the city upon the 24th of last November it would not, even at that early date, have been an evidence of any hostile purpose nor "in view of possible hostilities toward your Government," but an act of ordinary prudence and protection against the contingency of mob violence. Their fears, under the circumstances, were, must be admitted, not unreasonable.

The wives of the officers to whom you refer and others, with their children, numbering nearly a score, having no anticipation of danger, had selected as their residence a most central and exposed location, within a few hundred yards of the executive building, and of easy access from every direction. Their husbands were daily absent from shipboard and if danger threatened were compelled to be absent. Their diplomatic representative could not exercise the usual privilege of landing troops for their protection, because that act, in the unfortunate condition of affairs, would, he feared, have been construed as a hostile invasion, of which the lawless element might have taken advantage.

Paragraph (19) states: "It was also known that you were in frequent communication with the ex-Queen. I desire to state that the only communications of a political character which I have had with the Queen were limited to three occasions. As to the first of these, on November 14, I have no reason to believe you were informed. The other two, on the 16th and 18th of December last, were the following day reported by me in person to your Government and their subject-matter fully explained. The sole purpose of these negotiations were, as you know, to secure proper guarantees from the Queen as to life and property of all connected with the overthrow of the monarchy. These having been secured, I then, under the instructions of the President of the United States, presented his decision, setting forth the reasons therefor and submitting it to your Government for its voluntary action.

With regard to Mr. J. O. Carter's comments on the situation and conversation with his nephew, I have this to say. Mr. Carter was invited by me to the last interviews with the Queen, December 16 and 18. He knew nothing until then of the interview of November 14. As a native Hawaiian, of American parentage, whose character for integrity and intelligence was acknowledged in the community, I considered him a proper person to be present. His counsel to his nephew was, to use his own language, "based entirely upon Secretary Gresham's published letter and current newspaper comments. * * * It was not a warning in the sense the letter of Minister Dole conveys."

In paragraph (20) you state: "It was the almost well-nigh universal belief in the city that you were about to attempt to land the naval forces of the United States to enforce the execution of the President's policy."

My answer is that my Government, one month prior to the time referred to, had given you information negating the idea of using force and had authorized the