

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Merrill.

No. 137.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 22, 1889.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Nos. 243-256.
I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Merrill.

No. 138.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 23, 1889.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 255 of the 1st instant, relative to the attempt of July 30 last, to overthrow the Hawaiian Government.

The steps taken by the legation to protect the lives and property of our citizens at Honolulu, in that emergency, seem to have proved effectual. A copy of your dispatch will be sent to the Navy Department.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.

No. 260.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, August 29, 1889.

SIR: Referring to political affairs I have the honor to inform you that, since the episode of the 30th ultimo and the judicially defined power of the King and cabinet, referred to in my No. 257 of the 6th instant, peace has prevailed and the people have pursued their usual avocations undisturbed by disquieting rumors.

At the present time sixty-four persons have been arrested in connection with the insurrection, variously charged with treason and conspiracy.

The trial of the insurgents will occur at the regular term of the court in October next.

I have, etc.,

GEO. W. MERRILL.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.

No. 262.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, September 7, 1889.

SIR: Referring to the disturbance of July last, it now appears that among the influences operating to induce the native Hawaiians to attempt such a scheme was the fact that their minds had become

imbued with the belief that the foreign residents and the cabinet were in league for the purpose of destroying the autonomy of the kingdom, and this feeling was augmented by letters of indiscreet correspondents, published in the United States, advising the interference of our Government agents to influence the current of Hawaiian political affairs, which were freely quoted and harshly commented upon by the newspapers published here in the native language.

The native, in his simplicity, readily accepted these quotations and statements of the press as true and foreboding the loss of the independence of their country.

There also existed a feeling among many Hawaiians that they were not the recipients of a fair share of the official patronage under the present administration, and that a change of cabinet ministers ought to occur.

Relying upon the result of the revolution in 1887, it was believed that the only thing required to effect the change desired was to surround the Government building with an armed guard, take possession of the palace and the King, make a show of force, compel the promulgation of a new constitution, demand the resignation of the present members of the cabinet and the appointment of others.

In other words, it is asserted by the insurgents that the revolution attempted in July last was intended to be as peaceful and harmless to persons and property as that of June, 1887.

To the native mind generally it is difficult to distinguish any difference of rights in the premises or of the principles on which the two movements were based.

It is also noticeable that among the American residents here there are several who, from personal motives, contemplate with satisfaction periodical disquietude in this kingdom, hoping that frequent revolutionary epochs will force the United States Government to make this group a part of its territory, and to absorb into its body politic this heterogeneous population of 80,000, consisting of Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, native Hawaiians, half-castes, and only about 5,000 of those who may be properly denominated the white race.

In order to keep affairs in as much turmoil as possible baseless rumors are constantly put in circulation, many of which find publication in other countries.

The latest agitation is one against the increase of Chinese, and a movement is now being made to call the legislature in extra session for the purpose of submitting a constitutional amendment on the subject to the people at the election in February next.

It is feared if such a question is submitted to the people as a ministerial measure, that the foreign residents representing the mechanical and planting interests of Hawaii will be divided, while the native Hawaiians will be united and succeed in defeating the measure, thus regaining full control of the Government.

For this reason many among those inclined to favor Chinese restriction oppose the calling of the legislature, fearing the defeat of the reform party as a consequence.

I have, etc.,

GEORGE W. MERRILL.

Mr. Adee to Mr. Merrill.

No. 139.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 10, 1889.

SIR: I have received and read with interest your dispatch No. 257, of the 6th ultimo, touching the political situation at Honolulu, growing out of the recent controversy between the King and his cabinet.

I am, etc.,

ALVEY A. ADEE,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 2 bis.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 25, 1889.

SIR: I improve the opportunity to report to the Secretary of State that, taking the usual route of travel by train and steamer, I arrived with my family at Honolulu September 20, and on the following day communicated with the minister of foreign affairs, who promptly arranged the day and the hour for my reception by the King. Monday, September 23, His Majesty received me in the customary manner, when I presented my sealed letter of credence from the President. I inclose a printed slip containing my remarks and those of the King in reply. All the facts and incidents attending my reception at the Hawaiian capital have been most cordial and satisfactory, and I appreciate that I assume my post of duty here under highly favorable auspices.

I have the honor, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in Mr. Stevens's No 2 bis.]

Mr. Merrill then presented to the King his excellency John L. Stevens, who addressed His Majesty in the following words:

“MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY:

“SIRE: In presenting to His Majesty my letters of credence he will allow me to say that it is with an experience of pleasure that I am permitted to be the medium of communicating to him the good wishes of the President of the United States and of the sixty-five millions of people whom he ably and faithfully represents. It is in the spirit of international fraternity, which has greatly increased in force and elevation in recent times, that I am sent as the American agent to His Majesty's Government and to reside among the people of these beautiful islands, a cluster of gems in the Pacific Sea. It is proper for me to say, what His Majesty and Government well understand, that the Government and people of the United States cherish a deep interest in the prosperity and welfare of the Hawaiian Islands, so smiled upon by nature and so important to the future commerce and civilization of the countries contiguous to the Pacific.

“Your autonomy secured by the good will of the great nations, all true statesmen and generous citizens of other lands must wish that your Government may be successful in securing order, prosperity, and happiness to all your people. Though separated by a thousand miles of ocean, the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom make a part of the new world, whose reciprocal interests of commerce tend to unity and to all that is liberal in policy and beneficent in the arts of peace. If my residence among you shall in any way conduce to these pacific and desirable ends, it will be my good fortune to faithfully represent the wishes of the people and Government of the great American nation.”

The following is a copy of the autograph letter from the President of the United States to His Majesty presented by his excellency John L. Stevens:

Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States of America, to His Majesty Kalakaua, King of the Hawaiian Islands.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND:

I have made choice of John L. Stevens, one of our distinguished citizens to reside near the Government of Your Majesty in the quality of minister resident of the United States of America. He is well informed of the relative interests of the two countries and of our sincere desire to cultivate to the fullest extent the friendship which has so long subsisted between us. My knowledge of his high character and ability gives me entire confidence that he will constantly endeavor to advance the interest and prosperity of both Governments and so render himself acceptable to Your Majesty.

I therefore request Your Majesty to receive him favorably and to give full credence to what he shall say on the part of the United States, and to the assurances which I have charged him to convey to you of the best wishes of this Government for the prosperity of the Hawaiian Islands.

May God have Your Majesty in His wise keeping.

Written at Washington, the 26th day of June, in the year 1889.

Your good friend,

BENJ. HARRISON.

By the President:

JAMES G. BLAINE,
Secretary of State.

His Majesty replied to Mr. Stevens, as follows:

"Mr. MINISTER: It is with pleasure that I receive from you the assurance of the continuance of the friendly regard of the President and the people of the American nation for the Sovereign and people of Hawaii.

"And I am well pleased to welcome to a residence in my kingdom a gentleman who is the choice of my great and good friend, President Harrison, as the representative of the American Government and people.

"The officers of my Government will be instructed to tender to you every attention and courtesy during your official residence in my dominions."

His Majesty was attended on this occasion by the Hon. A. S. Cleghorn, H. R. H. Prince Kawanakoa, His Excellency Hon. Jona. Austin, minister of foreign affairs; James W. Robertson, esq., His Majesty's vice and acting chamberlain; Col. the Hon. Robert Hoapili Baker, A. D. C.; Maj. John Dominis Holt, A. D. C., and Capt. the Hon. E. K. Lilikalani, equerry in waiting.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 3.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, October 7, 1889.

SIR: There is at the present time a lively interest among the Hawaiian citizens in regard to proposed changes in the treaty relations between the United States and these islands. By some means, as to which I have not accurate information, a draft of a new treaty found its way into the newspapers here hostile to the present ministry. This has caused an earnest discussion of the subject involved in the public journals and in private and commercial circles. This has led the cabinet to deem it expedient to publish a correction of false impressions and to express its real opinion as to the necessity and terms of a new treaty. I inclose a copy of the statement of the minister of foreign affairs, which has been published in the papers here.

The facts, so far as they have come to my observation, lead me to conclusion that the chief opposition to the proposed new treaty arises from partisan opposition to the present ministry and from the representa-

tions of the English and French diplomatic agents, who have already called on the minister of foreign affairs to present their objections, which fact seems to have disturbed the ministry very little. I am much impressed by the strong American feeling pervading the best portion of the population, and which is especially manifest among the men of business and property. There is no doubt that "reciprocity" is doing much to Americanize these islands and to bind them to the United States.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Pacific Commercial Advertiser.]

Reply of the cabinet—A full explanation of the Government position in regard to the treaty question.

The following is a copy of the reply of the cabinet delivered to the native mass-meeting committee Friday:

Messrs. A. ROSA, J. L. KAULUKOU, J. F. COLBURN, AND OTHERS:

GENTLEMEN: As a committee representing a public meeting of Hawaiian citizens you have asked from His Majesty's ministers certain information concerning their action in regard to the relations between this country and the United States of America.

Feeling that it is the right of the people to know the policy of the administration, the ministers take pleasure in informing you that they have for a long time had under consideration the practicability of extending our treaty relations with the United States so as to enhance and increase both the commercial and political benefits which the two countries now enjoy by reason of existing treaties.

As the result of nearly a year's consideration of this subject by the Cabinet, our minister resident at Washington has been instructed to ascertain whether the Government of the United States is willing to entertain propositions looking to the end above indicated, and, should he find such willingness to exist, he is instructed to open negotiations with that Government for the conclusion of a treaty which will effect the purposes hereunder indicated.

This statement of the present status of the subject renders it unnecessary to say that no proposition has been made or accepted by the United States and that no treaty has been submitted to His Majesty for signature.

The reasons which have moved the cabinet to adopt the course above indicated are numerous, and while an exhaustive enumeration and discussion of such reasons would exceed the scope of the present reply, a summary of the more salient among them is as follows:

1. The history of our staple products during the past thirteen years has demonstrated how essential to our commercial prosperity are the advantages secured to us by the existing treaty.

The development of our export trade from \$2,241,041 in 1876 to \$11,707,598 in 1888, during the life of that treaty, with its attendant advantages to all our citizens and residents, are witnesses of its stimulating effect upon our industries and commerce, and its beneficent influence upon our national welfare, and are fresh illustrations of the principle that no great material advantage can be enjoyed by any class dependent upon labor without the entire community partaking of such benefits.

By the terms of the existing reciprocity treaty with the United States, notice of termination within one year thereafter may be given in five years from now.

The interval between 1883 and 1887, during which time the treaty was subject to termination upon a year's notice, illustrated the evil effects to our commercial well-being of a dependence from year to year for the continuance of our treaty relations upon the uncertain humor of the American Congress.

The uncertainty involved has an unsettling effect upon capital and is detrimental to the making of large permanent investments, many of which now contemplated requiring heavy preliminary expenses.

With only the certainty of a five years' continuance of the treaty, the experience of the recent past in mind, and the strong probability that renewed and strenuous efforts will be made by our opponents in the United States to terminate the treaty at the end of the five years, it is the part of wisdom to prepare in the day of prosperity for the days that are to follow.

2. At the last session of the United States Congress there was developed a strong movement looking to the reduction of sugar duties and the payment of bounties upon sugar of American production.

The effect of this would be to discriminate against Hawaiian sugars in favor of American, and materially reduce to us the value of the existing treaty without any corresponding benefit.

We believe it to be the duty of the Hawaiian Government to endeavor to secure the placing of our products upon the same basis as American products in respect of bounties and privileges.

3. The existing treaty is limited in its extent. A large number of American products still pay duties in the Islands, while the products admitted by the treaty free of duty into the ports of the United States are practically limited to sugar, rice, bananas, hides, and tallow.

There are many articles which might be profitably produced here, upon lands which are not available for products now admitted under the treaty, were there a market for them.

If a mutual agreement can be arrived at whereby the products of either country can be admitted free into the other, a great stimulus will be given to new industries in the Islands, resulting in an increase of exports and of domestic and foreign shipping; the bringing into cultivation and increasing in value of many lands now waste; the consequent improvement in all departments of business, and a corresponding benefit to the United States by the increase in our imports to meet the necessary increased consumption by our people.

We believe that the additional value which each country would receive would many times over compensate them for the loss of the duties now levied.

4. The Hawaiian Islands are now the only group in the Pacific which is wholly self-governing. Our situation is peculiar. We have no military or naval strength of our own to maintain our autonomy against the pettiest naval power; and we have to-day no guarantee of our continued independence as against any foreign nation other than the sufferance or the mutual jealousies of the great powers.

Within the last few years the police of annexation has prevailed among the European nations interested in Polynesia, which has resulted in the rapid absorption of nearly all the Pacific islands.

Within the year last past we have seen Samoa lose her position as a self-governing state. The acts of her Government are now subject to the approval of the Governments of the United States, England, and Germany, and had it not been for the good offices of the United States Government the probability is that she would have ere now been annexed by one or more European nations.

Within the past year the question of the disposition and absorption of the Hawaiian Islands, as well as of Samoa, has been the subject of serious consideration by certain of the nations interested in the Pacific.

The cabinet are of the opinion that the interests of this country, and of every race and industry resident or located therein, will be best served by the continuance of its present independent state, free from any protectorate or control on the part of any foreign government.

It is, and ever will be, the endeavor of the present administration to not only unqualifiedly maintain this status, but to obtain such assurances and guarantees thereof as will remove the question from the debatable politics of the world.

It has long been the custom of European nations to form alliances with neighboring countries for purposes of defense, safety, and commercial exchange. The time has, in the opinion of the cabinet, arrived when we should follow a precedent so well established and form an alliance with some great nation. If an alliance of this character is desirable it should be in the direction where our greatest interest lies.

The proximity of the United States, the cordial friendship which has been from the commencement of our civilization a marked characteristic of our relations with the American people, and the extensive commercial exchanges which are the result of such relations, point inevitably to that great country as our best friend, our most valuable commercial colleague, and our natural political ally.

Animated as we are by the desire to strengthen and extend the commercial ties which have done so much for our national prosperity, and to secure the safety and perpetuation of our institutions by an alliance whereby we shall have the positive and efficacious guarantee of a strong friend against interference by itself or others with our perfect autonomy, independence, and sovereignty, we have instructed our representative at Washington to ascertain if the United States would be willing to negotiate with us a convention whereby the following objects may be secured:

First. To continue in force all treaties and conventions now existing between the two nations, until they shall find it mutually advantageous to abrogate or modify such treaties or conventions, or any of them.

Second. That all products of either country which are by virtue of the reciprocity treaty admitted free of duty into the other country shall be treated in respect of bounties paid, exemptions or immunities, and in all other respects, as if such other articles were of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the country into which they are so admitted.

Third. To provide for the entry into either of the two countries, without payment of duty, of all products of the other, excepting, however, opium, spirituous liquors of more than 18 per cent alcoholic strength, and all articles prohibited by law in either country.

Fourth. A positive and efficacious guarantee by the United States Government of the perfect independence and autonomy of the Hawaiian Government in all its dominions, and its right of sovereignty over such dominions.

To enable the United States Government to do this without danger of complication with other powers, we do agree not to negotiate treaties with other nations without the knowledge of the United States Government.

The cabinet, for more than a year, has studied carefully many reasons for and against the points submitted for negotiation, and has taken counsel with others, both connected and unconnected with the Government, and has considered various propositions and suggestions, some of which have been approved and some disapproved.

Any statements of objects or intentions, and any purported draft of a treaty stating more or other than is above indicated, which may have been published, are unfounded and incorrect.

The ministers are strongly and unanimously of the opinion that the accomplishment of the objects above indicated will tend to greatly increase the material prosperity of the country and perpetuate the independence of Hawaii and the sovereignty of His Majesty and his successors over all his dominions.

I have the honor, on behalf of the cabinet, to remain

Your obedient servant,

JONA. AUSTIN,
Minister Foreign Affairs.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 4, 1889.*

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 5.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 16, 1889.

SIR: I have received your No. 2 *bis.* of the 25th ultimo, and the copy which you inclose of the interesting addresses made on the occasion of presenting your credentials to the King of the Hawaiian Islands.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 6.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, October 17, 1889.

SIR: My predecessor in charge of this legation, Mr. Merrill, in his dispatch 255, dated August 1, 1889, informed the Department of State of the revolutionary attempt made July 30 by certain disaffected persons under the lead of Robert W. Wilcox and Robert Boyd, two half-breed Hawaiians, aided by a Belgian named Loomens. For the past two weeks the trial of the participants in this revolutionary effort has been going on in Honolulu before Chief Justice Judd, of the supreme court of the kingdom. Loomens, being a Belgian citizen, has been tried before a jury of white men, here termed a foreign jury. Robert Boyd,

one of the chief conspirators, turned state's evidence, and after a careful and impartial trial, as to which even his counsel made no complaint, Loomens was convicted of treason, though recommended to mercy, and several others have pleaded guilty or been convicted of riotous proceedings. The trial is tending plainly to show that the Hawaiians are numerous in sympathy with Wilcox, who is to be tried by a native jury, and whose conviction is regarded as very doubtful.

It is proper for me to convey the confidential information that so far as the examination of witnesses and the general course of the trials tend, in the opinion of many persons here, to implicate the King, at least in sympathy with the revolutionary movement, neither the Government attorney nor the counsel of the accused seem to mince words or spare His Majesty, and the court rules with independence and firmness.* I herewith inclose the charge of the chief justice in the case of Loomens, as published verbatim in the Commercial Advertiser. It is probable that when the trial of Wilcox takes place there will be an expression of native Hawaiian sentiment which may be indicative of the general opposition of the native Hawaiian voters at the election which is to occur in February. The feelings of hostility to the Government at the present time is being stimulated by foreign agitators, who are taking advantage of the simplicity of the natives for the promotion of their political and private ends. Out of these trials and the passions and prejudices they invoke may arise some disturbance in the near future, of which the February election for members of the two houses of the legislature may furnish the occasion. I will endeavor to keep the Department of State informed as to the course of events so far as they may be of importance.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 7.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, October 18, 1889.

SIR: In forwarding to the Department of State my dispatch 2, of September 26, 1889, containing an account of my first reception by the King, and the presentation of my letter of credence, I inclosed a printed copy of my remarks and of His Majesty's reply. On second thought I conclude that I should have sent the addresses in writing; therefore, I forward the inclosed and ask that the same be placed on file instead of the printed copies. I ask the indulgence of the Department for the error which I seek hereby to correct.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

The following is the text of my remarks on being presented to the King:

"SIRE: In presenting to His Majesty my letter of credence he will allow me to say that it is with an experience of pleasure that I am permitted to be the medium of communicating to him the good wishes of the President of the United States and of the sixty-five millions of people whom he ably and faithfully represents. It is in the spirit of international fraternity which has greatly increased in force and elevation in recent times that I am sent as the American agent to His Majesty's

Government and to reside among the people of these beautiful islands, a cluster of gems in the Pacific Sea.

"It is proper for me to say what His Majesty and Government well understand, that the Government and people of the United States cherish a deep interest in the prosperity and welfare of the Hawaiian Islands, so smiled upon by nature and so important to the future commerce and civilization of the countries contiguous to the Pacific. The autonomy of your country secured by the good will of the great nations, all true statesmen and generous citizens of other lands must wish that your Government may be successful in securing order, prosperity, and happiness to all your people. Though separated by a thousand miles of ocean, the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom make a part of that new world whose reciprocal interests of commerce tend to unity and to all that is liberal in policy and beneficial in the arts of peace. If my residence among you shall in any way conduce to these pacific and desirable ends it will be my good fortune to faithfully represent the people and Government of the great American nation."

His Majesty replied to Mr. Stevens as follows:

"Mr. MINISTER: It is with pleasure that I receive from you the assurance of the continuance of the friendly regard of the President and the people of the American nation for the sovereign and people of Hawaii.

"I am well pleased to welcome to a residence in my kingdom a gentleman who is the choice of my great and good friend, President Harrison, as the representative of the American Government and people.

"The officers of my Government will be instructed to tender to you every attention and courtesy during your official residence in my dominions."

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 6.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 31, 1889.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Nos. 1, 2, 2bis, and 3; also of Mr. Merrill's Nos. 257-265, one of which (No. 264) contains his inventory of the archives and property of the legation.

I am etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 7.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 4, 1889.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your interesting dispatch of the 17th ultimo, relating to the trial of the persons concerned in the revolutionary movement of July 30 last, at Honolulu.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 10.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 4, 1889.

SIR: In my dispatch No. 6, dated October 17, 1889, I gave the information that the persons engaged in the riotous and revolutionary movement of July 30, 1889, were being tried before the chief justice of the Kingdom, and that Loomens, the Belgian, had been convicted of treason.

Others of the accused have been convicted of conspiracy or have pleaded guilty of that offense. But those convicted were tried before a foreign jury, for the reason that they were not native Hawaiians. Since the date of my former communication Wilcox, the half-caste Hawaiian, the leader in the revolutionary attempt, has been tried before a native jury, and after an elaborate and able prosecution by the Government, in which his guilt was conclusively proved by his own testimony, as well as by that of numerous witnesses, he has been acquitted by a jury vote of 9 to 3, a unanimous vote not being necessary for conviction nor acquittal under the Hawaiian laws. This preponderance of native opinion in favor of Wilcox, as expressed by the native jury, fairly represented the popular native sentiment throughout these islands in regard to his effort to overthrow the present ministry and to change the constitution of 1887, so as to restore to the King the power he possessed under the former constitution, which the natives believe would tend to give them more predominance in the Kingdom.

What will be the ultimate effect of this failure of the Government to convict the chief leader in the revolutionary attempt of July 30, I will not now presume to predict. The immediate consequence is certainly injurious to public order and good government, and indicates that tendency of opinion among Hawaiian natives which is likely to find strong expression in the national election which is to take place in February.

It is admitted by all of the most intelligent and best citizens here that the present Government is the wisest and most efficient which this country has ever had, and should it be defeated and thrown out by the native Hawaiian voters under their present leadership, it would afford occasion of regret to all true friends of Hawaiian independence and Hawaiian prosperity.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 8.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 6, 1889.

SIR: I transmit for your confidential information a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, and its inclosure, relating to the political situation in Hawaii; also, a copy of the reply of this Department.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 8.]

Mr. Tracy to Mr. Blaine.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 1, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith, for the information of the Department of State, a copy of a report dated the 18th instant, from Rear-Admiral L. A. Kimberly, commanding the United States naval force on the Pacific station, with reference to the political situation in the Hawaiian Islands.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

The SECRETARY OF STATE.

[Inclosure in Inclosure 1 in No. 8.]

Rear-Admiral Kimberly to Mr. Tracy.

No. 165d.]

U. S. FLAGSHIP ALERT (THIRD RATE),
Honolulu, October 18, 1889.

SIR: I have to report that, politically speaking, quietness prevails at present. There is an agitation quietly working as to the race question, which no doubt will become a prominent factor in the elections that come off in February.

The natives seem to have an uneasy feeling as to their rights being usurped by the whites and their gradual loss of prestige and power in the Government as laid down in the principles of the present constitution, which, to their ideas, circumscribes too much the kingly power.

It would promote a feeling of security to our own people, and, I think, other foreigners, if at the February elections we had a force here competent to preserve order should necessity arise.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. A. KIMBERLY,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 8.]

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Tracy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 6, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 1st instant and of the copy of Rear-Admiral Kimberly's report of the 18th ultimo, which you inclose, on the political situation in Hawaii. In view of his opinion that the security of our citizens there would be promoted "if, at the February elections," the United States had a force in those waters competent to preserve order should the necessity arise, I trust that your Department may find it convenient to make such dispositions in that quarter as will subserve the desired object.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 11.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 14, 1889.

SIR: A careful survey of the present political situation in these islands and a due regard to my responsibility lead me to make this communication to the Department of State.

Of the recent revolutionary attempt to overthrow the present Hawaiian Government and to change the constitution in a retrograde direction the several dispatches of my predecessor and of the undersigned, have informed you. Beaten at their attempt by violence in July, Wilcox and his coadjutors are preparing to accomplish their purposes at the ensuing election of the members of the legislature in February. Apparently they are uniting the natives, who constitute nearly two-thirds of the voters, in the effort to obtain a native and revolutionary majority, and to some extent have enlisted the sympathies of the Chinese, who are not voters, but some of whom use their money to assist the natives in their political designs. Generally the principal land-owners and men of business and property are uniting in support of the present Government, regarding it the best the country has ever had. The complex character of the

population tends to complicate the political situation, and the most intelligent and thoughtful citizens are anxious about the immediate future.

The past of these islands, since 1835, has shown the usefulness of American naval vessels in the harbor of Honolulu. The revolutionary outbreak of July 30 strongly illustrated this. It is the opinion of the best-informed American residents here that one or more of our naval vessels should be constantly at Honolulu, at least until after the February election and the result of it has been fully tested, and with this view I fully agree, after mature investigation and deliberation. I think the probabilities are against any serious outbreak and that the crisis will be passed safely, but there are possibilities of riot and loss of life, unless prevented by a naval force in the harbor, of which the agitator and the unruly of the natives and of the foreign nationalities have salutary fear.

I presume the necessary instructions have already been given to our naval commanders in the Pacific, and so far as I have observed, Admiral Kimberly is alive to any contingency of danger and duty. None the less do I regard it my duty to report the facts to the Secretary of State, and to urge strongly that there be no possible failure of the retention here of one or more of our vessels of war, with the usual instruction to the officers in command as to an emergency of need.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Adee to Mr. Stevens.

[Confidential.]

No. 11.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 16, 1889.

SIR: I herewith inclose for your confidential information a copy of the instructions addressed by the Secretary of the Navy (and received with his letter of the 13th instant) to the commanding officer of the United States naval force on the Pacific station, relative to the retention of a sufficient number of vessels of his fleet in Hawaiian waters during the approaching February elections for the prompt protection of American interests, should occasion arise.

I am, etc.,

ALVEY A. ADEE,
Acting Secretary.

[Inclosure No. 11.]

Mr. Tracy to Mr. Blaine.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 13, 1889.

SIR: Referring to your letter of the 6th instant concurring in the opinion of Rear-Admiral Kimberly that security to our citizens there would be promoted if at the February elections the United States had a force in Hawaiian waters competent to preserve order, should necessity arise. The Department incloses herewith for your information a copy of its instructions issued this day to that officer for his guidance.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

[Inclosure in Inclosure in No. 11.]

*Mr. Tracy to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.*NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 13, 1889.

SIR: Referring to your letter No. 165 of the 18th ultimo with reference to the political situation in the Hawaiian Islands, and in which you state that "it would promote a feeling of security to our people and I think to other foreigners if at the February elections the United States had a force here competent to preserve order should necessity arise," the Department directs that you will keep as many of the vessels of your command in Hawaiian waters as you may deem expedient for the purpose of carrying out the object in view. A copy of the letter from the honorable the Secretary of State, concurring in your opinion as to the desirability of such action, is inclosed herewith for your information.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
*Secretary of the Navy.**Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.*

No. 12.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 3, 1889.

SIR: I have received your No. 11 of the 14th ultimo, confirmatory of the statements of previous dispatches touching the importance of retaining one or more of our naval vessels in Hawaiian waters until after the elections of February next.

You were informed by instruction, No. 11 of the 16th ultimo, of the action of the Secretary of the Navy in this regard.

You can exhibit to the naval officers concerned copies of the dispatches referred to, and will in general keep such officers advised of any political events of importance.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 17.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 7, 1890.

SIR: I improve the earliest opportunity to inform the Department of State as to the result of the election in the Hawaiian Islands, which took place this week, February 5. It was for the choice of the 48 nobles and representatives which compose the national legislature that is largely to control the country the next two years. It has been looked forward to with the deepest interest by all the native and foreign residents, and the discussion and agitation have been very heated and determined, and on the part of the opponents of the present ministry extremely bitter and unscrupulous. The result is a triumph of the opponents of the present ministry and of the reform constitution. The election was conducted with exceeding fairness by the legal authorities, and the polls were kept open from 8 in the morning until 5 in the after-

noon. The most complete quiet and good order prevailed in all the voting precincts of Honolulu. An election conducted in the most intelligent and moral of American rural towns could be no more orderly.

The ministry had taken the most careful precautions for the maintenance of order; the liquor saloons were closed, the ballot was secret, and both parties worked with the utmost determination and precision to get their supporters to the polls. This defeat of the existing Government is deeply to be regretted, for it has been accomplished by a most reckless appeal to race prejudices and to all the elements of corruption and disorder in the Kingdom. It is well known to the Department of State that in July, 1887, the best citizens of these islands, composed of most of the property holders, the men of business, and the professions, chiefly Americans, English, and Germans—largely of the first named—were driven to a revolution, accomplished without bloodshed, resulting in the overthrow of the corrupt Gibson rule and the adoption of the reform constitution, by which the chief power was taken from the King and given to the Legislature and a responsible ministry. It has been under this constitution that the country has been governed the past two and a half years with signal success. Few of our American States in that time have had their affairs more honestly conducted, their laws more faithfully administered.

Two of the ministers are of the best American stock, the sons of missionaries, and another, the minister of foreign affairs, was born and educated in the State of New York, though he has been many years identified with this country. These three men have done their utmost to govern the Kingdom wisely and honestly. To do this they have been obliged to resist the King and all the worst elements of the islands. Among these are the men who thrived on former maladministration, whose plundering devices had been brought to an end. I am sorry to say that some of the worst men in bringing about the triumph of reaction are Americans, either by birth or adoption. Yet so successful has been the new constitution and the reform administration that the opposition party was obliged to pledge itself in speech and platform not to return to the former state of things, and to promise to carry on the Government according to the terms of the present constitution, which has so deeply entrenched itself in the existing state of things as not to be easily overthrown. Among the successful party there are some large property-holders, who will be driven to restrain their political associates, and these, with the determined efforts of the minority reform party, will be likely to keep the country to constitutional rule in a considerable degree.

It is proper for me to say that among the leaders of the party just successful at the polls are those not friendly to the United States, and that the Department of State and this legation will have to deal with the incoming ministry with great caution and circumspection. The new legislature will meet in May, when a new ministry undoubtedly will be chosen. In a future dispatch I will give the result of my most careful observations as to the status of things here relative to the interests of the United States and her immediate duties and responsibilities as to these islands.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

N. B.—Above I have given the present estimate here of the election result. It is possible that full returns from the other islands may not sustain the present hopes of the reactionists.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 18.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 10, 1890.

SIR: I am pleased to be able to report to the Department of State that the slight hope which was expressed in the postscript of my dispatch, No. 17, February 7, that full election returns from all these islands might prove the success of the reform party and of the present ministry has been fully realized in fact. While Honolulu and the rest of this island elected but one reformer out of seventeen, the other islands have supported so generally the present Government as to give the reformers a small majority in the legislature, and the reactionists' majority in Honolulu on nobles is so small that a change of 75 votes would have given the reformers all of them, and thus have secured them two-thirds of the legislature.

The opposition in this election contest has had the support of the King and of all his dependents and parasites and the chief element of corruption in the Kingdom. The issue has been made largely between those who have American sympathies and interests on the side of the reformers and of the present ministry, while all the worst element of society and violent race prejudices have been with the opposition. It is safe to say that three-fourths of the property-holders of the Kingdom are with the reformers and favorable to good relations with the United States. Herewith I inclose duplicate copies of clippings from Honolulu papers, containing editorials and speeches of Hon. L. A. Thurston, minister of interior, the most influential member of the reform party and the most resolute of the four cabinet ministers, the grandson of a missionary who came to these islands from his native State, Connecticut, more than sixty years ago. These remarks of Mr. Thurston are an index of the direction the political contest here has taken. The German consul openly gave his influence to the reformers. Probably a majority of the English voters went with the reformers, while there is little doubt that the English and French commissioners desired the success of the opposition.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[The Times, Saturday, February 1, 1890.]

America's unfailing friendship to Hawaii, and to all nationalities within our borders, reaffirmed.—Hawaiian history and its application to present issues.

[A reply by L. A. Thurston to the National Herald.]

The Herald does me the honor of devoting practically its whole English issue of the 31st of January to a criticism of my remarks at the armory on Thursday evening. If the subject-matter related to me personally, only, I should not think of intruding upon the public at this juncture, when important issues demand the undivided attention of the reading public. But the subject-matter is so involved with an issue of vital import to the country, which issue awaits decision on the 5th of this month, that I make no further excuse for this statement.

I would first call attention to the circumstances under which, and the reasons for the allusion to the history of this country in connection with France, England, and the United States.

It has been publicly stated by the cabinet that they have initiated negotiations with the United States for the purpose of extending and rendering more permanent our present treaty relations with the United States.

The points concerning which the cabinet proposes negotiations, and the reasons therefor, have been publicly stated in all detail. It has also been publicly and offi-

cially stated that negotiations are preliminary in their character, of a nature necessary to bring the question up for discussion and action by the legislature, and that no final action is to be taken without full submission to and the approval of the legislature.

The published statement of the objects sought is a full enumeration of all that the cabinet has in view. The treaty sought is, we believe, a like preservative of the honor, dignity, and independence of the two countries, and conducive to their mutual commercial prosperity.

Without foundation therefor, regardless of the grave consequences of interference with the cordial relations existing between the two countries and solely for partisan influence upon the coming election, the gentlemen constituting the opposition to the present administration have for months filled the ears of the public, more particularly the native Hawaiians, with violent appeals and false statements concerning the intentions of the cabinet and of the United States. This has been the keynote of their whole campaign. They have placed their whole reliance upon the ignorance of the people of the facts and the prejudice which their misrepresentations have produced. They have worked up and are still working up, by every disingenuous method, a strong distrust, prejudice, and antagonism in the minds of many of the native people toward the United States upon a wholly false basis and by an entire perversion of facts and history.

Under these circumstances it was due the United States and essential to the welfare of Hawaii that the long-tried, continued, and more than generous friendship of the United States toward Hawaii should be stated, and the most signal and complete illustration of it, heretofore secret history, made public.

In order to do this intelligently it was necessary to state the historical facts which in logical sequence led up to it. For this purpose, and thus far only, was reference made to early history and the relations of Hawaii with other countries.

The Herald charges that I have "purposely and knowingly garbled and misstated Hawaiian history for political purposes," and that the demands of the French in 1849 and 1851 were based upon the differences existing between the two countries in 1839. In proof, and as sole proof, of these charges and statements, it prints a letter, dated 1839, signed by the "Hon. J. C. Jones, then American consul," and five other foreign residents, laudatory of Laplace and his actions in 1839.

The reference to the occurrences of 1839 in my argument at the armory was simply incidental in its nature, those events chronologically preceding the events of '49 and '51, and being illustrative of the arbitrary methods employed in those days in settling differences with this country in its weakness, the approved method being to submit peremptory demands and require immediate compliance therewith, with the alternative of the loss of independence. Otherwise the occurrences of 1839 are entirely unconnected with the events of '49 and '51, which led up to and were the direct cause of the treaty of cession to the United States of 1851.

I again affirm, and the evidence hereafter cited proves, that the events of 1839 were not the moving causes of the action of any of the parties in '49 and '51, and that the incidents and moving causes of the former are unessential to an understanding of the events of the latter period, except to illustrate the fact that redress for real or imaginary wrongs was obtained in those days by force.

The religious intolerance displayed by the Hawaiian Government during its early history toward the Catholic faith and its believers is a portion of the history of this country which every lover of the good fame of the nation and of religious liberty regrets. It is no more and no less excusable than have been much more serious acts of religious intolerance perpetrated at different periods of their history by enlightened England, France, and New England.

Suffice it to say that the letter published by the Herald is a mere chip upon the stream of literature concerning the subject, which occupies hundreds of pages of diplomatic correspondence and volumes of contemporaneous history, written by the immediate parties interested upon both sides. Had my object been to discuss the religious differences of the time, there is far stronger documentary evidence on both sides concerning the subject than the letter referred to by the Herald.

In proof of the fact that the difficulties with France in 1849 and 1851, which caused the execution of the treaty of cession to the United States, I cite the following facts:

1. The further merits or demerits of the Laplace controversy are not germane to this issue. It is sufficient to say that, whatever the feelings of the Hawaiians on the subject, the French were satisfied and Laplace sailed away, which the Herald itself cites a letter to prove.

2. In 1839, a month before the arrival of Laplace, the Government had discontinued the policy of intolerance towards the Catholics, and in 1840 the King promulgated a constitution, guaranteeing religious liberty to all.

3. In 1843, England and France executed the famous "recognition" treaty, which was distinctly looked upon as a mark of friendly approval of the Hawaiian Government by those two countries.

4. In 1844, France voluntarily returned to the Hawaiian Government the \$20,000 which had been exacted by Laplace in 1839, the original packages of money being sent back in a French warship, specially detailed for that purpose; the return being accompanied with considerable ceremonial and mutual expressions of friendship and regard.

5. In 1845, the late Bishop Maigret, who, during his long life here, held the confidence and respect of all classes and nationalities, irrespective of religious faith, wrote to Capt. Le Compt, of the French ship *L'Heroine*, as follows:

“HONOLULU, Aug. 7, 1845.

“M. COMMANDANT:

“I am happy to be able to inform you that we enjoy, at this moment, perfect tranquility, that all our old subjects of complaint have entirely disappeared, and that it is, in a great part, to the conduct, prudent and full of sagacity, of our estimable consul, that we owe this happy result.

“The number of our neophytes amounts to-day to 14,000. We have a hundred schools and nearly 3,000 children who attend them; sites for our churches have been granted to us. Our schoolmasters have been licensed, and have even received encouragement. The marriages of our Christians are no longer thwarted. We can not, then, do otherwise than give our praises of the Government in respect to us, and we pray you instantly ‘to be pleased to instruct the Admiral.’

“Be pleased to receive the assurance of the perfect consideration, with which I have the honor to be M. Commandant,

“Your very humble and obedient servant,

“L. D. MAIGRET.

“Monsieur LE COMPT,

“*Commandant of the French Corvette L'Heroine.*”

6. In 1846 Bishop Maigret wrote a precisely similar letter.

7. In 1846 a new treaty was concluded with France, eliminating the harsh terms of the treaty of Laplace of 1839. This produced an exceedingly friendly feeling toward France, which continued unbroken until, unhappily for both parties, M. Dudoit retired in 1848 from the French consulship and M. Dillon was appointed in his place.

M. Dillon immediately initiated a systematic and irritating interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom, arising largely out of personal hostility to R. C. Wyllie, minister of foreign affairs, picking flaws and making matters of extended diplomatic correspondence over circumstances of trifling importance. This continued until 1849, when the French Admiral Tromelin arrived, and after a short conference with M. Dillon the celebrated “ten demands” were formulated and presented to the Hawaiian Government with the peremptory request for immediate action. *None of these demands referred to or mentioned the events of 1839.*

Pending negotiations for the settlement of these demands the unprovoked spoliation of the fort, the destruction of the governor's furniture, and the seizure and removal of the King's private yacht took place, and Admiral Tromelin sailed away without further enforcement of the demands.

8. In 1850 Hawaiian representatives went to France and attempted to obtain reparation for the losses and indignities sustained and to come to an understanding to prevent a repetition of them, but without results.

9. In 1851 a new French consul, M. Perin, was appointed. Upon his arrival here he immediately, to the surprise of every one, re-presented the same “ten demands” which had been presented in 1849 by M. Dillon, although part of them had been already settled. An immediate compliance with the demands was required.

10. In 1849 and 1851 the *foreign residents of Honolulu of all factions and all nationalities were a unite in favor of the Hawaiian Government and against the demands of France.* This is evidenced by the fact that one of the ten demands for payment of damages to M. Victor was immediately paid by subscription by the foreign merchants under the following circumstances, as appears by the correspondence hereunder set forth.

“HONOLULU, September 1, 1849.

“SIR: I have the honor to inclose you a copy of the subscription list signed by the most respectable portion of the foreigners residing in Honolulu, unconnected with the Government, together with the copies of the account of Victor Chancerel and his receipt, of which documents (bearing testimony as to the feeling of the community towards Her Hawaiian Majesty's Government in connection with the French claim, towards the officers and crew of Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Ambi-trite*) you will make such use as you may deem proper.

“I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

“H. SEA.

“His Excellency R. C. WYLLIE,

“*Minister of Foreign Relations.*”

[Inclosure 1.]

Understanding that one of the demands of the French against the Hawaiian Government is for damages claimed by M. Victor, for disorderly conduct of some of the seamen belonging to Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Amphitrite*, we, the undersigned, not wishing any stain to rest on the *Amphitrite* or crew, agree to liquidate said claim:

G. W. Hunter.....	\$3. 50	Dugald Maetavish.....	\$3.50
Sea & Summers.....	3. 50	W. J. Robertson.....	2. 00
W. Wond.....	3. 50	William Gill.....	3. 50
A. Porter.....	3. 50	J. Macduff.....	2. 00
H. Macfarlane.....	3. 50	James Austin.....	2. 00
F. Withington.....	3. 50	R. S. Barker.....	2. 00
James Robinson & Co.....	7. 00	D. N. Flitner.....	3. 50
Isaac Montgomery.....	3. 50	Makee & Anthon.....	3. 50
John Meek.....	3. 50	A. B. Howe.....	3. 50
Robert G. Davis.....	3. 50	Swan & Clifford.....	3. 50
J. C. Spalding.....	3. 50	W. Phillips.....	2. 00
Andrew Auld.....	1. 00	Everett & Co.....	3. 50
C. H. Marshall.....	1. 00	S. W. Williams & Co.....	3. 50
J. M. Stanley.....	3. 50	A. H. Fayerweather.....	2. 00
C. P. Robinson.....	3. 50	A. H. Parker.....	2. 00
Joseph Booth.....	3. 50	T. Cummins.....	3. 00
E. Brown.....	3. 50	George Friel.....	2. 00
George Pelly.....	3. 50	Samuel Thompson.....	2. 00

A much larger sum was subscribed, but as so many persons wished to sign, the amount of subscription was lowered as above.

H. SEA.

[Inclosure 2.]

HONOLULU, August 30, 1847.

Received of Henry Sea, esq., the sum of \$93.50, being amount claimed by me against H. B. M.'s *Amphitrite* for damages done by her crew at the French hotel, kept by me in Honolulu, and being one of the demands made by Admiral de Tromelin against the Hawaiian Government.
\$93.50.

V. CHANCEREL.

Witness to signature,
WM. SUMNER.

A true copy of original receipt in my possession.

H. SEA.

It will be noticed that many nationalities are represented in this document, and two of the signers of the document of 1839, John Meek and George Pelly, were also signers of the above document, which they would not have been had the circumstances of the then French demand been based upon the differences of 1839. The "Hon. J. C. Jones" had left the country. Incidentally it may be stated that Mr. Jones was not United States consul in 1839, he having been removed from that office by his own Government, in 1838, on account of his disreputable character.

11. The unsubstantial nature of the French claims of 1849 and 1851 are evidenced by the fact that upon a knowledge of the situation relating to the United States coming to the French consul he withdrew the "ten demands" and substituted in place thereof a mild statement of four points which was presented for the "consideration" of the Hawaiian Government, which points were thereupon referred by M. Perin to his Government for consideration, and nothing further was ever said or done about the "ten demands."

There continued to be disconnected diplomatic correspondence with France upon various subjects until 1857, when a treaty was concluded with her much more favorable in its terms to Hawaii than any of the three previous treaties with France.

Since that date our relations with France have been without cause of complaint, and we are indebted to the French Government and people for many acts of kindness and courtesy, and are now upon the most cordial terms with France.

In view of the fact that the early religious difficulties between the Hawaiian Government and members of the Catholic faith have been practically made the basis of the charges against me, it is not inappropriate for me to here say for the last forty or fifty years the Catholic bishops and their subordinates in this country have ever been the warm friends of the Hawaiian Government during its many succeeding administrations, and the staunch supporters of peace and good order during the

many trying periods through which the country has been called upon to pass; and that this has been largely due to the highminded and liberal character of the late Bishop Maigret and his successors, by reason of which the Catholic and Protestant faiths have flourished in the country, side by side, with little or no friction.

Concerning the personal abuse heaped upon me by the Herald, I have nothing to say.

Concerning the aspersions upon the character of my ancestors in this country, I would say that their records are too deeply engraven upon the history of this country to require any defense by me.

If I have disproved the charge of having "purposely and knowingly garbled and misstated Hawaiian history for political purposes," I claim that, in the interest of civilized journalism, the responsible editor of the Herald should, at least, admit that he was misinformed as to the facts upon which he based his charges.

In conclusion, I here reaffirm the fact, which was the only point I sought to establish at the armory, that the United States of America has always, under all circumstances, and upon all occasions, been our true friend, and that she has ever exhibited toward, and extended to, the native Hawaiians and all residents of other nationalities dwelling within the borders of Hawaii, without discrimination of race or creed, the same unchanging kindly assistance, support, and good faith, and there is no indication of any change of such policy.

LORRIN A. THURSTON.

HONOLULU, February 1, 1890.

A rousing meeting.—A large gathering of citizens interested in reform at the Old Armory.

Yesterday evening a mass meeting of the fourth ward was held at the Old Armory. There was a large attendance, including many prominent citizens. The meeting throughout was of the most enthusiastic nature. It was called to order by Mr. J. H. Fisher, who nominated Mr. Theodore C. Porter as chairman amid applause. Mr. E. O. White undertook the duties of secretary, and Mr. Luther Wilcox was interpreter.

Mr. Porter said they had met to hear the views and expressions of their candidates and others. He would first call upon his excellency Mr. Thurston, minister of the interior.

Mr. L. A. Thurston, who was received with applause, said: The course of the opposition for the last few weeks reminds me of a statement recently made by Chauncey M. Depew in connection with the recent election in New York. He stated that formerly the Democratic party learned nothing and forgot nothing, that its present exponents learned nothing and forgot everything. That is just the situation with the present opposition, although the country has a history concerning its relations with France, England, and the United States for the past fifty years they have learned nothing from it, and have forgotten all of it that they ever knew. They ignore facts and history and are running a campaign on ignorance and prejudice. They are pursuing the same course and using the same incendiary arguments and appeals to race feeling that they did prior to the 30th of July last. It led to bloodshed then and will not be their fault if it does not lead to bloodshed now.

The question of our relations with our great neighbor is a live issue with us. It affects us, our children, and our future. The only argument of the opposition is that the Government is trying to sell out the country and that the United States is trying to gobble us up. They state that we shall have to keep a watch on the United States or else they will come and take away our independence. It shows they have learned nothing of our past history. I will state briefly what the history of this country with France and England has been. In 1839 a French man-of-war arrived and demanded \$20,000 damages. The Government was very poor and had to scratch around for money, finally getting it from white people, to save bombardment. At the point of the gun the captain forced the Government to make a most unjust treaty, one claim of which was that there should not be more than 5 per cent duty charged on imports from France. In 1843 France and England entered into a treaty. They agreed not to interfere with this Government, which was not a party to it. If either country chose to take the country to-day they could; the treaty is between themselves, so far as that treaty is concerned. In 1849 another French war vessel arrived, and, trumping up a lot of charges, said if the Government did not come to terms, the King would be deposed and they would take the country. He would not weary them with all the demands, simply mentioning, four as follows:

1. That all correspondence between the two countries should be in French.
2. That the Catholic schools should have paid Catholic inspectors (the schools had an inspector for both Protestant and Catholic schools).
3. A small boy having gone into the Catholic Church, made fun of the priest and stuck his finger in the holy water, that such sacrilege should not be repeated.
4. Because certain English sailors had gone into a Frenchman's saloon, got drunk on his brandy, and broke his glasses, a

bill was made out for damages. This last demand was so ridiculous that the merchants subscribed \$3.50 each and paid the damages. This clause was withdrawn. While the Government was trying to arrange matters, and while the prime minister was on board the French man-of-war, a squad of soldiers was sent ashore, who took possession of the fort, dismantled the guns, threw them into the harbor, went to Governor Kekuanaoa's house, smashed the furniture, and threw it into the yard. As a finale, the French took the private yacht belonging to Kamehameha III and sailed it to Tahiti. It has never been heard of since nor has any compensation ever been made for it. They finally withdrew their claims. Next year Dr. Judd went to England and France and tried to arrive at some definite settlement with the French and see that it should not be repeated. He was put off, and returned to the islands in 1851. He had not been home long before another French vessel came in with similar demands. The Government at that time was weak, and in desperation the legislature passed the following:

JOINT RESOLUTION.

Be it resolved by the nobles and representatives of the Hawaiian Islands in legislative council assembled, That, in the sense of this house, the demands of France are so entirely unjust, and contrary to the laws of nations and to treaty; and the course pursued by her is so incompatible with the existence of a regular independent government in these islands. If France should persist in such a course, it will be the duty of the King to shield himself and his Kingdom from insult and oppression, by placing this Kingdom under the protection of some friendly state, and that should such emergency be so urgent as not to admit of the legislative council being convened, it shall be left to His Majesty, by and with the advice of his privy council, under such emergency, to consult the honor and safety of his Kingdom according to His Majesty's best judgment; and that whatever he may do, will be binding upon the nation.

Passed both houses of the Legislature, June 21, 1851.

WM. L. LEE,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
KEONI ANA,
President of the House of Nobles.

Approved by the King, August 4, 1851.

KEONI ANA.

KAMEHAMEHA.

He would state some facts which formed part of the unwritten history of this country, which were probably not known by a dozen people. The Government invited General Miller, British consul, to see them, and after telling him of France's demands, asked him if England would protect the Islands, from France. General Miller replied, "I can not do it; we have a treaty (1843) with France." The Government then sent for Mr. Severance, father of the present United States consul-general, who at that time was the United States representative, and asked him if the United States would protect the Islands against France. He said, "They will." [Applause.] In accordance with the authority of the statute, a treaty was drawn up, and from this you can decide who has been the friend of this country when it needed a friend most. The treaty which is now made public for the first time is as follows:

We, Kamehameha III, by the grace of God of the Hawaiian Islands, King:

By and with the advice of our kuhina nui and counsellors of native chiefs, finding our relations with France so oppressive to my Kingdom, so inconsistent with its rights as an independent State, and so obstructive of all our endeavors to administer the government of our Islands with equal justice with all nations and equal independence of all foreign control and despairing of equity and justice from France, hereby proclaim as our royal will and pleasure that all our Islands and all our rights as sovereign over them are from the date hereof placed under the protection and safeguard of the United States of America until some arrangements can be made to place our said relations with France upon a footing compatible with my rights as an independent sovereign under the laws of nations and compatible with my treaty engagements with other foreign nations; or, if such arrangements be found impracticable, then it is our wish and pleasure that the protection aforesaid under the United States of America be perpetual.

And we further proclaim, as aforesaid, that from the date of publication hereof the flag of the United States of America shall be hoisted above the national ensign on all our forts and places and vessels navigating with Hawaiian registers.

Done at our palace at Honolulu this 10th day of March, A. D. 1851, and in the twenty-sixth year of our reign.

[L. S.]
KEONI ANA.

KAMEHAMEHA.

That King who signed it was the great and enlightened Kauikeaouli, who did more for his people than any other of the Hawaiian Kings, being the one who gave the people lands. He made the treaty, relying fully on the generosity and integrity of the United States, and his trust was not betrayed. [Applause.] That treaty was sent to the United States and laid there for months. The French admiral finally hearing something of the treaty withdrew his claim and left the country. [Laughter.] It may be of interest to mention that the U. S. S. *Vandalia*, so well known here, was in the harbor at the time and rendered assistance. Orders were given to Marshal Parke and he sewed Hawaiian and American flags together, the latter at the top, and sent them to all the sheriffs. He had one in the fort ready to hoist directly the French landed.

There was the situation, the country was ceded and the deed in the hands of the United States Government. The King, with the full knowledge and consent of the Legislature, of the chiefs and of his cabinet, had deliberately and formally ceded the country to the United States, and that Government had only to sit still and do nothing in order to hold the country. If they had done so this would have been United States territory to-day. The American Government on learning that this had happened under pressure and fear of the French, said it would not be fair to take advantage of the situation. The treaty, which had never been published, was returned, the flag was never hoisted, and we remain a free and independent country to-day solely through the generosity of the United States of America. [Loud applause.] The episode when the British took possession in 1843 is well known to all. For seven months the British flag floated over the islands. The King was deposed, ministers were out of office, the records of the Government show that the entire Government was carried on by Lord George Paulet and his subordinates. Another episode simply shows the feeling of the United States Government towards us. The United States frigate *Constitution* came into the harbor, the deposed King going on board. The royal standard was hoisted and a salute of 21 guns fired. Lord Paulet protested, saying "The islands are British territory, and you are saluting a man who has no authority."

The American admiral replied, "I have recognized the man who is the King of the country, and if you do not like it you can lump it." [Laughter.] England nobly atoned and has been a good friend to us ever since. Is there any question who has been our friend in the past, and who will continue to be our friend, first, last, and all the time? The United States has always been friendly towards these islands. The foreign office is full of expressions of regard and good-will from that country from the earliest records down to the last mail. A number of men in the opposition ranks were in the country and participated in these matters, but they have learned nothing from it and have forgotten it all. Now they have the cold impudence to come forward and talk about giving the United States the go-by and going to France for protection—through our distrust of the intention of the United States. They say that Thurston, Damon, and the other damned missionaries are going to sell the independence of the country; that they, the patriots, are the ones who will preserve it. Wilcox and men of his stripe are doing more to destroy the independence of this country than any other person. They are striving to produce a state of anarchy, and it will not take many more of such events of July 30 to lose our independence, and then who will we have to thank for it but the gallant leader of the opposition, R. W. Wilcox. [Loud and continued applause.]

The object of political discussion is to present arguments on principles involved, pro and con, and let the people decide at the polls. The opposition have a platform; do they discuss it? Do they discuss the Chinese question, development of the country, or the immigration question? On the contrary, we see Wilcox stigmatizing his countrymen as "traitors, murderers, thieves, and robbers," and he proposes "to break their necks, stamp on them, and throw them in the water and let the sharks eat them." Those are his arguments, by which he tries to show his patriotism. He went to Italy to be educated, and it has been the burden of his complaint that because the Government had supported and educated him for seven years it owed him an office and living, and that because he did not get it he was forced into despair and revolution. I have not heretofore stated that upon his return he came to me and asked me for something to do. I sent him to the superintendent of water works, who keeps in a book a record of water privileges, showing the distance from the sidewalk to the block. Mr. Wilson told Wilcox the record was two or three months behind, and he would give him \$100 a month to keep it, and more if he did the work satisfactorily.

Wilcox took up the record book, and said that as the figures were in feet and inches and he had been educated in meters he did not feel competent to undertake the work. [Laughter.] He walked sadly and slowly out of the office from the \$100 with unknown feet and inches to despair and revolution. [Laughter.] Wilcox's chief grievance was that his education had been cut off in the middle. If he could only have had two years more to complete his course he would have been equipped

for the battle of life. If he had had those two years more schooling he might then have been able to translate feet and inches into meters. [Laughter.] The Bulletin states there is no issue between the two parties; that whoever is elected, things will slide on about the same. I say there are live issues in this election and the future of this country depends a great deal on how it is decided. If Bush is to run bridge contracts and foreign diplomacy and Wilcox the engineering department, there will be a very different state of things to what the reform party has done. I leave it to you, next Wednesday, to say whether the reform Government shall go on with its work or whether you wish to see R. W. Wilcox sitting, with an Italian uniform on, in the Government building.

WILCOX'S LOVE OF LIBERTY.

The Voice of the Nation says that R. W. Wilcox has imbibed too much of the spirit of liberty to undertake to pull this Government back to arbitrary methods and the old order of things. This is pretty good, considering that Wilcox himself testified on the stand, under oath, that his new constitution which he had prepared was like the old constitution, with but few minor changes.

It will be remembered, also, that he testified that he showed his constitution to Mr. Pahia, who told him that he had better put some check upon the power of the King to arbitrarily dismiss his cabinet, but that he (Wilcox) replied: "If you have a king, make him a king, just like the European kings."

How much of the spirit of free institutions Mr. Wilcox has imbibed the reader can see, when he recollects that Wilcox complains continually in his speeches about the mixture of all classes in this country.

Who does not remember his hackneyed information that "there are three classes in Italy: First, royalty; second, the middle class; third, the rest of the people—farmers, traders, etc.; and that none of the third class can even get into the second class, never mind how much they improve their condition?"

AN IG-NOBLE SPEECH.

Mr. H. G. Crabbe is running as a noble for the Island of Oahu. While we are not sticklers for form or too much dignity and reserve, still we, in common with all people, recognize the fact that the position of noble is intended to represent the more conservative, dignified, and staid element in the legislative body.

Mr. Crabbe, so far from maintaining his dignity in the opposition meeting at Palama last week, indulged himself in the use of billingsgate that would have done credit to an artist in the use of such language.

Getting more and more personal, he called Mr. Achi a "little half-Chinese monkey," and wound up finally with an out-and-out filthy epithet in Hawaiian, which raised a murmur of disapproval among the native listeners that were standing by.

For fear that the reader will hardly credit this, and will take the opposition general denial as correct, we challenge Mr. Crabbe to deny it if he can.

WHO IS VIOLATING THE LAW?

Mr. Macfarlane is credited, in his speech to the natives last Saturday night at the old armory, with saying that the opposition would peaceably abide the result of the election if defeated, but that it looked as if the reform party would not; that already the reform party were taking steps to challenge and shut off opposition electors from their vote.

The trouble is that it is the opposition itself and not the reform party that purposes to break the law, and has already done so. Unquestionably a large number of parties have registered as noble voters at the instigation of runners of the opposition who are not qualified to vote for nobles or anywhere near it, and perjured themselves thereby. These men should be challenged, and undoubtedly will be, and without placing the reform party open to the charge of wishing to make a disturbance or to violate the law.

Mr. Macfarlane would do much better if he asserted more control over his party and urged his following not to attempt to vote the noble tickets next Wednesday, even though on the register of noble voters, if, as a matter of fact, they violate the law and their consciences in so doing.

To-morrow will be the election day in which eight men will be chosen, for better or worse, to hold power without further control on our part until the year 1896. Eight more will serve for four years, and the balance—both representatives and nobles—for two years.

The six-year men will be still in the legislature when our present treaty relations with the United States shall have expired, and all will have very important measures to pass upon before election day comes round again.

It is customary, we believe, to spring new matter on your opponents at the last minute, when it is too late for them to refute it.

We believe, however, that such a course is cowardly, and brings neither credit to the man who does it or much harm to the party against whom it is aimed, and we have refrained in this (practically) our last issue to present any new personal charges against the opposition. What charges we have made have been made openly and with full opportunity given the object of our attack to defend himself or themselves from it.

A charge kept back at the last minute is usually kept back because if put forward soon enough could be refuted. A well-founded charge should stand the test of a public sifting.

A SERIOUS CHARGE.

Mr. John Phillips is indignant that the board of education has had the temerity to advertise for bids for the erection of schoolhouses and accept the lowest bid in all cases where they were satisfied that the bidder was responsible and able to fulfill his contract. This is indeed a serious charge! Why, it gives the poor mechanic, even though he is a native Hawaiian, an equal chance, so far as the board is concerned, with the owner of a planing mill! Those who are opposed to such a fair way of transacting business will vote for Mr. Phillips.

A DENIAL BY THE CABINET.—THE PROPOSED TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE LANDING OF THE TROOPS.

Some three months ago the cabinet met a committee of citizens who desired information concerning the proposed revision of our treaty relations with the United States.

Full information was verbally given at the time, and in the course of a few days a lengthy written statement was published.

The committee made no report to the meeting which appointed them, although they several times announced that they intended to report.

In yesterday's Herald a member of the committee makes an altogether false statement in the native language of what occurred at that interview. He states that the committee were told by the cabinet that the King had rejected two sections of a proposed treaty, they being sections which allowed the landing of troops with their munitions of war.

No such statement was made.

We would further state that no proposition to allow the landing of troops and munitions of war on Hawaiian soil has been made either by the United States or the Hawaiian Government, nor will any such proposition be entertained or supported by the present administration.

LORRIN A. THURSTON.
 JONA AUSTIN.
 S. M. DAMON.

AMERICA'S GOOD FAITH AND GENEROSITY.

Amid all of the snarling, wrangling, and blackguarding of the opposition, and their attempts to engender bad blood and prejudice against the United States, the fact stands out bold and clear that:

Hawaii voluntarily surrendered her independence to the United States and the United States voluntarily restored it.

TEN REASONS FOR SUPPORTING THE REFORM PARTY.

1. The Reform party has given us a free constitution.
2. It has vigorously instituted and carried out a policy of public improvements.
3. It has improved our reputation and credit abroad. (Under its administration government bonds have gone to a premium.)
4. It has borrowed money at a lower rate than ever before.
5. It has energetically pursued the policy of segregating the lepers.
6. It has introduced the principle of civil-service reform.
7. It has reduced the number of Chinese in the country by 3,000.
8. It has opened up several hundred holdings to settlers under the homestead act.
9. It has been economical.
10. It has swept away a corrupt régime with all its attendant abuses, and has thereby abolished the use of the civil service for partisan purposes, the control of the Legislature by the Crown, the misappropriation of public funds, the violation of law in the conduct of office, the wasting of the public resources in discreditable enterprises, impoverishing the country at home and disgracing it abroad, and the neglect of necessary public improvements, besides a host of other things which our space forbids us to mention.

TEN REASONS FOR NOT SUPPORTING THE "NATIONAL REFORM PARTY."

1. Because its prominent leaders are opposed to the new constitution.
 2. Because it proposes to revise the constitution in some unknown way.
 3. Because it proposes to modify or abolish altogether the property qualification.
 4. Because it proposes the election of certain public officers by the people (which is not known).
 5. Because its declared foreign policy is dangerous to the reciprocity treaty, and consequently to the commercial prosperity of the country.
 6. Because it is unwise to abandon a party which has deserved well of the country.
 7. Because a change of administration is always in itself a serious misfortune, and will be injurious to our credit abroad.
 8. Because the candidates of the party, with some honorable exceptions, are composed of men either without any record or with a bad one.
 9. Because the party has conducted the campaign by a systematic attempt to rouse race hatred and set the Hawaiian against the entire foreign element.
 10. Because this campaign is an undisguised attempt to nullify all the fruits of the revolution of 1887, and to carry out the insurrection of 1889.
- Which ticket are you going to vote?

VOTE FOR PERMANENT RECIPROCITY. ITS EFFECT ON WOOL.

Wool, upon which a duty of ten cents a pound exists and which now barely pays the expense of putting on the market, and which we now ship across two oceans to Germany and elsewhere, would go through the Golden Gate, and the abolition of the duty would put sheep on every available spot on the mountain slopes of Mauna Loa and Mauna Kea, where the single station of Humuula now tells what might be done with sheep if an impossible duty did not shut our wool out from the market which nature has ordained to be our national outlet.

VOTE FOR PERMANENT RECIPROCITY. ITS EFFECTS UPON OUR FRUIT INDUSTRY.

Permanent reciprocity means that every banana, lime, pineapple, orange, coconut, etc., that we raise goes into the United States free of duty until the crack of doom. It means that fruit orchards, which under a seven years' treaty there is no use to create or spend any money on, will cover that home of tropical fruit, the two

Konas, and cultivated bananas will be found in every one of the thousand gulches of the Hilo district, which, too steep for cultivation of sugar, now lie idle between the fields of cane. It means that the wood lands, running 60 miles from Hilo to Kukuihaele, too high for cane, will afford a home for the lime and coffee tree, where one can now see limes as large and coffee as healthy as ever gladdened the eye of man.

Waialua, whose orange trees, neglected and slighted as they are, still insist on bearing fruit which discount California's best, will be as familiar an object in the hotels of the Pacific slope as Florida's favorites are in the markets of the East.

VOTE FOR PERMANENT RECIPROCITY. ITS EFFECT ON CLERKS.

Clerks can remember the Hon. Charles R. Bishop, P. C. Jones, J. C. Glade, T. H. Davies; and many others, who came here and worked their way up the ladder step by step, and with the upward movement of permanent reciprocity commence to climb the stairs themselves. It looks as if the clerks of this city were now booked to remain such for good, or else be fired out by Asiatics; but new times will make a change.

Remember that a name scratched is a vote lost for the party that constitutes the backbone and enterprise of the land.

That a vote for the best man on the other side, as the issues have narrowed down, is a vote for all that that man has identified himself with.

VOTE FOR PERMANENT RECIPROCITY. ITS EFFECT ON MECHANICS.

Mechanics can remember that Young, and Renton, and Thomas, and Daniel Foster, and many others coming here as mechanics, worked their way to the front on the tide of prosperity which came with reciprocity, and from their example can take heart that in a newer and broader commercial dispensation they, too, will work their way to that competency which is the legitimate ambition of every honest man, but which seems shut out by the absorption of one developed industry.

Remember that your vote is essential to the sure and complete overthrow of the reactionary elements among us;

That the men on your ticket represent the spirit of progress among us, and as such should be elected to a man.

VOTE FOR PERMANENT RECIPROCITY. ITS EFFECT ON CAPITAL.

Abiding, which can not be revoked without mutual consent, means the settling of values and the restful confidence of capital. The complaint against the steady withdrawal from the country of hundreds of thousands of dollars made in it would cease, for there would be no occasion for it.

REFORM PARTY. GENERAL ELECTION OF 1890. PLATFORM.

1. We pledge ourselves to maintain inviolate the autonomy and independence of this Kingdom, while securing at the same time the amplest commercial benefits in our treaty relations with the United States.

2. To secure adequate legislation, by constitutional amendment or otherwise, whereby Asiatic immigration shall be restricted to the agricultural necessities of the country, and Chinese not now engaged in trade or the mechanical occupations shall be prohibited from hereafter engaging therein.

3. To favor wise and liberal appropriations for internal improvements, and to sustain a progressive policy in the development of our national resources.

4. To secure such an extension of the present homestead act as will facilitate the settlement of small landholders throughout the Kingdom.

5. To procure for the people an honest, economic, and efficient administration in all departments of the Government.

CANDIDATES.

For Nobles—Island of Oahu.—Hon. W. C. Wilder, Hon. M. P. Robinson, Hon. W. O. Smith, six years. Hon. J. I. Dowsett, sr., Robert Lishman, R. J. Greene, four years. S. M. Kaaukal, E. S. Kunha, B. F. Dillingham, two years.

For Representatives—District of Kona, Oahu.—District 1: Hon. Cecil Brown. District 2: S. K. Kane. District 3: M. A. Gonsalves. District 4: James F. Morgan. District 5: W. C. Achi. District 6: J. L. Kaulukou. District 7: ———. District 8: J. I. Dowsett, jr.

For Nobles—Island of Hawaii.—J. Kauhane, J. M. Horner, six years. R. R. Hind, Hon. Dr. J. Wight, four years. Hon. Samuel Parker, Dr. C. H. Wetmore, two years.

For Representatives—Island of Hawaii.—South Hilo: R. Rycroft. Central Hilo: Geo. Kaihenua. North Hilo: Albert Horner. Hamakua: W. H. Rickard. Kohala: J. W. Moanauli. Kona: ———. Kau: ———.

For Nobles—Island of Maui.—Hon. H. P. Baldwin, W. Y. Horner, six years. W. H. Cornwall, R. D. Walbridge, four years. Jas. Anderson, L. Von Tempsky, two years.

For Representatives—Island of Maui.—Wailuku, district 1: W. K. Makakoa. Wailuku, district 2: Patrick Cockett. Makawao: W. H. Halstead. Hana: Jos. U. Kawaiui. Lahaina: ———. Molokai: ———.

For Nobles—Island of Kauai.—Hon. Geo. N. Wilcox, six years. Hon. P. P. Kanoa, four years. Hon. P. Isenberg, sr., two years.

For Representatives—Island of Kauai.—Hanalei: Hon. A. S. Wilcox. Lihue: Hon. W. H. Rice. Waimea: V. Knudsen.

To the readers of the Times:

When your eyes shall rest upon this last issue of the Times, election day will already have partly run its course.

At such a time above all others we would make no mad appeal for the Reform party, no loud declamation against the opposition; but wish only to address you in the language of soberness and truth.

A strong movement, like that begun on the 30th of June, by the Reform party must naturally expect some day to have to meet the reactionary wave that is always sure to follow. That wave has come to-day full-crested with the accumulated passions, prejudices, and disappointment of those who, like the Bourbon of France, "decline to forget anything or to learn anything new," and while you are now scanning these lines those two waves are meeting in a clash and collision that will settle things one way or other before the sun goes down.

If, after the collision, the Reform party is found still moving on, then reaction is gone forever. Bush, Wilcox, and their partisans have lost their employment for good. Nothing can then revive the past.

If, however, reform goes down, the leadership of Wilcox and his following are assured, and hundreds of dubious hearts will follow in his train and hasten to enforce his mandates and back up his demands who now are waiting to see which way the tide will turn.

We believe this country will never see social or political peace as long as men can run politics on race lines or consent to reap the advantages to such work when done by hirelings. Every man who is opposed to such methods should see to it that Messrs. Widemann, Macfarlane, Muller, Phillips, and others are rebuked to-day for such a course, to the end that it may be established in this land of varied races from now on, that any political party, however laudable its objects may be, which seeks to secure them at the price of stirring up ill-will and race prejudice among the people, will for that act alone be snowed under so deep that even Gabriel's political trumpet will fail to rouse it from its slumbers.

We believe that an intelligent glance at the platform of the Opposition shows clearly, and the tone of its campaign confirms the fact, that it will if successful inaugurate a foreign policy inimical to the United States and imminently dangerous to our present commercial relations with that country. Feeling as we do that the whole fabric of society with us, political, social, and commercial, rests on that sheet of parchment we call the treaty, we can not, as a public organ, but warn the people against the folly of provoking results which will blight and bankrupt the country, drive out mechanics, force property on the market until it becomes a drug, and compel the delivery of the country once and for all over to Asiatics as the only class that could survive the collapse and save the forty millions invested in sugar.

Let us hold to our present treaty relations with the United States as a drowning man clings to the life buoy. Let us in all honorable ways promote the good will and fellowship now existing between our neighbor and ourselves, and press for such broader and more permanent commercial relations as will give this country and all the spare capital within it a new start, and to the young men of the land fuller and increasing opportunities to make a start in life for themselves.

With these words the Times bids the public farewell, with many thanks for its kind reception. Aloha nui!

Remember! That your opponents will vote the straight party ticket.

That they will not scratch any names in favor of men on your ticket whom you like best.

That those who advise you to scratch do so in the interests of the party whom you wish to see defeated.

That if the Reform party wins the election, progressive constitutional government is assured.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 17.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 4, 1890.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential dispatch (No. 17) of the 7th ultimo, touching the result of the late election in the Hawaiian Islands, and its probable effect on the interests of the United States. It has been read with attention.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 19.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 6, 1890.

SIR. I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 18 of the 10th ultimo, by which I learn that, contrary to the indications of the first "returns" of the late elections in the Hawaiian Islands, the result throughout the islands proves favorable to the "reform party" and the present ministry.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 20.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 20, 1890.

SIR: The archives of the Department of State are conclusive evidences of the interest which the Government of the United States has long taken in the affairs of the Hawaiian Islands. That these territories are of great importance to the future development and defense of American commerce in the Pacific, hardly will be questioned. To secure the influence over them which the United States so long has considered its right and duty to maintain, some decisive steps must soon be taken which, in the past, were not of pressing necessity. For more than half a century the American Missionary Board, with the agencies and influences in its control, has served as a strong fortress to the United States in these islands. The large financial contributions, amounting to nearly one million of dollars, which that organization obtained through innumerable channels of American benevolence and religious zeal, and the large number of educated and resolute agents which it sent to these islands, secured an influence over the ruling chiefs and native population which held them as firmly to America as a permanent military force could have done.

But a change of facts and circumstances in recent years is bringing near the time when this well-sustained power must be strongly reinforced. In a large and increasing degree other influences have come in to counterbalance and relatively to decrease the American missionary influences. The native population of sixty years ago is reduced to

less than a third it then was, and is continually growing less. The chiefs, who were formerly the supports of monarchy and mainly controlled the affairs of the islands and who for many years were largely influenced by the teachings of the American pastors, no longer exist. The grave has closed over them forever. The native pastors, who now hold the places once occupied by the American missionaries, have not the strong American sympathies of their predecessors, and if they had they possess not the strength of character to hold their parishes by any effective influence relative to affairs of government. Of the ninety thousand population now on these islands less than one-half is of the original Hawaiian race, and but a small proportion of the lands and other property are in their possession.

The following is believed to be very nearly the present make-up of the population: Natives, 37,500; half-cast, 5,000; Chinese, 19,000; American, 3,000; Hawaiian, born of foreign parents, 3,000; Britons, 1,250; Portuguese, 12,000; Germans, 1,500; French, 150; Japanese, 8,400; Norwegian, 250; other foreigners, 500; Polynesian, 500; total, 92,050. It is not necessary for me to elaborate the argument to show that a population thus composed has not the inherent tendencies and unity of force to hold them to American interests. It is doubtless true that more than one-half of the property of the country to-day is possessed by those of American birth or of American blood. But wealthy men of other nationalities are becoming numerous here, and the number of adventurers and of those of cosmopolitan ideas, caring little for any country, is always considerable in lands peopled as this now is, with commercial and political circumstances as they are.

To thwart and hold in check the increasing influences here hostile to the United States some effective measures are absolutely necessary. In view of the facts as they existed for half a century a drifting policy was safe enough. Rapidly changing circumstances demand a prompt abandonment of the drifting policy of the past. Left to themselves, the prevailing logical force of things would ultimately drive out the best American elements and swamp these islands with adverse influences. To hold an assimilating control of the largely preponderating Asiatic and native Hawaiian population there must be maintained an American policy, strong, conservative, but not costly, if adopted in time. The longer this is postponed the more difficult and expensive it will be in the end to secure the desired result. The laying of an ocean cable from San Francisco to Honolulu, with the aid of the United States Government, and the expenditure of a sufficient sum of money to make a fair commencement of the improvement of Pearl Harbor would be of immediate benefit to American commerce, would be a salutary notice to foreign powers of our intentions in these waters, and operate as a powerful incentive to retain and to increase an enterprising and influential American population in these islands.

As monarchy and feudalism, formally so strong here, have no longer any solid foundation, and government has become constitutional, and largely by the ballot, the moral pressure of the United States is absolutely necessary to enable the Americans and other intelligent citizens of the country to withstand the Asiatic and other influences adverse to Christian civilization, its laws, and agencies. Fairly governed and retained under auspicious American influences, these islands are capable of supporting a population of 250,000, possessing financial resources ample to pay all the taxes necessary for the support of their institutions and the ordinary means of defense. The vital question, one that can not be possibly ignored or held in abeyance, is: Shall Asiatic or

American civilization ultimately prevail here? The near future is to show conclusively that only the strong pressure and continual vigilance of the United States can enable American men and American ideas to hold ascendancy here and make these islands as prosperous and valuable to American commerce and to American marine supremacy in the North Pacific as the isles of the Mediterranean have been and are to its adjacent nations. The data in possession of the Department of the Navy, and doubtless well known to the Department of State, show how valuable Pearl Harbor easily can be made as a commercial marine and naval station, and the great and pressing importance of an ocean cable, under American control, is so plainly obvious as to require no elaborate argument for its clearer demonstration.

The most careful study of the situation here leads me to urge a limited appropriation for Pearl harbor, financial aid to the ocean cable, and such modification of the existing treaty as shall increase the American population here and permanently strengthen the bonds between Hawaii and the United States. The sooner this is done the less difficult and expensive it will be in the end. It is certain that time and events will not wait for us, and that a drifting and waiting policy is now the most hazardous.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

From the Minister of Finance I have just received the inclosed report of the Collector of Customs, a single advance type-written copy, showing the increased commercial importance of these islands to the United States.

HONOLULU, H. I., March 13, 1890.

His Excellency S. M. DAMON,

His Majesty's Minister of Finance :

SIR: In conformity with the provisions of section 553 of the Civil Code, I have the honor to submit to your excellency the annual report of the business of this bureau for the year ended December 31, 1889.

I beg to call your excellency's attention to the reports with each table, which, I think, will give more information than in former years. Your attention in particular is called to tables numbers 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.

The exports have increased from \$4,875,694 in 1880 to \$13,874,341 in 1889, and the imports from \$3,673,268 in 1880 to \$5,438,790 in 1889.

The trade with the United States has increased 5.78 per cent during the past year, and is now 79.10 per cent of our entire imports.

Our exports, virtually, all go to the United States. The exports of our principal product, sugar, has increased over the exports of previous years, as follows: 1889, 242,165,825 pounds, against—

Year.	Quantity.	Increase.	Year.	Quantity.	Increase.
	<i>Pounds.</i>	<i>Pounds.</i>		<i>Pounds.</i>	<i>Pounds.</i>
1877	25,575,965	216,589,879	1883	114,107,155	128,058,680
1878	38,431,458	203,734,377	1884	142,654,923	99,510,912
1879	49,020,972	193,144,863	1885	171,350,314	70,815,521
1880	63,584,471	178,531,364	1886	216,223,615	25,942,220
1881	93,789,483	148,376,352	1887	212,763,647	29,402,188
1882	114,177,938	127,987,897	1888	235,888,346	6,277,489

An average increase of 119,035,144 pounds per year.

Rice has fallen off from the output of 1888, 3,208,704 pounds; a large amount of this shortage is due to the number of Japanese laborers having been introduced. The true amount of rice produced in this Kingdom can never be ascertained from the records of this Bureau for the reason that this article is used to a greater or less extent by our own population.

Wool has decreased to 241,925 pounds. The export of this article reached its highest point in 1882 and its lowest in 1887.

Bananas have increased in the number of bunches exported from 1876 to the present year, when it reached 105,630 bunches.

Tallow has decreased from the amount exported last year.

Molasses has increased slightly.

The manifested value of sugar for the past year was 5.45 cents per pound.

It will be seen by reference to the table that the United States received practically all of our domestic products.

Japan imported 92 head of Hawaiian cattle.

China did not import anything. In former years a large amount of betel leaves and tallow have been exported there.

Our import trade with the various countries of the world has increased to a considerable extent. The aggregate of our imports for 1888 was \$4,540,887, while for 1889, \$5,438,790, an increase of \$897,903. Reviewing our trade with each country, we find that we imported from the United States 79.10 per cent, an increase of 5.78 per cent over the previous year, or more particularly an increase of \$976,108 from that country alone; from Great Britain 12.38 per cent, a falling off from the previous year; from China and Japan 3.68 per cent, also a slight falling off; and from other countries a similar falling off. The relation which our imports from the United States of free by treaty and goods paying duty bear to each other is as 4 of the former to 1 of the latter. The class of goods which compose the duty-paying class are to a great extent of foreign origin, and American beer and wines.

The United States received the bulk of our trade, both in exports and imports; Great Britain received 3.45 per cent, and China and Japan 1.10 per cent.

The trade of the United States with this Kingdom has increased 1.61 per cent over that of 1888.

The total imports and exports have increased from \$16,248,486 in 1888, to \$19,313,132 for the period just ended.

The increase in the imports and exports carried by American vessels in 1868 was 66.19 per cent, while in 1889 it carried 72.34 per cent. The percentage carried by vessels of other nations has decreased in each case.

The imports of specie for the year just ended amounted to \$1,146,925, and \$1,207,555 for the previous year, showing a slight falling off.

The exports of gold increased from \$23,935 for 1888, to \$40,477 for 1889.

The value of our foreign and domestic goods exported amounted to \$13,874,341. The value of foreign goods exported amounted to \$64,270, it being the smallest amount exported for ten years past.

The value of our domestic exports has increased \$2,178,635 over the previous year, and it represents a production of \$172.62½ per capita for the entire population, basing the calculation on the census returns of 1884.

The vessels engaged in carrying our domestic products were divided among principally four nationalities. American, gauged by the value, carried 80.22 per cent against 73.09 per cent in 1888; Hawaiian, 15.20 per cent against 21.72 per cent for the previous year, the falling off being occasioned by one of the regular steamers being laid up for repairs and an American vessel taking its place.

The number of Hawaiian-registered vessels has decreased in number as well as in tonnage. This has been caused through the sale abroad of the bark *Kalakaua* and the brigantine *Allie Rowe*, the breaking up in port of the bark *Lilian* and the brigantine *Hazard*, and the losing of the bark *James A. King* and the schooner *Jennie Walker* by being wrecked.

The additions to the list were the steamers *Hawaii* and *Akamai*; the bark *Andrew Welch* and *Foohng Suey*, and the brigantine *Geo. H. Douglass*, and the sloop *Kealani*, all vessels of the first class.

We have in our merchant marine five vessels built of iron, three being steamers, and among the coasters one iron steamer. The number of men employed by all vessels, both merchantmen and coasters, is 850, in the capacity of sailors.

The number and tonnage of vessels entered and cleared at all ports, Hawaiian Islands, remain about the same as in the previous year. The total number entered has increased, while the tonnage has decreased, showing that vessels of smaller tonnage have been employed.

Vessels under the American flag had a total tonnage of 129,095, and in 1888, 113,459; British, 19,139, and in 1888, 29,519; Hawaiian, 54,813, against 64,607; German, 4,197, against 5,820 for the previous year.

There was an excess of departure of passengers and tourists of 53 during the year, as against 499, excess of departures in 1888; while there was an excess of arrivals of immigrants of 1,358, which indicates that there was a gain to the population of this Kingdom of 1,305. The Chinese population has decreased by 1,059 persons; 32 Chinese females have arrived, and 43 have departed.

The consumption of spirits in this kingdom varies very little from that of 1888, save in the withdrawals of beer, which has increased from 40,000 gallons to 61,000 gallons for the year just ended. The consumption of light wine remains about the same. European wines, which have been always of a high test, have been all along displaced by California wines; but during the past year the experiment was tried of importing a quantity of a lower test, corresponding to its California rival. The result is a small increase in its consumption.

There has been an unexpected increase in the receipts for duties in some articles which showed a decrease in 1888, while others have unexpectedly fallen off, but the total amount shows a slight increase over the previous year. It largely exceeds our estimate for the biennial period, which was estimated at \$500,000 per year.

Marine railway.—I would draw your excellency's attention to the increasing importance of the marine railway, and since the arrival of the warship *Nipsic* from Samoa was placed on the railway for extensive repairs many foreign vessels have taken advantage of it through the experience gained from that vessel.

The number of coasters and merchantmen placed thereon during 1889 was 70, of which number 33 were steamers, the largest being 1,070 tons and the smallest 18 tons; and the other 37 were sailing vessels, the largest being 1,088 tons and the smallest 6 tons. The demands made upon the statistical department of this Bureau has largely increased during the past year, and is likely to increase with the increase of our commerce and as we become better known abroad. It is on account of these ever increasing demands, and increasing commerce that our report is later than usual.

I have the honor to be, sir, your excellency's most obedient servant,
A. S. CLEGHORN,
Collector-General of Customs.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 22.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 7, 1890.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Nos. 4-19.
I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 21.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 24, 1890.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 20 of the 20th ultimo, touching the commercial relations of Hawaii with the United States. A copy of your dispatch has been confidentially communicated to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 24.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, May 20, 1890.

SIR: The import and intent of the reciprocity treaty between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands are well understood by all Americans who have a patriotic regard for the future commercial

growth and power of their country in the Pacific. The bearing which the continuance of the terms and advantages of the present reciprocity treaty has on the political relations of the Hawaiian kingdom with the United States renders it proper for me to inform the Department of State of the present alarm caused here by the sugar provisions of the tariff bill reported by the Committee on Ways and Means of the Washington House of Representatives. The production of sugar is the principal business of these islands, as the figures of the nearly \$14,000,000 of exports to the United States in 1889 plainly show. Sugar is the chief source of the financial life—is the banking capital—on which the present and future prosperity of this country depends. To destroy this productive industry and chief source of wealth is to spread ruin and disaster throughout the islands.

It is certain that the present treaty is the chief cause of the present large dimensions of sugar production, having already more than doubled the entire property of the islands. In the opinion of all well-informed persons here, to place sugar on the free list would be the virtual annulment of the reciprocity treaty and the destruction of the prosperity of the islands. Thus it is easy to understand why there is so deep an anxiety among the business men of Hawaii as to the present aspect of the sugar question in Congress. They clearly understand that it is a matter of life and death to the Hawaiian kingdom. To all sincere Americans here it is especially alarming, as they see plainly that the virtual destruction of the chief productive industry of the country is to weaken essentially its fraternal relations with the United States. It would have been better never to have had the treaty than now to annul its chief financial advantage and knock the main props from the business of the islands. I am sure that these fears are not exaggerated. The business men here have no more faith in the "bounty system" than have the business men of the United States.

It certainly seems highly inopportune to abandon the protective principle as to sugar just at the time when in various sections of the United States extensive arrangements are being made to invest large sums of money to produce sugar from cane, beet, and sorghum. That the sugar tariff has not already led to a large production of sugar in the United States is no conclusive reason why it will not in the future, now that greatly improved methods of producing sugar have recently come into use and capital is much more available for sugar-raising than formerly. There are strong reasons to believe that if sugar-raising can be protected in the future, say by a specific duty of 50 per cent on the raw product, it will increase on a large scale and become a very important interest in eight or ten States of the Union, and that at no distant day the United States and its dependencies and allies will produce sugar sufficient to supply the increasing demands of the American people. Logically and practically there seems to be no stronger reasons for abandoning the protective principle as to sugar than as to any other agricultural interest or productive industry of the country. Believing the commercial and political relations of these islands to be of inestimable importance to the United States, duty impels me to state the grave injury and danger there are involved in the proposed annulment of the sugar tariff. I am sure I have not overestimated the calamity it would bring to Hawaii, and I am clearly of the opinion that a 50 per cent specific duty on raw sugar would be well for the ultimate interests of the United States.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 25.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, May 28, 1890.

SIR: I improve the first mail opportunity to inform the Department of State that the Hawaiian Legislature assembled May 21 and was opened by the King with the customary formalities. Contrary to the hope of the best citizens of the islands, the reform party, through whose agency the present constitution was made and carried into effect, is found in minority. Two or three members-elected by the reformers, half-caste and native Hawaiians, have joined the opponents of the present order of things. The opponents of the ministry elected the speaker and other legislative officers by a small majority, and the committees appointed are similarly constituted. The resolutions thus far offered and the discussions had in their regard indicate a matured purpose of the majority to force out the present ministry and put in its place one hostile to the present constitution or that regards its requisitions of secondary importance.

The situation is somewhat complicated by the fact that one of the ministers, the attorney-general, a Canadian by birth and sympathy, has deserted his colleagues and become a bitter partisan of the present legislative majority. Not long since he made a visit of several months to Canada, spending, I think, a few days in Washington, and returned here since the Hawaiian election an earnest opponent of a new treaty with the United States and an advocate of an ocean cable and a reciprocity treaty with the Canadian Dominion. It is strongly suspicioned here that he is now in the pay of the Canadian Pacific Railroad, if not an agent of Sir James McDonald, the Canadian premier. Recently, instead of following the advice of the three more respectable and responsible members of his cabinet and the united opinion of the supreme court as to cabinet power and responsibility, the King has adopted the opinion of this Attorney-General Ashford that a single cabinet member can neutralize and block the decision of the other three members.

This course of the attorney-general and the diverse heterogeneous and irresponsible elements of which the majority in the Legislature is composed render the present political situation less favorable than could be wished. The aspect of the "sugar question" in Congress at Washington strengthens the opponents of the existing ministry and continues to depress and alarm the Americans here and those who hold that the United States is the best ally and the real hope of the Hawaiian Kingdom. As soon as the present legislative majority agree upon a new cabinet there is no doubt that a probably successful effort will be made to carry a vote of "want of confidence" in the present ministry, though some signs of discord begin to be manifest among the opponents of the three best members of the cabinet. I inclose two copies of the King's speech well known to have been formulated by the three responsible ministers.

I have, etc.,

JOHN I. STEVENS.

The King's speech at the opening of the Legislature May 21, A. D. 1890.

Nobles and Representatives:

The meeting of the Legislature to-day affords me the opportunity to congratulate the nation upon the measure of prosperity enjoyed by it during the period which has elapsed since the commencement of the last session.

The friendly relations between this Kingdom and foreign nations continue to promote the happiness and security of our subjects, and of all sojourners within our borders.

During the biennial period just closed, the country has enjoyed a great degree of prosperity. Industry and enterprise have been well rewarded, and as will appear from the reports of the several departments of the Government, great progress has been made in the development of our material interests.

It is a source of gratification that our credit is good, and that our financial affairs have been placed upon a sound basis.

I sincerely trust that the laws which you shall enact for the welfare of the Kingdom will foster and encourage the extension of public improvements in the full confidence that they will return to us rich rewards, and I recommend for your consideration, liberal expenditures for the development of the industries of the Kingdom, especially in the encouragement of railroads and other facilities for the transportation of merchandise and of passengers.

The authorities charged with guarding the health of the people have been vigilant, and have succeeded in a great measure in the suppression of our chief malady.

The subject of education, so closely connected with the foundation of good government, has received the earnest consideration of those appointed to forward its interests, and our progress in this important branch of human welfare has received the commendations of all nations, as expressed at the Paris Exposition, where our educational exhibit was rewarded with the highest order of prizes.

In view of the probable completion of an interoceanic ship canal in the near future, and of the promised extension of lines of steam communication, it is of the highest importance that our harbors should be prepared to furnish accommodation to the great increase of commerce which will surely follow.

Let us also hope that arrangements may be made during the present period, whereby an electric cable under the Pacific shall place us in instantaneous communication with the thoughts and feelings of the whole human race, and add largely to our commercial advantages.

We shall deem it wise with your concurrence to pledge the credit of the Hawaiian Kingdom for such purposes and it can not be doubted that the material welfare of the nation will be thereby greatly enhanced.

Nobles and representatives: Invoking the blessings of the Almighty upon your deliberations, I now declare the Legislature of the Kingdom open.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 26.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, June 9, 1890.

SIR: I improve the first mail opportunity to forward two copies of the speech of Hon. L. A. Thurston, Minister of Interior, just delivered in the Hawaiian Legislature. It is a clear, strong statement of facts, as I had previously ascertained them by careful investigation, and these plainly indicate the actual political situation here, showing that in my former dispatches I had not been mistaken as to my general views of the condition of affairs.

Mr. Thurston is a gentleman of marked ability, of tried integrity, and of real courage. He is a native of the islands, as were his father and mother, both of his grand parents being of sturdy Connecticut stock, having come here as missionaries nearly seventy years ago. He has been, from its beginning, a bold and earnest leader in the reform party, and has the entire confidence of the best men of the islands. He can always be relied on as a friend of the country of his ancestry. His speech has made so decided an impression that it is possible that the heterogeneous majority of the opposition party in the Legislature may become a minority and not be able to force out the present ministry.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure.]

[From the Honolulu Commercial Advertiser of June 7, 1890.]

The MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR: I am ready to speak to the question of privilege in regard to the reply of the attorney-general to the questions of Nobles Crabbe and Muller. The answer of the attorney-general amounted to a general charge against the cabinet of interfering with him in the discharge of his duties and of acting in a manner derogatory to the interests of the community, in maintaining last April an armed guard at the police station. The charges of the attorney-general resolve themselves into three, which I shall take up in turn.

1. That the marshal maintained, during April last, an armed guard in the police station, with the approval of the majority of the cabinet, and against the approval of the attorney-general.

2. That such action was unwise, unnecessary, and groundless.

3. That if there was any reason to apprehend a disturbance the action taken was such as to precipitate the very disorders it was intended to prevent.

Mr. President, I admit the first charge. I admit that the majority of the cabinet maintained a guard at the station house not only without the consent of the attorney-general, but that he did everything in his power to prevent it. The thing that he did not do was to go down and find out what was actually going on. I think that instead of censuring the marshal, he deserves the thanks of the community that in spite of the resistance of his superior officer he had the principle and the courage to take measures which, I think, prevented the recurrence of happenings similar to those of the 30th of July last.

Having admitted the first charge, that the marshal defied his superior officer and the cabinet approved it and advised it, only a strong reason can exculpate the cabinet, and if I do not give sufficient reason for their action, I ask that they be condemned as they should be.

Our defense is that at that time the majority of the cabinet had good reason to believe that Volney V. Ashford and Robert W. Wilcox were contemplating violence, and that the attorney-general, if not actually assisting, was conniving at it. Now I maintain that I have not got to furnish legal proof of this, such as would be needed to procure a conviction before a jury; but if I show that we had good reason to believe it we were justified in the action which we took. I don't propose to indulge in rhetoric or adjectives, but to make plain statement of facts and of the information which I received, and then let the gentlemen here draw their own conclusion. The reasons which actuated us involve a considerable amount of the secret history of this country during the last three years. I do not propose to state any facts which are not essential. There are a large number which bear on the subject which I have stricken out, but I think that I have retained enough to convince the house.

I will show first why we had cause to distrust R. W. Wilcox and to believe that he was intending to disturb the peace.

As you all know, Mr. Wilcox was several years a ward of this country studying abroad, until his return in 1887. A fact not so generally known is that he organized at that time a conspiracy to dethrone the King, overthrow the ministry, and proclaim a new constitution. One of those who assisted him in drawing up the constitution is now present in this house. They went so far as to actually have the constitution engrossed, and Wilcox, with others, went into the palace and demanded of the King that he abdicate and declare his sister Queen. They even had the form of abdication written out for him to sign. If it had not been for the faithful service of Robt. Parker, the matter which came to a head in July, 1889, might have come to a head in the early part of 1888. The tactics which Wilcox pursued were almost identical with those which he employed in last July, except that he went into it so subtly that he managed to draw in a great many innocent persons, who did not understand it until they were so deep in that they could not withdraw. One of these became frightened and came and told us, and that is how we came to know about it. As soon as I learned about it, I sent for several of the prominent conspirators, one after another, and charged them with it, and they confessed. I put their statements in writing and they signed them, and I have those statements to-day. The object was, straight and simple, to compel the King to abdicate. They had the abdication all written out and they tried to compel him to sign it. Within a day or two after the matter came to my knowledge, they all knew that I knew it. The wife of R. W. Wilcox came to me (as she said, at the request of her husband) and begged me with tears that they might be allowed to go away. She said they would go back to Italy and that would be the last of it. It may be said that the cabinet ought to be condemned for not bringing it all out at that time, and so preventing the trouble of July 30.

Perhaps we were right and perhaps we were wrong. The reason we did not was that the country had been disturbed and we did not wish to again arouse alarm.

Nobody knew of the affair, and they promised to reform. Robt. Wilcox came to me himself and admitted the whole affair; said that he had been wrong, that he saw his mistake, but had been desperate, living as he was on charity. That he was angry with the King for not giving him an office which he had expected and been promised. He said he would go back to Italy and take service in the Italian army where they were fighting in Arabia, and that perhaps he would obtain promotion there. It seemed to us best, after mature deliberation, not to prosecute, and so no arrests were made, no publicity was given to it. Wilcox was allowed to go and he went. After this there were no disturbances, no rumors—everybody went about his business with the unconsciousness that everything was all right and that the country was secure.

This state of things continued until Wilcox came back in 1889. He had scarcely arrived before we began to receive information that he was trying to bring about the same thing again. There is no need of my repeating the events of July last, as it has all been before the courts. Now, after all that had happened in 1888, after his exposure and failure, his repentance and promises, he came back and repeated his attempt, and to-day he has the blood of 7 poor Kanakas on his head. The results of his second attempt you all know. He was tried and acquitted. You know what has happened since. He made a triumphal tour through the country, not only expressing no regret and repentance for what he had done, but glorifying in it, representing himself as a patriot and saying that if he had a chance he would do the same thing again. So things went on until some time before the election. Then rumors again began to go around, and I received direct information that he was again discussing schemes of violence and that as a first step he intended to take the station house; that he had been discussing that with V. V. Ashford, and with his assistance was devising plans as to how it might be accomplished. R. W. Wilcox stated to several of his friends the substance of his conversation with V. V. Ashford. Two of them gave me their statements in writing. They are persons who were politically opposed to me. It is unnecessary for me to state that one of them was Antone Rosa, since he has stated the same thing over his own signature in the public press.

I went immediately to Mr. Rosa, upon hearing that he knew of the matter, and said: "You and I are not politically in accord, but we both know that there is nothing will so damage the country as a repetition of July 30. We can sink our political differences in the attempt to prevent anything of this kind. I shall certainly do all that I can, and I think it is your duty to do all you can to prevent anything of the kind." He said that he took the same view, and would do what he could to ferret out what was going on, and he did. I think Mr. Rosa deserves the thanks of this house and of the community for sinking his political differences and doing what he could to prevent what would have injured the country.

Mr. V. V. Ashford soon heard of the rumors with regard to his conversation with Wilcox and sent for him and asked him if he had made any such statement. Mr. Wilcox said he had not. Mr. Ashford asked him if he would put that in writing, and Wilcox said he would. Mr. Ashford prepared a written statement which Robert Wilcox signed, and that statement is now in Mr. V. V. Ashford's possession. Then Wilcox went after Rosa for having told of it. Mr. Rosa said: "Didn't you tell me what I say that you did." Wilcox replied: "Yes; but I told you in confidence, and not to tell anyone else."

This put a quietus on Mr. Wilcox for some time. After the election Mr. Wilcox felt jubilant. He said that he had made the party successful and was entitled to the leadership of it, and would be made minister. Upon this some of the respectable members of his party began to grow restive, and expressed themselves in very decided language to the contrary. Then Mr. Wilcox told some of his friends that he was beginning to suspect the good faith of his haole associates, and that they would not help him to become minister and that he must look out for himself. He accordingly consulted with some of those who had been associated with him in July last, and asked them if they would be willing to help him again, if necessary. Some of them said yes, some were kanalua, and some said that they had had enough. Feelers were sent out and various persons were asked if they would assist in turning the Government out if matters came to a head. I have information from a gentleman in whom every member of this house has confidence, who was asked in front of the post-office by one of Wilcox's intimate friends if he would help take the station house; that they were going to have a meeting that night to discuss it.

Several of my informants were then, and still are, members of the opposition party. One actively expressed himself during the election for the express purpose of getting the cabinet out of office.

This brings the matter to the 17th of April, which the attorney-general considers the culminating iniquity of the cabinet.

The second question which I shall consider is why the cabinet distrusted V. V. Ashford and believed that he was favorable to creating a disturbance. I will not go back to the 30th of July last, although there are a number of earlier instances

which I might mention. Shortly after July 30 rumors and statements began to be circulated that V. V. Ashford, although he commanded the force against Wilcox, yet knew more than he ought to about that movement, and that his heart was not entirely in the action which he took that day. At first I did not take much stock in these rumors, for people talk as much here as they do anywhere; but as time passed on I received intimations that there were facts at the bottom of these reports, and I thought that I ought to investigate. I did not consult C. W. Ashford. Blood is thicker than water. Although I will state that I had at that time implicit confidence in the attorney-general. As a result of my investigations I have statements in writing from friends of the Government, from enemies, and from neutrals, and I state unhesitatingly that V. V. Ashford knew of and counseled and advised the disturbance of last July; that he sent messengers to Wilcox saying that the King and the cabinet were at loggerheads, and that now was the time to act.

Matters were quiet after the 30th of July, so far as his action was concerned, except that his conduct was characterized by the most violent denunciations of the cabinet, publicly and without stint, to such an extent that a member of the diplomatic corps came to a member of the cabinet, and although as he said he was acting beyond the scope of his official duty, warned them not to have confidence in a man talking as V. V. Ashford was.

V. V. Ashford became a frequent contributor to opposition newspapers, declaiming against the Government in the bitterest terms, giving out false statements with regard to the cabinet, and stating that he got them from his brother, although I did not believe anything of the sort. As an illustration, one of the members of this house lately told me that at about that time Mr. Ashford told him that he was so anxious to have this ministry turned out that he would rather have the country go back to the old régime than see it go on with them in office, and would rather see the country reduced to ashes than have them remain.

So matters continued, Mr. President, until two or three weeks before the election. That was a time of a good deal of uncertainty. Both parties were confident, and neither was sure. At that time V. V. Ashford had a quarrel with his political friends. Although in a position, as commander of the volunteer forces, of high responsibility and trust under the Government, he had been an active political worker against the Government. Then he sent word to me and asked for a truce between himself and the Government, and asked that I make an appointment with him (which for reasons was not kept), a second, which also was not kept, and finally a third was made, which was kept in my office. In the presence of a mutual friend the interview was held, and he made this statement. He said that he wished to be perfectly frank. He said that he had worked against the Government, admitted that he had been writing for the Elele to a large extent, but was sick of his associates, they were a mean lot generally and he wanted to be done with them. He offered either to retain his position as colonel and work secretly for us or to resign altogether and take the stump openly. He made, however, one condition. He said, "My reason for opposition to you has been my belief that you and the other members of the cabinet were engaged in a conspiracy against my brother. But if you and the others will promise to stand by him in the next Legislature, I will do all that I can for you."

I heard all that he had to say, and then replied what we wanted is votes. Votes are what counts, and that we should be glad of your assistance and vote and the votes that you control. As for promises, I have stood by you straight through and have done nothing for you that I ever agreed to do, and the only result has been that you have constantly villified me. I consider myself discharged of any obligations to you and will make no promises and no agreements with you. As far as the relations of the cabinet to C. W. Ashford are concerned your course will have nothing to do with it. C. W. Ashford has stood by us so far as I know and we propose to stand by him, and if we go down we will go down together.

Shortly after the election of the colonel came up, and V. V. Ashford was elected. The election was certified up to the cabinet and it became our duty to decide whether to approve or reject it, and it was not until after consideration of all the facts that I have mentioned, that we came to the conclusion that it was our duty not to indorse the election, and that we would be faithless to the interests of the community if we again allowed that man to go in as the head of the military. I don't say that we had evidence to warrant his arrest and trial. We did not feel justified in taking that action, but we did feel justified in refusing to ratify his election, as we knew that he was a man in whom we could not confide in case of another 30th of July.

We therefore did not recommend him to the King, and the matter was referred back to the officers again. Mr. V. V. Ashford asked for our reasons. We refused to give them orally, but said that if he would make application in writing we would state them in writing. He stated that he would apply in writing, but later he sent a letter to the minister of foreign affairs stating that he would make no written application, as it was contrary to military principles and etiquette.

The next step was his reelection by a majority of the officers. Before we took action on the reelection the attorney-general returned.

This brings me to the third branch of my statement, viz, the reason why we have distrusted C. W. Ashford, and this brings me to one of the most painful experiences of my life, because C. W. Ashford has not only been my official companion for three years, but because ever since he came here, seven years ago, he has been my intimate friend, and in this world intimate friends are not many. I have worked with him, trusted him, have passed through trying periods with him, shoulder to shoulder, have stood by him. When prominent members proposed to put him out of the cabinet last Legislature and go on with a new minister, I said no, if we go out we go out together. And I wish to say here that I believe, and know from previous experiences many years, that we have never had an attorney-general who has worked harder and more faithfully in the conduct of the business of his office than he has.

The relations of the cabinet with the attorney-general continued most cordial up to the time of his departure for the United States. He has mentioned a point of difference of opinion with regard to the treaty. It did not interfere with our cordial relations and was solely a matter of discussion, and was adjusted by the cabinet. As evidence of this and against the published statements made by C. W. Ashford, over his own signature, and before the finance committee I will read from the reply on October 4 last to the committee which waited on the cabinet concerning the treaty.

This reply was constructed in the following manner: After full discussion of the whole topic, each member of the cabinet made a draft of a reply. Then sections were taken from each and embodied in the final draft, so that the three replies, including Mr. Ashford's, are there. The beginning shows that it is the reply of the whole cabinet, and the title so states. The ministers take pleasure in informing you, etc. It is signed by the minister of foreign affairs because it was a matter of his department. I will read a passage, showing that there was no difference of opinion at that time:

"Animated as we are by the desire to strengthen and extend the commercial ties which have done so much for our national prosperity, and to secure the safety and perpetuation of our institutions by an alliance whereby we shall have the positive and efficacious guarantee of a strong friend against interference by itself or others with our perfect autonomy, independence, and sovereignty, we have instructed our representative at Washington to ascertain if the United States would be willing to negotiate with us a convention whereby the following objects may be secured."

"The cabinet for more than a year has studied carefully many reasons for and against the points submitted for negotiation, and has taken counsel with others, both connected and unconnected with the Government, and has considered various propositions and suggestions, some of which have been approved and some disapproved.

"Any statements of objects or intentions, and any purported draft of a treaty stating more or other than is above indicated which may have been published, are unfounded and incorrect.

"The ministers are strongly and unanimously of the opinion that the accomplishment of the objects above indicated will tend to greatly increase the material prosperity of the country, and perpetuate the independence of Hawaii and the sovereignty of His Majesty and his successors over all his dominions."

Mr. Ashford left on November 16, 1889, with the utmost cordiality of feeling between the cabinet. He left, as he stated, on account of his health, expecting to stay over one steamer. Two personal notes were all we had from him until his return on March 8, 1890. We had otherwise no direct communication with him, but saw numerous interviews in the papers in which he discussed all sorts of subjects, treaties, steamship and telegraph communication from Canada, all vital matters which should have been dealt with by one in his office only with the advice and consent of the cabinet. What he did in Canada we do not know. He gave us the barest outline of what he did. He did state that he had an interview with the Canadian prime minister, that he traveled as a guest of the Canadian Pacific Railroad in a private car—[Attorney General, No]. Then some one else told me about the private car; and to this day we don't know what his objects were or what he did. The first question which came up after his return was the colonelcy.

The attorney-general having returned just before the second election, when the question came up he immediately called upon the cabinet to reverse its decision on the matter, to nominate Mr. V. V. Ashford to the King, and to appoint him. It is unnecessary to say that the cabinet pursued no such stultifying course, but followed its previous decision. The attorney-general stated that he considered this action against his brother as simply an attack upon the Ashford family, and he was not going to stand it. The question had to be settled, and the attorney-general was requested to state whether he intended to carry his opposition so far as to advise the King not to confirm the nominee of the cabinet. Mr. Ashford refused to state

what he would advise the King. I said it is an anomalous thing, something unheard of in this or any other cabinet, to go to the King divided. He admitted it was anomalous and regretted it, but said that he could not change his course on that account, but would take the matter into consideration. He considered for a few days and then stated that he declined to inform us what his course would be, as he did not choose to abridge any of his legal rights, and should reserve to himself the right to advise the King as he saw fit when the time came. We accordingly held a cabinet council with His Majesty, March 21, in which three members of the cabinet stated that they did not consider Mr. V. V. Ashford a fit man for the place and recommended H. F. Hebbard. The attorney-general then advised His Majesty not to concur in this advice and not to appoint Hebbard, because, first, there was no reason why V. V. Ashford should not be appointed, and, second, on the technical ground that the period of incumbency of the present colonel had not expired. His Majesty stated that he wished to do what was proper, and asked each party for an opinion in writing, which was given. He answered in writing laying down the broad principle that he should take no action in any matter requiring by law the advice of the cabinet unless he chose, unless he had the advice of the whole cabinet. As this raised a vital principle, striking at the very roots of constitutional government, it seemed proper to submit the matter to the supreme court, and we did so, after first submitting our statement of the case to the attorney-general, which he admitted contained a correct statement of the facts. The supreme court gave a decision upholding the position of the majority of the cabinet, that the majority should govern, as the majority of the legislature and of every other body governs. On April 10 we met His Majesty again. There were two subjects for discussion, first, the appointment of colonel, and, second, the commissioning of Mr. Carter to negotiate the treaty. The majority of the cabinet advised His Majesty to appoint Mr. Hebbard, and presented him with the opinion of the supreme court, stating that it was his duty to follow the advice of the majority of the cabinet. The attorney-general then advised His Majesty as follows (the exact words were taken down at the time): "The opinion of the supreme court is not in the slightest degree binding and is of no more effect than that of any other three men of equal ability. I advise Your Majesty to decline to follow the advice of the majority of the cabinet and that of the supreme court."

This brings us down to the time when an armed force was being maintained at the station house.

Now as to the special charge that the guard was kept in such a manner as to excite disturbance. The attorney-general has in unmeasured terms denounced it, here and elsewhere, and has declared that it was in a high degree improper and unwise, and detrimental to the public good, for from five to eight men, citizens, to guard the police station, arms being in the station, available for volunteers and regular forces if necessary. This at a time when R. W. Wilcox was at liberty; when, as he states in his reply, street rumors connected V. V. Ashford with disturbance; when the town was so disturbed that the heads of business houses were consulting as to what should be done to protect life and property; and this, although his words in August last, when the country was roused, when Wilcox and his confederates were in jail, locked up in prison, were what I shall now quote.

On the 28th of August, 1889, the attorney-general wrote the following letter to the marshal:

"DEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL,
"Honolulu, H. I., August 28, 1889.

"J. H. SOPER, esq., marshal:

"SIR: In regard to the protection of the arms and munitions of war now under your charge at the police station in this city, the subject has been discussed by the cabinet, whose ideas I here put upon paper, in the form of instructions to you, in order that none of the misapprehensions to which verbal instructions are liable may in any way interfere with a full mutual understanding of the situation.

"The cabinet regard it as of the highest importance that those munitions shall be vigilantly and effectively guarded, and that all other matters in your department, existing or reasonably to be apprehended, shall be made subordinate to the due protection of the police-station building, its inmates, and contents.

"I understand you have now in operation a system of guarding that building with six foreign policemen (two from each watch), in addition to those who are necessarily or incidentally on the premises as officers of the respective watches, turnkeys, etc. This, in addition to D. H. Hitchcock, jr., whom I understand is still retained as special night watchman in your own office, will make a special guard of seven foreigners, which, if its members are intelligent and vigilant, should be sufficient, supported, as it ever is, by the prevailing facilities for defense and the opportunity to secure prompt reinforcements by telephone.

"But in order to its highest effectiveness, such guard should be under the immediate charge and command of some particular officer, and a definite system should be

observed as to the place and character of the vigils of the different members. In addition to this, there should be adopted a definite rule as to admissions to the building during the night, and such rule should and must be strictly enforced.

The necessity in this latter direction is best illustrated by a recital of circumstances actually witnessed during the present month, during the day as well as at times during the evening hours, I having been the witness as to some of them myself. Thus there are certain foreigners in town whose fidelity to the present conditions is at least questionable and their sympathy with the late insurrection at least suspected. In addition to these are some native and half-white members of the bar, whose hostility upon this point is hardly a matter of doubt. And yet it is no uncommon thing for the parties referred to, sometimes several at once, to enter the police building and walk unchallenged through any part of at least the ground floor thereof. For instance, they have been seen to go, as a matter of course, into the back recesses of your office, whence the route to the armory is through a door unsecured, as a general rule, by either lock or guard. The key to the armory, moreover, has very recently been accessible to any one from that recess.

I recite these facts, not in a spirit of complaint, but as tending to show how easy it might be for half a dozen armed and determined men, gaining the advantage of such an entrance, either day or night, to spring upon and overpower, shoot down, or intimidate the unsuspecting officer in charge and thus capture the building. If it be thought that such an event is not probable, the answer is that our aim must be to guard against possible and not alone probable attacks.

I have, therefore, to request your careful attention to the following system of guarding that building, which may, of course, be supplemented by any details you may think necessary to add, viz:

That the main door and all other means of access to said building, except the door to the receiving station, be closed and bolted (unless upon special occasions) not later than 8 o'clock in the evening, and I think an even earlier hour preferable. That the special guard shall always have among their own number a leader whose orders they will be obliged to obey, and who shall be responsible for the due execution by the guard of their stipulated duties, and who, in the absence of the captain of the watch or other superior officer, shall have full command of the building and all the officers therein and thereabout. From the fact of his being on watch during the entire night and not changing with the different watches, I should suppose Mr. Hitchcock (if satisfactory in other respects) an eligible man for this position.

The guard should be armed with clubs and pistols, and should have, each man, his rifle and filled cartridge belt conveniently at hand, elsewhere than in the receiving station. At least one of the guard (I think two preferable) should be kept constantly on patrol in Merchant street between Nuanu and Kaahumanu, to observe movements in the three streets named, as well as Bethel street. These patrolmen should be relieved, say, every two hours, by other members of the guard, and should be kept diligently on the move and observant of events. Half-hourly circuits of the block in which the building stands should be made by one of such patrolmen, *i. e.*, around to and along Queen street. The rest of the guard should be on the alert, so disposed throughout the building as to be able to rally on any point immediately upon call, and at least one of them should be in the receiving station all the time, whence the means of access to the yard and ground cells is very easy.

The patrols will of course give the earliest possible notice of any persons or events in the locality out of the natural order, and thus the entire guard will be ever ready to meet any exigency or repel any attack. In this connection let me caution you that nothing short of a tragedy within plain sight, or orders from the marshal, should tempt any member of the guard away from the building or his beat.

In case of an attack they should meet it upon the sidewalk, at the doors, or retreat within the building, secure the doors and defend the premises from the windows, as the force and direction of the attacking party might suggest to the one in command, and telephone at once to the marshal or his deputies. Seven resolute men, well armed, should be able to hold that building for hours against any force that could be brought against it from the front.

I understand that the hours of special guard are now from 8 p. m. to 6 a. m. While I do not now think it necessary to extend these hours, yet captains of watches coming on duty at 6 p. m. and 6 a. m., respectively, should be especially instructed to give particular attention to the guarding of the building prior to the advent and after the departure of the special guard evening and morning. This, I think, during one hour of each of those watches, should take the form of a small detail of their foreign patrols for this service.

Now as to the indiscriminate admission of all comers to the different offices of the building. This should be guarded against during the day by some practicable yet reasonable rule, that will at once permit the despatch of business and secure the privacy of portions of the premises. After office hours in the evening no one except

members of the force, regular or special, or other officers of the Government, and attorneys and others upon legitimate business, to be stated to the officer in charge, should be admitted to the building. Let this principle be enforced.

In particular I would call your attention to the oft-recurring absence of "all hands" from your own office during business hours, which of course leaves open opportunities such as should not exist for any venture such as herein discussed. I have frequently (and several times during the present month) tried in vain to ring up some occupant of your office. A trial of both telephones convinced me that no one was present. I need not assure you that this should not be, particularly at the present juncture, and I shall expect to see it remedied.

Not wishing to handicap you by the enumeration of details to be observed in the carrying into effect of the foregoing instructions, I leave them chiefly for your own device and application. The main purpose, and in fact the only purpose, of my writing thus at length is to secure the ample protection to that building which its present importance demands.

I repeat, that nothing herein is penned in a spirit of complaint but of caution and admonition only. I shall expect the main object of these instructions to be scrupulously observed and lived up to. I purpose to myself test the efficiency and vigilance of the guard in question from time to time, and recommend the same course to you. While I desire that they should have a general notice to this effect, for the purpose of keeping them on their mettle, I shall give no special notice of the hours of my visits.

Yours faithfully,

C. W. ASHFORD,
Attorney-General.

That was the opinion of the attorney-general in August last, when he thought that we ought to guard against possible, not merely probable, danger; when he thought that it was necessary to have men armed to the teeth with clubs, pistols, rifles, and cartridge belts. Now, when we have a volunteer guard at night only, with no weapons on them, he complains and sees a threat and a menace to the community.

The statement that there was unnecessary ostentation and display is without foundation. As a matter of fact, the guard was there two weeks before the public knew anything of it.

At this time garbled accounts of what was being done by the cabinet appeared in both English and native, which could only have come from the attorney-general. Arguments which the attorney-general made in the cabinet, down even to the underscoring, came out next day in the newspapers with those very points in italics. If anyone wants to know what it is to be in hell without waiting for eternity, let him be in a divided cabinet, knowing that every word and act is being reported and misconstrued by a traitor, with the knowledge that a man is among you whom you can not trust and the possibility of another 30th of July hanging over your head.

That was the situation. What was to be done? The attorney-general was giving demoralizing and revolutionary advice to the King. Never before has the King refused to follow the advice of the supreme court. That was the bulwark of the country, and the King never dreamed of refusing to follow their advice, until the attorney-general advised him to do so. I say the action of the attorney-general was revolutionary, and it has brought the King into a revolutionary position, which he has maintained ever since. The chairman of the foreign affairs committee has referred to my "brutal statements" to the King. Mr. President, I am no courtier; I never was and never shall be one; I believe in speaking the truth, and I have done it. I have made no brutal statements to the King. I have treated him with perfect respect, but with perfect candor. When he was taking a course contrary to the law and the constitution, I did not tell him that he was doing right, but that he was taking a course that would bring disaster upon himself and upon the country.

In this situation, with the history of Robert Wilcox before us, with the facts in regard to V. V. Ashford before us, with the attorney-general in open hostility to the cabinet, refusing to resign and saying that he would stay to paralyze all action, in this situation I say that even if there had been no truth in the report which came to us there would still have been ample ground for taking the precautions urged by the attorney-general in August last. The marshal came to me to consult. He had received information from a different source from mine of a similar character. He felt that he could not consistently with his duty to the community and to himself go to the attorney-general and tell him what he knew. After talking it over with the other members of the cabinet, the marshal stated that he could get volunteers, and stated who they were, men of the most respectable standing, clerks, bookkeepers, etc., as well as a few Government employes, who took steps, and the station house was guarded for several weeks before it was known at all.

Now in regard to the night of the 17th of April, when the minister of the interior "was there," the Gatling gun run out, and the 40 armed men on hand.

A 1 a. m. I was rung up with the statement that a policeman had seen a body of armed men. I thought it sufficient to put us on our guard. I went down, found 5 men on guard, and we telephoned for 3 or 4 more. No one else was there. The statement as to 40 men is entirely without foundation. We stayed till daybreak. The guns were not put out into the street; there was no unnecessary exhibition of force; there was no guard sent out to the Rifle's armory, unless you consider one lame prisoner such a guard. One or two men patrolled. I took the statement of the policeman in writing. He stated that there was a passer who could confirm it, and the next day he brought the man who stated that he had seen some armed men in that neighborhood. Whether there were any armed men there, you know as well as I. At anyrate there was the information, and I considered it was my duty to be on hand, and for the marshal to be on his guard. Suppose no precaution had been taken, and the station had been captured, then what?

The fact is it was the duty of the attorney-general to inquire into the situation and guard the peace. He did nothing whatever, and the rest of the cabinet had to take the responsibility of guarding, not merely against "probable," but "possible" dangers.

As to the statement that these precautions were calculated to create a disturbance, this strikes me as one of the thinnest, flimsiest and most ridiculous propositions that I ever heard. Precautions of this kind are the first thing to prevent a disturbance. Look at Berlin on the 1st of May, labor day; it was a garrison. Look at London a few years ago at the Hyde Park riots, and citizens were sworn in as special police by the thousand. And yet it is claimed that the precautions taken here tended to excite a disturbance; that the presence of a few men at the police station, probably playing cards when not on duty, must so tend to excite Mr Wilcox's nerve centers as to lead him to shoulder a musket and try to capture the police station, just because there were a few men there who had a perfect right to be there.

Mr. President, on this statement I am ready to leave it to the house whether the inaction of the attorney-general is to be commended, or the positive course of the majority of the remainder of the cabinet. Taking into consideration what happened on the 30th of July, would we not have been responsible for any loss of life or property, if we had neglected these precautions and a disturbance had occurred. I am willing to leave it to the house, but if every man votes against me, I would still, in a similar situation, when I thought the country was threatened with a possibility of danger, act as I have, whether the attorney-general approved it or not.

Representative Bush moves to amend by referring to printing committee to have both replies printed in English and Hawaiian.

Representative Brown seconded the amendment.

The motion as amended was carried.

House adjourned at 1:10 p. m. until Monday.

Diplomatic reception—Brilliant entertainment at the United States legation.

His excellency J. L. Stevens, United States minister resident, and Mrs. Stevens, held a reception at the legation, Nuuanu avenue, from 3 to 6 o'clock yesterday afternoon. It was an event both brilliant and pleasant. Flags almost covering the house showed their bright colors to the street through interstices of the luxuriant foliage. Lovely bouquets, clusters of gorgeous lilies, and other floral designs, with profuse traceries of vines, made the interior a delight to the eye, while filling the air with fragrance. An elegant collation was spread in the dining room, and no guest was permitted to depart without receiving an invitation to be refreshed.

His excellency and amiable lady gave a cordial greeting to all. Mrs. Stevens was assisted in receiving and in dispensing the hospitalities of the legation by the Misses Stevens, Mrs. Severance and Miss Severance, Mrs. J. O. Carter and the Misses Carter, Mrs. W. Foster, the Misses Winter, and Miss Waterhouse.

The band of the United States flagship *Charleston*, sixteen pieces, under Bandmaster Carlo, played on the grounds alternately with the Royal Hawaiian Band. The playing of the naval band was very much admired. The programme of the concert was the following:

Overture—Masaniello	Auber.
Chorus—Tanhäuser	Wagner.
Gavotte—Festival	Latann.
Reminiscences of Verdi	Godfrey.
Fantasia—Recollections of the War	Beyer.
Waltz—1,001 Nights	Strauss.
Patrol—Guard Mount	Eclenberg.
Medley—Ye Olden Times	Catlin.

The Star Spangled Banner.

Hawaii Poul.

Their majesties and the heir apparent were among the callers. The King was attended by Mr. Jas. W. Robertson, vice-chamberlain, and His Majesty's staff. Mrs. Robertson was lady-in-waiting to the Queen. Hon. A. S. Cleghorn was present with Princess Liliuokalani. Visitors were coming and going during the three hours, the following being some of them:

Their excellencies Jona. Austin, minister of foreign affairs and C. W. Ashford, attorney-general; Hon. C. R. Bishop, Hon. and Mrs. W. F. Allen, Hon. and Mrs. J. B. Atherton, Miss Atherton, Hon. and Mrs. W. G. Irwin and Mrs. Ivers, Hon. and Mrs. W. D. Alexander, Mrs. J. I. Dowsett and the Misses Dowsett; Major J. H. Wodehouse, British commissioner, Mrs. and Miss Wodehouse; Mr. G. C. B. d'Anglade, French commissioner; Mr. A. de Souza Canavarro, Portuguese commissioner, and Mrs. Canavarro; Mr. Masaki, Japanese diplomatic agent, and members of his legation; Rear-Admiral Brown, U. S. N.; Mr. H. W. Severance, United States consul-general, Mrs. and the Misses Severance; Mr. F. A. Schaefer, consul for Italy and dean of consular corps; Mr. H. W. Schmidt, Swedish consul, and Mrs. Schmidt; Mr. C. Afong, Chinese commercial agent, and Miss Afong; Mr. A. W. Richardson, United States vice-consul-general; Mr. T. R. Walker, British vice-consul; Capt. Remey and staff, U. S. flagship *Charleston*; Capt. Green and staff, U. S. S. *Adams*; Capt. McCurley and staff, U. S. S. *Nipsic*; Lieut. Dyer, Lieut. Blow, and Mr. Cole (of the admiral's staff); Lieut. Qualtrough, Fleet Surgeon Woods, Dr. Weiber, Fleet Paymaster Arthur Burtis, with Mrs. Burtis; Fleet Engineer Inch, and Mr. Hollis, with Mrs. Hollis, U. S. flagship *Charleston*; Chief Engineer Webster, U. S. S. *Nipsic*; Rt. Rev. the Bishop of Honolulu and Mrs. Willis, Rev. and Mrs. H. Bingham, Rev. and Mrs. S. E. Bishop, Rev. and Mrs. W. C. Merritt, Rev. and Mrs. A. Mackintosh and Miss Von Holt, Mrs. R. F. Bickerton, Mrs. W. Foster, Dr. and Mrs. A. B. Lyons, Dr. and Mrs. C. T. Rogers, Dr. Lindley of Kentucky, Dr. and Mrs. J. S. McGrew, Dr. J. S. Emerson, Dr. Kimball, Col. V. V. Ashford, Capt. Mist, R. N., and Miss Mist, Prof. and Mrs. M. M. Scott, Prof. and Mrs. G. Sauvlet, Maj. and Mrs. C. T. Gulick, Hon. Jas. Anderson, Mr. and Mrs. J. O. Carter and the Misses Carter; Hon. and Mrs. B. F. Dunning, Misses Dunning and Clarke, Mrs. Helen Mather, New York; Mr. and Mrs. George Fritch, Mrs. Eugene B. Rail, Mr. and Mrs. Layton, San Francisco; Mrs. S. C. Allen, Mr. and Mrs. W. W. Hall, Mrs. G. E. Boardman, Mrs. Robt. Lewers and Miss Lewers, Mr. and Mrs. T. F. Lansing, Mrs. W. W. Dimond, Mr. and Mrs. W. C. Wilder, Mr. G. K. Wilder, Mr. and Mrs. B. F. Dillingham, Mr. and Mrs. J. G. Spencer, Mr. and Mrs. C. L. Carter, Mr. and Mrs. E. A. Jones, Mr. and Mrs. H. H. Renjes, Mr. and Mrs. H. F. Wichman, Mrs. S. B. Rose and Miss Rose, Misses Chamberlain, Waterhouse, Winter, Payson, Atkinson, Brewer, and Snow; Messrs. H. Waterhouse, W. C. Parke, W. H. Baird, J. Dyer, T. M. Starkey, G. C. Potter, and Paul Hamill.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 27.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 14, 1890.

SIR: I have received your No. 25, of the 28th ultimo, apprising me of the unexpected change in the attitude of "two or three" of the new members of the Hawaiian Legislature, by which the opposition to the reform party gains strength enough to control that body; also of the fact that one member of the present ministry, of Canadian birth, is in declared agreement with the opposition party.

Noting your reference to the circumstance that the present "aspect of the sugar question" in our Congress "strengthens the opponents of the existing ministry and continues to depress and alarm the Americans" in Hawaii,

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 27.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, June 26, 1890.

SIR: Corresponding to strong indications of which I have previously informed the Department of State, there has been made an entire change in the Hawaiian ministry. The attorney-general, C. W. Ashford, a Canadian by birth, since his return here in April from a visit in Canada, where he is known to have been in intercourse with the leading members of the Dominion ministry, had completely changed in his attitude towards his colleagues and in his views as to commercial relations with the United States. He is believed to have strongly entered into the Canadian plans of connecting these islands with the Canadian Pacific Railway by cable and steamer and commercial arrangements. He suddenly took ground against the reform party, with which he had been identified, and sought to sustain himself by uniting with the party he had before strongly opposed, and stimulating the reactionary tendencies among the less responsible portion of the citizens and residents here. The other three ministers, finding it impossible to carry on the Government with him, tested their strength by a motion of want of confidence in Ashford. The vote in the Legislature was a tie—24 to 24. At once the three ministers offered their resignations, and this forced the resignation of Ashford.

A new ministry has been formed, composed of two from each party. John A. Cummins, a half-caste and a large sugar planter, is the minister of foreign affairs. Godfrey Brown, minister of finance, was born in England, leaving his native country at three years of age; he lived years in New York and California, and has recently spent a while in the city of Washington. C. N. Spencer, the minister of interior, is a native of New York State, but came to these islands in childhood. A. P. Peterson, the attorney-general, is a native of Massachusetts, and is regarded the ablest man of the new cabinet. As a whole, the ministry has less intellectual force and character than its predecessor. The reform party is in a measure satisfied, because it is better than it feared. The more numerous portion of the party of the King and of the native factions is dissatisfied because it has only two of the four ministers, and these not of the most pronounced type. It is less decidedly American than the three best of the retiring cabinet, yet it is reasonable to hope that it will favor strong friendly relations with the United States.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 29.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 3, 1890.

SIR: I have read with interest your No. 26, of the 9th instant, in which you transmit a copy of a speech delivered on the 6th June last, in the Hawaiian Legislative Assembly, by Hon. L. A. Thurston, minister of the interior, relative to the political situation in Hawaii.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Adee to Mr. Stevens.

No. 31.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 14, 1890.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 27, of the 26th ultimo, announcing a recent change in the cabinet of His Majesty and communicating a sketch of its members.

I am, sir, etc.,

ALVEY A. ADEE,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 2.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 16, 1890.

SIR: I inclose for your confidential information copy of a letter recently received from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, transmitting one from the commander in chief of the United States naval force in the Pacific station, in regard to political affairs in the Hawaiian Islands. The letter in question seems to confirm the general tenor of your dispatches on the same subject.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 30.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, August 19, 1890.

SIR: I regret to be obliged to report to the Department of State that the political affairs of this island Kingdom have recently assumed a less assuring aspect. It is well known that the present constitution was gained by the people, especially by the property holders and business men, in 1887, much as the Magna Charta of England was gained by the barons from King John in 1215. Kalakaua has always been restless under this constitution, to which he has solemnly sworn. The result of the elections last February encourages him to hope that the constitution might be so changed as to restore to him much of his former autocratic power. A movement has been put on foot to this end. A popular delegation, composed mainly of the less intelligent natives, led chiefly by unscrupulous demagogues, has formally marched to the palace and presented petitions in a revolutionary sense, asking the call of a constitutional convention. The King, without having consulted or received the sanction of his cabinet, has commended the objects of these petitions in a message to the Legislature.

The constitution specifically provides how it may be amended, which is by voting proposed amendments by the Legislature, which amendments must be resubmitted and voted by another Legislature two years

subsequently. The businessmen and the more responsible citizens of the islands are greatly disturbed. For good reasons they fear to have the country convulsed by such an issue. The English commissioner and the undersigned have been urged confidentially by the leading member of the cabinet and by the most conservative of the Legislature to counsel the King against the rash and dangerous step. My English colleague, who has been here twenty years, fully agrees with me as to what the situation demands of us. Yesterday, in a confidential interview, the commissioner and myself gave our opinions and advice to His Majesty. Of his bearing toward us we have no reason to complain. The two ablest of his four ministers are against changing the constitution in the revolutionary way proposed, and it now looks as though the other two will decide to go with their colleagues. A careful count in the Legislature indicates that a small majority will vote to adhere to the constitution as it is, consenting to small amendments to be made in the way provided. There is some fear of a mob in surprise to force a revolutionary vote by intimidation, and there is little reliance placed on the native police in an emergency. The King professes that he is neutral in the controversy, and that he has only brought popular grievances to the attention of the Legislature. But the facts are conclusively against this pretension. None of the best citizens here have the least faith in these royal professions. He and a few corrupt parasites are at the center of the conspiracy, back of which is a big loan in London for their corrupt handling.

Under the circumstances it is my duty to say that one United States ship of war should remain at Honolulu. The English commissioner thinks it highly necessary that one English ship should continue here constantly. All of the more responsible business men here are of like opinion. The presence of this force has a suggestive meaning to the disorderly element here. I shall continue to act cautiously but firmly, in the light of former precedents of the Department of State and of this legation, varied only by different facts and circumstances. Admiral Brown, who was here two months, who had former experience here, before he left on the *Charleston* a few days since was strongly of the opinion that one vessel, or more, of the United States Pacific naval force should be kept here, though when he left the aspect of affairs was apparently more auspicious than at present. The *Nipsic* is here, and I understood from the Admiral that on the departure of this vessel her place would be taken by the *Iroquois* or *Mohican*. I assume such to be the naval orders.

I have the honor, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 4.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 10, 1890.

SIR: I inclose copy of a letter of the Secretary of the Navy and a copy of the report therewith on the serious political situation in Hawaii, which as confirmatory of your No. 30 of the 19th ultimo will doubtless be read with interest.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 2.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,

Honolulu, September 17, 1890.

SIR: My commission as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary has been duly received at this legation, and I have officially communicated the fact to the Hawaiian Government, and the King has received me formally in said capacity as the following authoritative publication shows :

BY AUTHORITY.

Foreign office notice.

FOREIGN OFFICE,

Honolulu, September 8, 1890.

This day had audience of the King his excellency John L. Stevens, United States minister resident, to present his credentials as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America.

His excellency Hon. John A. Cummins, His Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, presented to His Majesty the King his excellency John L. Stevens, who addressed His Majesty as follows:

"SIR: In appointing me envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, placing the representative to His Majesty's Government on an equality with the American representatives to the great nations of the world, the Government of the United States once more manifests its strong friendship for the Hawaiian kingdom and its firm resolution to respect its autonomy and to promote its welfare.

"His Majesty may be sure that it always will be my earnest effort faithfully to carry out the instructions of my Government.

"In doing so I shall endeavor to show proper respect to His Majesty, and in any counsel or advice which I may give I shall seek the peace and prosperity of his kingdom. Thus I shall help to foster good relations between the two countries so closely united by near neighborhood and common interests."

His Majesty was pleased to reply to His Excellency John L. Stevens as follows:

"MR. ENVOY: It is with pleasure that I receive from you the assurance of the continuance of the friendly regard of the President and the people of the American nation for the sovereign and people of Hawaii.

"And I am well pleased to receive as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States a gentleman who has already in the capacity of minister resident given so many proofs of the good-will and kindly feelings entertained by him towards my kingdom, myself and my people.

"And I fully appreciate the honor done to my crown and kingdom by the action of the President of the United States in placing the representative of the United States in my kingdom on an equality with the American representatives to the great nations of the world, and the expression thereby of his firm resolution to respect our autonomy and to promote our welfare.

"The officers of my government will be instructed to tender to you every attention and courtesy during your official residence in my dominions.

His majesty was attended on this occasion by the Hon. John O. Dominis, Hon. A. S. Cleghorn, his honor the Chief Justice A. F. Judd, Hon. John S. Walker, president of the Legislature; his excellency, Hon. J. A. Cummins, minister foreign affairs; colonel, the Hon. G. W. McFarlane, his majesty's chamberlain; J. W. Robertson, esq., his majesty's vice chamberlain; Maj. John D. Holt, jr., A. D. C.; captain, the Hon. Edward K. Lilikalani, equerry in waiting.

I have the honor, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 3.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 25, 1890.

SIR: In my dispatch 27 of August 15, I gave an account of the political status of things here touching a constitutional convention and the advice of the English commissioner and myself privately given to the King. Since the date of that dispatch the situation has gradually improved. The counsel we gave His Majesty appears to have operated even more favorably than we expected. By the intent or want of restraint of the King the fact that we had advised him against the revolutionary scheme of the convention became known to the public, as we presumed it probably would. The effect of this has been to unify and strengthen the efforts of the best citizens who are opposed to the convention, and to lessen the numbers and influence of its supporters. The King is not of those who stick to a losing cause.

Seeing the increasing strength of the opponents of the convention in the legislature, and among the chief property holders and responsible citizens, he is more ready to appreciate our advice. We have it from good sources that the King is now opposed to the convention, and present appearances are that the convention scheme will be defeated in the Legislature by a decisive vote. The committee having the matter in hand, originally supposed to be in favor of the convention, have just made a majority report against it by a vote of two-thirds of its members. It is agreed that the question shall be taken up by the Legislature September 29. There are threats of attempts to constrain the Legislature by intimidation and violence. But at present writing it looks like a pacific solution by the legislative approval of some constitutional amendments in the manner prescribed by the constitution as it is.

By the next mail following this I hope to be able to announce the decision of the Legislature and the final adjournment of that body.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 8.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 15, 1890.

SIR: I have received your No. 3 of the 25th ultimo, informing me that the majority report of the committee on the bill in the Hawaiian Legislature to convene delegates to frame a new constitution is opposed to such a convention, and stating, also, that His Majesty is believed to be now opposed to such a convention.

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 7.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, October 22, 1890.

SIR: Though it may be somewhat outside of the conventional rules of my office, a due regard for the interests of the United States Government seems to require that I should make a brief statement in respect to a coal depot in Honolulu. Admiral Brown has called my attention to the subject and asked me to express my views thereon to the Department of State. Previously to the admiral's arrival here circumstances had led me to the conclusion which I shall here indicate. I need not repeat the well-known truths as to the necessity of good stopping places and coaling stations for vessels of commerce and vessels of war. Napoleon's adage that armies march on their bellies has an equally strong application to the agents and servants that win commercial and naval victories on the seas. It goes without saying that the Hawaiian Islands have a commanding position in the North Pacific. The Government of the United States has long recognized this fact. If it is well to have a coaling station at the Samoan group, how much more important it is to have one at Honolulu. To one familiar with the facts it is plain that the supply of its naval vessels here should not depend on private parties and local dealers. The price of coal greatly varies at these islands, owing to the distance from the sources of supply and the irregularities and varying contingencies of the demand. At one time the wholesale price is nearly double what it is at another. If our Government can have proper and convenient landing and building for its coal, filled from our mines at home or by cargoes purchased here at the lowest market rates, I am confident that a large saving can be made in the cost of coal supplies to our naval vessels, which thus would not be subjected to undue exactions of the local dealers and to uncertain contingencies. I am clearly of the opinion that the views of Admiral Brown on the subject are based on substantial facts, and are those which business men would carry out in their private affairs. The owners of the land of whom he speaks are personally known to me as reliable and responsible men, and I think their terms for the first twenty-five years of lease are reasonable, and that it would be well to secure the option of a subsequent lease unless our Government should decide to make an absolute purchase at the present time, which I would regard preferable.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 9.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 12, 1890.

SIR: I have received your No. 7 of the 22d October last, favoring the establishment of a coal depot at Honolulu, for the use of our naval force.

A copy has been sent to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 8.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 14, 1890.

SIR: After a session of 146 days the Hawaiian Legislature adjourned finally to-day. The general course of its proceedings has been more deliberate and conservative than it was generally anticipated by the most thoughtful citizens.

As my previous dispatches have indicated, the first months of the session were somewhat stormy and there was considerable public excitement, mainly growing out of the attempt to change the constitution in a revolutionary way and in a reactionary direction. The defeat of this movement was so complete and decisive that the malcontents gradually lost a large degree of their influence and gave up their efforts as hopeless, at least for the present. Some amendments to the constitution have been voted nearly unanimously, while the constitutional convention scheme was rejected by a large majority. But the amendments thus passed through their first stage do not restore to the King any of the power taken from him by the constitution of 1887, and the functions of the Legislature and of the ministry are not at all impaired. This result has been largely owing to the good conduct and superior ability of the reform members, who, with a majority of two or three against them at the beginning of the session, were enabled largely to control the Legislature. In this they had the coöperation of some of the most conservative of the opposition party. A careful review of what has transpired confirms the opinion that the earnest advice which the English commissioner and myself gave His Majesty was expedient and salutary.

In this connection I may be allowed to remark that the sudden return here by Admiral Brown in the *Charleston* from Puget Sound, about which more or less comments were made by the Pacific Coast press, was not at my solicitation, but was entirely unexpected by me, my request having been only for the retention of one United States ship here. But it is just to say, that it is the judgment of the best informed and most responsible men here that the coming into the harbor of that powerful ship of war, the circumstances being as they were, had a very pacifying effect on the disorderly elements here. The average native mind and the more irresponsible of the foreign population looked upon it as a plain determination of the United States Government not to tolerate disorder on these islands.

After the decision of the question of the constitutional convention the most exciting and important issue before the Legislature has been that of "labor." The sugar and rice farmers have a pressing need for seven or eight thousand more laborers than are attainable in the islands. The Japanese and Chinese are regarded the most available, and a majority of the planters prefer the latter. Yet there is among all classes a strong aversion to receiving into the country more Asiatics. The Legislature has passed, finally, with general unanimity, a very stringent bill, allowing the admission of more Chinese under a specific contract, with adequate bonds that they shall engage in no other employment than on the sugar and rice plantations, and that at the close of their terms of engagement they shall return to China. This measure does not apply in any of its provisions to persons now in the islands.

The amount of appropriations voted are large, considering the population of the country. The total amount for the two years covered is

\$4,774,171. Of this sum \$200,000 is for the improvement of Honolulu harbor and its entrance; \$63,000 for the new wharves and sea wall at Honolulu; \$275,500 for additional water supply and the improvement of the works; \$244,500 for the care of the lepers; and \$270,000 for educational purposes and school buildings. The liberal annual subsidy of \$24,000 for the San Francisco steamers is continued, and subsidies to the amount of \$15,000 have been voted for a monthly steamer to Tahiti, and an equal sum for a monthly steamer to Southern California. Liberal appropriations have been made for roads and bridges, thus continuing the wise and highly necessary policy greatly enlarged and stimulated by the reform party when it came into power in 1887. A resolution has been passed, nearly unanimously, requesting the ministry to open negotiations with the Government of the United States for the purpose of enlarging the free list of the two countries under Reciprocity.

While some bills have been passed which are not creditable in their character, in the main the doings of this Legislature have been such as to receive the approval of the best public opinion.

I have, &c.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

N. B.—Allow me to express the earnest hope that no part of my dispatches relating to any feature or fact of Hawaiian politics be allowed to go into the published volumes of the Department of State.

The official copy not having yet been received at this legation, I inclose newspaper copy of the resolution passed yesterday relative to Reciprocity.

J. L. S.

Whereas, recent tariff legislation by the United States has, to a great extent, diminished the value to Hawaii of the existing treaty of reciprocity with that country, and

Whereas, the history of the relations of the two countries has been such that Hawaii can with confidence ever depend upon the integrity, good faith, and generous friendship of the United States of America,

Now, therefore, be it resolved that it is the sense of the nobles and representatives of this Kingdom in the Legislature assembled that the Hawaiian Government should, while guarding most zealously the freedom, autonomy, and independent sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hawaii, enter into negotiations with the United States Government for a treaty revision looking toward the extension of the principle of reciprocity between the two countries to other articles which may be the product or manufacture of the two countries with a view to the continuance and increase of the mutual benefits which have heretofore accrued to both countries under the existing reciprocity treaty.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 9.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 20, 1890.

SIR: His Majesty, King Kalakaua, with consent of his cabinet and friends, will probably take passage on board the U. S. ship *Charleston*, Admiral Brown in command, Tuesday, February 25, for San Francisco. He makes this visit to the Pacific coast for the benefit of his health, at this time not very good. I understand he would be pleased to have official recognition on his arrival at San Francisco, but there-

after would wish to travel incog., or in a private manner. It is not now supposed that he will go east of the mountains, unless on his arrival at San Francisco he should receive advices from Minister Carter to the import that it is an opportune time to enter on new negotiations at Washington relative to Reciprocity. The belief prevails here among the best informed that the fitting time for this will not be before late in the winter or in the spring.

If deemed necessary and proper, a telegram can be sent from Washington directing that the usual salutes be fired on the arrival of the King in the *Charleston*. It is thought that the passage from Honolulu to San Francisco will take from twelve to fourteen days. The King will be accompanied by his chamberlain, Col. George W. McFarland.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 11.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 5, 1890.

SIR: I have received your No. 9 of the 20th ultimo, relative to the departure of His Majesty, the King of Hawaii, for San Francisco.

Stating that every proper courtesy will be shown to His Majesty on his arrival,

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 16.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 5, 1891.

SIR: Eight days prior to its reception at this legation the Department of State had received the sad intelligence of the death of His Majesty, King Kalakaua, in San Francisco, and of the attending circumstances. The *Charleston*, Admiral George Brown in command, arrived here on the morning of the 29th with his remains, causing a deep impression among the native and foreign population. In the afternoon of the same day, commencing at precisely 5 o'clock, the body was taken from the *Charleston* and transferred to the royal palace, the hearse being followed by the Hawaiian ministers, members of the diplomatic corps, American and English naval officers, escorted by a body of marines and sailors from the *Charleston*, the *Mohican*, and the English naval vessel, the *Nymph*, and an immense concourse of citizens. This display of honor was admirably conducted, largely under the direction of Admiral Brown, the chief portion of the military escort being American.

By a note from the minister of foreign affairs, the evening of the 29th, I was officially informed that the remains of the King would lie in state from 11 a. m. to 11:15 of the 30th, for the observation of the diplomatic corps, and in company with Mrs. Stevens I improved the opportunity in an appropriate manner.

In the afternoon of January 29th, prior to the removal of the royal remains from the *Charleston*, the new sovereign was proclaimed, of which fact I was duly informed by the following communication:

FOREIGN OFFICE,
Honolulu, January 29, 1891.

SIR: I have the honor to inform your excellency that on this day Her Royal Highness, Princess Liliuokalani, Regent, was publically proclaimed as successor to His late Majesty, Kalakaua, deceased, as Queen of the Hawaiian Islands, in accordance with the twenty-second article of the constitution, under the style and title of Liliuokalani.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect and esteem,
Your excellency's most obedient humble servant,

JOHN A. CUMMINS,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.

The remains of the deceased King will remain in state at the royal palace until the 15th instant, when the final funereal obsequies will take place. The present ministers perhaps will continue in office until the meeting of the legislature in 1892, the Queen not having the power to change them without the previous action of that body. This sudden and unexpected change of sovereigns has been made without commotion and with no extraordinary excitement.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 18.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 9, 1891.

SIR: Herewith inclosed I transmit to the Department of State a copy of resolutions adopted at a public meeting of a large number of influential native-born citizens of the Hawaiian Islands, relative to the death, and its attending circumstances, of the late King Kalakaua. I also inclose a copy of my remarks addressed to the committee who called at this legation and placed the said resolutions in my hands.

I forward likewise a copy of resolutions adopted at a less numerous assemblage of native Hawaiian citizens, among whom I may name John E. Bush, formerly a Hawaiian minister, now editor of a native newspaper, and a present member of the legislature, a half caste, R. W. Wilcox, leader of the revolutionary attempt of July, 1889, and others of similar political sympathies.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 18.]

RESOLUTIONS.

Whereas the unbounded courtesy and kind attentions extended to his late Majesty, King Kalakaua, in his recent visit to California by the United States Government, the State of California, the city of San Francisco, as well as citizens and residents in San Francisco, and by Rear-Admiral George Brown and the officers and men of the United States Flagship *Charleston* have placed the Hawaiian nation under a deep debt of gratitude to the United States and to citizens of said country, and to said Rear-Admiral Brown, his officers, and men: Therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Hawaiian people recognize, with the deepest gratitude, the great courtesies of the United States Government, and of officials and citizens of the

State of California, in the courtesies extended to his late Majesty, the King, upon the occasion of his recent visit to California, where he met his most untimely death; and be it further

Resolved, That we recognize a like debt of gratitude to Rear-Admiral Brown, of the American Flagship *Charleston*, and to his officers and men, in their more than courteous treatment and care of his late Majesty, King Kalakaua, both in going to California and in their tender care and attention during his illness and in returning his remains to our midst; and be it further

Resolved, That an engrossed copy hereof be presented to his excellency John L. Stevens, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States in Honolulu, for transmission to Washington; that a like copy be sent to the governor of California; another to the mayor of the city of San Francisco, and another be presented to Rear-Admiral Brown, on behalf of his late Majesty's grateful subjects and friends.

HONOLULU, H. I., 5th February, A. D. 1891.

PAUL P. KOMOA,
W. L. HOLOKOHILL,
S. K. KANE,
J. KALUA KABOOKANO,
JOHN LOT KAULAKOU,
JOHN F. COLBURN,
PARK P. ROBINSON,
SAMUEL PARKER,
WM. G. IRWIN,
E. C. MACFARLANE,
WM. R. CASTLE,
ALEX. YOUNG,
C. O. BERGERY,
PAUL R. ISENBURG,
F. M. SWANZY,
JOHN W. KALVA,
A. ROSA,

Committee.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 18.]

Remarks of Minister Stevens.

GENTLEMEN: It is with no ordinary emotions that I meet you under the afflictive circumstances which call you to this legation. I recognize in your committee the honored representatives of a large and influential portion of the native citizens of Hawaii, all equally interested in the welfare of their country. As the American minister at this capital I receive the resolutions which you place in my hands as the expression of the warm and sincere feelings cherished by the citizens of Hawaii for the citizens and Government of the United States. The manner in which these sentiments are called forth, and the attending circumstances of your late Sovereign's death, can not fail to strengthen permanently the fraternal and friendly relations between this island Kingdom and the American nation, which are united by the triple bonds of moral sympathy, of near neighborhood, and of common interests.

It will be my duty as well as my pleasure to transmit copies of your resolutions to the President of the United States, to the governor of California, and to the mayor of San Francisco.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 19.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 16, 1891.

SIR: The Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, an important commercial body, wishing to express thanks to the United States Government and to the people of California for the honors and kindness shown to the late King Kalakaua in his visit, illness, and death, has adopted resolutions, an engrossed copy of which is here inclosed, which is forwarded to the Department of State agreeably to request.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in No. 19.]

Resolutions unanimously passed by the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce.

Whereas the Hawaiian nation is under the highest obligation to the United States Government, to the State of California, to the corporation of San Francisco, and to the citizens of said State and city, for their truly royal welcome and entertainment of His Majesty King Kalakaua, and for the distinguished feelings of friendship and esteem exhibited toward him and the Hawaiian people in their tender and sympathetic care of the King during his recent illness, and in the funeral obsequies held in San Francisco, and in returning His Majesty's remains to its home; and

Whereas a like obligation has been incurred to Rear-Admiral George Brown and his staff, and to the officers and crew of the U. S. S. *Charleston* for their unfailing care and attention to the King in his recent visit to California, and in the return of his remains to Hawaii: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce joins with all others in this country in expressions of the most cordial thanks to the United States Government, to the State of California, to the corporation of San Francisco, and to the citizens of said State and city for their courteous attentions to His Majesty the King during his recent visit and for the like respectful and tender care of the dead King's remains, and

Resolved, That we likewise tender to Rear-Admiral George Brown and his staff and to the officers and crew of the U. S. S. *Charleston* the heartfelt thanks of this association for the courteous attentions paid to His Majesty during his visit to the Pacific coast and in the honorable attentions paid to his remains upon their return to the land of his birth.

Resolved, That an engrossed copy of the above preamble and resolutions be forwarded to the Secretary of State of the United States, to the governor of the State of California, to the mayor of the city of San Francisco, to Rear-Admiral George Brown and Captain Remy, commanding U. S. S. *Charleston*.

Resolved, That the above preamble and resolutions be spread upon the records of this Chamber of Commerce and that the same be published in the newspapers of this place.

F. A. SCHAEFFER, *Vice-President*.
I. B. ATHERTON, *Secretary*.

HONOLULU, *February 4, 1891.*

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 20.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 22, 1891.

SIR: The funeral services, with the customary honors, of King Kalakaua, took place February 15, a full account of which being contained in the printed slips which I forwarded with a previous dispatch. In the two weeks while the royal remains were lying in state in the palace, there was a good deal of friction between the dowager Queen, Kapiolani, and the reigning Queen. Almost from the day of the arrival of the news, by the *Charleston*, of the death of Kalakaua, there has been a deep interest here as to what may be the course of the new sovereign as to the cabinet and the persons who may have her confidence. Unfortunately, from the first hour of her accession she has been surrounded by some of the worst elements in the country, persons of native and foreign birth. The present ministry has been but a few months in office, and the best men of the islands, including nearly all the principal business men, wish the present ministry to remain, who, by the present constitution, are chiefly independent of the Crown and can not be removed except by impeachment, or by the vote of the Legislature.

Under her extreme notions of sovereign authority and the influence of her bad advisers, the Queen is trying to force the resignation of the ministers and to get a cabinet composed of her tools. So far the min-

isters have refused to resign and the best public opinion increases in their support. Should the supreme court sustain the right of the ministers, which is very clearly and strongly intrenched in the constitution, the ministers will be supported by such a united determination of the business men and other better citizens of the islands as will force the Queen to yield; if she should still persist and attempt to form a ministry of her own, without the consent of the Legislature, she will surely imperil her throne. She is well known to be much more stubborn in character than her brother, the late King, but my present belief is that she will finally yield to the legal and other legitimate forces operative against her present course, and place herself in the hands of the conservative and respectable men of the country as the only way to retain her throne.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in No. 20.]

FOREIGN OFFICE NOTICE.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *Honolulu, February 16, 1891.*

This day had audience of the Queen: His excellency John L. Stevens, United States envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

His excellency Hon. John A. Cummins, Her Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, presented to Her Majesty his excellency John L. Stevens, who addressed Her Majesty in the following words:

"MADAM: It is my official duty to offer to Your Majesty congratulations on your accession to the throne in accordance with the provisions of the constitution of your Kingdom. Turning from the funeral scenes through which we have just passed, I address Your Majesty words of hope as to the future of your reign. Standing on the border land of death and the future world, of which we have been so solemnly reminded by what has just transpired within our midst, and reverent toward the Supreme God, to whom all are accountable, the minister of the United States expresses his earnest gratification that Your Majesty has taken the firm resolution to aid in making your reign a strictly constitutional reign; to maintain the constitutional right of your ministers to administer the laws, and always to acknowledge their responsibility to the Legislature in the performance of their sworn obligations. In the wish thus to respect the supreme authority of the constitution and the laws Your Majesty places yourself in the exalted rank of the best sovereigns of the world, and thus will avoid those embarrassments and perplexities which have so often disturbed the peace and crippled the prosperity of countries not blessed with free and enlightened constitutions. It is my earnest prayer that Your Majesty may be able to carry out your noble resolution, and thus have full time and opportunity to discharge the duties which Your Majesty justly regards necessary to the success of your reign and beneficial to your whole people. In endeavoring to make good these auspicious promises, Your Majesty will have the full sympathy and the good wishes of the Government which I have the honor to represent at this capital."

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 15.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 28, 1891.

SIR: I have received your No. 16, of the 5th instant, relating to the death of King Kalakaua and the accession of Queen Liliuokalani; and your No. 18, of the 9th instant, transmitting a resolution of Hawaiian citizens expressive of the gratitude to the Government of the United States, the governor of California, and the mayor of San Francisco, and through them to the people they represent, for courtesies extended to the late King during his recent visit to California, and of their thanks to Rear-Admiral Brown and the officers and men under his command,

on the United States flagship *Charleston*, for the attentive entertainment of His late Majesty on his way to this country, and the solicitude and care with which his remains were returned to Honolulu on board that ship.

This Government is gratified to be apprised of the accession of Her Majesty Queen Liliuokalani, surrounded and sustained as she is by the good will and sympathy of her people; and I hasten to express on its behalf, not congratulations and good wishes alone, but the confident expectation that the high duties devolved upon her by the act of Providence will be wisely and beneficently discharged.

By his visits to this country, where he was always assured of a sincere and cordial welcome, the person of the late King had become familiar to many of the people, and his approachableness, the simplicity and amiability of his manner and the kindness of his disposition had rendered him the object of their friendly regard and aroused the desire on their part to testify their sentiments by such hospitalities as they might offer with propriety. It is therefore not necessary to emphasize the fact that his death among them became the cause of something more than a merely formal expression of sorrow, or that he will be long and pleasantly borne in remembrance.

The many years of friendship between his late Majesty and the Government of the United States, and the neighborhood and common interests of the Hawaiian and American peoples made it peculiarly fitting that the last honors should be paid to him, and his body be returned to his people, by officers and men of the American Navy, and on board an American ship of war.

Your address to the committee of Hawaiian citizens, at whose hands you received the copy of resolutions transmitted by you, is approved.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 16.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, March 2, 1891.

SIR: I have received your Nos. 21-30, and 21 *bis* of the old series, and Nos. 1-16 and No. 18 of the new series.

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 19.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, March 10, 1891.

SIR: I have received with great appreciation the copy of the resolutions of February 4, 1891, of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce which accompany your No. 19 of 16th ultimo, relating to the late visit of His Majesty King Kalakaua to this country, and to his lamented death; as also to the attention paid him while here and the solemn conveyance of his remains by one of our war-ships, from California to Honolulu.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 20.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 14, 1891.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 20, of the 22d ultimo, on the political situation in Hawaii. It has been read with interest.

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 21.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 26, 1891.

SIR: Your dispatch 15, of February 28, was received at this legation March 15. The chief portion thereof, all that relates to the late King Kalakaua and to Her Majesty the Queen, was duly communicated to the minister of foreign affairs, with the request that it should be read or otherwise made known to her, in a note dated March 17, to which I have received a response, a full copy of which is herewith inclosed.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in No. 21.]

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, March 24, 1891.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's dispatch of the 17th instant, announcing that you had received from your Government a communication through the Secretary of State, Hon. James G. Blaine, relative to the death of King Kalakaua and the accession of Queen Liliuokalani, and the resolutions of various bodies of Hawaiian citizens expressive of gratitude for the kindness shown by the Government and people of the United States to his late Majesty, and favoring me with a copy of the chief portion of said communication for Her Majesty's consideration.

In reply I beg to state that I have had the honor of conveying to Her Majesty the Queen a copy of the honorable Secretary's communication and have received her commands to acknowledge its receipt. Her Majesty is inexpressibly touched with the sincere sentiments of friendship for her departed brother and late Sovereign, for the Hawaiian nation, and for herself, so feelingly expressed by the Secretary of State for the Government of the United States. The duties of the high position Her Majesty has been called upon to assume will, under the guidance of the Supreme Ruler, be discharged with the sole aim of benefiting her people and in thus obtaining and endeavoring to maintain the esteem and friendship of all nations, but more especially of the Government represented by your excellency, whose friendship has been tried and tested in innumerable instances and to whose assistance and encouragement the nation is deeply indebted.

With the highest esteem, I remain, etc.,

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 23.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, April 4, 1891.

SIR: Since the date of my dispatch, 20, of February 23, the situation here has improved in some degree. Contrary to what seems to be the plain terms of the Hawaiian constitution and to the opinions of framers of that document, as well as of the principal lawyers here, a majority of the supreme judges decided that the cabinet of Kalakaua ceased to have legal existence at his death. Two of the four judges were appointed under the old monarchical régime prior to the adoption of the reform constitution, and have been regarded as not specially sympathetic with that document. But from whatever cause or motive, the decision of the supreme court was in accord with the earnest wish of the Queen, who was especially averse to having Hon. John A. Cummins, the half-white planter, in the ministry. Wilson, the half-white of Tahitian birth, named in my No. 20, whom, it is believed, the Queen desired for the premier, was unable to form a cabinet that the public would be likely to tolerate, of those who would consent to serve with him, and is obliged to be content with the marshalship of the Kingdom.

As now composed the ministry consists of Messrs. Widemann, Parker, Spencer, and Whiting—equally divided between the two political parties in the islands. Widemann is a German by birth, long a resident here, a man of wealth, well advanced in years, formerly in the cabinet, somewhat erratic, quite irascible, and hardly calculated to get along well with his associates. He is married to a native Hawaiian. Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs, is of three-fourths Hawaiian and one-fourth American blood, a general favorite among the Hawaiians, and very friendly to the United States. He has appointed for his chief clerk Mr. F. Hastings, formerly for years a clerk in the United States consulate here, and a native of Calais, Me. Whiting is an American lawyer, from Boston, a resident here eight years or more. Spencer is a native of the State of New York, having come to the islands when a small boy, with his father, who was United States consul at Lahaina.

The present indications as to the course of the new Sovereign are more favorable than they were the first two or three weeks after her accession. Her present bearing, and that of her husband, toward myself seem all that could be desired. It may be proper for me to say that I have it from the best sources, that my remarks on her accession, of which I sent a copy with my dispatch of February 23, have done good.

Were it not for the peculiar characteristics of Widemann, the minister of finance, I would indorse the prevailing impression here, that "the present cabinet probably will continue until the next meeting of the Legislature," in June, 1892.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Wharton.

No. 28.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, July 23, 1891.

SIR: In reply to dispatch circular of the Department of State of June 25 relative to the inquiry of the Acting Secretary of the Treasury relative to sugar bounties, I have to reply that the Hawaiian Government pays no bounty whatever "directly or indirectly" on the production or the exportation of Hawaiian sugar.

I am, sir,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 30.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, August 20, 1891.

SIR: Touching the import of the inclosed clipping from the San Francisco Chronicle, which has the appearance of being authentic, it is proper for me to say that the present political aspect here is peaceful. All the parties, since the death of Kalakaua, have been trying to gain the support of the new Sovereign and the influence of the palace, and this is tending to help keep things quiet in the immediate present. The selection of a new Legislature will occur in January, and the business men, as well as the leading political factions, are each hoping to secure a majority at the polls, and this tends to maintain present quiet. The probabilities strongly favor the presumption that a United States war ship will not be pressingly necessary in the two or three immediate months.

But as early as the first of December, without fail, the month preceding the election, and for sometime thereafter, there should be a United States vessel here to render things secure. I have strong reluctance to being regarded an alarmist, but with due regard to my responsibility I am impelled to express the opinion that a proper regard for American interests will require one ship here most of the time in 1892. In case of disturbance the only legal force here is the city police and the palace guard of 60 men, both composed of natives and half-castes, a very frail and uncertain reliance in the time of special need. The rifle companies, composed of whites, were dissolved a year since by vote of the Legislature, which was done mainly to propitiate native prejudices and to secure native votes. The best security in the future, and the only permanent security, will be the moral pressure of the business men and of what are termed "the missionary people," and the presence in the harbor of Honolulu of an American man-of-war. The presence of a United States vessel not only operates strongly to secure good order among the many nationalities here, but it is a standing notice to foreign nations that the United States has a special care for these islands.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in No. 30.—From the San Francisco Chronicle.]

Ordered to China.—*The Charleston to sail for Shanghai at once.*—*The steamers Marion, Alert, and Mohican, are to go direct from Bering Sea.*

[Special dispatch to the Chronicle.]

WASHINGTON, August 10.

Orders were issued to-day for the *Charleston* to prepare at once to sail for Shanghai. This means she will leave San Francisco to-morrow or Wednesday. She will go via Honolulu, and if her immediate presence is not required there she will continue on her journey, which, it is estimated, can be completed in fifteen or eighteen days. This will bring her into Shanghai during the first week in September, when, if the expected outbreak of Chinese students should occur, her services will be most needed.

I learn, also, that a further draft is to be made on the vessels in Bering Sea. Orders are now on the way for the *Marion* to leave Bering Sea at once for Nankin, and for the *Alert* to follow as soon as she can be spared from her present police duty. Instructions will go from San Francisco, by another Alaskan steamer leaving this week, for the *Mohican* to follow the *Marion* and *Alert* through the Aleutian Islands to the China coast.

The Department's orders to the *Alert* and *Mohican* are in a measure discretionary with their respective commanding officers. From the instructions now on the way they will understand that the situation in China is serious, and that they are expected to proceed posthaste to that country the moment the ships can safely leave the sealing grounds.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 31.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 3, 1891.

SIR: Proper respect to the Government to which I am accredited, renders it proper for me to inform the Department of State that the Prince Consort, husband of the present Queen, John Owen Dominis, died in Honolulu August 27. For several years his health has been imperfect, and for a considerable time before his death he had been confined to his room. He was born in Schenectady, N. Y., in 1832. His father was of Italian birth, and his mother a native of Boston, Massachusetts. He came to these islands a child with his parents, his father being a master marine. He was educated at a Honolulu school, and for a while served as a mercantile clerk in San Francisco, and afterwards in one of the principal American commercial houses of Honolulu, until he was appointed private secretary to Kamehameha IVth, the reigning sovereign. Subsequently he was appointed governor of Oahu, which position he held for twenty years. In 1862 he was married to the lady who is now Queen, by whom, on her accession to the throne, a few months since, he was proclaimed His Royal Highness, Prince Consort. In 1874 he visited Washington and other American cities with King Kalakaua. By his associates he has been regarded amiable in character and of strong American sympathies. His remains are now lying in state at the Royal Palace, and Sunday, September 6, will be buried with royal honors.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 32.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 5, 1891.

SIR: The Hawaiian cabinet, with the approval of the responsible citizens and the Queen, is about to renew the effort for a revision of the treaty with the United States, and the aim will be to secure entire free trade, with the exception of opium and distilled liquors. Believing that such an extension of the trade relations would be beneficial to both countries, I will endeavor to condense what seem to me the chief reasons why such a treaty as proposed should be made and carried into effect with reasonable promptness. The present reciprocity treaty has been highly advantageous to this country, has largely developed its resources, added to its wealth, and much increased American interests and influence here. It is just to say that it has had a tendency to carry investments and business enterprise too exclusively in a single channel. The repeal of the sugar duty by the United States has struck the principal material product of Hawaii a very severe blow, and with the most favorable estimate it now looks as though bankruptcy must be the inevitable fate of more or less of the sugar-planting firms and corporations.

It is fair to state that a large proportion of the liberal profits of sugar-raising made under the present treaty while the United States maintained the sugar tariff recently repealed has been expended in starting new plantations, in the building of expensive mills, purchasing improved machinery, and securing expensive methods and means of irrigation. It is obvious enough that no probable legislation or treaties can give the production of sugar here the prosperity it has had in recent years. It is equally obvious that a more diversified industry, a more varied business and development, would be for the ultimate welfare and civilization of these islands whose resources are much greater than the present population and the general American estimate of them seem to indicate. But reconstruction of business, like reconstruction in architecture and in government, is expensive to those who make it, whether by choice or compulsion.

A new, enlarged, and liberal treaty with the United States would aid the present business men and holders of property here to parry the blow which the free-sugar policy of the United States has dealt their chief industry and means of commerce, and would tend to foster other agricultural products and commercial interests. A liberal and comprehensive policy, in the direction indicated, is absolutely necessary to save these islands from grave disaster and secure the American interests and influence here which our Government has so long held of vital importance. In default of such a treaty and policy, Americans and the sons of Americans, who reside and have their investments here, will be driven to California, to Oregon, and Washington, in the desire of benefitting their fortunes and of enjoying the full citizenship of the United States. Much as Americans may desire the rapid growth and great prosperity of these splendid Pacific States, whose great future is so well assured, it is manifestly not for the best interests of the United States to have their population of business men increased by depleting these islands of those who are now the very best sentinels and supporters of American interests here. Bear in mind that the prospects and prosperity of the American Pacific States are becoming more and more attractive to Americans here, and it is no imaginary danger of which I speak.

It is also becoming more and more obvious that these islands are to be of commanding importance in the near future to American trade in the North Pacific. Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain have taken possession of nearly all of the principal groups in the South Pacific and of the small isolated islands in the Central Pacific. If the Hawaiian group should slip from our control our national rivals would gain great naval and commercial advantage in the North Pacific, whose dominance fairly belongs to the United States. Nothing can be plainer than that it is our imperative duty to hold these islands with the firm resolution and the invincible strength of the American nation. To ignore their prospective value and to treat them other than with a liberal and fostering policy would be one of those blunders which justly have their place among the crimes of statesmen. Nothing should be done or neglected to be done, which would drive them into the control of England or Germany. At the present time the German plantation owners and the German commercial houses tend strongly towards the United States and want Hawaii to become an American dependency, and would even favor annexation. A majority of the English would yield readily to the same tendency if our Government should not hesitate.

The thrifty and prosperous Chinese merchants and property-holders are ready to follow the lines of their interests in the same direction. But coldness and neglect on our part could not fail to strengthen foreign political interests here to the future embarrassment and injury of the United States. The rapid decay of the native race of these islands now reduced to two-fifths of the inhabitants, and the increase of the foreign population, are tending to create new political and commercial contingencies and duties which can not be ignored, nor safely disregarded. A prompt and vigorous American policy would prove the safest and most economical in the end. A liberal and wise consideration of present exigencies and opportunities, the laying of a cable from San Francisco to Honolulu, and the opening of the Nicaragua Canal would make these islands a garden, with a population thrice its present numbers, with taxable resources enough to pay the expenses of their government and institutions, and help make Honolulu and Pearl Harbor impregnable with fortifications securely backed as they are by walls of highlands and mountains. Commercially and politically they can be rendered of more value to the United States than Malta and Cyprus are to Great Britain.

Napoleon's axiomatic remark that "an army marches on its belly" has an equally forcible application to commerce as to war. Whether the agencies of transport are caravans, railroads, steamers or electrical forces, there must be feeding places, coaling stations, and store-houses. No thoughtful legislator or commercial agent with a good marine map before him, can fail to see that in the grand future now dawning on the Pacific, these islands will be of immense importance to the United States, and that necessarily and inevitably they must continue under the increased fostering care of the United States, or fall under foreign control. A niggardly, hesitating, and drifting policy towards them would be as unwise and unsafe as unstatesmanlike. There is certainly no possible objection to negotiating and carrying into effect a full free trade treaty with them, for the aggregate of their products would be relatively so small compared with the vast productive resources and requirements of the United States as to make little perceptible difference in American markets and prices.

Believing that the views I have herein expressed are in accord with much in the past course of the American Government and in harmony with the opinions of the President and of the Department of State, I submit them for what they are worth. As an American citizen, loving my country and caring for its welfare and its future greatness, I can say no less. As the official representative of the Government of the United States in these special circumstances I can properly say no more.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 28.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 9, 1891.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 30 of the 20th ultimo, in relation to the need of an American ship of war at Honolulu.

A copy of your dispatch has been transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 30.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 22, 1891.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 31, of the 3d instant, in relation to the death of the Prince Consort.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 34.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, October 15, 1891.

SIR: It is proper for me to inform the Department of State that, in consequence of the serious and probably prolonged illness of Minister Carter, the Hawaiian Government has appointed Hon. J. Mott Smith, special envoy extraordinary to negotiate with the United States a treaty of the character of which I gave an account in my dispatch 32, of September 5. Mr. Smith is an American, is the present minister of finance, and has the marked confidence of the business men of these islands. Formerly he had resided here twenty or thirty years, but of late has been a resident of Boston, Mass. He has still considerable property interests on the islands. Arriving in Honolulu a few months since, he was strongly urged by leading citizens and the Queen to become minister of finance, and some years ago he was in the cabinet of Kalakaua, and visited Washington in behalf of reci-

procuity, about 1876. Though my acquaintance with him is brief, I have good reasons to think the Department of State will find him a safe agent with whom to negotiate a treaty favorable to the interests of the two countries concerned. I deem it safe to say that now is a good time to secure Pearl Harbor in practical perpetuity. Mr. Smith leaves here on the 17th.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 46.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 8, 1892.

SIR: The semiannual election of members of the Hawaiian Legislature took place February 3, after several weeks of exciting canvass. The principal issue on the part of the business men and more conservative and responsible citizens was in respect of treaty relations with the United States. These supporters of the proposed new treaty, which they believe has been negotiated at Washington, had the approval of the principal Government officials, though the cabinet is far from being vigorous and influential. The opposition, or "liberals," as they term themselves, composed mostly of the irresponsible white voters, half-castes, and of a large majority of the native Hawaiians, push their canvass on three lines—a new constitution, opposition to the present cabinet, and hostility to the proposed treaty, though it finally hedged and disclaimed more or less in regard to the last.

These so-called liberals were led by Wilcox, the half-cast, who was at the head of the revolutionary outbreak in July, 1889, and by C. W. Ashford the Canadian member of the cabinet, who betrayed and deserted his associates when Minister Carter was trying to negotiate a new treaty in 1889. This Ashford has some ability, any amount of audacity, and is utterly without scruples, and has done his utmost to influence the prejudices and passions of the native Hawaiians. Both he and Wilcox secured their election as representatives from this island. The Legislature is composed of 48 members, one-half being nobles, elected by property holding or income voters. The conservatives and friends of the treaty have secured most all of the nobles and enough of the representatives to give them a decisive majority, sufficient, it is thought, to secure the approval of the treaty, even with the Pearl Harbor grant in perpetuity. Not improbably there may be a change of cabinet when the Legislature assembles in May.

There are increasing indications that the annexation sentiment is growing among the business men as well as with the less responsible of the foreign and native population of the islands. The present political situation is feverish and I see no prospect of its being permanently otherwise until these islands become a part of the American Union or a possession of Great Britain.

The intelligent and responsible men here, unaided by outside support, are too few in numbers to control in political affairs and to secure good government. There are indications that even the liberals, just beaten at the election, though composed of a majority of the popular vote, are about to declare for annexation, at least their leaders, their chief newspaper having already published editorials to this effect. At a future time, after the proposed treaty shall have been ratified, I shall deem it

my official duty to give a more elaborate statement of facts and reasons why a "new departure" by the United States as to Hawaii is rapidly becoming a necessity, that a "protectorate" is impracticable, and that annexation must be the future remedy, or else Great Britain will be furnished with circumstances and opportunity to get a hold on these islands, which will cause future serious embarrassment to the United States.

At this time there seems to be no immediate prospect of its being safe to have the harbor of Honolulu left without an American vessel of war. Last week a British gunboat arrived here, and it is said will remain here for an indefinite period.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 39.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 3, 1892.

SIR: I have received your No. 46, of 8th ultimo, in which you give a careful review of the political situation in Hawaii.

I am, sir, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 48.]

HONOLULU, March 8, 1892.

SIR: In view of possible contingencies in these islands I ask for the instructions of the Department of State on the following, viz:

If the Government here should be surprised and overtaken by an orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement, largely of native Hawaiians, and a Provisional or Republican Government organized and proclaimed, would the United States minister and naval commander here be justified in responding affirmatively to the call of the members of the removed Government to restore them to power or replace them in possession of the Government buildings? Or should the United States minister and naval commander confine themselves exclusively to the preservation of American property, the protection of American citizens, and the prevention of anarchy? Should a revolutionary attempt of the character indicated be made, there are strong reasons to presume that it would begin by the seizure of the police station, with its arms and ammunition, and this accomplished, the royal palace and the Government buildings containing the cabinet officers and archives would very soon be captured, the latter buildings being situated about one-third of a mile from the police station.

In such contingencies would it be justifiable to use the United States forces here to restore the Government buildings to the possession of the displaced officials? Ordinarily in like circumstances the rule seems to be to limit the landing and movement of the United States force in foreign waters and dominion exclusively to the protection of the United States legation and of the lives and property of American citizens. But as the relations of the United States to

Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years the United States officials here took somewhat exceptional action in circumstances of disorder, I desire to know how far the present minister and naval commander here may deviate from established international rules and precedents in the contingencies indicated on the first part of this dispatch.

I have information, which I deem reliable, that there is an organized revolutionary party in the islands, composed largely of native Hawaiians and a considerable number of whites and half whites, led chiefly by individuals of the latter two classes.

This party is hostile to the Queen and to her chief confidants, especially opposed to the coming to the throne of the half-English heir-apparent now being educated in England, and means to gain its object either by forcing the Queen to select her cabinet from its own members or else to overthrow the monarchy and establish a Republic, with the ultimate view of annexation to the United States of the whole islands. A portion of this party mean only the former, and the other portion intend the latter. Failing to accomplish the former, the most of the party would seek the latter alternative. I have little doubt the revolutionary attempt would have been made ere this but for the presence here of the United States ship of war. I still incline to the opinion that the revolutionary attempt will not be made so long as there is a United States force in the harbor of Honolulu. But it would be rash to assume or assert this positively. Therefore I deem it my official duty to ask for instructions in view of possible contingencies.

I may add that the "annexation" sentiment is increasing quite as much among the white residents and native Hawaiian and other workmen who own no sugar stock as with the sugar planters.

I am sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 41.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 19, 1892.

SIR: The Department has received your Nos. 19, 46, and 42 bis.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 50.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, March 19, 1892.

SIR: The Department of State will not deem it outside of the duties of this legation to report that a highly interesting manifestation of official courtesy has taken place to-day in the harbor of Honolulu. By due arrangement Queen Liliuokalani and the entire Hawaiian cabinet, as well as the royal chamberlain and court attendants, paid a visit to the United States ship *San Francisco*, Rear Admiral George Brown in command, who had sent the ship's boats to take the party on board. By the request of the Admiral, I was on board of the *San Francisco* to

receive Her Majesty at the rail gate of the ship. She was received with the salute of twenty-one guns and the excellent music of the *San Francisco* band. The Queen and party were conducted about the ship by Admiral Brown and officers, and other civilities were shown to the royal party. At the close of the visit another salute of twenty-one guns was given and appropriate music played by the band as the boats containing the visitors passed to the shore. The weather during the day has been exceedingly fine, and the occasion passed off in the best manner. The *San Francisco* is the finest ship ever seen in the harbor of Honolulu. Admiral Brown and his officers exhibited admirable taste and courtesy to the official visitors, and there is no doubt of the good influence of the honors and politeness shown the Hawaiian representatives.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 52.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, April 2, 1892.

SIR: That the Department of State may be well informed as to what is transpiring here in matters of politics and government it is necessary for me to report that the palace authorities have been seriously alarmed recently by what they believed to be strong indications of an armed insurrection. During the night of Sunday, March 27, by the direction of the marshal of the Kingdom the royal guard of sixty men were hastily put to the task of fortifying the approaches to the palace with bags of sand, fearing an attack. But no hostile force appeared, and public opinion decides that there was needless alarm. The Queen has lost much in public regard of late, and has incurred the special ill will of many of the native Hawaiians. This is largely owing to her having taken to her close intimacy and confidence a half-caste Tahitian, by the name of Wilson, who became marshal soon after her accession to the throne, and whom she wished to have appointed to the most important place in the cabinet, the ministry of interior.

Responsible men would not serve in the cabinet with him and therefore he was made marshal of the Kingdom, an office of great importance, as under his immediate control is the chief police force of the country. He now lives in or near the palace, and the Queen appears to be largely in his hands. The administration of his office results in very gross abuses, and it is a striking evidence of the forbearance and restraint of the white and native population that they endure it.

The great lack here now is an intelligent and efficient executive, which it is impossible to have with the existing monarchy. For twenty years the palace has been the center of corruption and scandal, and is likely to remain so as long as the Hawaiian native monarchy exists.

There is little doubt that the less responsible and more resolute opponents of the Queen and the marshal are strong enough to capture the palace and Government buildings, but the more responsible and conservative citizens favor only pacific measures and urge forbearance. The existing state of things fully justify what I have said in former dispatches as to the need of a United States vessel here, whose pres-

ence has undoubtedly prevented an outbreak so far. I have strong hopes that quiet will be maintained until the meeting of the Legislature, five or six weeks hence, which will then largely control affairs. In the meantime "the annexation" sentiment has grown rapidly. Quoting those who would seek annexation by first creating a republic, to the larger number and more responsible citizens, the chief property holders, who wish to use only pacific measures, they would carry all before them, provided the latter could get any encouragement that the United States would take these islands as a territory.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 46.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 12, 1892.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 50 of 19th ultimo, relative to a visit made that day by Her Majesty, the Queen of the Hawaiian Islands, and by her Cabinet to the U. S. ship *San Francisco*, in the harbor of Honolulu. The Department has found pleasure in making its contents known to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 56.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, May 21, 1892.

SIR: That the Department of State may have a clear understanding of affairs here at the present time, I must state what is transpiring of some significance.

May 19, at 5 p. m., the minister of foreign affairs and the attorney-general called at this legation and informed me that the Government had decided to arrest that night or the next day a considerable number of persons charged with treasonable designs, and that the papers had already been issued by the judge. My opinion had not been asked, and it was then too late for me to oppose effectively and too short a time for me to investigate the proofs they claimed to have against the accused parties. In this confidential interview I was careful to have it understood that I would assume no responsibility in regard to the proposed proceedings; yet the line of my inquiries and the reasonable implications of my language indicated that I strongly doubted the expediency of these proposed arrests, especially as the Legislature would assemble within eight days. Subsequently I learned that the minister of foreign affairs, a native Hawaiian, had held back for some time against the proposed arrests, but finally yielded to the palace influences.

On the following day, the 20th, seventeen arrests were made, and warrants were issued to arrest forty to fifty other persons. The arrested men include V. V. Ashford, R. W. Wilcox, and other leaders of,

the party, composed mainly of native Hawaiians and half-whites one of them being member-elect of the Legislature about to assemble. Wilcox was the leader of the revolutionary outbreak of 1889. Ashford, the ablest man of those arrested, a lawyer by profession, is a Canadian by birth, who served in the Union army during the American war of the rebellion, but is still a British subject. The persistent belief among intelligent men is that there can be no conviction of the accused persons by jury trial, with the possible exception of Ashford, who will be tried before a foreign jury; and so strong is the prejudice against him that he may be convicted by a foreign jury, though the evidence against him were inadequate. Wilcox and the other half-whites and native Hawaiians must be tried by a native jury, and nobody believes they will be convicted. If these presumptions should be verified, Wilcox and other arrested natives will come out of prison only more influential than they were before. Why did the Government postpone these arrests so long and show this vigor just as the Legislature is about to assemble, there having been committed no act of violence, no hostile gathering in the streets?

Obviously for the following reasons: The Attorney-General unwittingly allowed me to understand what facts and circumstances otherwise informed me. The cabinet is very weak in its makeup. It had entirely lost prestige with the public. It knew that it was likely to be voted out by the Legislature because of its inefficiency. It hopes to gain strength by these arrests of persons against whom there is a strong prejudice with the legislative members elect. Who was and is the controlling factor back of the cabinet that forces this issue at so late an hour? The Tahitian half-caste marshal, the former reputed, if not the present paramour of the Queen, who terrifies her with the fear of an insurrection. This cabinet was mainly the choice of the marshal and the Queen, has never been passed upon by the legislature, that body never having been in session since its appointment, and does not dare resist what the Tahitian and the Queen see fit to do. This largely gives the marshal the key of the situation. In a mistaken hour, immediately after the death of the late King, a majority of the judges in an era of good feeling, knowing that the Queen was importunate to select a cabinet of her own, gave a decision of policy, that she had the right to remove the cabinet then existing and select her own, in the exceptional case of the death of the sovereign, though the most level-headed judge—an American, McCulley, recently deceased—gave a counter opinion in accordance with the plain terms of the constitution, for the exclusive right of the Legislature to remove the ministers is the vital and essential provision of the constitution, made in 1887, so intended by the men now living here, who placed it in the constitution, and so regarded by the principal lawyers here. That decision of good-natured policy to conciliate the Queen had the immediate result of making her Tahitian favorite the most potent man at the palace. She wanted to make him minister of interior, the most responsible member of the cabinet, but he found it impossible to find associates. But a cabinet was formed, who immediately made him marshal of the Kingdom, with the entire police force, such as it is, in his hands, with an attorney-general largely under his influence.

These are the circumstances which have given Wilcox, Ashford, and their associates their opportunity to increase their political influence. While the best and most responsible men of the islands are disgusted with the relations of the Queen and the Tahitian favorite, they will not follow such agitators as have just been arrested. They wish to secure

a change by peaceful measures, and look to the Legislature, which was fairly and quietly elected, and is believed to have a safe majority of prudent men, several of them being of the chief men of the islands, of good American blood.

Of course an American ship of war is still needed here; one is ample. And when the *San Francisco* leaves I presume another ship will have arrived. *One whose captain or other commander is cautious, reticent, and firm* is specially needed where circumstances are so exceptional as they are here.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 50.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 7, 1892.

SIR: I have received your No. 56, of 21st ultimo, relative to the arrest of several prominent persons at Honolulu, on a charge of treason, and have advised the Secretary of the Navy of your suggestions as to the presence of a war vessel of this Government at that port.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 57.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, June 11, 1892.

SIR: I forward herewith two copies of Her Majesty's speech at the opening of the Legislature, May 28. Of what is transpiring in that body and all of importance that may be done the first month of its session I will give an account in a future dispatch.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in No. 57.]

The Queen's speech at the opening of the Legislature of 1892.

NOBLES AND REPRESENTATIVES: Since the Legislature of this Kingdom last assembled death has taken from us your lamented King and my beloved brother. His reign of nearly seventeen years marked an extraordinary epoch in our country's history, an era of unparalleled commercial advancement, of educational enlightenment, and political progress. His late Majesty's memory will be held sacred by his friends, and his successful labors in the interests of his people properly estimated and respected by all.

The decree of Providence and the constitution of the Kingdom having called me to occupy the throne of Hawaii, it is my earnest prayer that divine assistance may be vouchsafed to enable me to discharge the duties of the exalted position to the advantage of my people and the permanent benefit of Hawaii.

With the consent of the nobles of the Kingdom, I have appointed Her Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kawekiu Kaiulani Lunalilo Kalaninuiāhālapalapa as my successor.

Fully recognizing that by the constitution and laws of the Kingdom my station is that of a constitutional monarch, accepting the will of my people, as pronounced

by them through their representatives in the Legislature and my constitutional advisors, the ministers of the Crown, I shall firmly endeavor to preserve the autonomy and absolute independence of this Kingdom, and to assist in perpetuating the rights and privileges of all who are subject to our laws and in promoting their welfare and happiness.

I am gratified to state that my relations with foreign powers are of the most cordial and friendly nature.

The treaty of commercial reciprocity between this Kingdom and the United States, which has hitherto proved so beneficial to both countries in building up and maintaining a larger commerce and exchange of productions, has been seriously affected by tariff legislation made by the Congress of the United States, the effect of which on our principal industry is being severely felt. I trust that such legislation as may tend to relieve the consequent depression will receive your early and careful attention.

I recommend the appointment of a special commission to ascertain the most practical manner of developing and expanding the several industrial and agricultural resources of the Kingdom; and more especially with a view to enable small landholders to add to the wealth and progress of the Kingdom by raising such products as the soil and climate of the country foster.

The probability of a decrease in the revenues of the Kingdom requires economy and retrenchment in the expenditures of the public funds, but I earnestly hope that every effort will be made to carry out all necessary internal improvements throughout the Kingdom.

I note with pleasure that surveys are being made between the western coast of the United States of America and these islands, for the purpose of laying a submarine cable. I sincerely hope that every effort to connect Hawaii by an electric cable with the outside world will continue to receive your assistance.

I commend to your earnest attention the invitation received by my Government from the President of the United States of America to participate in the celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus by sending an exhibit to the World's Columbian Exposition to be held at the city of Chicago in 1893.

My ministers will submit for your consideration the reports of their several departments and the laws necessary for the welfare of the Kingdom and the promotion of the objects I have referred to.

Nobles and representatives, invoking the blessing of Divine Providence upon your deliberations, I now declare the Legislature of the Kingdom open.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 64.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 9, 1892.

SIR: I presume the Department of State already has information of the seizure of Gilbert Islands by the English Government. But I deem it well to send you the inclosed slips from the New Zealand Herald.

I also inclose copy of the recent change in the Hawaiian customs rates. When the official pamphlets of laws is published after the adjournment of the Legislature, I will forward copies.

At the present time there is considerable excitement here in regard to a new cabinet.

The old cabinet has been voted out by a large majority, mainly because it was very weak and was very much dominated by the Tahitian favorite of the Queen and persons in whom the best portion of the citizens had no confidence.

In trying to get a new cabinet the Tahitian and his associates push the Queen to resist the responsible men of the islands and the majority of the legislature.

In my next dispatch I hope to announce the new cabinet.

I have, etc.

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Confidential.]

No. 65.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 14, 1892.

SIR: In my dispatch, No. 64, of September 9, I expressed the hope that I would be able to send the information by this mail that a new Hawaiian cabinet had been formed to take the place of the one so emphatically voted out by the Legislature, but the deadlock between the Queen and the Legislature continues. She has announced a new cabinet, but it is so unsatisfactory to the legislative majority and the business men of the islands that it will undoubtedly be rejected to-day; but the vote will not be taken in time to send the information of the fact by this mail, which closes at 11 a. m. The Tahitian half-caste favorite of the Queen, the marshal of the little Kingdom, and his band of adventurers, still dominate the palace and defy the responsible men of the Legislature and the islands. An associate of the half-caste favorite is an American renegade by the name of Whaley, a disgraced and expelled San Francisco custom-house officer, now at the head of the "opium ring," and one of the supposed owners of the *Halcyon*, the notorious smuggling schooner which flits between these islands and British Columbia. This man Whaley has more brain than the Tahitian favorite.

The better portion of the English residents are in substantial accord with the principal Americans in support of the Legislature, and the chief German commercial houses and influential German residents are in full agreement with the Americans; but more or less of the English are so jealous of the strong American sentiment in the Legislature that they support the Queen and the Tahitian openly or covertly. The native Hawaiians, composing half of the Legislature, are about equally divided. The unscrupulous adventurers of different nationalities—Americans, English, and Germans, without character, and most of them without property—are with the half-caste Tahitian favorite and the Queen. A majority of the Legislature and the best citizens of the islands are exercising remarkable forbearance and self-control.

It is proper for me to say that just at this time Mr. Mott Smith, the present minister at Washington, is likely to be misinformed as to the real condition of things, for the rejected minister of foreign affairs, a native Hawaiian, of the Queen's supporters, still occupies the foreign office, and the American deputy would hardly dare send any advices to Minister Smith not indorsed by the acting head of the department.

The U. S. ship *Boston* is in the harbor, and Capt. Wiltse will cooperate with me in exercising careful circumspection. In about twelve days from this I can send another dispatch.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 57.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 29, 1892.

SIR: I have received your No. 65 (confidential) of the 14th instant describing the deadlock existing between the Hawaiian Legislature and the Queen over the constitution of a ministry, and have inclosed a copy to the Secretary of the Navy for his confidential information.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

No. 71.]

*Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.*LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, October 19, 1892.

SIR: According to what I expressed in my dispatch 70 of October 12 as likely to transpire here, on the 17th a resolution of want of confidence in the cabinet passed the legislature by a vote of 31 to 15; the 24 members specified in my No. 70 having been increased by 7 natives, thus making 17 native members in opposition to the cabinet and 10 in favor. As indicated in preceding dispatches the most potent factor in the pending issue is, whether the Tahitian favorite and the Queen shall defy the intent of the constitution as to the choice of ministry and the retention in office of the Tahitian marshal with all the abuse and corruption which surround him and the Queen. Though he has a wife, for years he has been regarded as her paramour, and her infatuation for him is now so excessive that he is believed to have almost absolute control of her official action. The two-thirds majority of the Legislature represent the chief men of the islands, and the friends of order and good government generally. The faction of the Tahitian has with it most of the anti-American element, and this is the reason why the ultra Englishmen all are on the same side, with more or less approval of the English legation, the last simply because the legislative majority is strongly American in sympathy. As in the previous vote, two English members on the 17th voted with the minority, and the three Americanized Englishmen voted with the majority.

The newspaper report of the debate I send gives indication of the drift of things in the Legislature. The minister of finance, who, in the debate, claims to be an American, was born here of Scotch-English parentage, and by plans and interest is hostile to the United States. Some years since he resided awhile in San Francisco, and it is said took out the preliminary papers for naturalization. But he and his brother are the chief members of an importing firm, mainly of liquors, and are the agents of English manufacturers. As stated in my No. 70, they were engaged in making the English loan in 1886, the negotiations of which cost this Government from \$50,000 to \$100,000. It is known that his plan was, if he had been retained in the cabinet, to push another heavy loan in England, thus aiding to mortgage these islands to English bondholders. To this scheme all the best men here are opposed.

The insult to the American minister, spoken of in the resolutions and debate, was in certain anonymous communications published in the Bulletin, the official organ here, reflecting unjustly on the American minister, consul-general, and naval commander here for not ordering the U. S. ship *Boston* to hunt for the crew of the ship *Wm. A. Campbell*, wrecked in a gale 2,300 miles from Honolulu, of which the consul-general has forwarded an account to the Department. I deemed it my duty to call the attention of the Queen and minister of foreign affairs to the falsehoods and insults in the Bulletin communications. Her Majesty's Government expressed in writing strong regrets for the offensive publications and the attorney-general pronounced them libellous, and offered to prosecute. I did not deem it wise to demand prosecution, but required only full apology. The apology made is not wholly satisfactory to me nor to this Government. I leave the matter with Her Majesty's Government, which makes strong promises for the future. The Bulletin newspaper in reality is the organ of the Tahitian favorite, of the ultra English, and of the more disreputable persons who sustain

the palace against the legislative majority. The editor is a Nova-Scotian, aided by an Australian and an Englishman.

At this writing it is thought that there will be a "deadlock" of a week or two between the palace and the Legislature as to the appointment of a new cabinet. There is a prevailing anxiety in the public mind as to the actual state of things. The Tahitian favorite of half-English blood does not mean to yield, and were there not an American ship-of-war here, he would perhaps try to use his police and a mob of "hoodlums" to break up the Legislature, restore the old constitution, and thus render the palace master of the situation. My present impression is that the Queen and her faction will have to yield, otherwise the entire overthrow of the monarchy could not be long delayed.

I may say here that the personal relations of the English minister and myself are still pleasant. I can not yet believe that he advises the Queen to hold out against the Legislature, as some private rumors indicate, though he is undoubtedly apprehensive that the success of the legislative majority means more or less an American cabinet.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in No. 71.]

Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, October 18, 1882.

THE LEGISLATURE.—One hundred and eighth day,
MONDAY, October 17

The house met at 10 a. m.

The minutes of the preceding day were read and approved.

Rep. Waipuilani moved the following resolution of want of confidence:

"Whereas the present cabinet has not announced or given any intimation or evidence of any financial policy which will extricate the country from its present dangerous financial situation; and

"Whereas it is essential to the commercial progress of the country that more favorable treaty relations with the United States be obtained whereby our products can obtain a free market in that country; and

"Whereas the present cabinet has shown no disposition to favor any such policy, and the present head of the cabinet has displayed conspicuous hostility toward the representative of that country in this kingdom, and the general tone of the administration has been and is one of opposition and hostility to the United States of America and American interests, thereby rendering it improbable that any changes in our treaty relations favorable to Hawaii can be negotiated by this cabinet; and

"Whereas the cabinet has given no evidence of any intention to attempt to remedy existing scandals in the police department, and have otherwise failed to evince any ability to successfully guide the nation through the difficulties and dangers surrounding it: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Legislature hereby expresses its want of confidence in the present cabinet."

Rep. Waipuilani said it was proper that he should explain in a few words his reason for bringing this resolution. Such a resolution had been brought once before, and he had voted against it because the cabinet was then new and he thought it should have an opportunity to express itself by deeds. The cabinet had now been in office a number of weeks. Week after week was slipping by and nothing was done by them, although a policy had been promised. But none had been announced and nothing done, and the house was tired of waiting. It would be a waste of time for him to go on and discuss the matter in detail. Business was dull, closer relations with the United States were necessary and the conduct of the present cabinet was not likely to produce that. Everyone knew what the head of the cabinet had done. He had brought in a resolution against the American minister, which had been expunged from the minutes of the house. All knew that the Bulletin, which was supposed to be under the control of the cabinet, had adopted a course antagonistic to the minister and to the whole of the United States, and the cabinet, which might have stopped it, had allowed it to go on.

If the cabinet allowed that paper to go on insulting the minister and remain silent themselves, they make themselves responsible, and antagonize the whole American people against us, and under such circumstances how could we expect to get a more favorable treaty. He favored free trade with the United States, which would be of great benefit to the whole country, and especially to the district which he represented, where pineapples could be canned and exported if it were not for the American duty of 35 per cent. Everyone knew that the reciprocity treaty was of the greatest benefit to this country, increasing values 10 to 100 fold. How could any more favorable treaty be hoped for if the cabinet adopted a policy of incessant irritation toward the United States?

Perhaps not the least reason for this motion was the fact that the cabinet had looked quietly on at the great scandal in the police department, and had done nothing. Moreover, the attorney-general had the other day actually proposed to refer the whole matter to another committee after it had already been investigated by several. Either that was an insult to the committees which had already spent so much time on the subject, or, if not so intended, the idea was to prevent a report and stave off all further investigation. No one had been removed at the police station. Let any member of this house go down on Maunakea street and he will see the *fa* played openly, with no attempt at concealment, the police mixing with the crowd. Opium was smuggled unchecked. The fame of the opium scandals had gone abroad and affected the good name of this Government. The attorney-general might institute proceedings to stop some of this, but the cabinet could not take to itself a stiff backbone and cleanse the evils oppressing the Government.

Rep. Kapahu moved the resolution be made the special order for Thursday. The introducer of the resolution was prepared; the speaker was not, not having known the resolution was to be brought in. Moreover, the minister of the interior was not present, and no one liked to attack an empty seat. The adoption of this resolution was no small matter, and justice required some delay.

Rep. Kauhi favored considering the resolution to-day. The majority must decide. This was the second resolution of the kind brought against the cabinet, and they must be prepared already.

Rep. Kapahu wished to know whether this resolution was the same as the other.

Rep. Kauhi said there was a strong family resemblance between them. The other resolution was really carried, but was thrown out on a question of law. Before sunset we should know what the fate of the resolution is to be.

(Minister Gulick entered and took his seat during the remarks of Rep. Kauhi.)

Rep. Nawahi said it made no difference to him personally whether the resolution was considered to-day or Thursday. But the house was sitting as judges, and if the defendants—the cabinet—wished a delay to prepare themselves, let them have it. If they were ready let the house proceed at once. When the late cabinet was on trial, the twenty-seven hour attorney-general said they were ready to go on.

Rep. Kamaoha said a resolution had been brought before, which he had opposed for reasons very similar to those given by the member from Kona. He was disappointed in the present cabinet. He had thought they would do something about cleansing the police department. These complaints against the marshal had been made for a long time, and so it was with a feeling of disappointment that he had heard the attorney-general recommend reference of the matter to another committee. The minister of finance had, with the other members of the finance committee, presented a very strong report severely criticising the police department. How is it that he does not join in now that he is a minister and insist on carrying these recommendations out? He had had confidence that this would be done, but that confidence was now severely shaken.

Another thing which inclined him to vote for this resolution was the fact that the attorney-general was the introducer of a bill—the registration act—which was very obnoxious to the Hawaiian people. Another thing which shook his confidence in the attorney-general was the bill authorizing the O. R. and L. Co. to mortgage their franchise to foreigners. The attorney-general might say that was not a cabinet measure. It had, however, the support of the cabinet, which made it to all intents and purposes a Government measure. Owing to the McKinley bill, the great industry of the country had come to a standstill. Yet the present cabinet had nothing to offer. The country could not afford to have a cabinet in office which was in open hostility to the United States or its representative, or which showed that disposition. We ought to conciliate in every way the United States, and show a friendly disposition toward that nation. Representing, as he did, the district of Kohala, one of the largest sugar districts of the Kingdom, he felt it his duty to support this resolution.

Rep. Kanealii said he agreed with the first and last grounds set forth in the resolution, but favored the striking out that part which related to the personal relations of the cabinet with the ministry, because to drag in personal matters would only intensify feeling. All knew that the present head of the cabinet brought in a reso-

lution against the American minister. The house had cleansed itself of that matter by striking the resolution from the records of the house. The speaker thought that bringing that up again was inexpedient. He favored the resolution with that amendment, and he favored considering the resolution to-day. The claim that the cabinet was unprepared had nothing in it. This resolution had been the talk for a long time, and the cabinet were doubtless as ready to meet it now as they ever would be. We all wanted the flesh of this cabinet.

Noble Hoapili called on the cabinet to say whether they wanted the delay or not.

Attorney-General Neumann said he had not been aware that the resolution was to be brought this morning. He was ready to take some of the matters up to-day. There were allegations based upon street rumors, to which he was ready to make answer immediately; on other matters he would like a delay until to-morrow. He would like to have a few words to say on the registration act, etc. He had no desire to sit as a minister, and was ready to resign at any moment. He proposed to defend his action on the registration bill and O. R. & L. Co. bill as long as he had a voice and vote in the house. There were none so blind as those who would not see, nor so deaf as those who would not hear. If the house chose to grant time until to-morrow, the cabinet would be thankful. If not, it was ready to proceed to-day.

Noble Hoapili, continuing, said the remarks of the attorney-general raised doubts in his mind. (Attorney-General: "Well, I'll remove them if I can.") This was the fourth resolution of want of confidence brought in this session. One was withdrawn, the second was carried; on the last he had voted with the minority in favor of the ministry. Since that time the ministry had stayed here, and the house had certainly waited a long, long time for them to announce a policy. For a long time there had been a general feeling throughout the country that there was a great deal of corruption in the police department and that the marshal should be removed. The cabinet had known that that was the almost unanimous feeling of the house. Yet they did nothing. He had no hesitation in saying that he supported the resolution on that account. A few days ago there had been a big disturbance on the street corner and the police had been called on to stop it, but they would do nothing.

Minister Macfarlane (*sotto voce*). It was a luau.

Noble Hoopili. He asked the police officer why he made no arrest, and the officer said the marshal gave the orders not to arrest anybody except when caught in some act of violence. A hack was there without lights, and vile and obscene language was being used. The police would do nothing, and finally Peter High took the matter up and with speaker's assistance a man was arrested and punished. These things were a scandal, and if the attorney-general could not stop it someone else must be got. On the other hand, people came to him and told him that the idea was to remove the cabinet, so as to get an annexation cabinet in, and annex the country to the United States. If he believed that, he would support the cabinet. He would rather have corruption and scandal than annexation. He was distinctly opposed to annexation, and was so instructed by his constituents, but he favored close relations with the great "makua" over there.

Rep. R. W. Wilcox had but a few words to say. The attorney-general had suggested waiting until to-morrow, but the attorney-general was noted for his readiness, and could defend himself to-day as well as to-morrow. So far as the announcement of a policy was concerned, every man, boy, and child in the country knew the cabinet had done nothing; so, what could be said in their defense? The same could be said in regard to the police department; nothing had been done. The matter of relations with the United States had not been much discussed in the Hawaiian papers, and as to that something might be said; but without it there was enough and the question should be settled this afternoon.

Attorney-General Neumann. How does the member know that nothing has been done about the police department?

Rep. R. W. Wilcox. Have not the committee made their report and recommendations?

Attorney-General Neumann said he had also made his report and had wished a committee appointed in order that he might explain to them why their recommendations could not be carried out.

Rep. R. W. Wilcox said the proposition to appoint a new committee was an insult to the house and showed that the attorney-general was not fit to occupy his position. He admitted his weakness. He came here and admitted that he could not tell the house why he could not carry out the recommendations of the committee. He would therefore favor the resolution. The part about the relations with the United States might be stricken out as there was enough without that.

Rep. Nawahi said if there had been any publications in the newspapers regarding the American minister, the latter would have his remedy in the courts. He, therefore, favored striking out that part of the resolution. As to the rest, he did not need to state his views. The cabinet has had fair warning. He had voted against the last resolution simply to give the cabinet a trial. When it had been here a

month it was in order to say to them, you have been tried and found wanting. A man could not talk on an empty stomach, so he favored a recess till 1:30 p. m.

Carried at 12:01.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

The house met at 1:35 p. m.

Noble Thurston proposed to say but a very few words. He had stated his opinion a month ago, and had seen nothing to change his mind since. The present resolution was introduced by one who voted against the former resolution. It had been tacitly agreed that the opposition should not filibuster, but should quietly go about its business. That policy has been pursued up to the present time. There were a number of members who voted against the resolution then because they wished to see what the cabinet proposed to do. In the meantime they had been deciding what they themselves would do; this resolution was the result. Two members had stated that they favored the resolution on two of the grounds set forth, but not on the other. Here were five of the original supporters of the cabinet who had now declared against them, except that two of them were not agreed with one of the reasons set forth.

The question now to be settled was whether the house had confidence in the cabinet or not. Those who had confidence in the cabinet would vote against the resolution, and those having no confidence in them should vote for the resolution, no matter what their reasons might be. All would not necessarily have the same reasons. For himself he did not care whether there was any preamble or not. He was prepared to vote for a resolution of a single line. Others might have a preamble if they liked. He was ready to state his reasons for his vote, and others might state or conceal their reasons as they saw fit. The member from Wailuku and the member from Hilo had both stated that the third ground, the scandals in the police department, was their main reason for supporting the resolution. That was their reason. The speaker on the other hand considered the attitude of the cabinet toward America the leading reason, and upon this second point he proposed to speak. In regard to the marshal, it might be that everything which the members from Hilo and Wailuku alleged was true, but that was a matter which would eventually be remedied. Whether it was remedied to-day or to-morrow, would not vitally affect the future of the country. There had been bad administration there before. The present cabinet had the right and duty to remedy that, and it was entirely within their power. The responsibility was upon them to do it or not. They have ample power. That is the point.

The other charge is that they have developed no financial policy. That also was not so absolutely vital a point as the one upon which the speaker would lay stress. The second reason therefore contained something which might or might not be within their power, viz, to cope with the financial situation; but the third reason was something which struck right down into the vitals and pockets of the country, and it was something with which this cabinet could not cope. Pineapples were being planted on Hawaii, in Manoa, and at Ewa. Pineapple-raising could be carried on with large returns. In Cona all you had to do was to stick the top into the ground. Why were not pineapples raised? Because the American duty of 35 per cent destroyed the margin of profit. Why were these people starting in? Because they hoped we could negotiate a treaty and get that duty taken off. If it were taken off 500,000 pineapples would be exported inside of three years. It was not only on pineapples that there was a duty of 35 per cent, but on every species of preserved fruit. The member from Lahaina had brought in a bill about guava jelly. Thurston and his one guava bush in Manoa was made the text of a number of speeches at the last campaign, but the guava jelly will march triumphantly over the head of the speechmaker.

If this duty can be got rid of, when guava jelly gets to paying a handsome profit not only the capitalist will benefit, but the poor man in Hamakua, for instance, where the bushes cover the land from the sea to the bush as thick as they can grow in unbroken masses for miles, and all you have to do is to go out and pick them. These were but two items which had been brought before the house by petitions and bills. He might go on the whole afternoon enumerating others. It was, therefore, obvious that whether the cabinet was on friendly terms with the United States was important, not merely to the capitalist, but to all the poor throughout the land. Two years ago the cabinet were charged with trying to sell out this country. They got them out and as soon as they did they adopted the programme of their predecessors and tried to get the same treaty negotiations. It was pigeonholed.

They tried in every way to stir up feeling here against America and the Americans and then sought favors from the United States. Had they succeeded? The government which went in then was not personally hostile to the United States. The ministry went with their party. But now we have a cabinet whose leader

went out of his way to insult the United States on the floor of this House, and their organ carried on the same thing to-day. It was useless to deny government ownership in this organ. Government ownership did not alone make an organ. The New York Tribune was the organ of the Republican administration, but it was not owned by the government. It was immaterial whether the paper was controlled by the cabinet, or as he was informed, partially owned by them. He had reason to believe that the cabinet did have something to do with the Bulletin, and that its late apology, which apologized and then rubbed it in alternately, was written with their cognizance, and that the anti-American tone of the paper was an expression of the attitude of the cabinet. He did not propose to inquire whether the minister of finance had good reason for his resolution, etc. It was sufficient to point out the fact that there was the antagonism of the cabinet toward the representative of the American interests here.

With the fact staring us in the face, was it not perfect folly to go home and let the cabinet stay there expecting them to do anything for Hawaiian agricultural interests? He was not talking on an annexation basis, but was speaking on the same basis as the attorney-general on the late want of confidence debate, who had expressed his views to a dot. The United States would never take possession of this country against the will of its people. It was not a live issue now, and when it was introduced it was done solely with a view to mislead. Annexation was brought up and trotted out regularly, and was simply a substitute for the old missionary cry. When an election, etc., was over it would not be heard of again until a similar occasion arose. Before being frightened by the annexation scarecrow it was well to stop and think. All history belied the idea that the United States would ever take this country against the will of the people. It had^d been the first to recognize its independence. Follow the history down. When Lord George Paulet hauled down the Hawaiian flag, what was the position of the United States? A United States frigate appeared here, refused to acknowledge the foreign usurper and, in defiance of him, fired a royal salute.

Passing over this episode, which the British Government right royally retrieved, what was the position taken by the United States at the time of the French usurpation? A treaty of cession was signed and sent to Washington, where it lay for four solid months untouched, and when the danger was over it was returned without pretence of any right to retain what had been freely given without solicitation. The French have gone on until they now own a hundred islands. Daniel Webster said that if the French took the islands they would take them back and restore their independence if it took the whole power of the United States to do it. That was their position, and it had been consistently maintained ever since.

Again, it had not been foreigners who proposed all this. Kamehameha III himself proposed to cede the islands, and just before he was going to do so he was taken sick and died. The treaty lies in the foreign office ready for his signature, and may be seen by anybody. It was unnecessary to come down to the events of the last twenty years. They were within the knowledge of everybody. The United States had, out of its bounty, given us a treaty for which it received almost no monetary return, which had put millions into the pockets of this country. The advantages of this treaty were now gone, and additional ones must be sought. Not only was it a fact that the United States had stood between Hawaii and France, between Hawaii and England, had held our independence in their hands, had given us a treaty, but during the reign of the present sovereign a ship of war had been asked by Her Majesty's Government if it would assist in preserving order against internal enemies. Apart from these financial and material interests, common decency and common gratitude should prevent these slurs and insinuations on the United States. It was an insult to the opposition which was not less loyal than the cabinet, and the ideas were advanced simply to keep the cabinet in power. In conclusion, the speaker said it made no difference on what ground members united against the cabinet if they agreed in having no confidence in it.

Rep. Bipikane said it had always been his practice to scrutinize every cabinet. He had watched this one. He saw no advantage to be gained by delay. If there was a majority in favor of the cabinet, the resolution would not pass; if there were not, it would, and that was the sum of the matter. The resolution brought in before was carried, so far as numbers go. He voted for the cabinet then to give them a chance to do something. They had done nothing at all. If the cabinet had not power enough to remove the marshal, they had better remove themselves. There was no use in delay. The question did not need any discussing. He had been watching cabinets for thirty years, and never seen anything like this before. Why did not the attorney-general put out the men whom the people wanted put out? This was the fourth resolution of want of confidence which had come in. That ought not to be so. A few small branches had been lopped off, but the stump—the marshal—was still there. They voted a want of confidence, and the marshal was there still. If they voted another, he would still be there; and if that was the way

things were going to go, the house might as well pack up and go home, and let the cabinet own the country and make the laws.

Let the cabinet stick to their marshal and run the Government without any aid or vote of money from the Legislature. All he wanted was to have the right done. It was the general wish of the country to have the marshal removed. The cabinet should have whispered in the ear of marshal: "If you have any regard for us please resign, or we will not be able to keep our seats." He would like to know whether, if we would promise to support them, they would make an oath that no more opium should be smuggled? Who was benefited when opium was smuggled in? All of them—they were all benefited. He did not make these remarks to assist the passage of the resolution—that was a foregone conclusion—but on the scriptural principle: "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear." The cabinet had ears, and they had heard his opinion of them, but they had not done anything. He moved the previous question. Withdrawn.

Noble Pua said this was the second resolution against this cabinet. Such resolutions had been common since 1887. The first reason announced was that the cabinet had no financial policy. Yet they had the confidence of moneyed men. If the introducer of the resolution and the member for the Third ward had been ministers they would not have been able to borrow one cent. He was sorry to see the disposition among native members to favor this resolution. It was very foolish to go on removing cabinet after cabinet. When Mr. Gibson was minister everything was prosperous; yet there was a clique which was not satisfied, and their dissatisfaction culminated in a revolution. Everything was prosperous in 1887, and then the reform party took the Government and ran it into the ground.

Now, after they had ruined the country and themselves, they came begging for help, and yet when measures were proposed like the lottery bill to make the country prosperous they opposed them. The Government has been run on a moral and holy plan long enough. Let us try some of the schemes got up by the devil and see how they work. Morality has failed; let us try the devil and his plan for a while. Let us have a change. The good plan is played out. The lottery bill will give us \$12,000,000, and the missionaries will put them in their pockets fast enough and ask no questions. The lottery bill will give us our gold, and Horner's bill our paper. All this talk about the works of the devil will then wear out, and people will consider it very good money after all. The resolution said that the cabinet were opposed to American interests, and not on good terms with the American minister. He would like to ask the ministers about that.

Minister Parker said he would say something on that score after the member was through. He had all the documents there.

Noble Pua, proceeding, said the idea was to get rid of the cabinet and have a better one. Did the member from Kona expect to get four angels from heaven?

Rep. Waipuilani said his business was to record his vote in this case against the cabinet. If Her Majesty wished to import four angels from heaven that was her affair.

Noble Pua, said the member, was like a boy who went fishing without any bait. Proceeding, the speaker said he himself would make a good deal better minister than many who might be named. He favored indefinite postponement of the resolution.

Minister Parker said he had not intended to say anything in defense of the cabinet, but he would make a few remarks on the allegations regarding the relation of the cabinet to the American minister. There might be some truth in the statement in regard to the relation of the premier to the minister, but the resolution on the whole gave a wrong impression. The documents in his hand would show what the situation was. The policy of the Government was the same as that of the honorable noble from Maui would be if he were a minister. The documents it would hardly be proper to make public, but, if necessary, the clerk of the house might read them. The honorable noble had made statements of facts which he might have learned from the Advertiser, perhaps, or through spies. It was true that insulting articles had been published in the Bulletin, but the cabinet was not in any way responsible for them. (Rep. Ashford: "Will you allow a question?") After I get through. I know the question. It is true I own a little of the stock. That does not make the Cabinet responsible because I own a little of the stock.

Rep. Kamanoha asked if there had been any feeling of irritation between the American minister and the cabinet, and, if so, whether that feeling had been done away with?

Minister Parker could not speak for the relations of the minister of finance with the American minister, but his own relations were cordial. As to the consideration of the resolution, he, personally, was ready to have it proceeded with at once.

Rep. Kaunamano said it is alleged that the present head of the cabinet was insolent to the minister of the United States. He had brought in a resolution against the minister of the United States, but that resolution was laid on the table and no action was taken on it. If that is all that is alleged in the present resolution, it is

not right to bring that up now. It is all over. But if it is anything which has transpired since, that is different. Therefore, if all the foundation of this resolution is the one that Minister Macfarlane brought in then, then the house should not entertain this resolution, but should lay it on the table. I have heard it said that the American minister took umbrage that the Hawaiian people should wish a ship of war sent out for the relief of a wrecked vessel. If that is the only reason that this resolution is brought in, then it should not be entertained for a minute. Therefore I say that if this resolution is passed on the resolution brought in by Minister Macfarlane when he was noble, then it should be dismissed. But it is put into the resolution because the opposition was to create ill-feeling here, that they wish to force the United States to take this country.

We know that every difficulty of this country for the last fifty years has not been caused by Hawaiians. Fifty years ago it was a few Englishmen who caused the trouble, then the French people, now it is the white people, not the natives. So this clause is put in this resolution to keep prodding the United States till they come down here and take this country. This resolution says the cabinet has not given any notice of a policy. The minister of finance has announced that the policy of the Government was to reduce the expenses of the Government. This was hailed with delight by the house. They may not have announced a policy in regard to the banking bill, but they have in regard to economy, and that is very important. The cabinet enjoys the confidence of the business men of this community. They can go out and get money to pay salaries at the end of the month. The house should take this into consideration. I move that the house take a recess until 7 o'clock.

Lost.

Rep. White moved to take a recess till 7:30.

Rep. Ashford did not believe in a recess. Every member had made up his mind how to vote, and it was unnecessary to take a recess.

Rep. White said he wished to have an opportunity to convince the members from the third that he is wrong in supporting this resolution. I move the house take a recess till 7:30.

Rep. R. W. Wilcox. I move the previous question.

Minister Macfarlane. I claim it is an unfair advantage to take of the ministry to spring a motion of the previous question on us.

Rep. Smith. I would request the motion be withdrawn.

Noble Baldwin. We should give the ministers a chance to speak on this question.

Rep. R. W. Wilcox. I am willing that the ministers should have a chance to speak.

Minister Neumann. I express my thanks to the member from Waialua, and I believe the member from the third wishes to close this discussion, because he thinks I wish to speak about him.

Rep. White said this resolution alleges three grounds for being introduced. Any man who is going to announce a policy waits for a favorable occasion to announce a policy. I have been informed that this cabinet has the intention of giving this house a policy in a very few days. It is not right in us to try to put them out before they have a chance to do anything. As to the second clause of this resolution, that the head of the cabinet was hostile to the American Government, who is the head of the cabinet? There is no head of the cabinet. The constitution provides no head to any cabinet, and therefore this clause falls to the ground. As for the removal of the marshal, this house has given no reason for removing him. If this house is to remove men as they want to, we had better dispense with the judiciary department and all other departments of the Government. The marshal is doing his duty. He is doing all he can to enforce the law. There are opium cases in the courts all the time. Two or three days ago the marshal made a capture of over eight hundred tins of opium. What more can he do? He stopped the last uprising in this country by his forethought and sagacity. The marshal is not perfect; very few men are. But he has done excellently in his position. If every man was perfect there would be no world. This would be heaven, not earth. Those who are advocating a change in the cabinet are only those who wish to further their own ends.

Rep. Bush rose to a point of order. He said Rep. White had the floor more than the time allowed.

President Walker. This is a part of the free fight, and there has been no restriction on time. I shall have to rule that the gentleman will have to take his seat.

Rep. Bush said there was only one speech that day that was over the half-hour limit. We have given the ministry all the chance to speak that they could possibly want, and they have not taken advantage of it.

Rep. Kamaooha moved that the member from Lahania be allowed to speak. Lost.

Noble Marsden said that the member had a little habit of speaking all day. He was perfectly willing to give him another half hour, but to give him unlimited time, never. He therefore moved that he have another half hour. Carried.

Rep. White. I move that we take a recess till 7:30. Amended to 7 o'clock; amended to 10 o'clock on Tuesday.

Minister Macfarlane. The cabinet is prepared to go on to-night, and moved to take a recess till 7 o'clock.

Rep. Ashford wanted to go ahead now.

Carried till 7 o'clock.

EVENING SESSION.

The house reassembled at 7:03 p. m.

Rep. White. The second clause relating to the American minister should be stricken out. As for the marshal, he had proved himself in many respects a very efficient officer. As for opium, some was brought in only a few days ago, in the vessel *S. N. Castle* in containers marked C. & C. Just as much was smuggled during the Thurston administration. The resolution might pass, but the reasons assigned for it had very little weight. Some of the members had very little patience. The work of the session was by no means complete. This resolution should be postponed until after the passage of the appropriation bill. A popular vote would keep the cabinet in their seats by a large majority. One of the things which won the hearts of the natives for the cabinet was their saying they did not favor annexation.

Rep. R. W. Wilcox said he did not want to shut off the member from Lahaina, but he had already used up his extension. The house wanted to hear the ministers. He had withdrawn his motion of the previous question in order to allow the minister of finance to speak, but the latter did not seem disposed to speak.

Minister Macfarlane said he had been waiting patiently to hear why the cabinet should be voted out, but no foreign member had spoken except Noble Thurston. That was his reason for his delay. He wished to hear from the foreign members why this cabinet did not enjoy their confidence. Two weeks ago the ministry had been sustained. Since then a general election had been held and the ministry overwhelmingly indorsed, no other issue being raised. He had little to say, but would refer to some of the statements made by members. The ministry was not being voted out because the allegations of the resolution were true. They were known by the introducer to be unqualifiedly false. The cabinet was voted out for the same reason as two weeks ago, because they would not have them under any consideration.

One of the charges in the resolution complained of a lack of financial policy. It was well known that for the past two weeks the ministry had been incessantly busy working on the appropriation bill in order to be able to formulate and lay before the house a policy, hoping to keep the expenses within the revenue, but at every step they had been thwarted by the men whose sole idea was to rule the country or to ruin it. Only three days since he had informed the house that he would ask the house to refer section 1 of the appropriation bill to the printing committee, so that he could present it to the house with retrenchments from one end of it to the other, and he would have been able to present it in such a shape that it would have been perfectly acceptable to the house and country. It was also well known that Her Majesty had instructed him to commence with her privy purse. To-day was the day set for him to begin. But instead he meets a cut and dried resolution calling on the cabinet to go out of office. They wanted no policy, no retrenchment—nothing but the dismissal of the cabinet. Such a policy was damnable, and it would be so viewed that he believed that not one of these men would be returned to this house. It had been stated by some of the members that the cabinet had sat here doing nothing. No intelligent man could make such a charge. Not one minute had been wasted; \$167,000 had been cut out of the appropriation bill, and he had on his desk six or seven bills, all revenue measures.

Under such circumstances it was not just nor true to say that no financial policy was forthcoming. Those measures would have added largely to the revenue. His successor would perhaps do better; but when they said the cabinet had no policy they said what was not true. They wanted no policy from this cabinet. They wanted nothing but their scalps. If he had been idle, he had been idle to the further extent of putting the assessor's office in order and simplifying it. As to the charge that the cabinet was inimical to the United States, that was an unqualified falsehood, trumped up to rouse feeling. When had he ever placed himself before the community in such a light that such a charge could be made. It was not true. The noble for Maui had referred to his alleged animosity and had mentioned the resolution introduced three months ago. It had seemed to him at that time that the words of his excellency the American minister contained an improper reference to the affairs of this country. The American minister had disclaimed, and he believed the disclaimer to be true. That had not changed his feeling. He was an American citizen not from the accident of birth, but because he preferred to be a citizen of America rather than of any other country in God's world. If those objections were urged against the cabinet because he was a member of it, why had the noble from Maui urged him to accept a position in the cabinet two months ago? These charges were specious, groundless, untrue, and dastardly; and those who made them knew

that he was proud to be an American citizen, and three members of this cabinet were American citizens to-day.

Rep. Smith asked if the minister was not a Hawaiian subject.

Minister Macfarlane said he was one of the last to take the oath of allegiance, and then only on the advice of Minister Merrill that he would not lose his American citizenship. He was a better American than the member from Libue was a Hawaiian, or he would not be advocating annexation. He believed in annexation and the Advertiser was in favor of annexation, and nothing but annexation would satisfy them. Two weeks ago these gentlemen were fighting for the constitutional principle involved. That is lost sight of now and new charges are trumped up to defeat what we have been trying to do in the interests of the country. The gentlemen had charged that they were opposed to American interests, and that these struggling industries were throttled in their infancy because the cabinet was hostile to the United States. That was the veriest bosh and nonsense, and this cabinet would be as able to negotiate a treaty as anyone, and the correspondence would prove that, and he wished the house might see it. Such statements were simply dust-throwing to make it appear that only these gentlemen of the opposition could bring about a treaty with the United States. It had also been stated by the noble from Maui that the utterances of the Bulletin were chargeable to the cabinet. Those statements were utterly untrue, and the cabinet had no control over that paper whatever. He would read, with the permission of the house, the correspondence with the minister, which would show that the course of the cabinet had been fully straightforward and manly, and not as had been represented by the noble from Maui. The correspondence was somewhat extended, but it would show the facts. It would be proper to have the correspondence read if the house so requested, and he would ask the house to request that the correspondence be read.

Noble Williams moved it be read.

Noble Thurston said if the minister wished to have the correspondence read he must do so on his own responsibility, and not endeavor to shift the responsibility to the house.

Rep. Ashford endorsed the remarks of the last speaker. The minister might read it on his own responsibility if he wanted to, but he hoped he would not want to. Not that he feared to have anything read, but to judge from the remarks of the premier it must be twaddle.

Rep. Waipuilani thought the minister had no right to read the correspondence. In any case the house should be cleared.

Rep. Kaunamano wished it read.

Minister Macfarlane said it was somewhat irregular, but he would read it with the concurrence of the house and not without. It would show the statements of the members of the other side to be false. It would show that the cabinet were in no way responsible for the bulletin.

The president stated that the minister was asking too much of the house. He might read it if he chose.

Minister Macfarlane contended that he might read it if the house asked for it.

Rep. ASHFORD. We shan't ask for it.

Minister MACFARLANE. Then you won't hear it, and you don't want to, either.

Minister Parker asked the minister of finance to give way for a moment. The allegation was made here that the cabinet were on unfriendly terms with the American minister. This correspondence was brought here to disprove that. If the house were not willing to hear the correspondence, then they should strike out the corresponding part of the resolution.

Rep. Kapahu said no amount of talking would change anybody's mind. Noble Thurston had expatiated on a quarrel supposed to exist between the cabinet and the American minister, but when the correspondence was brought in they were scared and didn't want it read. This correspondence should be examined. A committee should be appointed to examine into the truth about it. There was nothing in any of the charges against the ministry. The opposition were like a man who pulls a banana plant up every twenty-four hours to see whether it is growing. It was only the other day that when the minister wanted to fix the appropriation bill, this house told him to take it and fix it. Now they want to put him out, before he has had a chance to do anything about it. This house has no right to tell the attorney-general to remove the marshal. This rests with the attorney-general alone. We have no right to try public officials for their actions. Much fault has been found with the cabinet because they do not put down gambling. Gambling has gone on under all administrations here. Was it stopped during the term of office of the noble from Maui? No. Therefore the house should not censure the marshal or the cabinet for these things now.

Mr. NEUMANN. The cabinet is not on the defensive, but I will ask if any member of this house wishes to speak, for I want to close. It is our right to close this debate, and I will give way to anyone who wishes to speak. On behalf of the cabinet, he

could say they would be glad to go out, and wish joy to their successors. [Rep. Bush: What, in going out?] No; in coming in. The house was like a theater, in which various motions were brought out; but he had never felt the emotion of pity as he had for the once great, wise, and truthful noble for Maui. He had detailed truthfully and eloquently how much the United States had done for us; but his love for the United States was like Horace Walpole's gratitude—a lively anticipation of future favors. The bounty, however, would not come. He had gloried in the strength of the member for Maui, and had looked on him as one of the best and most patriotic young men in the country until to-day.

We will now look at this resolution, and see what sort of language it is written in. (The minister then read the second clause of the resolution.) I congratulate his excellency the minister of finance that he was important enough to have made so much trouble. If you had read as much fiction as I have, you would say that Dumas, who wrote the Count of Monte Christo, should hide his head in shame. He is "not in it" with Mr. Thurston. Who the brilliant author is I do not know. I suspected at first that it came from the facile pen of the member of the Third ward. But it is miles above his imagination. If the Legislature should vote this cabinet out on this ground, it would be laughed at in Washington. I hope you will not be laughed at. I am a Hawaiian by residence, denizenship, and citizenship, and I do not wish harm or ridicule to come to the Hawaiian people; and this second clause is dragged in as a reason to put this cabinet out. I am not here in defense of the cabinet. It has been said that the cabinet has no policy. Anyone who is not wilfully blind can see that it has a policy. It has the policy of economy, of renewing the credit of this country abroad. Now, he did not desire to retaliate upon the member from Maui, who had robbed him of one of his dearest illusions—his admiration of him, but if Hawaiian bonds were ever worth 113 it was none of his doing. The \$900,000 in the Postal Savings Bank was gone, unaccounted for.

During his incumbency the treaty which Mr. Carter had brought to perfection was rejected. So much for American enmity. By the grace of his late Majesty the speaker was made a denizen. He was practically a Hawaiian, but first an American, and would remain one. Now, however, he proposed to make the interests of this country his first care. The want-of-confidence motion was cut and dried or it would not have been brought. He did not question the motives of the members who voted for the cabinet two weeks ago. Some of them had a slight lapse of honesty four years ago, when a reform house voted them out of it. He wished them now a good digestion of the acquisition. Perhaps the conduct of these members now had motives similar to those which actuated them in 1888. He understood that a good deal of the persuasion had come from a member who gives luaus, and who has offered a member of this house a valuable piece of land. He held himself responsible for what he said and he would not be afraid to meet him when he came to him if he was in hearing. One of these men was a member of a benevolent society and had not turned in the funds which he had collected. He did not propose to leave the subject without tearing off the mask, and if the reform party got its support from such foul and impure sources, he could only congratulate them.

It had been strikingly said by his friend the noble from Maui that he would form a coalition with the devil, and he had come as near to it as he could when he found these two coadjutors. These men when they went back to their constituents would wear a blush which would shame the woods on fire. This cabinet was not necessary to the prosperity of the country. He could pick out quite as good a one from this house, but let the house be honest, strike out the preamble and do not pretend that you have any honest reason for the vote. The member from Maui had charged the cabinet with raising the sham cry of annexation. Not a word had been said by the cabinet on annexation except in reply to what the opposition had advanced, and when a fellow ran at the head of a crowd and shouted stop thief, he was usually the man who should be locked up. It had been well said that no remarks from anyone would change the views of anyone. No amount of talk could move those men who had such cogent reasons for changing their minds.

In regard to the marshal, he wished to thank the members for all their courtesies, but he would say that not ten houses could make him do any unjust act—he would not condemn a man unheard. Mr. Bush's report contained a number of citations from encyclopedias, etc., which even he had not read. He had learned more about opium from that pamphlet than he had ever known before, but nothing about the marshal except a few vague rumors. As to the other opium report, he had been astonished that there had not been at least a little paltry flame after so much smoke and noise. But there was nothing but glimmering ashes. There was nothing in the reports on which a rational man could take action. He would say to the gentlemen who were going to vote for the resolution, that he could not admire their sense of justice. They could not hurt him, for he wanted no position which brought nothing but abuse from every quarter. He thanked them for their attention.

Noble Thurston did not propose to go into details. The attorney-general in a late campaign speech had taken occasion to charge him with losing \$900,000. The attorney-general knew that he was speaking an untruth, and he knows it to-night. He said the bonds could only be sold for 90. The treasury balance when he took office was about \$13,000. Bonds could not be sold at any price. Bonds had to be placed in England at a cost of \$100,000. The treasury balance March 31st, 1888, was \$109,465; March 31st, 1890, it was \$491,152. Hawaiian Government bonds sold at public auction here at 113. The minister wrote to London to buy bonds at par and could not get any for nearly a year. As to the postal savings bank, the minister of finance's report gives every dollar and every cent of expenditure of the funds for that service. During that period \$579,000 was received from the bank. (The speaker read a large number of items showing that the money was expended in useful public improvements.) So that when the attorney-general makes such statements he knows, or should know, it was false, and should have the decency to get up and admit it. [Attorney-General: I said it had been wasted.] You said it had disappeared, and left no record and no trace.

Attorney-General Neumann asked indulgence of the house to set himself right. He had not charged any stealing. The honorable member claimed that there were bribes. So there were. Iron pipes resting at Wailuku—an electric plant which was almost worthless. (Noble Thurston: And a balance of \$491,000 in the treasury.) Perhaps he had erred in his figures. The member might have wasted but \$600,000.

Rep. Kamaooha said he had not intended to say anything more, but the attorney-general had reflected on the motives of the members. The attorney-general had suddenly developed the idea that going to luau was wrong. What then did he say to the luau given at Waikiki when this resolution was up before. What about the little dinners that used to be given at the hotel. Did the attorney-general mean to admit that these were given for the purpose of influencing votes? The reason of the change of the members was that they had been disappointed in the conduct of the cabinet. As for the members going back to their constituents with a blush on their cheeks, there would be no need of that, and their chance of being returned was a good deal better than the attorney-general's. He would move the previous question.

Rep. Waipuilani said the insinuations of the attorney-general, that certain members had taken bribes, were an insult to the house. (Some sparring took place between the member and the attorney-general at this point.) The minister of finance had intimated that this resolution had been got up at the luau yesterday. It was proposed last week and given to the interpreter to translate. He hoped every member would vote honestly and moved the ayes and noes be taken.

The motion to indefinitely postpone was lost on the following division:

Ayes—Nobles Hopkins, Pua, Peterson, Williams, Maile, Hind, Cornwell, and Dreir, Reps. Pua, Koahou, Kaunamano, Kapahu, White, Kanealii, and Edmonds—15.

Noes—Nobles Ena, Cummins, Kauhane, J. M. Horner, Hoapili, Marsden, Young, Baldwin, W. Y. Horner, Walbridge, Anderson, Thurston, G. N. Wilcox, and Kanoa; Reps. Wilder, Bipikane, Ashford, Aki, Kauhi, R. W. Wilcox, Bush, Nawahi, A. Horner, Kamaooha, Waipuilani, Nahinu, Kaluna, Iosepa, Akina, Smith, and A. S. Wilcox—31.

Absent—Noble Berger.

Rep. Nahinu explained his vote. He voted no on account of the registration bill and the O. R. & L. Co. bill.

The motion to adopt the resolution was carried on the same division.

A motion to reconsider was made and lost.

The house adjourned at 10:18 p. m.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 59.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, October 26, 1892.

SIR: I have received your dispatch No. 70, of the 8th instant, in relation to the political situation in Hawaii. It has been read with much interest and attention.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Confidential.]

No. 72.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, October 31, 1892.

SIR: In dispatch 71, of October 19, I gave account of the rejection of the new cabinet appointed by the Queen in defiance of a previously expressed majority of the Legislature. The deadlock continues. Though two weeks have elapsed since the decisive action of the Legislature, no ministers have been designated to fill the vacancies. The Tahitian favorite and the Queen still refuse to take the legislative majority and the leading business men of the islands into their confidence. The palace is still thronged and surrounded by the worst elements, and the responsible citizens feel that they are not welcomed as advisors. The Queen and the Tahitian have made several new ministerial slates, with one responsible man and three of the other kind; but no responsible man, so far, can be found who will go into the cabinet with the three whom only a minority of the Legislature will accept.

Thus there is here, on a small scale, the old historic issue between autocracy and parliamentary responsibility. The foreign adventurers and renegades stand by the Tahitian favorite because he is the instrument which they can use, and he adheres to them because he needs their support. In the meantime the Legislature is unable to do business and has been in session only a few hours for several weeks. If that body holds firm, the Queen will have to yield, and a responsible ministry would probably be the result. The ultra-English influence is strongly with the half-English Tahitian favorite and the Queen, for the one reason only, that the success of the legislative majority would be the appointment of a cabinet strongly American in sympathy and purpose. There are strong reasons for the belief that were it not for the presence of the American naval force in the harbor the Tahitian marshal and his gang would induce the Queen to attempt a coup d'etat by proclaiming a new constitution, taking from the legislature the power to reject ministerial appointments.

The recent arrival here from England of T. H. Davies, the head of a strong English house in Honolulu, formerly a resident here for many years, has served to intensify the ultra-English feeling and to strengthen the American sentiment. This T. H. Davies having made himself rich under the sugar provisions of the reciprocity treaty, now resides in England and has a kind of supervisory care of the half-white Hawaiian crown princess, for several years and still at school in England. When a resident here at the time the Pearl Harbor provision was pending, Davies strongly opposed that provision. He comes now with revived zeal against the Pearl Harbor concession. It is not thought that he has any encouragement to this course from the home Government of England, but that his course is his own, and that his zeal is increased by the Canadian Pacific Railroad managers, of whom Davies is the agent. The desperate efforts of that road to save itself embrace the scheme of a cable, and Pacific steamer lines to Australia and China, including the design of antagonizing the interests of the United States in these islands. This involves the plan of controlling the Hawaiian monarchy through the present Queen and her favorite, and especially by having in hand the crown princess, the general belief being that the present Queen will not live many years. Davies, who has this supervising care

of the crown princess in England, is a Tory. Of course these facts, so apparent to intelligent observers here, are telling on all friends of the United States.

The other of the two principal English commercial houses here, older and nearly as wealthy as those of Davies & Co., is thoroughly Americanized and stands firmly against the efforts of T. H. Davies, and is for the United States on every issue. This house owns several hundreds of thousands (of dollars worth?) of property in Iowa and California, its head being father-in-law of Gen. Dimond, the head of the United States mint in San Francisco.

Perhaps it is well to state that it is the rumor here that the last rejected cabinet, only holding their places until others are appointed, have sent a dispatch to Washington asking the recall of Consul-General Severance. I do not credit this rumor. But influential parties have called at this legation who say that if any such step has been taken by this rejected cabinet, the American merchants and business men, as well as other leading citizens, will send a strong memorial to the Department of State against any such action of a dead ministry. I have not encouraged any such action in our behalf, believing it to be unnecessary. So far I am supported here by all the responsible Americans and others to a degree more than I had the right to expect. This so much the more impresses on me the necessity of prudence as well as of firmness. To keep the Department of State well informed as to affairs here, I deem it well to give these particulars.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Later.]

NOVEMBER 1, 1892.

Names of the new cabinet sent to the Legislature this morning. Resolutions of "want of confidence" passed in one house, and thirty minutes after the names of the new ministry were read, and only 13 votes out of 48 members of whom the Legislature is composed were in their favor. The strongest objections are to the minister of foreign affairs and to the minister of finance—Joseph Mamohi and William H. Cornwell—both of them unqualified and very unacceptable to the more responsible men of all nationalities. As they will assume to hold their places until their successors shall have been appointed, they may attempt to do some strange things. As Cornwell, for some reason, is hostile to the American minister and to the consul-general, would not be surprised should he induce his associates to ask for our recall. Possibly they may hold their places one week, as the Legislature has adjourned for six days to allow the Queen time to select their successors.

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 61.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 5, 1892.

SIR: I have received and read with attention your dispatch No. 71, of the 19th ultimo, in relation to the Hawaiian political situation.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Confidential.]

No. 62.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 8, 1892.

SIR: Adverting to your current dispatches in relation to the course of political events in the Hawaiian Islands, many of which are marked by you "Confidential" and for obvious reasons, I desire to suggest that you endeavor to separate your reports into two classes, one of which shall aim to give the narrative of public affairs in their open historical aspect, and the other to be of a strictly reserved and confidential character, reporting and commenting upon matters of personal intrigue and the like so far as you may deem necessary for my full understanding of the situation. Many of your dispatches combine these two modes of treatment to such a degree as to make their publication, in the event of a call from Congress or other occasion therefor inexpedient and, indeed, impracticable, without extended omissions.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 73.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 8, 1892.

SIR: The prolonged struggle between the Queen and the Legislature has terminated to-day by the triumph of the latter. A new ministry has just been appointed, of quite different material from that of its several predecessors. Mark P. Robinson, Foreign Affairs; Peter C. Jones, Finance; G. N. Wilcox, Interior; Cecil Brown, Attorney-General. These are of the responsible men of the islands, none of them needing the salaries, all being of comparative wealth, their aggregate property being estimated at nearly one million of dollars. Mr. Jones is a native of Boston, Massachusetts, in active business here for a quarter of a century, though he has lived the past year in his native city, having recently returned to Honolulu.

Wilcox, the wealthiest man of the four, was born on one of the islands, of American missionary parentage. Robinson is the most respected man of the islands, of mixed blood, three quarters white, born here. The first three are strong in American feeling and purpose. Brown, the attorney-general, was born here, of English parentage, and is said to be more American than English as to the future of Hawaii. It is possible the Tahitian favorite may be continued as marshal for the present, but his dictatorship is practically overthrown. The success of the Legislative majority and the appointment of this cabinet are regarded as the triumph of the better citizens of Hawaii over the worse, and especially a proof of American ascendancy over ultra English and other anti-American elements and sentiments. This new cabinet is justly considered the most positively American there has been here since the Reform ministry went out two and a half years ago. I am happy to say that my official and personal relations with this ministry are likely to be most friendly and cordial.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Confidential.]

No. 74.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 20, 1892.

SIR: Fidelity to the trust imposed on me by the President, the Department of State, and the Senate, requires that I should make a careful and full statement of the financial, agricultural, social, and political condition of these islands. An intelligent and impartial examination of the facts can hardly fail to lead to the conclusion that the relations and policy of the United States toward Hawaii will soon demand some change, if not the adoption of decisive measures, with the aim to secure American interests and future supremacy by encouraging Hawaiian development and aiding to promote responsible government in these islands. It is unnecessary for me to allude to the deep interest and the settled policy of the United States Government in respect of these islands, from the official days of John Quincy Adams and of Daniel Webster to the present time. In all that period, we have avowed the superiority of our interests to those of all other nations, and have always refused to embarrass our freedom of action by any alliance or arrangement with other powers as to the ultimate possession and government of the islands. Before stating the present political condition of the little kingdom, it is well to review the substantial data as to its area, its resources, its financial and business condition, its capabilities of material development, its population, the status of its landed property, its government, revenues, and expenditures, etc.

PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS.

The total area of the kingdom is about 6,000 square miles. Not including several small islands of little importance, the chief value of the land area is in the six islands of Oahu, Kauai, Maui, Molokai, Lanai, and Hawaii, the last named being nearly the size of all the rest of the group. The plains, valleys, and lowlands are fertile, while the highlands are adapted to the raising of extensive herds of cattle, horses, and sheep. The arable lands are adapted to the production of sugar, coffee, rice, bananas, oranges, lemons, pineapples, grapes and maize. Of the arable lands only such as are fitted for the production of sugar and rice have been much brought into use. The coffee raised is of superior quality, and finds ready market for home consumption and in San Francisco. There is no doubt that this product can be greatly extended. This opinion is sustained by the examination of experts and has been verified by successful results in coffee-raising, to which there is now being given special attention.

The banana culture can be greatly extended, and the opportunities for the production of oranges are large and promising. Ripening at a time in the year different from those of southern California, the Hawaiian oranges can find a ready market in San Francisco, and especially in the cities of Oregon and Washington, where these islands procure most of their lumber for buildings and fences, and from which they procure coal, the consumption of which will necessarily increase for use in the sugar mills and the supply of steamers. For a quarter of a century the profits of sugar-raising have tended to divert capital and enterprise almost exclusively to the cane culture, to the neglect of the other industries and interests of the islands. Good government

and the building of necessary roads and bridges, the Government assumption of the "crown lands," and the conversion of them into small homesteads for raising the crops already specified, would speedily stimulate general prosperity and increase the American and European families and freeholders, and aid to constitute a large number of responsible voters, thus giving stability to legislation and government.

There are nearly 900,000 acres of "crown lands," and these, in the main, are among the most valuable of the islands. The rent paid for them goes to the sovereign, and the amount of the income received is no doubt much less than it would be if these lands were owned and managed by private individuals. There have long been more or less abuses in the leasing of these lands, and it is well understood that the leases have been prolific sources of political favoritism and corruption. Well handled and sold at fitting opportunities, the proceeds of the crown lands would pay the national debt, provide adequate pensions for the two or three royalties, in case monarchy should be abolished, and yet leave a balance of considerable amount for a permanent school fund.

COMMERCIAL AND NAVAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ISLANDS.

The value of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States for commercial and naval purposes has been well understood by American statesmen for more than half a century. The examination of the Hawaiian harbors and a careful consideration of their capabilities of defense, twenty years since, by Gen. Schofield and naval officers, whose opinions are on record in the Washington departments, plainly indicate how important these islands and harbors are to the future American commerce of the Pacific. Even to a nonexpert the great value and the easy defensibility of the harbors of Pearl City and of Honolulu are unmistakably obvious. Only six miles from each other, with narrow entrances backed by a continuous wall of mountains, each terminus of this natural barrier reaching to the sea, at relatively small expense these harbors can be impregnably fortified against all attack by sea and land. The harbor of Honolulu can now be entered by ships drawing 30 feet of water. But Pearl Harbor is larger and much preferable for naval purposes. It is only necessary to deepen the entrance by removing the bar of coral formation. This coral obstruction can be removed with comparative ease, and the expense would not be large. Opinions of practical men here, who have had to do with these coral formations, as well as my personal observation, as to how easily it can be broken up by pick and crow-bar, go to show how readily it can be removed by modern explosives and the improved mechanical agencies.

With a large island between it and the sea, a capacious, safe, and beautiful harbor is secured for American commercial and military marine just where the future greatness and the necessities of the United States imperatively require. Only those who have carefully examined the vast resources of the American Pacific States, and considered that nearly two-fifths of the immense area of the United States, through the transcontinental railways and by rivers and sounds, outlet on the Pacific, and have studied the data surely pointing to the vast future commerce of this western world, can adequately appreciate the importance of these harbors to the American nation, and the necessity of securing them against foreign rivals. If we neglect them the present occupants must suffer, and their necessities will force them in directions unfriendly to American interests. Circumstances are pressing, and no time should

be lost in looking at the facts as they really exist. The strong inclination of several European powers to gain possession of all the islands in the Pacific, except such as are expressly protected by the United States, is plainly shown by what has taken place in recent years.

The seizure of Gilbert, Johnson, and other islands, in the past few months, and what recently transpired in regard to Samoa, emphatically show that England certainly has not moderated her policy in the indicated regard, to which course the Canadian Government is undoubtedly the inspiring cause. The enormous cost of the Canadian Pacific Railway impels its managers to make the most desperate efforts to secure freight and passengers, and hence its aggressive plans to secure Pacific commerce and to gain political and commercial influence in these islands. The scheme of a British cable from Vancouver via Honolulu to Australia, as well as to Japan and China, and of establishing commercial and mail lines of steamers on the same route, is not an idle dream. Powerful agencies are already working to these ends, and to effectively safeguard American interests on the Pacific and in these islands there is no time for hesitation and delay. If the United States Government does not very promptly provide for laying a cable from San Francisco or San Diego to Honolulu or Hilo, it may be regarded as certain that a cable will be laid by British capital and be controlled by British managers. Pearl Harbor for a coaling station and an American cable between California and Hawaii are of immediate vital importance to American commercial and naval interests and to the maintenance of American influence on these islands.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLANDS.

A question of vital importance to Hawaii and of American interest in and care for its future is that of its government. There has been in the last twenty years a great change in the political status of things here. Formerly the facts and circumstances appertaining to government on these islands were essentially different from what they are today. Then the population was chiefly native Hawaiian. The natives had long lived under a kind of feudal system, with rigid laws and customs, which gave to the numerous chiefs and the King absolute despotic power. The wisdom and the religious zeal of the Christian missionaries enabled them to acquire and exercise a strong influence for good over the chiefs and King as well. Thus a system of government and laws was established which was a great improvement on the former condition of things. The general good character of the men who effectively aided the Hawaiian monarch to carry on the Government for years secured fairly successful administration of law and the maintenance of public order at limited cost, the public revenues being small. But the numerous Hawaiian chiefs are in their graves. Their families are extinct. The original native Hawaiians are now so decreased as to number less than two-fifths of the population of the islands.

The coming to the throne of the late King Kalakaua in 1873 was by legislative election, and but for the presence in the harbor and on shore of American marines and sailors, of the United States vessels of war, he would have failed to secure his Crown against a determined mob in the interest of another aspirant. The great prosperity of the islands under the reciprocity treaty, stimulating the production of sugar, leading to a large American, European, and Asiatic immigration, caused a great increase of the Government revenues. This prosperous state of things also soon resulted in a large increase of the Government expenditures,

in the addition of new offices, a large augmentation of salaries, thus stimulating the desire for official places and patronage, exciting the greed of adventurous and too often unworthy political partisans. Easy going, unused to and incapable of safe and economical administration, the King, Kalakaua, too often, in his seventeen years of reign, fell into the hands of unscrupulous associates and advisers. The Government expenditures soon reached figures much above what the area and population of the little Kingdom justified. But so long as the great profits of sugar-raising under the American tariff flowed into the islands, the excessive Government expenses could be paid without the principal taxpayers very sensibly realizing the burden.

The adoption of a new constitution in 1887, taking from the King much of his former power and establishing legislative and ministerial responsibility, effected a beneficial change. But the great reduction of the profits of sugar-raising, rendering some of the plantations nearly worthless, and greatly lessening the income and market value of the others, has brought a condition of affairs which compels all the reflecting and responsible citizens to see that the present expenses of the Government are much beyond what the islands can pay and much higher than wise legislation and proper economic administration require. But the difficulty of getting out of the old grooves, of scaling down salaries, and abolishing useless offices is hard to overcome. Nearly one-half of the population of the country have no voice in political affairs, unless exerted through corruption and bribery. The voting population is made up of several nationalities—Hawaiian, Portuguese, American, English, German, and others, the more intelligent and responsible of these generally acting together sufficiently to exercise a beneficial influence on legislation and administration. But the palace patronage and influence are still considerable, costing the country more than it is able to pay and returning to the country no positive advantages.

Directly and indirectly, the palace probably costs the little Kingdom \$150,000 per year. A governor, at \$5,000 a year, acting in harmony with the responsible men of the Legislature, would be far better for the islands than the present monarchical arrangement. In truth, the monarchy here is an absurd anachronism. It has nothing on which it logically or legitimately stands. The feudal basis on which it once stood no longer existing, the monarchy is now only an impediment to good government—an obstruction to the prosperity and progress of the islands. Incapable of comprehending the principles of constitutional government, more likely to take the advice of unworthy counsel than of the more competent, the reigning Sovereign insists in dealing with what properly belongs to the Legislature and to the ministers. Thus the palace is constantly open to superficial and irresponsible courtiers and to unprincipled adventurers of different nationalities. Instead of exercising a salutary influence on public affairs it is the center of maladministration and of the most vicious kind of politics. It is now, and it has been for the last twenty years, and is always likely to be, a fruitful source of public demoralization.

It may be asked, Why do not the people of the islands at once reform this state of things? There is a considerable number of intelligent, energetic, and excellent citizens, of the different nationalities, in possession of the elective franchise. They are largely Americanized in their opinions and manners. They are sympathetic with American institutions. This is so of the Portuguese, the Germans, more or less of the English, and of the native Hawaiians and half-whites, as well as

of the most of those of American parentage. But these unaided and alone can not well make the necessary changes in the existing condition of things. As a crown colony of Great Britain, or a Territory of the United States, the government modifications could be made readily, and good administration of the laws secured. Destiny and the vast future interests of the United States in the Pacific clearly indicate who, at no distant day, must be responsible for the government of these islands. Under a territorial government they could be as easily governed as any of the existing Territories of the United States.

The men qualified are here to carry on good government, provided they have the support of the Government of the United States. Why not postpone American possession? Would it not be just as well for the United States to take the islands twenty-five years hence? Facts and obvious probabilities will answer both of these interrogatives. Hawaii has reached the parting of the ways. She must now take the road which leads to Asia, or the other, which outlets her in America, gives her an American civilization and binds her to the care of American destiny. The non-action of the American Government here in thirty years will make of Hawaii a Singapore, or a Hongkong, which could be governed as a British colony, but would be unfit to be an American Territory or an American State under our constitutional system. If the American flag floats here at no distant day, the Asiatic tendencies can be arrested and controlled without retarding the material development of the islands, but surely advancing their prosperity by diversifying and expanding the industries, building roads and bridges, opening the public lands to small farmers from Europe and the United States, thus increasing the responsible voting population, and constituting a solid basis for American methods of government.

Two-fifths of the people now here are Chinese and Japanese. If the present state of things is allowed to go on the Asiatics will soon largely preponderate, for the native Hawaiians are growing less at the rate of nearly one thousand per year. At the present prices of sugar, and at the prices likely to hold in the future, sugar-raising on these islands can be continued only by the cheapest possible labor—that of the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Indian coolies. Americanize the islands, assume control of the "Crown lands," dispose of them in small lots for actual settlers and freeholders for the raising of coffee, oranges, lemons, bananas, pineapples, and grapes, and the result soon will be to give permanent preponderance to a population and a civilization which will make the islands like southern California, and at no distant period convert them into gardens and sanitariums, as well as supply stations for American commerce, thus bringing everything here into harmony with American life and prosperity. To postpone American action many years is only to add to present unfavorable tendencies and to make future possession more difficult.

It is proper to consider the following facts: The present Sovereign is not expected to live many years. The princess heir apparent has always been, and is likely always to be, under English influence. Her father is British in blood and prejudices, firmly entrenched here as collector of customs, an important and influential office. She has been for some years and still is in England; her patron there, who has a kind of guardianship of her, T. H. Davies, is a Tory Englishman, who lived here many years, who still owns large property in the islands, and is a resolute and persistent opponent of American predominance, bitterly denouncing even the American acquisition of Pearl Harbor. Mr. Wodehouse, the English minister, has long resided here; his eldest son is

married to a half-caste sister of the Crown Princess, another son is in the Honolulu post-office, and a daughter also is married to a resident of one of the islands. The death of the present Queen, therefore, would virtually place an English princess on the Hawaiian throne, and put in the hands of the ultra English the patronage and influence of the palace.

In the existing state of things, with non-American intervention, these palace influences, skillfully handled, are nearly equal, frequently superior, to the power of the Legislature. Add to this palace power, in British hands, the influence of an adventurous, impecunious, and irresponsible mob of "hoodlums," and there results a state of things which would put it in the power of Canadian and ultra-British schemers, with a subsidy fund of \$50,000, to secure control of the Legislature, and by prompt and vigorous action secure Canadian and British franchises, privileges, and rights entirely legal, to get rid of which would cause embarrassment and expense to the United States and her allies here. As is well known to the Department of State, Secretary Marcy, with the approval of President Pierce and Cabinet, authorized the negotiation of a treaty for making these islands a Territory of the United States. Commissioner Gregg was authorized to facilitate the negotiation by the promise to pay \$100,000 for pensions to the King, chiefs, and other official persons, on condition that the sovereignty and property of the islands should be transferred to the United States.

Commissioner Gregg exceeded his instructions by stipulating to pay, in all, three times the sum which Secretary Marcy named in his instructions. These terms were deemed onerous and unacceptable by the Washington Department of State, and consequently the treaty was dropped, after all negotiations had been completed, the King finally being induced by his Scotch minister of foreign affairs not to sign it, though the King and cabinet had previously given their support to the spirit and terms of the negotiations and the conclusions reached. The embarrassments and objections that then existed as to the number of the royal princes and chiefs, the small number of the American population, the want of ready communication with the United States, and distance from Washington, now no longer stand in the way of making Hawaii a well-governed and prosperous United States Territory. The reasons for annexation in 1854 were certainly much less adequate and pressing than they are now.

THE EXISTING BUSINESS STATUS.

It is well to consider the existing state of things here resulting from the change in the United States sugar tariff. Only personal observation and a careful investigation of the facts can give one an adequate idea of the severe blow sugar raising here has received. The production of sugar being the main business of the islands, the great reduction of the market price has affected powerfully the entire affairs and condition of the islands. I think it understating the truth to express the opinion that the loss to the owners of the sugar plantations and mills, etc., and the consequent depreciation of other property by the passage of the McKinley bill, wise and beneficial as that measure is proving to be for the vast interests of the United States, has not been less than \$12,000,000, a large portion of this loss falling on Americans residing here and in California. Unless some positive measures of relief be granted, the depreciation of sugar property here will continue to go on. Wise, bold action by the United States will rescue the property

holders from great losses, give the islands a government which will put an end to a worse than useless expenditure of a large proportion of the revenues of the country, using them for the building of roads and bridges, thus helping to develop the natural resources of the islands, aiding to diversify the industries and to increase the number of the responsible citizens.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be followed, either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a "customs union," an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not necessarily stipulated American protectorate over the islands. I believe the former to be the better, that which will prove much the more advantageous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end for the United States. If it was wise for the United States, through Secretary Marcy, thirty-eight years ago, to offer to expend \$100,000 to secure a treaty of annexation, it certainly can not be chimerical or unwise to expend \$100,000 to secure annexation in the near future. To-day the United States has five times the wealth she possessed in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are much stronger than they were then. I can not refrain from expressing the opinion with emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand. A perpetual customs union and the acquisition of Pearl Harbor, with an implied protectorate, must be regarded as the only allowable alternative. This would require the continual presence in the harbor of Honolulu of a United States vessel of war and the constant watchfulness of the United States minister while the present bungling, unsettled, and expensive political rule would go on, retarding the development of the islands, leaving at the end of twenty-five years more embarrassment to annexation than exists to-day, the property far less valuable, and the population less American than they would be if annexation were soon realized.

It may be said that annexation would involve the obligation of paying to the Hawaiian sugar-producers the same rate of bounties now paid to American producers, thus imposing too heavy a demand on the United States Treasury. It is a sufficient answer to this objection to say that it could be specifically provided in the terms of annexation that the United States Government should pay 6 mills per pound—\$12 per ton—to the Hawaiian sugar-raisers, and this only so long as the present sugar-bounty system of the United States shall be maintained. Careful inquiry and investigation bring me to the conclusion that this small bounty would tide the Hawaiian sugar-planters over their present alarming condition and save the islands from general business depression and financial disaster. Could justice to American interests in the islands and care for their future welfare do less than this?

To give Hawaii a highly favorable treaty while she remains outside the American Union would necessarily give the same advantages to hostile foreigners, those who would continue to antagonize our commercial and political interests here, as well as those of American blood and sympathies. It is a well authenticated fact that the American sentiment here in 1890, the last year of the great prosperity under the sugar provisions of the reciprocity treaty, was much less manifest than before that treaty had gone into effect, and less pronounced than when

Secretary Marcy authorized the negotiation of the annexation treaty in 1854. It is equally true that the desire here at this time for annexation is much stronger than in 1889. Besides, so long as the islands retain their own independent government there remains the possibility that England or the Canadian Dominion might secure one of the Hawaiian harbors for a coaling station. Annexation excludes all dangers of this kind.

Which of the two lines of policy and action shall be adopted our statesmen and our Government must decide. Certain it is that the interests of the United States and the welfare of these islands will not permit the continuance of the existing state and tendency of things. Having for so many years extended a helping hand to the islands and encouraged the American residents and their friends at home to the extent we have, we can not refrain now from aiding them with vigorous measures, without injury to ourselves and those of our "kith and kin" and without neglecting American opportunities that never seemed so obvious and pressing as they do now. I have no doubt that the more thoroughly the bed rock and controlling facts touching the Hawaiian problem are understood by our Government and by the American public, the more readily they will be inclined to approve the views I have expressed so inadequately in this communication.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Hon. JOHN W. FOSTER,
Secretary of State.

NOTE.—On the following pages will be found statistics from the Hawaiian census reports of 1890, touching the population, the different nationalities, the principal property owners, the amount of Government revenues and expenditures, Government property, etc., which will help elucidate the views I have expressed in the preceding pages.

J. L. S.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 75.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 28, 1892.

SIR: Your dispatch No. 62 of November 8 received. Hereafter I will comply as nearly as practicable with your suggestion that I separate my reports into two classes, one of an "open historical aspect" and the other of a "strictly reserved and confidential character."

My dispatch 74, marked confidential, was written and copied before your 62 was received. The reason why I have deemed it necessary to consider most of my dispatches confidential is because of the peculiar state of things here. Anything which gets out in Washington in relation to affairs here is sure at once to be taken up by San Francisco papers, some of which are highly sensational. These newspapers are brought here in large numbers by the mail steamer, not followed by another usually before two weeks. Thus a falsehood or misrepresentation stands here unrefuted for two weeks, doing mischief.

So far the new cabinet holds well and gives satisfaction to the responsible men of the islands.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 65.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 1, 1892.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of dispatches numbered 47-73 and 53 B.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 67.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 23, 1892.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 74, of the 20th of November, marked "confidential," relative to the financial and political condition of Hawaii, which has been read with interest.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 68.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 23, 1892.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 75, of the 28th ultimo, regarding confidential dispatches.

I am, sir,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Telegram.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, H. I., January 18, 1893.

Events in Hawaii in the past few days have moved rapidly. An entire overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy and the establishment of a provisional government in the interest of the whole people of the islands, without the sacrifice of a single life. The new Government is in full possession of the islands and was promptly recognized by all the diplomatic representatives. The four men of whom it is composed are of high character, one of whom resigned his position as one of the supreme judges to assume the place. Full dispatches by the mail leaving Honolulu to-day by special steamer.

STEVENS,
United States Minister.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 79.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 18, 1893.

SIR: In my 73, of November 8, I gave full information of the surrender of the Queen to the wishes of the Legislature by the formation of a ministry composed of men of intelligence and wealth, possessing the entire confidence of the business men and the more responsible citizens of the country. But this surrender of the Queen and of those surrounding her was only seeming. As soon as the principal appropriations had been voted and the legislative work was nearly concluded, several of the best members having already left for their homes, a remarkable conspiracy was revealed.

The undersigned, for the first time since he has been at the head of this legation, January 4 took passage for Hilo and the volcano on the U. S. S. *Boston* for the benefit of the health of himself and of his daughter, it being also desirable that the town of the second importance in the islands should have this attention at the time the *Boston* was making a visit to Hawaii, the chief island in the group. Beyond all doubt, immediately after the *Boston* and myself had left Honolulu the unscrupulous adventurers around the Queen improved the opportunity to push through the Legislature an astounding lottery franchise with the obvious intent to sell it out to the Louisiana lottery men. This was worked by some of the same parties supposed to be of the powerful opium ring whose four points of operation are Vancouver, San Francisco, Honolulu, and Hongkong. They distributed the lottery stock among the native members of the Legislature in large figures.

Notwithstanding the strong opposition of all the best people of the islands, including whites and natives, and the emphatic opposition of the chamber of commerce, the Queen and her palace favorite gave their warmest support to the lottery bill and signed it at once. She was to be immediately compensated by being allowed to proclaim a new constitution, restoring to the Crown the old despotic prerogatives in direct violation of the existing constitution, which provides for the only mode of change, which is by the action of successive legislatures.

Returning on the *Boston* from our Hilo trip on the 14th instant, we found the Legislature was to be prorogued at 12 a. m., one-half hour after my arrival at the legation. The prorogation completed, members of the Legislature, diplomatic corps, judges of the supreme court, and other officials went to the palace by invitation. In the meantime it began to be known in public circles the Queen's intention to proclaim the revolutionary constitution. This resulted in raising an excitement which alarmed her confidants and caused some of them to draw back. This consumed time, so that she could not secure the signatures of her new cabinet as she had expected. In the meantime the diplomatic corps grew weary and left the palace, realizing that the invitation to be present was a trick.

As I had just returned, weary from my voyage, I had not received the invitation, the chamberlain knowing I was absent when he invited the English, Portuguese, French, and Japanese diplomatic representatives the day before. In the short meanwhile I had suspicioned the trick. Finally, the Queen appeared in the throne room, before the supreme judges and other officials, in an extreme passion of anger, and avowed her purpose to postpone her revolutionary constitution for a brief period, and then went upon the balcony and spoke with great passion in the same strain to those around the palace, principally her

retainers and the royal guard, her determination to proclaim her constitution at another time. What I have described as to the lottery legislation, the forcing out of the responsible cabinet of November 8 and appointing the lottery cabinet, two of whom had been voted out of the ministry during the legislative session by a two-thirds vote for the best of reasons. It was the lottery bribe and the autocratic design of the Queen that quickly precipitated events.

A mass meeting of the citizens was called to meet on Monday, the 16th, at 2 p. m., which assembled in the largest hall in the city. Short as was the notice, over 1,300 of the principal citizens of Honolulu and from other islands, who happened to be in the city, were in attendance. This meeting included merchants, bankers, professional men, the principal business men, and the mechanics, the chief German and some of the leading English merchants and other nationalities, as well as American residents. It is said such an assemblage was never before equaled in Honolulu. Intelligent American visitors here say that such a public meeting would do credit to a meeting of a similar class of citizens in our best American cities.

The assemblage was a unit in feeling and purpose. The speeches and resolutions are on the printed slips I herewith inclose. This remarkable uprising of the best citizens, including nearly all of the chief property holders, the Tahitian marshal and palace favorite did not dare attempt to suppress. A committee of public safety was at once created to meet the emergency and to prevent anarchy and riot. It was fortunate that the *Boston* was in the harbor. The committee on public safety called on me for aid. I promptly addressed to the commander of the *Boston*, Capt. G. S. Wiltse, the following note:

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

SIR: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, including an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command for the protection of the United States legation and United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.

Very truly, yours,

JOHN L. STEVENS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Capt. G. C. WILTSE,
Commander U. S. S. Boston.

A copy of the call of the committee of public safety for aid is inclosed.

Promptly the men from the *Boston* were landed. Detachments were placed around the legation and the consulate, the principal members having marched to a central hall for shelter and headquarters; the night being at hand, the public anxiety being especially strong as to what might be done by irresponsible persons in the night, the landing of the men of the *Boston* so promptly gave immediate relief to the public anxiety.

As soon as practicable a Provisional Government was constituted, composed of four highly respectable men, with Judge Dole at the head, he having resigned his place on the supreme bench to assume this responsibility. He was born in Honolulu, of American parentage, educated here and in the United States, and is of the highest reputation among all citizens, both natives and whites. P. C. Jones is a native of Boston, Mass., wealthy, possessing property interests in the islands, and a resident here for many years. The other two members are of the highest respectability. The committee of public safety forthwith

took possession of the Government buildings, archives, and treasury, and installed the Provisional Government at the heads of the respective departments. This being an accomplished fact, I promptly recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands. The English minister, the Portuguese chargé d'affaires, the French and the Japanese commissioners promptly did the same; these, with myself, being the only members of the diplomatic corps residing here.

All is quiet here now. Without the sacrifice of a single life this change of government has been accomplished. Language can hardly express the enthusiasm and the profound feeling of relief at this peaceful and salutary change of government. The underlying cause of this profound feeling among the citizens is the hope that the United States Government will allow these islands to pass to American control and become American soil. A commission of citizens, duly accredited, will go by the steamer that takes this dispatch to Washington, to state the wishes of the Provisional Government and of the responsible people of the islands, and to give a complete account of the existing state of things here.

It is proper that I should add, that the presence of the *Boston* here has been of the highest importance, and the behavior of officers and men has been admirable. Capt. Wiltse has exercised prudence and great firmness, while he and the undersigned have recognized only accomplished facts and have not allowed the use of the United States force for any but the most conservative reasons.

I am, sir,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Written copy by future mail.

S.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 79.]

PROCLAMATION.

In its earlier history Hawaii possessed a constitutional government honestly and economically administered in the public interest.

The Crown called to its assistance as advisers able, honest, and conservative men, whose integrity was unquestioned even by their political opponents.

The stability of the Government was assured, armed resistance and revolution unthought of, popular rights were respected, and the privileges of the subject from time to time increased and the prerogatives of the sovereign diminished by the voluntary acts of the successive Kings.

With very few exceptions this state of affairs continued until the expiration of the first few years of the reign of His late Majesty Kalakaua. At this time a change was discernible in the spirit animating the Chief Executive and in the influences surrounding the throne. A steadily increasing disposition was manifested on the part of the King to extend the royal prerogatives; to favor adventurers and persons of no character or standing in the community; to encroach upon the rights and privileges of the people by steadily increasing corruption of electors, and by means of the power and influence of officeholders and other corrupt means to illegitimately influence the elections, resulting in the final absolute control of not only the executive and legislative, but to a certain extent the judicial departments of the Government in the interests of absolutism.

This finally resulted in the revulsion of feeling and popular uprising of 1887, which wrested from the King a large portion of his ill-gotten powers.

The leaders of this movement were not seeking personal aggrandizement, political power, or the suppression of the native Government. If this had been their object it could easily have been accomplished, for they had the absolute control of the situation.

Their object was to secure responsible Government through a representative cabinet, supported by and responsible to the people's elected representatives. A clause

to this effect was inserted in the constitution, and subsequently enacted by law by the Legislature, specifically covering the ground that in all matters concerning the state the sovereign was to act by and with the advice of the cabinet, and only by and with such advice.

The King willingly agreed to such proposition, expressed regret for the past, and volunteered promises for the future.

Almost from the date of such agreement and promises up to the time of his death the history of the Government has been a continual struggle between the King on the one hand and the cabinet and Legislature on the other, the former constantly endeavoring by every available form of influence and evasion to ignore his promises and agreements and regain his lost powers.

This conflict upon several occasions came to a crisis, followed each time by submission on the part of His Majesty, by renewed expressions of regret and promises to abide by the constitutional and legal restrictions in the future. In each instance such promise was kept until a further opportunity presented itself, when the conflict was renewed in defiance and regardless of all previous pledges.

Upon the accession of Her Majesty Liliuokalani, for a brief period the hope prevailed that a new policy would be adopted. This hope was soon blasted by her immediately entering into conflict with the existing cabinet, who held office with the approval of a large majority of the Legislature, resulting in the triumph of the Queen and the removal of the cabinet. The appointment of a new cabinet subservient to her wishes and their continuance in office until a recent date gave no opportunity for further indication of the policy which would be pursued by Her Majesty until the opening of the Legislature in May of 1892.

The recent history of that session has shown a stubborn determination on the part of Her Majesty to follow the tactics of her late brother and in all possible ways to secure an extension of the royal prerogatives and an abridgment of popular rights.

During the latter part of the session the Legislature was replete with corruption; bribery and other illegitimate influences were openly utilized to secure the desired end, resulting in the final complete overthrow of all opposition and the inauguration of a cabinet arbitrarily selected by Her Majesty in complete defiance of constitutional principles and popular representation.

Notwithstanding such result the defeated party peacefully submitted to the situation.

Not content with her victory Her Majesty proceeded on the last day of the session to arbitrarily arrogate to herself the right to promulgate a new constitution, which proposed, among other things, to disfranchise over one-fourth of the voters and the owners of nine-tenths of the private property of the Kingdom, to abolish the elected upper house of the Legislature and to substitute in place thereof an appointive one, to be appointed by the Sovereign.

The detailed history of this attempt and the succeeding events in connection therewith is given in the report of the committee of public safety to the citizens of Honolulu and the resolution adopted at the mass meeting held on the 16th instant, the correctness of which report and the propriety of which resolution is hereby specifically affirmed.

The constitutional evolution indicated has slowly and steadily, though reluctantly and regretfully, convinced an overwhelming majority of the conservative and responsible members of the community that independent, constitutional, representative, and responsible government, able to protect itself from revolutionary uprisings and royal aggression, is no longer possible in Hawaii under the existing system of government.

Five uprisings or conspiracies against the Government have occurred within five years and seven months. It is firmly believed that the culminating revolutionary attempt of last Saturday will, unless radical measures are taken, wreck our already damaged credit abroad and precipitate to final ruin our already overstrained financial condition; and the guaranties of protection to life, liberty, and property will steadily decrease and the political situation rapidly grow worse.

In this belief, and also in the firm belief that the action hereby taken is and will be for the best personal, political, and property interests of every citizen of the land—

We, citizens and residents of the Hawaiian Islands, organized and acting for the public safety and the common good, hereby proclaim as follows:

- (1) The Hawaiian monarchial system of government is hereby abrogated.
- (2) A Provisional Government for the control and management of public affairs and the protection of the public peace is hereby established, to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon.
- (3) Such Provisional Government shall consist of an executive council of four members, who are hereby declared to be Sanford B. Dole, James A. King, Peter C. Jones, William O. Smith, who shall administer the executive departments of the Government, the first named acting as president and chairman of such council and

administering the department of foreign affairs, and the others severally administering the departments of interior, finance, and attorney-general, respectively, in the order in which they are above enumerated, according to existing Hawaiian law as far as may be consistent with this proclamation; and also of an advisory council, which shall consist of fourteen members, who are hereby declared to be S. M. Damon, L. A. Thurston, J. Emmeluth, J. H. McCandless, F. W. McChesney, W. R. Castle, W. C. Wilder, A. Brown, J. F. Morgan, H. Waterhouse, E. D. Tenney, F. Wilhelm, W. G. Ashley, C. Bolte. Such advisory council shall also have general legislative authority.

Such executive and advisory council shall, acting jointly, have power to remove any member of either council and to fill such or any other vacancy.

(4) All officers under the existing Government are hereby requested to continue to exercise their functions and perform the duties of their respective offices, with the exception of the following-named persons: Queen Liliuokalani; Charles B. Wilson, marshal; Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs; W. H. Cornwell, minister of finance; John F. Colburn, minister of the interior; Arthur P. Peterson, attorney-general; who are hereby removed from office.

(5) All Hawaiian laws and constitutional principles not inconsistent herewith shall continue in force until further order of the executive and advisory councils.

HENRY E. COOPER.
 ANDREW BROWN.
 J. A. MCCANDLESS.
 THEODORE F. LANSING.
 JOHN EMMELUTH.
 C. BOLTE.
 ED. SUHR.
 HENRY WATERHOUSE.
 W. C. WILDER.
 F. W. MCCHESENEY.
 WILLIAM O. SMITH.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 79.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 17, 1893.*

SIR: The undersigned, members of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government this day established in Hawaii, hereby state to you that for the reasons set forth in the proclamation this day issued, a copy of which is herewith inclosed for your consideration, the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established in accordance with the said above-mentioned proclamation.

Such Provisional Government has been proclaimed, is now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and is in control of the city. We hereby request that you will, on behalf of the United States of America, recognize it as the existing *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and afford to it the moral support of your Government, and, if necessary, the support of American troops to assist in preserving the public peace.

We have the honor to remain your obedient servants,

SANFORD B. DOLE.
 J. A. KING.
 P. C. JONES.
 WILLIAM O. SMITH.
 S. M. DAWSON.
 JOHN EMMELUTH.
 F. W. MCCHESENEY.
 W. C. WILDER.
 J. A. MCCANDLESS.
 ANDREW BROWN.
 JAS. F. MORGAN.
 HENRY WATERHOUSE.
 E. D. TENNEY.
 F. J. WILHELM.
 W. G. ASHLEY.
 C. BOLTE.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister Resident.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 79.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 17, 1893.*

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 1.]

All persons favorable to the *Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands* are hereby requested to forthwith report to the Government at the Government buildings and to furnish to the Government such arms and ammunition as they may have in their possession or control as soon as possible, in order that efficient and complete protection of life and property and the public peace may immediately and efficiently be put in operation.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
J. A. KING,
P. C. JONES,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

JOHN EMMELUTH,
ANDREW BROWN,
C. BOLTE,
JAMES F. MORGAN,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
S. M. DAMON,
W. G. ASHLEY,
E. D. TENNEY,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
Advisory Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

[Inclosure 4 in No. 79.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 17, 1893.* (Issued 6 p. m.)

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 2.]

It is hereby ordered and decreed that until further ordered, the right of the writ of habeas corpus is hereby suspended and martial law is hereby declared to exist throughout the island of Oahu.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
J. A. KING,
Minister of Interior,
P. C. JONES,
Minister of Finance,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Attorney-General,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 79.]

[Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, January 17, 1893.]

MASS MEETING—CITIZENS DETERMINED TO RESIST AGGRESSION—AN ENTHUSIASTIC GATHERING AT THE RIFLES' ARMORY PROTESTS AGAINST THE REVOLUTIONARY ATTITUDE OF THE QUEEN—RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AND THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY AUTHORIZED TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS.

At 2 p. m. yesterday the Honolulu Rifles' armory was the scene of one of the largest and most enthusiastic mass meetings ever held in Honolulu. It was called by the committee of public safety for the purpose of protesting against the revolutionary aggressions of the Queen. At 1.30 citizens began to assemble, and before 2 o'clock the large building was crowded to its utmost capacity, 1,260 being present, by actual count, while many others came later. Every class in the community was fully represented, mechanics, merchants, professional men, and artisans of every kind being

present in full force. The meeting was intensely enthusiastic, being animated by a common purpose and feeling, and most of the speakers were applauded to the echo. Hon. W. C. Wilder, of the committee of safety, was the chairman.

Mr. WILDER said: Fellow citizens, I have been requested to act as chairman of the meeting. Were it a common occurrence, I would consider it an honor, but to-day we are not here to do honor to anybody. I accept the chairmanship of this meeting as a duty. [Applause.] We meet here to-day as men—not as any party, faction, or creed, but as men who are bound to see good government. It is well known to you all what took place at the palace last Saturday. I need not tell you the object of this meeting, and no such meeting has been held since 1887. There is the same reason now as then. An impromptu meeting of citizens was called Saturday to take measures for the public safety. The report of the committee will be read to you. We do not meet as revolutionists, but as peaceful citizens who have the right to meet and state their grievances. [Loud applause.] We will maintain our rights and have courage to maintain them. [Universal cheers.]

Noble Thurston being introduced by the chairman read the report of the committee of safety.

“REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF SAFETY.

“*To the citizens of Honolulu :*

“On the morning of last Saturday, the 14th instant, the city was startled by the information that Her Majesty Queen Liliuokalani had announced her intention to arbitrarily promulgate a new constitution, and that three of the newly-appointed cabinet ministers had, or were about to, resign in consequence thereof.

“Immediately after the prorogation of the Legislature at noon the Queen, accompanied, by her orders, by the cabinet, retired to the palace; the entire military force of the Government was drawn up in line in front of the building, and remained there until dark, and a crowd of several hundred native sympathizers with the new-constitution project gathered in the throne room and about the palace. The Queen then retired with the cabinet, informed them that she had a new constitution ready, that she intended to promulgate it, and proposed to do so then and there, and demanded that they countersign her signature.

“She turned a deaf ear to their statements and protests that the proposed action would inevitably cause the streets of Honolulu to run red with blood, and threatened that unless they complied with her demand she would herself immediately go out upon the steps of the palace and announce to the assembled crowd that the reason she did not give them the new constitution was because the ministers would not let her. Three of the ministers, fearing mob violence, immediately withdrew and returned to the Government building. They were immediately summoned back to the palace, but refused to go on the ground that there was no guaranty of their personal safety.

“The only forces under the control of the Government are the household guards and the police. The former are nominally under the control of the minister of foreign affairs and actually under the control of their immediate commander, Maj. Nowlein, a personal adherent of the Queen.

“The police are under the control of Marshal Wilson, the open and avowed royal favorite. Although the marshal is nominally under the control of the attorney-general, Her Majesty recently announced in a public speech that she would not allow him to be removed. Although the marshal now states that he is opposed to the Queen's proposition, he also states that if the final issue arises between the Queen and the cabinet and the people he will support the Queen.

“The cabinet was absolutely powerless and appealed to citizens for support.

“Later they reluctantly returned to the palace, by request of the Queen, and for nearly two hours she again endeavored to force them to acquiesce in her desire, and upon their final refusal announced in a public speech in the throne room and again from the upper gallery of the palace that she desired to issue the constitution, but was prevented from doing so by her ministers and would issue it in a few days.

“The citizens responded to the appeal of the cabinet to resist the revolutionary attempt of the Queen, by gathering at the office of William O. Smith.

“Late in the afternoon it was felt that bloodshed and riot were imminent; that the community could expect no protection from the legal authorities; that, on the contrary, they would undoubtedly be made the instruments of royal aggression. An impromptu meeting of citizens was held, which was attended by the attorney-general, and which was addressed, among others, by the minister of the interior, J. F. Colburn, who stated to the meeting substantially the foregoing facts.

“The meeting unanimously passed a resolution that the public welfare required the appointment of a committee of public safety of thirteen, to consider the situation and devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and the protection of life and property.

“Such a committee was forthwith appointed and has followed its instructions.

"The first step which the committee consider necessary is to secure openly, publicly, and peaceably, through the medium of a mass meeting of citizens, a condemnation of the proceedings of the party of revolution and disorder, and a confirmation from such larger meeting of the authority now vested in the committee.

"For such purpose the committee hereby recommends the adoption of the following resolution:

"RESOLUTION.

"1. Whereas Her Majesty Liliuokalani, acting in conjunction with certain other persons, has illegally and unconstitutionally and against the advice and consent of the lawful executive officers of the Government, attempted to abrogate the existing constitution and proclaim a new one in subversion of the rights of the people;

"2. And whereas such attempt has been accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed and a display of armed force, and such attempt and acts and threats are revolutionary and treasonable in character;

"3. And whereas Her Majesty's cabinet have informed her that such contemplated action was unlawful and would lead to bloodshed and riot and have implored and demanded of her to desist from and renounce such proposed action;

"4. And whereas such advice has been in vain, and Her Majesty has in a public speech announced that she was desirous and ready to promulgate such constitution, the same being now ready for such purpose, and that the only reason why it was not now promulgated was because she had met with unexpected obstacles and that a fitting opportunity in the future must be awaited for the consummation of such object, which would be within a few days;

"5. And whereas at a public meeting of citizens held in Honolulu on the 14th day of January instant a committee of thirteen to be known as the 'committee of public safety' was appointed to consider the situation and to devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and safety and the preservation of life and property;

"6. And whereas such committee has recommended the calling of this mass meeting of citizens to protest against and condemn such action, and has this day presented a report to such meeting denouncing the action of the Queen and her supporters as being unlawful, unwarranted, in derogation of the rights of the people, endangering the peace of the community, and tending the excite riot and cause the loss of life and destruction of property:

"Now, therefore, we, the citizens of Honolulu of all nationalities and regardless of political party affiliations, do hereby condemn and denounce the action of the Queen and her supporters;

"And we do hereby ratify the appointment and indorse the action taken and reported made by the said committee of safety; and we do hereby further empower such committee to further consider the situation and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii."

Mr. THURSTON said: Mr. Chairman, Hawaii is a wonderful country. We are divided into parties and nationalities and factions, but there are moments when we are united and move shoulder to shoulder, moved by one common desire for the public good. Three times during the past twelve years this has happened—in 1880, 1887, and to-day. They say it is ended, it is done, there is nothing to consider. Is it so? [Calls of no! no!] I say, gentlemen, that now and here is the time to act. [Loud cheers.] The Queen says she won't do it again. [Cries of humbug.] Fellow-citizens, have you any memories? Hasn't she once before promised—sworn solemnly before Almighty God to maintain this constitution? What is her word worth? [Calls of nothing! nothing!] It is an old saying that a royal promise is made to be broken. Fellow-citizens, remember it. We have not sought this situation. Last Saturday the sun rose on a peaceful and smiling city; to-day it is otherwise.

Whose fault is it? Queen Liliuokalani's. It is not her fault that the streets have not run red with blood. She has printed a proclamation and at the same time, perhaps sent out by the same carriers, her organ prints an extra with her speech with bitter language than in the Advertiser. She wants us to sleep on a slumbering volcano which will one morning spew out blood and destroy us all. The constitution gives us the right to assemble peacefully and express our grievances. We are here doing that to-day without arms. The man who has not the spirit to rise after the menaces to our liberties has no right to keep them. Has the tropic sun cooled and thinned our blood, or have we flowing in our veins the warm, rich blood which loves liberty and dies for it? I move the adoption of the resolution.

[Tumultuous applause.]

Mr. H. F. GLADE. The Queen has done an unlawful thing in ignoring the constitution which she had sworn to uphold. We most decidedly protest against such revolutionary proceeding, and we should do all we possibly can to prevent her from repeating actions which result in disorder and riot. We now have a promise from the Queen that proceedings as we experienced on Saturday shall not occur again; but we should have such assurances and guaranties for this promise that will really

satisfy us and convince us of the faith and earnestness of the promise given, of which we now have no assurance. What such guaranties and assurances ought to be I can not at this moment say or recommend. This should be referred to the committee of safety for their careful consideration. I second the motion.

Mr. YOUNG, in addressing the meeting, spoke as follows:

Mr. Chairman and fellow-citizens: In June, 1887, I stood on this same platform and addressed an audience almost as large as the one now before me. At that time we had met to consider a resolution that looked toward a new constitution, which proposed constitution was considered the most effectual method of removing some flagrant abuses in governmental affairs, practiced by the King and his cabinets. The constitution was promulgated. To-day we have met to consider the action of Her Majesty in attempting to set aside the constitution we all worked so hard to have promulgated, in the lost interests of the Sovereign and the people at large, as well as for the redemption of the credit of the Kingdom abroad. It has long been reported that at some favorable opportunity the Queen would spring a new constitution upon the people and place matters even more in the hands of the Sovereign than they were before the revolution of 1887. Some did not believe the rumors, but the actions of the Queen in the last few days have convinced the most skeptical that the rumors were well founded and that she had been pregnant with this unborn constitution for a long time; but it could not be born till under the propitious star.

In trying to promulgate this long-promised constitution the Queen has therefore premeditatedly committed a breach of faith with one portion of her subjects in order to satisfy the clamors of a faction of natives urged by the influence of a mischievous element of foreigners who mean no good to the Queen or the people, but simply for the purpose of providing avenues for carrying out more perfectly the smuggling of opium and diverting the contents of the treasury into their own pockets. A by-authority circular has now been handed around setting forth that the Queen and her cabinet had decided not to press the promulgation of a new constitution; but can we depend on this promise of Her Majesty? Is this promise any more binding upon her than the oath she took before Almighty God to support and maintain the present constitution? Has not the Queen resorted to her questionable methods in an under-handed way to remove what, to the people, was one of the most acceptable cabinets ever commissioned by any sovereign in this Kingdom, in order that four other ministers might be appointed that would carry out her behest, treasonable or otherwise, as might be most conveniently within their scope?

I say, have we any reasonable assurance that the Queen and her ministers have abandoned finally the new constitution promulgation scheme? [Roars of "No" from the audience.] My fellow citizens, while the Queen and her cabinet continue to trifle with and play fast and loose with the affairs of state there can be no feeling of security for foreign families residing within these domains. There can be no business prosperity here at home, and our credit abroad must be of the flimsiest and most uncertain nature. And you, business men, who are toiling honestly for your bread and butter, will have to put up with thin bread and much thinner butter if this farcical work is continued. In order that matters may be set to rights again, and that honest, stable, and honorable government may be maintained in Hawaii, I support the resolution and trust that it will be passed unanimously by this meeting.

Mr. C. BOLTE. Since the resolution which was read here has been written things have changed. On Saturday the Queen promised the native people that she would give them a new constitution under all circumstances; she did not say exactly when but as soon as possible. This morning a proclamation was issued, in which she says that her attempt to promulgate a new constitution last Saturday was made under stress of her native subjects, but that she will not do it again. An attempt to change the fundamental law of the land is a very serious matter, a matter that requires a good deal of consideration, and I am well convinced that this matter has been weighed and considered for more than a day by the Queen, and that there was no acting on the spur of the moment under the stress of her native subjects about it. It was her well premeditated conclusion that she would change the constitution so as to suit herself on the day of prorogation of the Legislature. Many people knew this several days ago, but there have been so many rumors about all sorts of things that not very much attention was paid to it; it was expected that she might change her mind before that day would come. But she did not change her mind as soon as that; she told the native people that she was ready to give them a new constitution right then and there, but that she could not do it because her ministers would not let her. Now she has changed her mind; she makes a sort of excuse for what she did, and says she will never do it again.

It seems to me that the question that your committee has to ask now, and which is for you gentlemen here in the meeting to decide, is this: Are you satisfied with the assurance given in to-day's proclamation signed by the Queen and the four ministers, and will you consider this matter ended, or do you desire greater and stronger guarantees for the safety and preservation of your life and liberty and property? I am one of the citizens' committee of public safety; my views on the situation are ex-

pressed in the resolutions which have just been read, and I trust you will show that you are of the same mind as the committee by adopting these resolutions.

Hon. H. P. BALDWIN. I feel, with the rest of you, that the actions of the Queen have put the country in a very critical situation. Before this revolutionary act of Her Majesty we were getting along. A ministry had been appointed which would probably have been able to pull us through. The McKinley bill had put the whole country into a critical situation. We were working up new industries. Mr. Dillingham was trying to build a railroad around this island. The Queen seems to have blinded herself to all these things. She has followed a whim of her own—a whim of an irresponsible body of Hawaiians—and tried to establish a new constitution. We must stop this; but we must not go beyond constitutional means. I favor this resolution, but think the committee should act within the constitution. There is no question that the Queen has done a revolutionary act; there is no doubt about that. The Queen's proclamation has not inspired confidence; but shall we not teach her to act within the constitution? [Loud calls of "No."] Well, gentlemen, I am ready to act when the time comes.

J. EMMELUTH wished to say a few words on the situation. He had heard the Queen's speech at the palace, and noted the expression of her face. It was fiendish. When the petitioners filed out he reflected on the fact that 30 men could paralyze the business of the community for 24 hours. It was not they that did it, but the schemers behind them, and perhaps a woman, too. It was not the Hawaiians that wanted the new constitution; not those who worked. This was the third time that he had shut his doors, let his men go, and came up to this building. It would be the last time. If we let this time go by we would deserve all we would get. An opportunity came once in every lifetime. It had come to us, and if we finished as we should a repetition of last Saturday would never occur in this country again. [Applause.] We must stand shoulder to shoulder. There was but one course to pursue, and we would all see it. The manifesto of this morning was bosh. "I won't do it any more; but give me a chance and I'll do it again." If the Queen had succeeded last Saturday, myself and you would have been robbed of the privileges without which no white man can live in this community. "Fear not, be not afraid," was written in my Bible by my mother twenty-five years ago. Gentlemen, I have done. As far as the Hawaiians are concerned, all have an aloha for them, and we wish to have laws enabling us to live peaceably together.

R. J. GREENE. Fellow citizens, among the many things I never could do was to make an impromptu speech. I have tried it over and over again and never succeeded but once, and that was that was after five weeks' preparation. Our patience has been exhausted. We all agree about the case. The question is, the remedy. John Greene, of Rhode Island, entered the war of the Revolution and served throughout. His son, my father, served through the war of 1812, until that little matter was settled. In 1862 John Greene, my father, stood before a meeting like this, and said he had four sons in the war, of whom I was the youngest, and would serve himself if he was not too old. This experience has biased my judgment as to some matters of civil government. It is too late to throw obstacles across the path of its progress here. I have adopted this flag and am loyal to it, but I am not willing to go one step back in the name of civil liberty, and I will give the last drop of Rhode Island blood in my veins to go forward, and not back. [Cheers.]

Chairman Wilder read the latter part of the resolution.

It was passed by a unanimous standing vote, without a dissenting voice, and amid tremendous cheers, after which the meeting broke up.

[Inclosure 6 in Nov. 79.]

[Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, January 18, 1893.]

THE NEW ERA—THE REVOLUTION TERMINATED BY THE ESTABLISHING OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT—CITIZENS RISE AND SEIZE THE GOVERNMENT BUILDING—THE MONARCHY ABROGATED—ENTHUSIASTIC VOLUNTEERS RALLY ROUND THE NEW GOVERNMENT—THE LATE QUEEN AND CABINET YIELD AND LEAVE THE TOWN UNDER THE QUIET PROTECTION OF ITS OWN CITIZENS—FULL TEXT OF THE PROCLAMATION AND ORDERS.

All day yesterday the community were in a state of expectancy, looking to the committee of public safety to do something to end the state of tension, and to secure the rights of all citizens against encroachment once and for all. The committee in the meantime was not idle, but was incessantly occupied completing its organization and perfecting the final arrangements necessary to the proclamation of the Provisional Government and its protection by an armed force. At about 2.30 o'clock an attempt was made by three native policemen to arrest the progress of a wagon which was being driven up Fort street by Mr. Benner and Mr. Good. Those in charge of the wagon resisted the attempt of the officers to arrest its course. One

of the officers making a motion to draw a revolver, Mr. Good drew his own, and calling attention to the fact that he was justified in shooting, he fired, seeking however, to avoid the infliction of a dangerous wound. The wagon pursued its way, followed by a policeman in a hack. This episode precipitated the movement. Citizens hurried to the Beretania street armory, where they were formed into companies and marched to the Government building.

In the meantime the committee of public safety, accompanied by members of the Government about to be formed, proceeded to the Government building. They were entirely unarmed. Arrived at the Government building the committee inquired for the cabinet, but the ministers were not to be found. They then demanded and received of Mr. Hassinger the possession of the building. The party now proceeded to the front steps and, in the presence of a rapidly increasing crowd, the following proclamation was read:

Before the reading of the proclamation was completed the volunteers from the Rifles' armory began to assemble in force. The grounds of Aliiolani Hale were cleared and a guard set at all the gates.

The following orders were then promptly issued by the Provisional Government:

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
January 17, 1893.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 1.]

All persons favorable to the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands are hereby requested to forthwith report to the Government at the Government building and to furnish the Government such arms and ammunition as they may have in their possession or control as soon as possible, in order that efficient and complete protection of life and property and the public peace may be immediately and efficiently put into operation.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
J. A. KING,
P. C. JONES,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,

Executive Counsel of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

JOHN EMMELUTH,
ANDREW BROWN,
C. BOLTE,
JAMES F. MORGAN,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
S. M. DAMON,
W. G. ASHLEY,
E. D. TENNY,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,
W. R. CASTLE,
LORRINA A. THURSTON,
F. J. WILHELM,

Advisory Counsel of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, January 17, 1893.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 2.]

It is hereby ordered and decreed that until further ordered the right of the writ of habeas corpus is hereby suspended, and martial law is hereby declared to exist throughout the Island of Oahu.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
J. A. KING,
Minister of the Interior,
P. C. JONES,
Minister of Finance,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Attorney-General,

Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

The Provisional Government sent for the late ministers, who were at the police station. Two of them came, and finally all four repaired to the headquarters of the new Government, where formal demand was made upon them for the possession of the police station. The ex-ministers asked for time to deliberate upon this demand. They went to the palace in company with Hon. Samuel M. Damon, and held a consultation with Liliuokalani. The result was a compromise proposition, which was rejected by the Provisional Government. After further consultation the following protest was noted:

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said Provisional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representative and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893.

LILIUOKALANI, R.
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWALL,
Minister of Finance.
JNO. F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

S. B. DOLE, Esq., and others,
Composing the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

(Indorsed:) Received by the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893. (Signed) Sanford B. Dole, chairman of the executive council of Provisional Government.

The late Queen and cabinet accordingly yielded unconditionally, and the police station was turned over to Commander Soper and Capt. Ziegler with forty men from Company A. Mr. Wilson made a short address to the police force assembled in the station, telling them that resistance was no longer feasible.

The Provisional Government sent notifications of the situation to the representatives of foreign powers. The following answer to the request for recognition was received from his excellency John L. Stevens:

"A Provisional Government having been duly constituted in the place of the recent Government of Queen Liliuokalani, and said Provisional Government being in full possession of the Government building, the archives, and the treasury, and in control of the capital of the Hawaiian Islands, I hereby recognize said Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

"JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States."

At latest advices the Provisional Government was in complete possession of the city, and the only Government possessing, exercising, or claiming any authority or power whatsoever.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 80.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 19, 1893.

SIR: The Provisional Government of Hawaii, by special steamer, send a commission to Washington with full powers to negotiate with the Government of the United States. It is composed of six representative men of the highest respectability. Hon. William C. Wilder is the president and chief manager of the Inter-island Steamship Company,

running steamers among the islands, and he has large property interests in Honolulu. Hon. C. M. [surname omitted] is a leading lumber merchant, doing business with Puget Sound and Oregon, born here of the best American stock. Hon. L. A. Thurston is one of the most, if not *the* most, talented and influential man on the islands, and is of the highest respectability. He and his father were born on the islands, of Connecticut parentage. Though a young man, he was the leading member of the reform cabinet from July, 1887, to 1890.

Hon. William H. Castle is a lawyer of eminence, born on the islands, of western New York parentage, his father still living here at the age of 84, having resided in Honolulu nearly half a century, and for many years exercised a large influence here. Mr. Charles P. Carter is the son of the recent Hawaiian minister at Washington, Hon. H. P. Carter, and is an accomplished and most reliable gentleman, American to the core, and has a Michigan wife. Hon. Mr. Marsden is of English birth, is a prominent business man and a noble in the Legislature.

These six commissioners represent a large preponderating proportion of the property holders and commercial interests of these islands. They are backed by the influences which will enable them to fully carry out their agreements with the United States Government.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Confidential.]

No. 81.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 26, 1893.

SIR: By the steamer taking this dispatch, goes Mr. Paul Neuman to Washington, the attorney of the deposed Queen. Nominally he may make at the Department of State a "protest" as to the way his client lost her crown. In reality his mission is to get a large fee out of whatever sum it is supposed may be paid by the treaty of annexation to the fallen monarch and the Crown Princess. This attorney, as the Hawaiian Commissioners now in Washington may inform you, was a former resident of San Francisco, where he had and still has an unsavory reputation. For years his influence in politics here has been pernicious. He was a boon companion of the debased Kalakaua, the recent King; shared in his corruptions, and is reputed to have won at cards the money of the weak monarch.

He was twice voted out of the cabinet by the recent Legislature by a large majority, every reputable member each time against him. He is believed on strong reasons to have been the head man in getting through the Legislature in the closing hours of the session the infamous lottery bill, which so much aided in precipitating the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy. This man, the Queen's attorney, is a good-natured, "jolly fellow," who, seeing the strong drift of things here, now avows himself unqualifiedly for annexation. I think it my duty to give to the Department of State this amount of information about the fallen Queen's attorney, and the Commissioners now in Washington can give you as much more as they deem proper.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Since the preceding dispatch was written Paul Neuman, as the attorney of the Queen, has called on me and explained his mission to Washington. I will take back nothing as to his former political career here; but he is good natured and politic lawyer. While he will probably urge the request to have the United States restore the fallen Queen to the throne as a matter of form and good faith on his part to his royal client, I have impressed on him the logic of the situation and the absolute impossibility of restoring the deposed Queen. I think he sees this clearly, however otherwise he may at first talk, and that his only hope is to obtain a good cash consideration for all her claims. I think he has "full power of attorney" to this end. He takes with him the young man, Prince David, as he is called here, one of the two princes made by Kalakaua, spoken of in my No. 82, page 9.

STEVENS.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 28, 1893.

Your dispatch, telegraphed from San Francisco, announcing revolution and establishment of a Provisional Government, was received to-day. Your course in recognizing an unopposed *de facto* Government appears to have been discreet and in accordance with the facts. The rule of this Government has uniformly been to recognize and enter into relation with any actual Government in full possession of effective power, with the assent of the people. You will continue to recognize the new Government under such conditions. It is trusted that the change, besides conducing to the tranquillity and welfare of the Hawaiian Islands, will tend to draw closer the intimate ties of amity and common interests which so conspicuously and necessarily link them to the United States. You will keep in constant communication with the commander of the United States naval force at Honolulu, with a view to acting, if need be, for the protection of the interests and property of American citizens and aiding in the preservation of good order under the changed conditions reported.

FOSTER.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Telegram.]

HONOLULU, February 1, 1893.

Provisional Government of Hawaii gaining power and respect. Everything is quiet. Annexation sentiment is increasing. Dead monarchy and opposition to annexation is supported chiefly by lottery and opium ring. To-day at 9 a. m., in accordance with the request of Provisional Government of Hawaii, I have placed Government of Hawaii under the United States protection during negotiations, not interfering with the execution of public affairs. Have mailed important dispatches. Have sent duplicate copies of dispatches. It is advisable that Commodore Skerrett proceed at once to Honolulu, Sandwich Islands, with one or more United States ships as precautionary measures.

STEVENS.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 70.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, Feb. 1, 1893.

SIR: I append a copy of telegraphic *correspondence with your legation, relative to the new Government of Hawaii.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 82.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,

Honolulu, February 1, 1893.

SIR: Everything is moving on here quietly. The Provisional Government is discharging its responsibilities with firmness, discretion, and in the spirit of conciliation and magnanimity. The annexation sentiment has constantly increased since the departure of the commissioners for Washington, and with heartfelt earnestness is taking possession of all classes. Nearly all the Germans, the large proportion of the respectable and responsible English, and almost the entire Portuguese population are warmly for annexation. This inclination of the Portuguese is quite important, for they number seven or eight thousand, are among the most industrious and saving, and they are thoughtfully led by Senor Canavarro, their chargé d'affaires, who has resided here for years, and commands the respect and confidence of all the best citizens of the island of whatever nationality. Canavarro's wife, on account of health and business, is obliged to spend much of her time in California, where she owns valuable property. Annexation and the United States have good friends in the Canavarros.*

As to terms of annexation, I still adhere firmly to the opinion expressed in my despatch No. 74 that the sugar bounty to be paid to the Hawaiian sugar planters should be limited to 6 mills per pound—\$12 per ton, so long, and only so long as the United States bounty system shall be maintained. To the objection that this allows only \$12 per ton on Hawaiian sugar while the Hawaiian planters get twice the amount per acre that the Louisiana planters do on the average, and as I said in my despatch 74, the concensus of opinion among the leading planters here, obtained by me five or six months since, was, and is, that \$12 per ton bounty will place all the Hawaiian plantations worth maintaining on the road of financial safety and success.

As to the form of Government for the islands, I now only vary from views expressed in my 74 as to incline strongly to the opinion that the beginning should be substantially like that of President Jefferson and Congress in respect of Louisiana in the act of 1804, page 283, United States Statutes at Large, only differing from that by providing, in addition to governor, attorney-general, a commissioner of finance, a commissioner of the interior, and a legislative council of thirteen or fourteen, all to be appointed by the President, unless it should be deemed best for the governor to appoint the attorney-general, and the commissioners of finance and the interior, who would be prac-

* See Mr. Stevens's telegram of January 18, 1893, and Mr. Foster's telegram of January 28, 1893, in reply.

* The remarks relative to Senor Canavarro, the Portuguese chargé, strictly confidential.

tically a cabinet of three to aid the governor to carry on the Government. This plan and method of Government could be maintained as a transition Government until experience should prove it best to change it to a more popular form. In the meantime the responsible voters would rapidly increase and American ideas and interest would gain in force and volume. My private consultation with the Provisional Government since the departure of the commissioners for Washington has led us to think highly of the Jefferson act of 1804 for Louisiana as a transition expedient for Hawaii. This would cause no shock and would allow affairs to move along on safe and conservative lines until time and experience demand something better. It would be fortunate to have such a man as Sanford B. Dole, the present head of the Provisional Government, the first American governor of Hawaii.

As to liquidating all political claims from the fall of the Queen and the Crown Princess, may I be allowed to suggest that the spirit and import of the Marcy treaty plan of 1854 had better be adopted, which authorized the expenditure of \$100,000 for like purposes. I, therefore, suggest that if a liquidation of this kind be now under consideration and \$150,000 should be allowed as the total sum for this purpose, \$70,000 should go to the fallen Queen Liliuokalani and \$70,000 to the Crown Princess Kaiulana, and \$5,000 to each of the two young princes. The last named—the two princes—are harmless young persons, of little account, not chiefs by blood, but they were made princes by the late King Kalakaua without any constitutional right or power to do so, the then boys being nephews of his wife Kapiolani. Should the entire sum granted for these purposes be greater or less than \$150,000 I advise that the above specified proportions be maintained.

As to the native Hawaiians and their native leaders at this time, things are tending favorably towards annexation. Mr. Kauhame, for many years a member of the Legislature, and regarded for years the best native in the islands in public life, a noble to the close of the recent session of that body, is earnest for annexation. So is Mr. Kanihi, a member of the Legislature from this island. Hon. John W. Kahia, the ablest native lawyer in the island, years a member of former Legislatures from the important island of Maui, thinks the fall of the Queen and the extinction of the monarchy a boon to Hawaii, and he is for annexation. Robert W. Wilcox, a half-white native, who led the Hawaiian revolt in 1889, which came so near being successful, is now for annexation. He was educated in Italy at a military school, is 37 years of age, his father being a citizen of Rhode Island, and, it is said, is still living in that State. This Wilcox has more fighting ability than any other native Hawaiian, and will be proud to become an American citizen and at a future time to serve in the army or civil service of the United States.

The ablest of the native Hawaiian Christian ministers are strong in their American sympathies. The pastor of the large native Hawaiian church in this city, a native Hawaiian, is for annexation earnestly. The other large Hawaiian congregation and church in Honolulu has a favorite pastor born here of American parentage, whose quiet influence is in the same direction. The native newspaper of much the largest circulation in the islands advocates annexation, stands by the Provisional Government, and is losing none of its circulation. The main part of the opponents of annexation are the lower class of natives, led by unscrupulous foreigners, of little property, mostly of California, Australia, and Canada, who wish to maintain the Hawaiian monarchy and its corruptions for their own unworthy purposes, and who think their

opportunities for power and spoliation will be gone if annexation becomes a fact.

The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it. If annexation does not take place promptly, all is held in doubt and suspense for six or ten months, there certainly will be here a revulsion to despair, and these people, by their necessities, might be forced towards becoming a British colony, for the English here of the monarchical type would then avail themselves of their opportunity and stir up all possible opposition to annexation. The wealthiest Englishman of these islands has to-day called at this legation, and no man in Hawaii is more earnest for annexation. His two sons, large business men, are with him in this regard, and the next old British resident, a Scotchman by birth, is with the man first named for annexation. I can not otherwise than urge prompt action at Washington.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 83.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, February 1, 1893.

SIR: In my No. 81, by this mail, I have given information as to the going of Paul Neumann to Washington by this steamer to represent the interests of the fallen Queen. I have since learned that it is not improbable that there also will go to Washington, of the Queen's faction, Mr. H. A. Widemann and Mr. C. O. Berger. The former is a Hessian German who came to these islands nearly forty years ago. He is married to a pure native wife, and has acquired property through his relations to natives and by the American sugar tariff under reciprocity. His views are widely different from all the other principal Germans here. His relations have been close with the fallen Queen and he was voted out of her cabinet early in the session of the recent Legislature, all of the best members voting against him. He is, and always has been, strongly anti-American. He was of the small clique in Honolulu bitterly against us from 1861 to 1865. He was the leading man of the *only five* who, in the Legislature two years since, voted to put an end to all further negotiations with the United States. For years he has had relations with the English minister here, though the latter has not always approved of Widemann's eccentricities, for which the latter is well known.

Widemann is 70 years of age, somewhat broken, and says he is going only to California for his health. He takes with him Mr. O. C. Berger, his son-in-law, a German or a Swede, who came here from the United States. Berger is reputed to be of few scruples. He was a member of the recent Legislature, always voted with the thieves, voted for the lottery franchise, and had "a job" with the recent Government which made much talk here unfavorable to Berger. It is thought now that he cares little for the old palace dynasty, but goes only to please and to take care of the health of Widemann,* of whose property, as son-in-law, he hopes soon to share. Possibly Widemann and Berger tell the

* It is now understood here that Widemann goes to Washington with Paul Neumann. Both of them have taken tickets for the steamer which leaves here to-morrow for San Francisco.

truth in saying that they are going only to San Francisco, but rumor and strong suspicion say that they will go with Neumann to Washington to help the case of the deposed Queen and to oppose annexation.

Another leaf of valuable information I wish to give the Department of State: The old "palace gang" for the past ten days have been busy here and in the other islands in getting the signatures of natives to a remonstrance against annexation, in the hope thus to restore the monarchy. The signatures to these petitions or remonstrances are being obtained by utterly false representations as to the purposes of the United States, by promises, and other unscrupulous means. This dirty work is managed exclusively by the same white men, American renegades, Australians, and Canadians, who have thrived on the palace corruptions under the recent King Kalakaua and his sister, the deposed Queen. There will be no certainty that half the signatures* to the petitions or remonstrances are genuine.

Possibly a Mr. Bush and a Mr. Namahi will be the bearers of these petitions. The former is a half-white, a minister of Kalakaua in the brief and famous "Moreno fiasco," and Bush and Namahi were members of the recent Legislature and voted for the lottery franchise. These and the whole lottery and palace gang are directly interested in discrediting the Provisional Government, for that Government has just annulled the lottery charter, which the palace gang hoped to sell out to the Louisiana Lottery men for a half million dollars, more or less. There is also some talk that Antone Rosa, a half-white lawyer, with a doubtful reputation, may go with Bush and Namahi. It is possible that none of these named—Widemann, Berger, Bush, Namahi, and Rosa—will go to Washington. Bush, Namahi, and Rosa have no following among the better class of the native Hawaiians, and their representations would be entirely unreliable. The members of the Provisional Government's commission, now in Washington, thoroughly know the character and backing of Widemann, Berger, Namahi, Bush, and Rosa. There is no doubt that the palace gang of white men will pay the bills of Bush, Namahi, and Rosa, if they go on their visit to Washington.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 84.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 1, 1893.

SIR: To-day the undersigned and Capt. Wiltse of the *Boston* are compelled to assume a grave responsibility. The inclosed copies of official notes will explain the reasons which have led to this action on our part.

I have time before the departure of the mail steamer only to state briefly the additional reasons which caused us to assume temporary protectorate of these islands. The Provisional Government must have time to organize a new police and to discipline a small military force. When the monarchy died by its own hand, there was no military force in the islands but the royal guard of about 75 natives, not in effective force equal to 20 American soldiers. These were promptly discharged

* Have received absolutely reliable information that the signatures of the natives to the petitions above specified are secured by paying so much a head to the signers or to the agents who secure them. The white palace and lottery men are working this plan of action.

by the Provisional Government, except 16 left as the guard of the fallen Queen at her house.

The white men here, as well as the natives, have not been much accustomed to the use of arms. There are scarcely any men familiar with military discipline. Companies are now being organized and drilled. They must have a few weeks for drill. Only a small force of a few hundred will be required, but these must be disciplined men. So far the Provisional Government has been sustained by the uprising and union of the business men and best citizens. Bankers, merchants, clerks, professional men, respectable mechanics have stood manfully by the new Government and kept guard by night. This kind of defense must give place to a small, reliable military force. Time is the necessity of the new Government. There are 40,000 Chinese and Japanese on the islands, and evil-disposed persons might stir some of them to disorder. But the chief elements of evil are in Honolulu, where are the renegade whites at the head of the lottery and opium rings, and a considerable number of hoodlum foreigners and the more vicious of the natives.

Another important reason for our action is the possibility of the arrival here of a British war vessel, and that the English minister here, thus aided, might try to press unduly the Provisional Government. With the islands under our protection we think the English minister will not attempt to insist that his Government has the right to interfere while our flag is over the Government building. This is all I have time to write before the departure of the mail. We shall continue to maintain our present position with great caution and firmness until we hear from the President through the Secretary of State. As a necessary precaution against all contingencies, I advise that Admiral Skerrett be promptly sent here with one or two ships in addition to the *Boston*.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

(One or two of the preceding numbers of the dispatches by this mail were written prior to this date, but they were dated February 1 because this is the day of the steamer's departure.)

[Inclosure 1.]

Mr. Stevens to Capt. Wiltse.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 1, 1893.

SIR: The Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands having duly and officially expressed to the undersigned, the fear that said Government may be unable to protect life and property and to prevent civil disorder in Honolulu, the capital of said Hawaiian Islands, request that the flag of the United States may be raised for the protection of the Hawaiian Islands, and to that end confer on the United States, through the undersigned, freedom of occupation of the public buildings of the Hawaiian Government and the soil of the Hawaiian Islands, so far as may be necessary for the exercise of such protection, but not interfering with the administration of the public affairs by said Provisional Government.

I hereby ask you to comply with the spirit and terms of the request of the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and to that end to use all the force at your command, in the exercise of your best judgment and discretion, you and myself awaiting instructions from the United States Government at Washington.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Capt. G. C. WILTSE,
Commander of the U. S. Ship Boston.

[Inclosure 2.]

*The Hawaiian Provisional Government to Mr. Stevens.*HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 31, 1893.*

Sir: Believing that we are unable to satisfactory protect life and property, and to prevent civil disorders in Honolulu and throughout the Hawaiian Islands, we hereby, in obedience to the instructions of the advisory council, pray that you will raise the flag of the United States of America for the protection of the Hawaiian Islands for the time being, and to that end we hereby confer upon the Government of United States, through you, freedom of occupation of the public buildings of this Government, and of the soil of this country, so far as may be necessary for the exercise of such protection, but not interfering with the administration of public affairs by this Government.

We have, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands,
and *Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

J. A. KING,
Minister of Interior.

P. C. JONES,
Minister of Finance.

WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Attorney-General.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Telegram.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, February 8, 1893.

The affairs of state continue to be hopeful. Hoisting flag in protection of this Government was expected. Subjects who were doubtful, now for annexation. The natives showed unexpected regard of the United States flag. Prudent conduct of Capt. Wiltse, the officers and crew of the *Boston*, credit to the Navy. Can not send by mail.

STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 85.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 8, 1893.

SIR: As I have already indicated by cipher telegram of this date, political affairs here continue to have a hopeful aspect. The raising of the United States flag and the published proclamation of temporary American protectorate of the islands, so far, appear to be having a more beneficial effect than could have been reasonably anticipated. Foreign residents, before in doubt, are now expressing satisfaction that the American flag has been raised here, and are hoping that it will not be lowered, believing annexation best for all concerned. The native Hawaiians are showing an unexpected regard for our flag. The fallen Queen has conducted herself so shamefully and shown so much favoritism to foreign adventurers that all the better portions of the natives had ceased to have legal reverence for her. Her bold, unblushing associa-

tion with the Tahitian half-white palace favorite weakened the hold of the Queen on the natives nearly as much as the official confidence she gave to the American and Australian adventurers of the lottery and opium rings.

Information from all the principal islands of the group is favorable; more so than could have been anticipated. The local government affairs are moving on with little friction, and the courts are transacting their regular and customary business. The interruption to private business and labor is comparatively little, while the hope of annexation is exerting an invigorating financial influence. As soon as it can become a certainty that these islands are to remain under the United States flag as a part of American territory, there is little doubt that all the principal native leaders will wish to become American citizens, and their assistance can be had to help bring the native people into ready obedience to American law and fidelity to the American flag.

As stated in my cipher telegram of this date, the conduct of Capt. Wiltse, of the *Boston*, and of the officers and men under his command has been admirable. Their deportment on shore and in public places, whether on duty or otherwise, has been such as to command the favorable comment of all. The time of Capt. Wiltse here is understood to expire February 10. I have no doubt it would be a just gratification to him could he remain on duty here until the question of annexation shall have been substantially decided.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 14, 1893.

Your telegram of the 1st instant has been received, with coincident report from commander of the *Boston*. Press telegrams from San Francisco give full details of events of 1st instant, with text of your proclamation. The latter, in announcing assumption of protection of the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States would seem to be tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate over those islands on behalf of the United States, with all the rights and obligations which the term implies. It is not thought, however, that the request of the Provisional Government for protection or your action in compliance therewith contemplated more than the coöperation of the moral and material forces of the United States to strengthen the authority of the Provisional Government, by according to it adequate protection for life and property during the negotiations instituted here, and without interfering with the execution of public affairs. Such coöperation was and is within your standing instructions and those of the naval commanders in Hawaiian waters. So far as your course accords to the *de facto* Sovereign Government, the material coöperation of the United States for the maintenance of good order and protection of life and property from apprehended disorders, it is commended; but so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority of the United States above that of the Hawaiian Government in the capacity of protector, or to impair the independent sovereignty of that Govern-

ment by substituting the flag and power of the United States, it is disavowed.

Instructions will be sent to naval commanders confirming and renewing those heretofore given them, under which they are authorized and directed to cooperate with you in case of need. Your own instructions are likewise renewed, and you are accordingly authorized to arrange with the commanding officer for the continued presence on shore of such marine force as may be practicable and requisite for the security of the lives and property interests of American citizens and the repression of lawlessness threatening them, whenever in your judgment it shall be necessary so to do, or when such cooperation may be sought for good cause by the Government of the Hawaiian Islands; being, however, always careful to distinguish between these functions of voluntary or accorded protection and the assumption of a protectorate over the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, which the United States have recognized as sovereign and with which they treat on terms of sovereign equality.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 15, 1893.

A treaty of annexation has been signed and will be sent to the Senate without delay.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 72.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 16, 1893.

SIR: I append copies of my telegrams to you of the 15th instant in relation to your recent bereavement, and to the treaty annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 73.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 16, 1893.

SIR: I append on the overleaf a copy of a telegram * sent to you on the 14th instant, relative to the Hawaiian revolution.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

* See under date of February 14, 1893.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 74.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 17, 1893.

SIR: I append for your information copy of an instruction to the consul-general at Honolulu, of this date, directing him to report fully as to the shipping under Hawaiian registry on the 17th day of January, 1893, and any transfers of vessels to the Hawaiian flag which may have been or may be effected since that date.

You will kindly lend Mr. Severance your counsel and aid in preparing the indicated report.

I suggest, moreover, for your confidential guidance, that it may be well for you to make such friendly and discreet intimation to the present Government as may discourage the placing of foreign shipping under its flag at this juncture.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

[Inclosure in No. 74.]

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Severance.

No. 74.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 17, 1893.

SIR: I have to request that you will prepare, at as early a day as may be possible, and forward to the Department, a table showing all vessels, bona fide, under Hawaiian registry on the 17th of January last, giving names, character, tonnage, horse-power, if steamers, where and when built, and how owned at that date, whether by Hawaiian citizens or foreigners.

You will also be expected to report what vessels, if any, have been or may be transferred from foreign registry to the Hawaiian flag since the 17th of January, giving the same particulars.

It is said, but with what positive foundation is not here known, that a movement is on foot to place a number of foreign vessels under Hawaiian registry, with a view to eventually obtain the benefits of United States registry. Your inquiries, which should be discreet, and your report should aim to throw light on this subject.

The minister has been informed of this instruction, and you may confer with him on the subject.

I am, etc.

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 22, 1893.

The treaty of annexation is still pending in the Senate. Confirming previous instructions, you are directed, in coöperation with the naval authorities, to support the Provisional Government in the maintenance of security to life and property and good order, until action shall be had upon the treaty.

FOSTER.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 75.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 23, 1893.

SIR: I append a copy of your telegram* of 8th instant on Hawaiian affairs.

I am, sir, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 76.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 24, 1893.

SIR: I append a copy of a telegram† sent you on 22d instant.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 86.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 27, 1893.

SIR: The political status of affairs here remains much the same as at the date of my last previous dispatch, with improving indications as to these islands becoming a part of the territory of the United States, to the great satisfaction of nearly all of the responsible citizens, whites as well as native Hawaiians.

The raising of the United States flag over the Government building continues to have a pacifying influence. The qualified United States protectorate, which has been temporarily assumed at the request of the Provisional Government, is being exercised with caution and reservation, in no way interfering with Hawaiian sovereignty nor with the administration of Hawaiian public affairs by the duly constituted authorities. My understanding of the spirit and terms of our temporary protectorate is in entire accord with the spirit and terms of the Secretary of State's dispatch to me of February 14, and implied in my dispatch No. 84, of February 1st, and the papers accompanying the same.

There are now on shore about one hundred and twenty marines and sailors of the U. S. S. *Boston*, with their officers, and their conduct so far has been highly creditable to the American Navy.

All present indications are to the import that if annexation becomes a fact the white population will be nearly unanimous in its favor; that most of the native Hawaiians will readily acquiesce, and that the permanent good order and prosperity of the islands will be secured. The most recent advices from all the principal islands indicate quiet, good order, and general acquiescence in the rule of the Provisional Government.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

* See under date of February 8, 1893.

† See under date of February 22, 1893.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 87.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 27, 1893.

SIR: In my dispatch 84, of February 1, I gave as one of the reasons for our action in assuming a qualified and temporary "protectorate" over these islands, the possibility of the arrival here of a British war vessel, and stated that the English minister thus aided might try to press unduly the Provisional Government. On the 13th instant the British cruiser *Garnet*, an iron ship of 2,120 tons, 240 men and officers, Capt. H. F. Hughes-Hallet in command, arrived here. Only three or four days had elapsed when the manifest unfriendliness of the English sailors as well as of some of the officers of the *Garnet* was displayed. The men of the *Garnet* being allowed to go on shore in the customary way, they soon showed marked sympathy for the fallen Queen's cause and indulged in insulting remarks towards the United States marines and sailors of the *Boston* on duty ashore by the request of the Provisional Government and with my approval.

There came very near being a riot and severe quarrel in the public streets. Only the forbearance and self-possession of the officers and men of the *Boston* prevented the English sailors getting a severe beating, with unhappy incidents. It at once became necessary for the Provisional Government to take precautionary steps as to the men from foreign naval vessels being on shore, providing that only those of one nationality should be on shore the same day. I cannot think that Capt. Hughes-Hallet, of the *Garnet*, gave countenance to this insulting and disorderly conduct of the men of his ship, though some of the under officers may have done so. Neither the captain of the *Garnet* nor his officers have made the customary call on the Provisional Government, and so far as possible they seem to wish to ignore it. It is generally supposed, and I think correctly, that the English minister here, Hon. J. H. Wodehouse, whose son is married to the sister of the Hawaiian Crown Princess, is largely responsible for this unfriendliness to the Provisional Government. By those best informed as to Hawaiian Government affairs in the past twenty years, it is said that Mr. Wodehouse in his persistent resistance to American predominance here has never been well supported by the British cabinet in London, and it is believed that he will not be now.

Were it not that our flag is over the Government House there is little doubt that this British unfriendliness would have done much more mischief in stirring up the "hoodlum" elements, of which the lottery and opium gang of the fallen Queen's supporters have more or less control. At a great American reception and ball here on the evening of the 25th instant, the largest and most imposing ever had in Honolulu, partly as a testimonial to Captain Wiltse, of the *Boston*, about to leave for the United States, the English, the English diplomatic and consular officials, nor the officers of the *Garnet* attended, though they were invited.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Telegram.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, March 1, 1893.

All quiet throughout archipelago. Protectorate is preventing pressure of the British minister. The Japanese representatives telegraphed Government January 19. Japanese ship *Naniwa* arrived February 23. *Kongo* arrived January 28. It is believed that the Japanese representative who arrived November 28 is urged by the British minister. It is believed that the British ship *Warspite* has been ordered here to provide for contingencies. It is advisable to send here at once the most powerful American ship available. I have sent particulars by mail.

STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 88.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 1, 1893.

SIR: My telegram preceding this dispatch informed the Department of State that quiet and general regularity in political and business affairs prevailed throughout the islands.

Our qualified protectorate appears to work favorably. It not only tends to increase American and annexation sentiments, but it also operates to prevent foreign complications. It makes it very difficult for the English Minister here—very hostile to American predominance—from interfering.

He is very desirous of bringing about a state of things to afford a pretext for landing English marines and sailors, and to bring about a tripartite management of Hawaiian affairs. Hence his efforts to secure the Japanese commissioner to his design. With the former Japanese commissioner, a gentleman of education and intelligence and very fair-minded, I had most cordial relations.

The present commissioner, here only a few weeks, is a different man. He had been in the consular service in San Francisco and New York and evidently has a certain degree of anti-American prejudice.

When he telegraphed Tokio for the great iron clad which arrived here February 23, the Provisional Government had not got fairly to work, and our "qualified protectorate" had not been established.

Not fully understanding the situation he acted hastily. So far the commanders of the two Japanese vessels have followed the example of the English commanders in not calling on the Provisional Government, though both the English minister and the Japanese commissioner had acknowledged it as the Hawaiian Government *de facto*. The French commissioner and the Portugese chargé are on most friendly terms with the Provisional Government, as are nearly all the foreign consuls.

I still hope to separate the Japanese commissioner from the English minister. He has already avowed himself quite well satisfied with the course of the Provisional Government, and acknowledges the unsupportable state of things the last weeks of the Hawaiian monarchy.

It is possible he has some connection with the middlemen who have been supplying contract laborers for the Hawaiian plantations, and fears annexation might spoil the occupation and profits of middlemen.

Whether any suggestions should be made to our minister at Tokio to say anything to the Japanese Government touching Hawaiian affairs, it is for the Department of State to decide.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

NOTE.—In requesting that war vessels be sent here I have considered that the Department of State might probably have information prior to arrival of my cipher dispatch rendering the granting of my request unnecessary.

But I also consider that if I do not give the view as it appears at this distant standpoint at this date, I would fail of duty.

STEVENS.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 77.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 2, 1893.

SIR: I transmit a letter of the President in reply to the letter of January 24, 1893, of his excellency the President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, relating to political events; and a copy thereof. You will send the copy to the foreign office, and deliver the original at a time and in a manner agreeable to his excellency.

I am, sir, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

[Enclosure in No. 77.]

Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States of America, To His Excellency, Sanford B. Dole, President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1893.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: I have received your letter of January 24, 1893, by which you inform me that the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands has been quietly and peaceably established under a proclamation formally and publicly made at the door of the Government building in Honolulu, on the 17th day of January, 1893, and that the said Government has honored you with the office of President of the Provisional Government and chairman of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

I am pleased to note the expression of your earnest desire to maintain and strengthen the strong friendship which has for so many years existed between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands, and to assure your excellency that I shall omit no effort which may conduce to the accomplishment of a purpose which I so heartily desire.

May God have your excellency and the people of the Hawaiian Islands in His wise keeping.

Your good friend,

BENJ. HARRISON.

By the President:

WM. F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary of State.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

No. 89.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 7, 1893.

SIR: Believing it to be proper and just for the administration of President Cleveland to have the appointment of a United States minister abroad who fully represents its views as to foreign policy, I hereby tender my resignation as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Honolulu. It is not improper for me to say that I should have offered my resignation about this date had President Harrison been reelected, it having been my firm resolution when I came here in 1889 not to remain longer than four years at most. I am aware that the present Hawaiian Government and most of the Americans and friends of the United States in these islands have a strong desire that I should continue to hold my official position here at present, owing to my thorough acquaintance with Hawaiian affairs.

But if annexation is near being accomplished, I think by the 1st of May I can leave here without detriment to public interests, and that whatever further duties may be required of a diplomatic official can be safely intrusted to Hon. H. W. Severance, the present consul-general. He is well informed as to the history of recent political events here. In addition to his four years of consular service in Honolulu he had had in former years an extensive acquaintance with these islands. He is a gentleman of correct life and has the confidence of the best men here, being about 64 years of age. As neither a United States minister nor consul is likely to be needed here long, I would advise that Mr. Severance be continued in office so long as his official services may be necessary.

If annexation is not at present to become an accomplished fact, and a minister should be needed here, you will allow the suggestion that he should be a superior man of tact, firmness, integrity, and correct life, and American to the core. To avoid risks I would advise he be not a Californian politician of any party, for owing to contiguity and near commercial association a Californian might not be entirely unbiased on some questions and interests.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

No. 90.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 7, 1893.

SIR: The political situation here at this time is much the same as it was at the dates of my two preceding dispatches. There is general quiet throughout the islands and the Provisional Government is getting along exceedingly well, all circumstances considered. It is giving satisfaction to all the better and more responsible citizens. Of course, all are awaiting with deep anxiety the result of the action of the Senate on the annexation treaty. Mr. Wodehouse, the British minister, is trying to embarrass it in several particulars, especially its freedom of action in respect to its negotiations with the United States. He has tried to induce it to request the return to their ship of the marines and sailors of the *Boston*, about 120 in all. He is assuming to urge that the

annexation treaty if ratified by the Senate should be submitted here to a popular vote, hoping to stir up all the factional and irresponsible elements thus to defeat annexation, though none knows better than he that such a procedure here under existing conditions would be a farce and no test of the opinions of the responsible people of the islands.

Of course, the views of the English minister in this regard get to the public ears and the factional and irresponsible elements are stirred more or less by the Canadian, Australian, and American adventurers here, of the lottery and opium rings. I think the Provisional Government has answered the English minister very effectively by pointing him to the general course of the British Government in its numerous annexations of Pacific Islands as well as of other countries.

In my dispatch 74 I have given the special personal and family reasons why Minister Wodehouse wishes the Hawaiian monarchy restored and American ascendancy here weakened. Annexation alone will put an end to these ultra British intrigues and give Hawaii responsible government and great prosperity.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

No. 91.]

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

[Confidential]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 7, 1893.

SIR: By the American newspapers it appears, and I have the information from other sources, that a Mr. E. C. Macfarlane is in Washington, professing to be an ardent American, sometimes claiming to be an annexationist, but avows himself hostile to the Hawaiian Provisional Government and to the course of the Hawaiian commissioners.

It is proper for me to inform the Department of State that this man is one of the firm of George Macfarlane & Co., referred to by my predecessor here, Minister Merrill, in his dispatch 78, to Secretary Bayard, of September 2, 1886, page 558 of printed volume of diplomatic documents. Again, the minister refers to the same firm in his dispatch 138, of August 2, 1887, page 832, printed volume, by which it is seen that the firm was a party to defrauding the Hawaiian Government of more than \$100,000 in negotiating a loan with a London house. For years this firm has been ultra English in its political affiliations and mercantile plans.

A few months since this E. C. Macfarlane, by intrigues and associations became one of the recent Queen's ministers, minister of finance. So unsatisfactory was he to all the best members of the Legislature and to the business men of the Islands, that he remained in the ministry but a few days, being voted out by the Legislature though the English minister, openly and by personal effort, and his wife more conspicuously in the legislative hall, worked to retain him. After Macfarlane was voted out, the English minister used the former as a go-between to the Queen to get her to appoint another pro-English cabinet, but the effort failed. This E. C. Macfarlane is referred to in my 70 and 71. This is the man who sought to get access to President Cleveland, at Lakewood, according to the New York and Washington papers, and is now posing as an American and is said to be asking a

hearing at Washington. He and his brother were born here of Scotch parentage, and E. C. lived several years in California. But American interests here have no more unrelenting foe than this liquor-importing house of G. W. Macfarlane & Co.

E. C. Macfarlane is a fitting confederate in Washington, as he has been in Honolulu, with Paul Neuman, the deposed Queen's attorney, whose character is described in my dispatch 81 of January 26.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

No. 79.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 10, 1893.

SIR: I append a copy of a telegram* received on 8th instant, over your signature.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

No. 92.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 15, 1893.

SIR: That the Department of State may fully understand the present status of affairs here, it is necessary for me to state as accurately as possible the practical working of the qualified and restricted protectorate which the United States officials are exercising here. We have never understood this practically to allow us to go much, if any, beyond the spirit and terms of Secretary Bayard's dispatch to Minister Merrill of July 12, 1887, in printed volume of Foreign Relations of that year, page 581, and both the Provisional Government and myself have ever construed it as strictly within the limitations specified in Secretary Foster's dispatch 71 of February 11, 1893, fully understanding that the United States representatives here shall not interfere with the sovereignty nor with the administration of the public affairs of these islands. This restricted protectorate has proved more necessary and beneficial than was fully perceived when assumed.

When the Hawaiian monarchy collapsed and the Provisional Government was instituted, there were corruptions and abuses wherever the palace power had exercised predominating influence in the selection of officials. Time was necessary for the eradication of these evils, for the creation of a reliable police, and for the organization and drilling of a small military force. Besides the English minister, for reasons indicated in previous dispatches, was bitterly dissatisfied that I had acted independently of him, landing the men of the *Boston* when they were imperatively needed, while there was then no British vessel here. According to what was anticipated might occur, not long after our restricted protectorate was assumed the British war ship *Garnet* arrived. It was then too late for the English minister to make effective any demand to land troops or to insist on dual action with the United States minister. Still more, the Japanese commissioner arriving here but a short time before the fall of the monarchy, and not fully understanding the situation, began to manifest a wish to land men from the Japanese

* See under date of March 8, 1893.

war vessel in the harbor, and telegraphed Tokio via San Francisco, two days after the fall of the monarchy, for another war vessel, and February 23, as previously stated in my dispatch 88, one of the largest ships of the Japanese navy arrived here. But it was then too late for the intrigues and pressure of the English minister and the arrival of the increased Japanese naval force to intervene. It was found that the prompt American action had given so much moral support to the new Hawaiian Government that neither the Government nor the United States officials here would consent to any temporary dual or tripartite arrangement as to Hawaiian affairs.

Yesterday, the 14th, the British ship *Garnet* left for Vancouver, and to-day or to-morrow the *Kongo*, the smallest Japanese ship, will leave for Japan. There is no doubt that but for our protectorate, restricted as it is, the British minister would have insisted on the same right to land troops that he had formerly exercised here, while our action of February 1 and of the days preceding closed the door against complications, saved the Provisional Government from foreign pressure, leaving the United States complete master of the situation. The Japanese commissioner and naval commanders now fully recognize the Provisional Government by official and ceremonial calls, and their attitude toward this legation and our naval commanders here appear to be cordial. But I have learned positively and beyond all doubt that had not the monarchy here fallen and this Government had remained in its former condition of weakness, it was the intention of the newly arrived Japanese commissioner to have demanded the same political rights in Hawaii, including the voting franchise for Japanese, as, under the constitution of 1887, have been exercised by resident foreigners of Christian nations. I am equally convinced that with annexation to the United States the Japanese Government will attempt no pressure of this kind, that Government fully understanding that the United States is a reliable friend of Japan and that the Japanese subjects in these islands will be well protected should Hawaii come fully under the rule of the United States. While I say this I shall be allowed to express the opinion that there is occasion for keeping a sharp eye on Tokyo and British and perhaps other foreign intrigues there against our plans of predominance in the North Pacific.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

No. 93.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 24, 1893.

SIR: In my previous dispatches I have given some facts and surmises regarding Japanese ambitions as to these islands. I presume the Department of State has knowledge of the elaborate article of Sir Edward Arnold in the London Telegraph of February 24, strongly anti-American and favoring the surrender of Hawaii to Japanese predominance and protection. By residence in Japan, as well as by some previously acquired taste of Calcutta and Hindostan life, Arnold seems to accept readily Japanese morals and civilization, warmly flatters the easily susceptible vanity of the Japanese, the real Frenchmen of Asia. My only reason for referring to Sir Edward Arnold and his copyrighted London article is because of certain Japanese indications in this neighborhood.

How far these indications have substantial basis in Tokyo of course I am unable to say. It is reasonable to presume that this Japanese interest in Hawaiian affairs is cherished and pushed forward by at least one of the political cliques in the Japanese capital. The sudden coming here of the *Naniwa*, a powerful iron clad, at the telegraphic call of the Japanese diplomatic agent here, though the *Kongo*, a Japanese war ship of 2,200 tons, was then here, indicates some sensitive spring of action at Tokyo. Just before the fall of the Queen, the Japanese commissioner had positively indicated to me his purpose to press on the Hawaiian Government the demand for the amendment of the Hawaiian constitution so as to give the Japanese in the islands the same rights of suffrage enjoyed by European and American foreigners and Hawaiians. He was to demand this in virtue of stipulations which he regarded to be in a Japanese treaty with Hawaii secured under the old Hawaiian régime prior to the adoption of the reform constitution of 1887.

There is every reason to believe that had not the United States flag been raised over the Hawaiian Government building, and American protection thus secured, it was the intention of the Japanese Commissioner to have demanded and asserted the right of landing Japanese forces from the *Naniwa* and the *Kongo*, and thus to have placed Japanese officials here on equal footing with the representatives of the United States, thus establishing a *dual* arrangement and protection in Hawaiian affairs. But when the *Naniwa* arrived here February 23 our action of February 1 raising the flag over the Government building had completely closed the door, and the Japanese commissioner and naval commander saw it would not do to encroach on ground covered by United States protection. Of course, the only hope of the Japanese jingo to carry out the suffrage scheme would be in the restoration of the Queen, who is ready secretly to promise anything for Japanese help in her monarchical design. Lately I have had several interviews with the Japanese commissioner of a friendly character. I have reminded him of the long-existing friendship and good relations between Japan and the United States, and why those relations are likely to exist in the future.

I called his attention to and explained our many years of special relations to and interest in these islands, and gave him to understand that we would view any encroachment on the sovereignty and soil of Hawaii by a foreign power much the same as an encroachment on the soil and rights of the United States. I assured him that in case annexation should become a fact we should strictly protect the life, property, and interests of all residents of the islands. I approached this point with so much caution and with such friendly words that I am confident he appreciated the weight of my reasons and the kindly vigor with which I stated them. Since these interviews with the Japanese commissioner I have learned of his saying to one of the principal men of the Provisional Government that he thinks it does not matter much who control the islands provided that the laws were well enforced and the life and property of the residents well secured.

Apparently at this writing the Japanese commissioner is more responsive to the wishes and purposes of the United States representatives here than to those of any other power. Yet I can but regard it all important for us to hold our position on shore firmly, especially so long as the *Naniwa* remains in Hawaiian waters.

There is no doubt that the foreign adventurers here, especially the lottery and opium rings that drew the Queen to her overthrow, will do

their utmost to seduce the Japanese officials by stimulating their animosities and aspirations. Among these adventurers are well known here to be Paul Neuman, the fallen Queen's attorney, now or recently in Washington. He is in the paid employ of the Tokyo contract labor importing ring, who for years have been bleeding the Hawaiian planters and the Japanese laborers out of large sums of money. There are the best reasons for the belief that this Tokyo ring and their co-partners here are opposing annexation because they believe that American possession will put an end to their corrupt work and large gains. Careful inquiry leads to the conclusion that this Tokyo ring, aided by Englishmen and others like Sir Edward Arnold, are stimulating Japanese ambitions and interference here. Highly-placed Englishmen will do this, because they prefer Japanese influence should predominate rather than American. Annexation would end forever all schemes of this kind. Certain it is that at present it would be risking too much to withdraw our protecting flag and armed marines from Honolulu until this Japanese menace shall have completely terminated and the unscrupulous ring of foreign adventurers can no longer make use of it as an agency of reaction and misrule.

All friends of the United States in these islands, and none more keenly than the Provisional Government, appreciate this, and are anxious for the continued support and protection of the United States. Had I failed to give to the Department of State the information and suggestions contained in this dispatch, I would have keenly realized that I had failed of my duty as an American minister at this important juncture of Hawaiian affairs.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

NOTE.—I have in the above and a preceding dispatch spoken of the presence here of the Japanese war ship, the *Kongo*. While in these waters that ship made a visit to Hilo early in March. While at Hilo the conversation related in the inclosed paper took place on board that ship, which may be read in connection with my accompanying dispatch 93. I also inclose printed slips of the Honolulu Advertiser, the chief newspaper on the islands, strongly American in its views and sentiments:

Copy of language used by the captain of the Japanese war ship Kongo while in the harbor of Hilo, March 5 or 6.

INTERVIEW OF JAPANESE INTERPRETER.

I have just had a long talk with Mr. LeRoy, the Japanese interpreter for the Hilo district. He was the only one who had a talk with the captain of the *Kongo* during her presence in the harbor, and I quote his own language.

"Sunday afternoon when the *Kongo* arrived the surgeon of the ship called upon me and asked about the health of the port. I referred him to Dr. Williams, the Government physician, and then he handed me a sealed letter; upon the upper corner of the envelope were the words 'official business.'

"Upon opening it I found a communication from the captain of the *Kongo*, who asked me to visit the ship the next day. I accepted, and Monday afternoon went on board. The captain took me into his cabin, away from the others, and, after a few introductory remarks, he said:

"What is the sentiment of the Japanese on the islands? Do they not side with the natives?" I assured him that such did not seem to be the case.

"In case," he continued, "that there should be trouble, would they not bear arms with the Hawaiians?"

"This question rather puzzled me, but I told him I did not think so.

"He went over the same ground several times, and, from what he said, I am convinced he was not pleased with the attitude the Japanese had taken.

"I then asked him what the *Kongo* had come to Hilo for, and he replied, 'To protect the rights of Japanese.'

"How so?"

"Well, there are many ways.' I asked him if he intended to take any definite action. 'No,' said he, 'I must consult with the captain of the *Naniwa*. I have to consult with him at Honolulu.' I then referred to the appearance of the U. S. S. *Alliance*. He shrugged his shoulders, and I said, 'I suppose she came to watch us; but she is a wooden tub, anyway.'"

Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

No. 94.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, April 4, 1893.

SIR: Your dispatch of March 11 was placed in my hands by Special Commissioner Hon. James H. Blount. So long as I remain in service here I shall endeavor faithfully to carry out the instructions of the Secretary of State.

The presence of the men from the U. S. S. *Boston* on shore from January 16 to April 1 had a remarkably beneficial influence on public affairs in the islands, safeguarding American life and property and encouraging the elements of public order. When the Hawaiian monarchy fell under the weight of its astounding corruptions and by its own suicidal hand, there remained here no reliable organized police, and there was no military force in all the islands with a population of nearly 100,000. The supporters of the Provisional Government having had little or no military experience, an organized military force could not be created at once. Time was absolutely necessary. The presence of the few United States soldiers with their country's flag was of incalculable importance to the only existing and only possible government for Hawaii. When the men of the *Boston* went to their ship, April 1 the Provisional Government had at its command a military force of 400 men—the most effective ever known in the islands—and an organized police with a tried and efficient man at the head. The remarkable change accomplished in seventy-five days had been without the loss of life or the destruction of property. Had the United States minister and the naval commander not acted as they did they would have deserved prompt removal from their places and the just censure of the friends of humanity and of civilization.

The general aspect of Hawaiian affairs at this time is highly encouraging. The Provisional Government is gaining in public confidence and popular support. There is complete good order throughout the islands. The present government is supported by all the more responsible citizens and by seven-eighths of the property of the country. By all the best citizens it is regarded the best government the islands have had for many years. The friends of annexation continue to increase and now include all the supporters of the Provisional Government, the principal property holders, and a large number of native Hawaiians.

With my family I intend to leave Honolulu for our home in Maine in the steamer of May 24. Unless otherwise directed, I will leave the archives, books, and other property of the legation in care of Hon. H. W. Severance, the consul-general. Owing to the advanced years and imperfect health of Mrs. Stevens and myself, it will be necessary for us to have repeated stopping for rest on our long journey, though we expect to make our home transit inside of the thirty-five days allowed by law.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

No. 81.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 18, 1893.

SIR: I have received your No. 92, of the 15th ultimo, relative to the Provisional Government recently established in Hawaii, and the attitude of the British and Japanese representatives with respect thereto.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 25, 1893.

In view of your tender of resignation dated March 7 and of your dispatch 94 of April 4, I am directed by the President to inform you that your resignation is accepted. You are therefore authorized to quit your post at your early convenience, leaving the archives and property of the legation in custody of Consul-General Severance without diplomatic functions.

GRESHAM.

Mr. Adee to Mr. Stevens.

No. 82.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 27, 1893.

SIR: I have received your dispatches numbered 89 and 94, of 7th ultimo and 4th instant, and with reference thereto append a copy of a telegram* of 25th instant accepting your resignation.

I am, etc.,

ALVEY A. ADEE,
Acting Secretary.

*See under date of April 25, 1893.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

No. 83.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 4, 1893.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 93, of the 24th March last, and the newspaper extracts therewith, concerning rumors and reports of a desire on the part of Japan to improve its footing in the Hawaiian Islands.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

No. 96.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, May 18, 1893.

SIR: Agreeably to your instructions I have turned over the archives and other property of the legation to Hon. James G. Blount, my successor as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States. Herewith is inclosed his receipt for the same. A duplicate copy I leave at the legation. I leave here with my family and the remains of my deceased daughter May 24. Had it been possible to have secured proper steamer accommodations we would have left Honolulu ten days earlier, though that would have been several days prior to your dispatch directing me to place the legation in charge of Mr. Blount.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 1.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 24, 1893.

SIR: I received by the *Australia* arriving here on the 17th instant two telegrams from you, dated on the 9th instant, forwarded through W. A. Cooper, United States Dispatch agent at San Francisco.

I regret very much that it was found necessary to appoint me as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Hawaiian Islands.

On the afternoon of the former date I took the oath of office—which I inclose herewith—and have taken charge of the records and property of the legation.

I have done so because I supposed from the circumstance that I was appointed against a declaration on my part to you in Washington that I could not accept it, that some important reason, not contained in the telegram, made it desirable to the President and yourself that Mr. Stevens' connection with the legation should be promptly severed.

I inclose herewith my resignation of the office, with the request that it be accepted, and my successor appointed as soon as practicable.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES H. BLOUNT.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 1.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 24, 1893.

SIR: I herewith tender my resignation of the office of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to the Hawaiian Islands, to take effect on your acceptance thereof.

With profound admiration for you officially and personally,

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

His Excellency GROVER CLEVELAND,
President of the United States of America.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 2.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 24, 1893.

SIR: The letters of Mr. Nordhoff to the New York Herald, on the situation of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, have produced intense resentment in the minds of American residents and of white annexationists generally here.

On the 21st instant Dr. J. C. McGrew, who claims to be an American citizen, and who is a leading member of the Annexation Club, and the editor in chief of the Hawaiian Star, which belongs to the Annexation Club and is a quasi official organ of the Government, reported to Admiral Skerrett that there had been quite an excitement all day long amongst persons who were offended by Mr. Nordhoff's letters, and that he had scarcely been able to restrain them from insulting Mr. Nordhoff by applying to him a coat of tar and feathers.

I immediately addressed a note to Mr. Dole, a copy of which I inclose herewith. (Inclosure No. 1.)

Later in the day Dr. McGrew informed Admiral Skerrett that there would be no effort to tar and feather Mr. Nordhoff, but that proceedings would be taken the next day in court against him.

The following day brought no answer from President Dole to my communication.

In the afternoon of the 22d instant, a paper was served upon Mr. Nordhoff—a copy of which I inclose.

The assertion of a power under the color of law to hold Mr. Nordhoff responsible for the publication of his letters in the New York Herald being regarded as without warrant of authority and in violation of his rights as an American citizen, I determined immediately to communicate to the Government a denial of their right to proceed against him on account of said publication.

Desiring to avoid any semblance of too great readiness to enter into a controversy with the Hawaiian Government over this matter, I went to see President Dole, and called attention to the action of the attorney general and informed him that the Government of the United States would not submit to the exercise of such a prerogative on the part of the Hawaiian Government; that I deemed it proper to hold a conversation with him, hoping to avoid thereby any official correspondence which might produce acerbity or the slightest estrangement. He replied that he was very much obliged to me for having taken such a course, and that the question raised would be examined and the conclusions reached communicated to me.

He then referred to my letter, saying that he would have answered it, but supposed that it was intended simply to give him notice of the facts stated. I replied that I regretted he had not seen fit to give me any information concerning the matter in writing in order that the same might be forwarded to the Government of the United States; that I hoped the additional subject of controversy, to which I invited his attention, would be adjusted in a manner consistent with the honor of the United States, and so speedily that I might be able to communicate this also to the home Government. After some conversation on this subject he informed me that the advisory council had requested Mr. Nordhoff to come before it, and asked me if I thought he would come, as it was only a request. To this I answered, "I presume not. Whatever information Mr. Nordhoff may have obtained carried with it an obligation of privacy, which I do not believe he would violate."

All this occurred on the street, and as we were about to part, I said to him that I should call on Mr. Nordhoff, and let him know the status of the affair; that I felt it my duty to give him such assurances as would conduce to his sense of security. To this he responded: "I have taken precautions against any violence being done to him, although I do not think he is in any danger."

I immediately sent to Mr. Nordhoff's house and was at first prevented from entering the yard by two policemen. I am persuaded, however, that this was an unintentional error on their part and not in pursuance of their instructions.

In conversation with Mr. Nordhoff he told me he had been summoned before the advisory council. On reaching home I found the document, a copy of which I inclose herewith (No. 3).

It had very little the appearance to my mind of a request. On the 23d I had Mr. Nordhoff come to the legation headquarters at 9 o'clock, and requested him to remain there until I should return from the Government building where I was about to proceed to make formal announcement of my appointment as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

I do not deem it necessary to report the speech of myself or President Dole, but simply to say that they contained those manifestations of friendship usually occurring on such occasions between friendly powers.

After this ceremony was over President Dole expressed a desire to speak with me on the subject of the legal proceedings instituted by the attorney-general against Mr. Nordhoff, and likewise the action of the advisory council and my verbal complaint in relation thereto. He began by desiring an appointment with me sometime during the day in order to communicate with me what had occurred in the matter of the consideration of the subject by the law officers of the Government. I said that I hoped it would be disposed of as promptly as possible; and that I had foreborne any written communication on the subject in the interest of good will between the two countries; that unless the matter was disposed of speedily I must address him a communication.

He asked me if Mr. Nordhoff would go before the council and make an apology? To this I responded that I did not think he would; that I could not advise him to such a course; that after denunciation by the "Star," the Annexation Club organ, threats of insult by tarring and feathering, proceedings instituted by the attorney-general in the local courts, and the action of the advisory council, such an apology would have the appearance of compulsion, to which I was not willing to see an American citizen subjected.

At this hour (10:40) I am awaiting a communication from the Government. To avoid any additional complications I have advised Mr. Nordhoff to remain at the legation.

At 2:10 p. m. a communication was received from President Dole, through his secretary, a copy of which I inclose herewith (No. 4). Whereupon Mr. Nordhoff left the legation for his residence.

At 4:30 p. m. of the same day, the 23d instant, not hearing anything from President Dole, I sent my secretary, Mr. Mills, to inquire whether he would call during the day, and if so, at what time? He sent me a verbal message by Mr. Mills to the effect that he was not under the impression that he was to have any further conversation with me, having had one at the Government building. Of course this was a misunderstanding between us. He further stated that the advisory council had referred the subject to the attorney-general, to inquire

whether any civil or criminal proceedings would be taken against Mr. Nordhoff.

Thereupon I determined to forward to him a letter (a copy of which I inclose, No. 5), which I had written on yesterday afternoon, but had withheld it, hoping for a speedy adjustment of the difference without its being placed in writing.

I recognize the obligation of an American citizen residing in a foreign country to obey its laws.

It has appeared to me that the doctrine laid down by Mr. Bayard in the case of A. K. Cutting, September 9, 1885, is applicable to the pending case. If this be true then the issue may as rightfully be made before the consideration of the cause as subsequent thereto.

Yesterday afternoon the Hon. John L. Stevens called to see me. He was exceedingly bitter against Mr. Nordhoff—charging him with treasonable conduct and displaying the most eager interest in the matter of the action of the Hawaiian Government against him. Amongst other things he alleged that Mr. Nordhoff had been conspiring with the royalists to overthrow the Provisional Government, and that the Government had the evidence against him in black and white. I asked him how this came to his knowledge? He replied, "Well, I have it, anyhow; and they ought to have it."

I very much fear that his relations to the people here, and his bitter feeling against Mr. Nordhoff, has contributed to produce an abnormal excitement against the latter.

I believe the situation was such as made it necessary for me to promptly act in the manner related.

The objectionable correspondence heretofore referred to was published in the Daily Bulletin. So far as I know it is not claimed by the authorities here that Mr. Nordhoff had anything to do with its publication.

I inclose herewith a copy of a communication from him (No. 6).

I expect that action will be taken requiring Mr. Nordhoff to leave the country. Should this occur I shall not deem it my duty to make objection.

I am, etc.,

JAMES M. BLOUNT,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United States.*

[Inclosure 1 in No. 2.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *May 21, 1893.*

SIR: I beg your attention to the following statement from Admiral Skerrett:

"I was informed to-day upon reliable authority—the authority being Dr. J. S. McGrew—that some exasperated citizens of Honolulu had taken great offense at the wording of a letter supposed to have been written by Mr. Nordhoff, a United States citizen, and newspaper correspondent of the New York Herald, which statement that he had received from certain persons in Honolulu, he communicated to his paper.

Threats have been made with regard to his possible maltreatment, such threats being tar and feathering, and other things."

Mr. Nordhoff being an eminent citizen of the United States, I deem it proper to call your attention to this matter.

Very respectfully,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
United States Special Commissioner.

Hon. S. B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 2.]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL,
Honolulu, May 22, 1893.

SIR: The inclosed statement, which you have caused to be published in the New York Herald, and which has been republished in the Honolulu Bulletin; is known by this Government to be false, and is regarded as malicious and libelous. Unless you retract the same at once, and give the retraction equal publicity with the libel, proceedings will be instituted against you.

I have, etc.,

WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Attorney-General.

Mr. CHARLES NORDHOFF.

MINISTER STEVENS' INTRIGUE.

Minister Stevens has been engaged all the last week in an intrigue having for its object to alarm the Queen and cause her to abdicate. Mr. Dole, head of the Provisional Government, has been, it is understood, working with the American minister at this enterprise, and reports have been set afloat that President Cleveland wishes her to make a cession of the islands to the United States; that Commissioner Blount would be pleased if she did; that Mr. Blount is going away soon; that he intends to land troops again and hoist the American flag; that he is unhappy over the situation; that he is afraid to leave here even to visit some of the other islands without first putting an American garrison in possession of Honolulu, and so forth.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 2.]

IN THE NAME OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS:

To the Marshal of the Hawaiian Islands, or his deputy on the Island of Oahu greeting:

Whereas, by a resolution of the executive and advisory councils adopted on the 22d day of May, A. D. 1893, a copy of which is as follows:

"Whereas the following statement, among others, has been published in the Daily Bulletin in a letter purporting to have been written by Mr. Charles Nordhoff, viz:

"SHREWD LOTTERY MEN.

"It is not necessary to give more names. A good many retail merchants, grocers, clothing sellers, etc., are on the lottery petitions, and I am told the labor union men, now all annexationists, went in almost in a body for the lottery, as well as most of the members of the Provisional Assembly."

And whereas said statement, as far as it applies to the Provisional Assembly, is wholly false,

Resolved, That said Charles Nordhoff be cited to appear before this assembly on Tuesday, May 23, A. D. 1893, at 11 o'clock a. m., to show upon what authority he has based such assertions. It was voted that Charles Nordhoff be cited to appear before said Assembly on Tuesday, the 23d day of May instant, at 11 o'clock a. m., to show upon what authority he based his said assertion.

Now, therefore, you are commanded to cite said Charles Nordhoff, if he can be found within your jurisdiction, to appear before the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government, at the Council Chamber in Honolulu, on Tuesday, the 23d day of May, A. D. 1893, at 11 o'clock a. m., to answer to such complaint as may be made against him.

Witness: Hon. Sanford B. Dole, President of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government at Honolulu, this 23d day of May, A. D. 1893.

CHARLES T. ROGERS,
Secretary Executive and Advisory Councils.

•HONOLULU, OAHU, Hawaiian Islands, May 22, 1893.

I hereby certify the within to be a true and correct copy of the original *in re* the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands *vs.* Charles Nordhoff, citation to be and appear before the executive and advisory councils of the said Provisional Government.

C. G. HITCHCOCK,
Marshal, Hawaiian Islands

[Inclosure 4 in No. 2.]

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 23, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter a United States Special Commissioner of the 21st instant, calling my attention to a statement by Rear Admiral Skerritt, that threats had been made by exasperated citizens of Honolulu of maltreatment of Mr. Charles Nordhoff, a citizen of the United States and the correspondent of the New York Herald.

In reply I beg to express regret that any such violence as your letter suggests has been threatened Mr. Nordhoff, and have called the attention of the proper authorities of the Government to the matter, and have taken steps for his protection against any violence whatever during his residence here.

With sentiments of the highest regard and esteem,

I have the honor to be, sir, your excellency's obedient servant,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency JAMES H. BLOUNT,
United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 2.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, May 22, 1893.

SIR: I have been handed the following communication from Mr. Charles Nordhoff. (See inclosure No. 2, Attorney-General W. O. Smith to Mr. Nordhoff.)

The New York Herald is a paper not published in the Hawaiian Islands, and the proposition that the Government thereof can take jurisdiction of the author of the article aforesaid on account of its publication in the United States is wholly inadmissible. It is equivalent to asserting that the Hawaiian Government can take jurisdiction over the authors of the various criticisms of political affairs in the Hawaiian Islands which appear in the newspapers of the United States.

To an assumption of such jurisdiction by the Hawaiian Government the Government of the United States will not submit. It will not permit that this prerogative shall be in any degree usurped by the Hawaiian Government, nor will it permit a citizen of the United States to be called to account by the Hawaiian Government for acts done within the boundaries of the United States.

On this ground I insist that no proceedings shall be taken against Mr. Nordhoff such as are indicated in the letter signed W. O. Smith, Attorney-General.

Since writing the foregoing I find the following paper has been served on Mr. Nordhoff. (See inclosure No. 3.—“In the name of the Provisional Government, etc.”)

Permit me to say that in my judgment this, and the foregoing proceeding, under the color of law, is a violation of the rights of Mr. Nordhoff as an American citizen.

When I remember how on the 16th of January last, at the request of your leading citizens, American troops were landed and brought quiet to the homes of the people of this city, it is passing strange to me to find an eminent citizen of the United States subjected to such outrage at the hands of the Provisional Government of these Islands.

I can but hope that this action will be, on reconsideration, repudiated.

While I desire to promote the kindest feelings between your Government and mine, I shall not forget that one of the proudest reflections of the American people is their disposition and ability to protect an American citizen throughout the civilized world.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
E. E. and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Hon. SANFORD B. DOLE,
President, etc., of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

[Inclosure 6 in No. 2.]

HONOLULU, *May 23, 1893.*

DEAR SIR: In reply to your question I say that the publication in the Bulletin of my letters to the New York Herald was without my knowledge and consent; that is to say, I knew nothing at all about it.

Yours, truly,

CHARLES NORDHOFF.

His excellency JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Minister of the United States.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 3.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 29, 1893.

SIR: Just before the leaving of the *Australia*, on the 24th instant, there came to me, too late for mailing to you, a communication from President Dole, a copy of which I inclose (No. 1).

At this date (May 29) nothing further has been heard.

I suggested to President Dole and the attorney-general, in conversations with them, that if Mr. Nordhoff was so obnoxious they might possibly require him to leave the country. This did not seem to impress them favorably. Indeed, the whole proceeding in relation to him seems to have been animated by the spirit of crushing out all opposing opinions by forceful methods.

I do not expect the Government to recur to this matter again until a mail from the United States brings some letter to the Herald from Mr. Nordhoff, criticising the action of the annexationists. Then I expect it to be very much stirred again with anger toward him.

The action I have already taken will restrain it from excesses.

The Hawaiian Star, which is the annexation organ, commenting on the stay of proceedings against Mr. Nordhoff, published an editorial entitled "The Cutting Precedent," a copy of which I inclose herewith. (No. 2.)

I also inclose another comment from the same paper, entitled "The Farce of Protection." (No. 3.)

The editor-in-chief of this paper, prior to my taking any notice of the temper of the community towards Mr. Nordhoff, went to Admiral Skerrett late in the afternoon and informed him that he had been all day endeavoring to prevent the people from tarring and feathering Mr. Nordhoff; that up to that time he had been able to prevent it, and called on Admiral Skerrett to do what he could with the same view.

Admiral Skerrett communicating the facts to me I communicated them to President Dole. On his motion he sent the police to Mr. Nordhoff's house.

The situation, therefore, will appear somewhat graver than in my former dispatch, in which the statement of Admiral Skerrett was not as full as herein contained.

I hope you will not underrate the excitement which prompted all my actions in regard to Mr. Nordhoff.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 3, Diplomatic Series.]

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, May 24, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 22d instant relating to Mr. Nordhoff, and to state in reply that upon full consideration of the questions involved this Government has decided to take no criminal proceedings against Mr. Nordhoff for what was suggested as contempt against the advisory council of this Government.

In respect of the matters referred to in the attorney-general's letter to Mr. Nordhoff, this Government does not propose to take any proceedings in contravention of the view of international law expressed by the United States Government in the Cutting case; but there is apparently this distinction to be noted in the two matters, viz, That Mr. Cutting was in the United States when he made the publication

objected to by the Mexican Government, whereas Mr. Nordhoff, while in the Hawaiian Islands and under the jurisdiction of its courts, has written articles defamatory of this Government, which were published in the United States in a newspaper which is freely circulated in the Hawaiian Islands, and which articles have been republished here.

I beg to inform you that this Government will rigidly adhere to the rules of international law in respect of this matter as in all other matters, and in that view has referred to its law advisers the question of Mr. Nordhoff's civil liability in the premises.

I have the honor to be Your Excellency's obedient servant,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

To His Excellency J. H. BLOUNT,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Honolulu.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 3.]

[From the Hawaiian Star, May 24, 1893.]

THE CUTTING PRECEDENT.

The Cutting case, which was cited by United States Minister Blount in behalf of Charles Nordhoff, is a well-remembered episode in the criminal practice of international law. Mr. Cutting was a citizen of the United States, who lived at Juarez, formerly Paso del Norte, on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande border. At odds with an official of the Mexican Government, he assaulted him bitterly in a paper published on the Texas side of the line at El Paso, for which offense he was arrested by the Mexican authorities and thrust into jail. The American Secretary of State thereupon demanded and enforced his release on the ground that a citizen of the United States could not be criminally punished by the Government of a foreign country for a libelous publication made on American soil, holding that the injured party must seek redress in the courts within the jurisdiction of which the offense of publication had been committed.

Such a rule as this would, for example, apply to George Kennan, author of the Century papers on Siberia, in case he should, upon another visit to Russia, be criminally prosecuted by the Czar for the libels which the Russian Government claim he committed in his accounts of official cruelties practiced upon Siberian convicts. The Imperial Government would doubtless be informed by the American Foreign Office that its only remedy—except the deportation of Mr. Kennan as an undesirable visitor—lay in his prosecution in the courts of the United States and before a jury of his peers. No doubt in Mr. Kennan's case the validity of this argument would be as promptly admitted by Russia as it was when applied a year ago to Poultney Bigelow and Frederick Remington, who went into the Empire on a mission similar to that of Kennan, but were arrested for it and expelled from the country. That they would have been otherwise punished but for the force of the international rule laid down in the Cutting case can hardly be doubted by any one who is familiar with the tendencies of the Czar towards those who write, speak, or act against his mode of government.

Mr. Nordhoff is of course fortunate that by appeal to American precedent he has escaped another humiliation; but that fact does not alter the circumstances that, morally speaking, and in a way amenable to civil damages, he libeled Minister Stevens and President Dole and deserved the punishment which Hawaiian criminal law would have been likely to inflict upon him. His guilt is patent, though the consequences of it may have been avoided. The only gratification he can feel is that of an apprehended miscreant who escapes his deserts through a merely technical plea against the jurisdiction of the judge.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 3, Diplomatic Series.]

[From the Hawaiian Star, May 23, 1893.]

THE FARCE OF PROTECTION.

A broad smile of amusement went across the face of the town last evening, when it was learned that Mr. Nordhoff had applied for protection to the United States minister, and that, at the request of the latter, the Provisional Government had detailed

two native policemen to guard the Herald correspondent's lodgings. In view of the fact that Mr. Nordhoff is as safe in Honolulu as he could be at his sequestered home on Coronado Beach, the whole episode becomes a tax upon the risibles.

Careful inquiry shows that the only basis for the Herald man's fears—apart from that conscience which, as the poet says, "Doth make cowards of us all"—was a stray remark here and there that he ought to be tarred and feathered. As Mr. Nordhoff is well aware, such talk is often heard in times of political debate, and is but the smallest of small change in the circulation of public opinion. It is the coinage of idle chat merely; in this case particularly so, as the annexation party is standing on its dignity as a representative Hawaiian body, asking admission to the American brotherhood on the ground, among other grounds, that in civilization, Christianity, and moral purpose it is worthy of the fellowship. It could not be induced to do or permit a ruffianly act, a fact which we believe Mr. Nordhoff himself appreciates as well as anyone else.

Why, then, did he ask protection? Wait and see! If he doesn't use the fact that he got it to fill the columns of the Herald with a lurid tale of how he escaped death at the hands of an infuriated annexation mob, only to be saved by the intervention of Minister Blount and the reluctant display of provisional force, then the Star misses a reasonable guess. The two shirt-sleeved native policemen who dawdle about his palace dozing and yawning will doubtless be magnified into a garrison of men in buckram surrounded and besieged by bloodthirsty planters or missionaries all eager to flesh their daggers in the heart of the one bold correspondent who had exposed their foul conspiracies and hailed their cause to the bar of public judgment. Life will hardly be worth Mr. Nordhoff's living until he can get some such phantasmagoria before the Herald's readers, as evidence that all he had previously said against the nature and personnel of the annexation movement is true.

In the meantime it is to be hoped that the two native guardians of Mr. Nordhoff's person and peace will manage to keep awake during the drowsy days and soporific nights which envelop the pastoral region of Nuuanu street.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 4.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Honolulu, June 1, 1893.

SIR: I send you a communication to-day signed as special commissioner because it relates to the object for which my appointment in that capacity was made.

I was sworn in as minister because I believed that some public reason for my temporary appointment influenced it. I could not under the circumstances do otherwise.

I now earnestly urge the immediate appointment of some person as my successor.

My resignation was forwarded in the form which you have seen because I did not deem it respectful to tender it absolutely when some temporary and public reason might have made it seem improper for me to do so.

If you have appointed a good man for consul-general here I do not see why he might not take charge of the affairs of the legation.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 5.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Honolulu, June 1, 1893.

SIR: Last night about 11 o'clock three sticks of giant powder were found, accompanied by some preparation of mercury. Suspicion is rife with royalists and annexationists.

The place where they were found is near the Barracks. Believing it was intended to blow up the Barracks the soldiers have been removed this morning into the Palace grounds.

The mail leaves very soon and I can not get any full or accurate statement.

I do not think it indicates any general movement, but rather seems to be confined to a few white persons.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount.

No. 5.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 23, 1893.

SIR: I transmit for your information a copy of a note of the minister of Hawaii, touching the recall by the Provisional Government of the Commission appointed last January for the purpose of negotiating terms for the union of the Hawaiian Islands with the United States, and announcing his readiness to resume the subject at any convenient time.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 1.?)

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 6, 1893.

SIR: I beg to inform the Department that I reached San Francisco on the 27th ultimo and sailed the following day, arriving in this city on, Saturday, November 4th, at 9 a. m.

On Saturday night I was tendered a serenade by the band of the Provisional Government, which passed off quietly and pleasantly. Having received information through our consul-general, Mr. Mills, that the Royalist party were contemplating a counter serenade and demonstration to-night, I strongly discouraged such action and it has been abandoned.

I addressed a note this morning to Hon. Sanford B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs, asking him to designate a convenient time and place when I could present the letters of recall and of credence which I bore, a copy of which I transmit herewith together with his reply, designating 11 o'clock of the forenoon, to-morrow, the 7th instant, as the time for the presentation at the Executive building. I also inclose the remarks which I propose to make upon the occasion referred to, a copy of which I sent to the Provisional Government.

Admiral Skerrett and his staff paid me the usual official call at 10 o'clock this morning, which in company with Consul-General Mills I returned this afternoon at 3, receiving from the flagship the customary official courtesies. I afterwards called on Capt. Nelson, commanding the *Adams*, where I also met with a cordial reception.

I send by mail to-morrow per steamship *China* a cipher telegram, as to the landing from steamship *Australia* last Saturday, of Winchester

rifles and ammunition, and the reported intention of the Provisional Government to issue a proclamation establishing a republic, the constitution for which, it is said, has been already prepared by Mr. Hatch, a member of the present cabinet.

The city is full of rumors, and the excitement is increasing every hour. I shall, therefore, avail myself of the earliest opportunity, after my credentials are approved, to carry out the instructions of the Department. The next steamer leaving here after to-morrow will be the *Australia*, which sails on Saturday, the 11th of November, by which time I hope to be able to give you reliable information as to the present attitude of all parties.

Mr. Mills has given me active and valuable assistance.

I have thus far had no communication with either of the opposing parties, except as herein stated.

With sentiments of high regard, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 1.]

Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 6, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you of my arrival in this city, bearing sealed letters, open official copies whereof are herewith transmitted, addressed by the President of the United States of America to the President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, recalling Mr. James H. Blount, who has for sometime past resided near your Government in the character of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, and accrediting the undersigned as his successor. By reason of his having resigned the office while in the United States, Mr. Blount is unable to present in person his letter of recall.

In pursuance of my instructions, I respectfully request you to designate a convenient time and place at which I may have the honor of presenting in person such original letters of recall and of credence.

With assurances of the most distinguished consideration, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 1.]

Mr. Dole to Mr. Willis.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 6, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's communication of this day's date informing me of your arrival in this city and that you are the bearer of sealed letters from the President of the United States of America to the President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, recalling Mr. James H. Blount, sometime United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at this Capital and accrediting you as his successor, which fact is duly authenticated by the inclosed copies of your excellency's letter of credence, and soliciting that a time and place be designated for the presentation of the original letters of recall and credence.

In reply I have the honor to state that it will give me pleasure to designate 11 o'clock of the forenoon to-morrow the 7th instant, as the time for the presentation at the Executive building.

I beg your excellency to accept the assurance of the high consideration and esteem with which I have the honor to be, sir, etc..

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Inclosure No. 3.]

Remarks of Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.

Mr. PRESIDENT: Mr. Blount, the late Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to your Government, having resigned his office while absent from his post, I have the honor now to present his letter of recall and to express for him his sincere regret that he is unable in person to make known his continued good wishes in behalf of your people and his grateful appreciation of the many courtesies of which, while here, he was the honored recipient.

I desire at the same time to place in your hands the letter accrediting me as his successor. In doing this I am directed by the President to give renewed assurances of the friendship, interest, and hearty good will which our Government entertains for you and for the people of this island realm.

Aside from our geographical proximity and the consequent preponderating commercial interests which centre here, the present advanced civilization and Christianization of your people, together with your enlightened codes of law, stand to-day beneficial monuments of American zeal, courage, and intelligence.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States were the first to recognize the independence of the Hawaiian Islands and to welcome them into the great family of free.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Telegram.]

HONOLULU, *November 6, 1893.*

Two hundred sixty rifles and ammunition arrived by steamer Saturday. Rumor that Provisional Government will declare for a Republic, with constitution already prepared.

WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Telegram.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, November 11, 1893.

Report can be sent to Congress on 19th November.

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Confidential.]

No. 2.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, November 11, 1893.

SIR: On the 7th instant, at 11 o'clock, I presented to the Provisional Government Mr. Blount's letter of recall and the letter accrediting me as his successor. I inclose an extract from the Commercial Advertiser giving an account of the proceedings. The time since then has been occupied with the reception of executive, judicial, and diplomatic representatives of the Provisional and foreign Governments. I have not, therefore, had an opportunity of executing more fully your instructions, nor was fuller action advisable while the excitement was so great. I expect on next Monday morning to have an interview with the Queen which, if satisfactory, will be followed immediately by one with the Provisional Government. I have, therefore, inclosed a telegram to

your dispatch agent at San Francisco as follows: "Report can be sent to Congress on 19th November," it being my understanding that you desired to have all the facts presented before any decisive action here.

The *Alameda*, the next vessel leaving here after next Monday, will not reach San Francisco until November 23, during which interval it is hoped some definite result may be secured.

On the afternoon of the 6th the British minister, Major Wodehouse, called my attention to the following paragraph in the "*Hawaiian Star*" of the same date: "It would serve the ex-Queen well to pray to her gods that the peril of restoration will never come to her"—which he interpreted to be a threat of assassination, and inquired whether our Government was ready and willing to extend to her its protection. I replied that, without reference to her royal claims, she stood in such relations to the United States that she was entitled to and would receive the amplest protection at their hands. As a matter of fact, I had already ascertained that, at present, she did not desire our protection. After next Monday, however, and earlier if necessary, I shall insist on her coming to the legation.

Neither side has the vaguest idea, as yet, of the attitude of our Government, and consequently no outbreak has occurred, although every night is filled with rumors. I inclose several extracts from the "*Commercial Advertiser*" (annexation) morning daily; the "*Star*" (annexation) evening daily; the "*Bulletin*" and "*Holomua*," both evening royalist papers, which will give you the situation here from a newspaper standpoint.

The U. S. S. *Philadelphia* and *Adams* are connected with Honolulu by telephone, but in the event of riot Admiral Irwin, now in command, has made arrangements for rocket signaling.

On Monday next I will, by request, meet a committee of the "*American League*," which one who claimed to be a member informed me was "six hundred strong, well armed with Winchester rifles, and would never permit the restoration of the Queen." He further intimated that the League had some fear that the Provisional Government "would make concessions and surrender their rights, and if so, they would overthrow it," etc. There is undoubtedly in this Government, as in all governments, a class of reckless, lawless men, who, under the impression that they have the moral support of some of the better class of citizens, may at any moment bring about a serious condition of affairs. Fortunately the men at the head of the Provisional Government are acknowledged by all sides to be of the highest integrity and public spirit, which, combined with the large material interests they represent, will, it is hoped, cause them to stand firmly and successfully for peace and good government.

The Japanese consul-general, Mr. Suburo Fujii, has just called to say that his people, who now number nearly one-third of the male population, are very apprehensive of immediate disturbances. He desired to know whether I would advise him to send for a man-of-war. I declined to give him any advice. He then inquired whether his people could expect protection from the United States troops. I told him that if it was his request, and that if his people were nonparticipants in any trouble, that he could probably rely upon the protection of our Government. The American interests here are so extensive and all interests are so close that it is impossible to touch one without involving all.

With sentiments of high regard, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Telegram.]

NOVEMBER 16, 1893.

Views of first party so extreme as to require further instructions.
WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 4.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, November 16, 1893.

SIR: On last Monday, November 13, I received a call from three gentlemen who said they were a committee representing the "American League." The chairman, Mr. Van Houton, made a speech of welcome, covering substantially the statements contained in the papers which I send herewith.

I replied thanking them for their words of welcome and friendship, and stating in very general terms the circumstances under which I came, and saying to them that it was the duty of all Americans, whether at home or abroad, to cooperate in executing the will of their Government when it was declared. After some further remarks as to the desirability of free institutions, provided the people were adapted to them and prepared for them, the committee withdrew. The chairman came back, after several hours, to inform me that he neglected to state that the "league" was opposed to the restoration of the monarchy. Nothing was said in the conversation as to the status of affairs here or of the instructions of our Government. I mention this as the committee, I am informed, have placed a different construction on the interview.

With high regard, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure.]

The Committee of the American League to Mr. Willis.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *November 13, 1893.*

SIR: As you are doubtless aware, a considerable number of citizens of the United States reside in the Hawaiian Islands. Having a love and veneration for the United States it is but natural that a fraternal feeling should exist among men so far from native land; and being desirous of cultivating these fraternal feelings an organization has been effected, where only citizens of the United States have been admitted to membership. The aims and objects of the organization may be briefly summarized as follows: To bear true allegiance to the United States, and, so far as possible, advance the interests of our native country. To aid and protect the members of the organization, and to assist in all honorable ways the members of the organization in obtaining employment, and advocate the just cause of the members and others owing allegiance to the United States of America.

The organization has assumed the name of the American League, and for the better protection of its members has adopted a simple ritual and has a password to be changed as often as necessary. While eligibility to membership is based on United States citizenship, the application must go into the hands of a committee, who investigate as to the qualifications of the candidate, including character and habits, with the object of receiving only those who are reliable and worthy.

The members of the league earnestly desire that the Hawaiian Islands should become a part of the United States, and with that object in view the organization

will support the present Provisional Government of Hawaii, and in all honorable ways aid in accomplishing annexation.

Believing that you would desire to know something of the aims and methods of work of the organization this committee was appointed to visit you and give you such information as you desire, and to extend to you cordial greeting. It would afford us pleasure to meet and greet you under the most ordinary circumstances, but, coming as you do as a representative of the President and the people of the United States, and considering the importance of your mission, it affords us peculiar pleasure to give you welcome.

Some of our members have resided in Hawaii for many years, while others have come within the last few years and some have arrived within the last year, yet whether we have been away from America a few months or many years; whether native-born citizens of the Union or citizens by adoption, we still venerate and love our country, and will cooperate with you in advancing its best interests and looking out for the welfare of the citizens of the United States, whether they are such from birthright or adoption. If at any time there is an opportunity for us to aid you feel free to command us, and be assured that under all circumstances we desire to make your stay here pleasant to yourself and beneficial to the country that you represent, for it is our common country and in its welfare we are all interested.

We have delayed somewhat in calling on you, believing that your official duties and the numerous calls being made would fully occupy your time for the first few days.

Again expressing the pleasure it affords us to greet and welcome you, we are, very respectfully, yours,

GEO. VAN HOUTEN,
JAMES F. HILBUS,
JOS. L. CURTIS,
Committee American League.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 5.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, November 18, 1893.

SIR: In the forenoon of last Wednesday, November 15, Hon. S. M. Damon, Minister of Finance, notified me in person that there were rumors of an attack that night or the ensuing night upon the Government building, in consequence of which the regular guard would be increased and one of the volunteer companies would be ordered under arms for the night. On the royalist side apprehensions for the safety of the Queen were expressed. The next day was King Kalakaua's birthday, an event which generally attracts a large crowd here, and is celebrated with various festivities. A concert in honor of the occasion was advertised under the auspices of the native Hawaiians.

In view of these facts, I thought it proper in an informal way to make public the fact that there would be no decisive action taken by our Government for three or four weeks, or until I heard from Washington. I also thought it proper, with the private knowledge and consent of all factions, to say that mob violence would not be allowed during this interval.

The effect of these announcements was to reassure the people and to stop active military preparations. Many representatives of foreign governments and prominent citizens, officially representing both parties, have called to express their gratification at the result.

The excitement has been continuous for so long that the slightest circumstances are magnified, and rumors fill the air, both night and day.

It is impossible to exaggerate the unhappy condition of this people, nor can I, in words, picture their pathetic surroundings. Almost every movement is under espionage, the most meaningless expression is

given an important significance, and speeches are quoted which were never delivered or thought of. In my dispatch No. 4, of November 11, I referred to the visit of a committee from the American League, to whose address I made a brief formal response, not having even the remotest bearing upon the question pending here. In yesterday's *Star*, a paper whose life began with the so-called revolution, was my alleged reply, which I inclose to you. This is a fair sample of the prevailing spirit of misrepresentation. I inclose, also, an extract from the *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, also an annexation organ, upon the same subject.

I send this by a sailing vessel which leaves to-day. The next steamer leaves here December 9. The next steamer arriving from San Francisco, the *Monowai*, due December 23.

With high regard, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS.

[*Hawaiian Star*, November 17, 1893.]

WILLIS FOR THE FLAG—HIS REPLY TO THE AMERICAN LEAGUE—HE WILL DO NOTHING HERE TO CONFLICT WITH HIS ARDENT AMERICAN PRINCIPLES.

The *Star* has obtained with much difficulty a complete and authentic report of the remarks made by Minister Willis to a delegation of the American League which presented him with a memorial some days ago. After a few words of welcome to his visiting countrymen, he said:

"GENTLEMEN: I am an ardent American. I would like to see the stars and stripes waving, under proper conditions, not only over the Pacific islands, but over any other territory which would be beneficial to the United States. I have my instructions, which I can not divulge. You will understand this. But this much I can say, that the policy of the United States is already formulated regarding these islands, and that nothing which can be said or done either here or there can avail anything now. I do not come here as did Mr. Blount. I come here as an executive officer. I come to act. When the proper time arrives I shall act. I am sorry that I can not tell you when or how. I wish you to understand that, knowing the policy of the United States, I could not have accepted the position of an executive officer had it been in conflict with the principles I hold. While performing my duties in carrying out the United States policy I shall have no need of aid from you or other resident Americans. I wish to state positively that any outside interference will not be tolerated by the United States."

[*The Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, Saturday, November 18, 1893.]

Be just and fear not;
Let all the ends thou aim'st at be
Thy country's, thy God's, and truth's.

A reporter who willfully and purposely falsifies the language of a diplomatic representative, as was done by the *Star* reporter, on Thursday last, in an interview with Minister Willis, as shown by his published statements, deserves to be branded as unworthy of public credence. Minister Willis may be thus compelled in future, for self-protection, to follow Mr. Blount's example and refuse all press interviews.

This paper is now, as it always has been, since the day when the monarchy was forever banished from Hawaii, the firm and unflinching advocate of annexation to the United States, without any compromise in any shape or form whatever. Nor can one word be produced to show a contrary determination. To this paper more than to any other is due the credit of firmly standing by and defending the Provisional Government and the cause it represents. It yields to no other paper a firmer allegiance to the principles which the Government and its supporters represent.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 24, 1893.

The brevity and uncertainty of your telegrams are embarrassing. You will insist upon amnesty and recognition of obligations of the Provisional Government as essential conditions of restoration. All interests will be promoted by prompt action.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 3, 1893.

Your dispatch, which was answered by steamer on the 25th of November, seems to call for additional instructions.

Should the Queen refuse assent to the written conditions, you will at once inform her that the President will cease interposition in her behalf, and that while he deems it his duty to endeavor to restore to the sovereign the constitutional government of the islands, his further efforts in that direction will depend upon the Queen's unqualified agreement that all obligations created by the Provisional Government in a proper course of administration shall be assumed, and upon such pledges by her as will prevent the adoption of any measures of proscription or punishment for what has been done in the past by those setting up or supporting the Provisional Government. The President feels that by our original interference and what followed, we have incurred responsibilities to the whole Hawaiian community, and it would not be just to put one party at the mercy of the other.

Should the Queen ask whether if she accedes to conditions active steps will be taken by the United States to effect her restoration, or to maintain her authority thereafter, you will say that the President can not use force without the authority of Congress.

Should the Queen accept conditions and the Provisional Government refuse to surrender, you will be governed by previous instructions. If the Provisional Government asks whether the United States will hold the Queen to fulfillment of stipulated conditions you will say, the President acting under dictates of honor and duty, as he has done in endeavoring to effect restoration, will do all in his constitutional power to cause observance of the conditions he has imposed.

GRESHAM.

Mr. Thurston to Mr. Gresham.

HAWAIIAN LEGATION,
Washington, December 5, 1893.

SIR: In confirmation of the claims presented to you by myself during several recent interviews, concerning suggested action by the United States Government towards the Provisional Government of Hawaii, as

outlined in your communication to the President recently published, and affirmed in the President's message sent yesterday to Congress, I have the honor to hereby submit to you the claims of the Government which I represent in and concerning the premises.

If I correctly apprehend the propositions advanced by the Government of the United States they are:

First. That the Hawaiian monarchy was subverted by the action of the United States representatives and forces.

Second. That but for such action the monarchy would not have been subverted nor the Provisional Government created.

Third. That such conclusions are based upon the report made by the Hon. James H. Blount.

Fourth. That in view of such action by those representing the Government of the United States, it is proposed that the latter Government shall restore the status existing prior to such subversion of the monarchy.

In opposition to such proposed action I hereby, on behalf of the Government I represent, submit the following claims and reasons:

First. The Provisional Government of Hawaii is a duly organized and fully recognized independent Government, holding diplomatic relations with nearly all the nations of the world.

It has accredited its diplomatic representatives to the United States Government, which has received them in the manner customary in dealing with the representatives of friendly independent nations.

The United States Government has, in turn, accredited its representatives to the Provisional Government of Hawaii, and they have in like manner been formally received by it.

There is nothing lacking to constitute the present Government of Hawaii a full, free, and independent sovereignty, subject to all the obligations and entitled to all the rights, privileges, and courtesies accorded by the United States Government to the most favored nations with whom it is in treaty relations.

Second. It is submitted that the Government of the United States has acquired no jurisdiction over the independent sovereign state of Hawaii. There being two distinct sovereignties, jurisdiction by the United States can only be obtained in three ways, viz: (1) by conquest; (2) by treaty; (3) by voluntary submission to the decision of the United States Government in the nature of arbitration.

There is no claim made that the sovereignty of Hawaii is subordinate to that of the United States by reason of conquest, nor has it been surrendered by treaty.

There is a suggestion, however, in the communication by yourself to the President, above referred to, that authority by voluntary submission in the nature of a power to arbitrate has been conferred upon the Government of the United States. I refer to that portion wherein you state that, "The Government of Hawaii surrendered its authority under a threat of war, until such time as the Government of the United States, upon the facts being presented to it, should reinstate the Constitutional Sovereign; and the Provisional Government was created 'to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon.'"

I submit that no such authority has been conferred, and in support of such contention present the following reasons: (1) If the parties in Hawaii contending for the control of the Government had intended to submit their differences to the arbitration of the United States, a formal statement to such differences and the points to be settled would

have been drawn up and signed in the usual form of an agreement for arbitration.

No such action has been taken. (2) An arbitration is essentially a judicial proceeding, the elemental features of which, under the principles and forms of procedure in use both in the United States and Hawaii, are, first, notice of the charges made or points at issue; second, opportunity to hear and cross-examine evidence produced by the opposing party; third, opportunity to produce evidence in support of claims made and to meet that of the opposing party; fourth, a full and fair hearing accorded to both parties in open court.

In no particular have these particulars, fundamental to the just and equitable decision of the simplest judicial issue, been observed in this admittedly complicated question.

The Government of Hawaii, acting under its international right, has made a formal proposition to, by treaty, change the political relation existing between the two countries.

The authority of the Hawaiian Government to make such a proposition was not questioned, and a treaty for the accomplishment of such purpose was duly signed by the representatives of the executives of the two countries.

Pending the final ratification of such treaty, by desire of the Government of the United States, negotiations were suspended over nine months ago, and an investigation was instituted by the Government of the United States by a special commissioner.

During all such time the Hawaiian Government has peaceably administered its own affairs and faithfully carried out all its treaty obligations with all foreign powers.

Up to the present time the Hawaiian Government has received no information that such investigation was for any purpose other than to determine the policy of the Government of the United States concerning such proposition of the Government of Hawaii.

It has not been a party to such investigation, which has been *ex parte* and conducted in secret.

It has been accorded no opportunity to meet the evidence produced nor to present evidence or argument in its own behalf.

The names of the witnesses and the character of the evidence upon which it is proposed to be subverted were unknown to it until published simultaneously with the announcement of the conclusion of the investigating commissioner.

It has received no notice that it was on trial for its life, and has not even been informed that it was charged with having taken action for which it was responsible to the United States or whereby it had brought itself within the jurisdiction of such Government.

The proclamation issued by the Provisional Government of Hawaii defining its objects and causes does, indeed, state as quoted in your communication above referred to, that it was created "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon." But I submit that neither legally, logically, nor grammatically does such phrase indicate that because annexation has not yet been consummated the Provisional Government is therefore and thereby terminated.

On the contrary, I submit that its meaning is clearly and distinctly the exact opposite of that suggested.

The Provisional Government was formed with a fixed, definite purpose in view, viz, annexation to the United States. If the date of the consummation of such object had been known it could have been

in the place of the phrase actually used. As such date was not and could not be known, an appropriate phrase was used signifying that the Government should continue to exist until the object *was* accomplished. A government was established not absolutely but conditionally. If the wording of the proclamation had been "to exist until the Government of the United States refuses to agree to annexation," a refusal would then have constituted a condition the happening of which, in and of itself, would have terminated the Provisional Government.

There was, however, but one condition named in the proclamation, the happening of which should terminate the existence of the Government thereby created, viz, "Union with the United States of America." There is no other terminating condition. Unless and until that condition happens the Government continues in existence. If the happening of the condition is postponed for one, two, or ten years, or for an indefinite period, the Government continues to exist for a like period. The fact that annexation has not yet taken place does not negative the possibility of its happening in the future. So long as the terminating condition has not happened, but may happen, so long does the Government continue to exist, unless changed or terminated by its own act or the act of the people of Hawaii.

I further submit that if the reasoning last above set forth is incorrect, and the failure to have yet secured annexation does logically terminate the existence of the Provisional Government, such fact does not confer jurisdiction upon the United States to construe such instrument, but that the construction and interpretation of the wording of such proclamation is purely a matter of domestic concern to be settled by the parties in interest in Hawaii in such manner as the Government and laws of that country may provide.

Third. While neither admitting nor questioning the correctness of the allegations of fact reported by Mr. Blount, I purposely omit discussion or criticism thereof, for the reasons, first, that the Hawaiian Government has not been a party to such investigation, and therefore can not be bound by same; and, second, if it be true that the representatives of the United States exceeded their powers, as alleged, such fact does not vest any jurisdiction in the Government of the United States to now infringe upon Hawaiian sovereignty.

It is an axiom of law that no man may take advantage of his own wrong. The fact that the United States minister, with or without the authority of his Government, may have trespassed upon the international rights of Hawaii, does not thereby confer jurisdiction upon the Government of the United States to now again, and deliberately, trespass upon such rights.

If the United States minister or naval officers have exceeded their authority or violated their instructions they are responsible to their Government therefor. The Hawaiian Government had no control over them. It is not responsible for what they did, and is not and can not be held answerable to the Government of the United States for their acts, nor to have forfeited any of its attributes of independent sovereignty by reason of their actions whether the same were right or wrong, authorized or unauthorized.

In like manner, if the allegation is true, that the ex-Queen abdicated under the belief that the Provisional Government would submit the question to the United States Government, such fact does not vest in the Government of the United States any jurisdiction over the subject-matter. If the ex-Queen was warranted in such belief and an agreement was made between her and the Provisional Government, which I

do not admit, the Government of the United States was no party to such agreement, and neither the making, nor the failure to carry it out, if made, confers any jurisdiction upon the Government of the United States to construe such agreement, nor in any manner to intervene between the contending parties in Hawaii, nor control or direct which of such parties shall at any given time exercise the functions of government in Hawaii.

Fourth. If after consideration of the reasons hereinbefore advanced it is maintained by you that they do not establish the claims advanced, and that the Government of the United States has jurisdiction, notwithstanding the independent sovereignty of Hawaii, to decide upon the form, and who shall carry on the Government of Hawaii, I then submit that neither international law nor the usage of nations authorize the Government of the United States to enforce, against the will of the parties, the conclusions to which it may come.

It is not suggested in the report of Mr. Blount than any such power was agreed upon, either between the ex-Queen and the Provisional Government or otherwise.

Even if a formal submission to the United States Government had been made, and full hearing had thereon, and a decision announced, such fact would not vest in the United States any power to carry out such decision or to compel either party to abide thereby.

Unless the method of enforcement of such decision is agreed upon by the parties, the carrying out of the decision rendered is purely a matter of good faith as between the parties in interest, with no power in the arbitrating Government to compel the recognition by either party of the decision rendered.

I beg also to re-affirm in this connection my firm conviction, based upon an intimate acquaintance with all the persons and conditions involved, that the restoration of the ex-Queen, regardless of the method by which the same may be accomplished, will, unless she is maintained by the troops of some foreign power, be speedily followed by the forcible overthrow of the monarchy, involving the probable loss of life and destruction of property.

Such action will be taken, as in the past, by the intelligent, law-abiding, property-owning portion of the community, for the same reasons that the same persons took similar action last January, viz: that the long and bitter experience under the monarchy has convinced them that so long as the monarchy exists no material improvement in the methods of conducting the Government can be expected and that a further continuance of the misrule of the past years is intolerable.

It is unnecessary for me to state that such a condition of affairs will be disastrous in the extreme to every material interest in the islands, and to all trade and commerce connected therewith, the greater portion of which is owned and carried on by American citizens and capital.

Allow me to reiterate that neither this statement nor any act done by the Provisional Government or by myself is with any spirit of hostility to the people or Government of the United States. On the contrary, so far from being in any manner hostile, the Provisional Government and its supporters have demonstrated by their acts that they are not only friendly in the ordinary acceptance of the word, but that they have such faith in the Government of the United States that they have taken up arms and risked their lives and property to place themselves, almost unreservedly and unconditionally, under the jurisdiction and control of that Government, asking only in return that they may share

in the freedom of its flag and the stability and equality of its Government.

All that I seek by this statement is to convey to you a plain frank statement of what the Provisional Government of Hawaii conceives to be its rights under international law in and concerning the premises, and to indicate to you, as it is my duty to do, what in my opinion the conditions are and will be if action on certain suggested lines is taken.

I have, &c.

L. A. THURSTON.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Telegram.]

HONOLULU, *December 4, 1893.*

Understand message. Had no communications from Washington, D. C., either to the United States Admiral or to me since my (our) arrival. One British man-of-war and one Japanese man-of-war are here. Active defensive preparations for several days; otherwise situation about the same. The feeling intense, but hope to preserve status until further instructed. Government last Wednesday inquired as to authenticity of your published letter and intentions of the President. I have declined to-day to answer. Prompt action desirable.

WILLIS.

House Ex. Doc. No. 47, Fifty-third Congress, second session.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

RELATING TO THE

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

DECEMBER 18, 1893.



M E S S A G E .

To the Senate and House of Representatives :

In my recent annual message to the Congress I briefly referred to our relations with Hawaii and expressed the intention of transmitting further information on the subject when additional advices permitted.

Though I am not able now to report a definite change in the actual situation, I am convinced that the difficulties lately created both here and in Hawaii and now standing in the way of a solution through Executive action of the problem presented, render it proper, and expedient, that the matter should be referred to the broader authority and discretion of Congress, with a full explanation of the endeavor thus far made to deal with the emergency and a statement of the considerations which have governed my action.

I suppose that right and justice should determine the path to be followed in treating this subject. If national honesty is to be disregarded and a desire for territorial extension, or dissatisfaction with a form of government not our own, ought to regulate our conduct, I have entirely misapprehended the mission and character of our Government and the behavior which the conscience of our people demands of their public servants.

When the present Administration entered upon its duties the Senate had under consideration a treaty providing for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the territory of the United States. Surely under our Constitution and laws the enlargement of our limits is a manifestation of the highest attribute of sovereignty, and if entered upon as an Executive act, all things relating to the transaction should be clear and free from suspicion. Additional importance attached to this particular treaty of annexation, because it contemplated a departure from unbroken American tradition in providing for the addition to our territory of islands of the sea more than two thousand miles removed from our nearest coast.

These considerations might not of themselves call for interference with the completion of a treaty entered upon by a previous Administration. But it appeared from the documents accompanying the

treaty when submitted to the Senate, that the ownership of Hawaii was tendered to us by a provisional government set up to succeed the constitutional ruler of the islands, who had been dethroned, and it did not appear that such provisional government had the sanction of either popular revolution or suffrage. Two other remarkable features of the transaction naturally attracted attention. One was the extraordinary haste—not to say precipitancy—characterizing all the transactions connected with the treaty. It appeared that a so-called Committee of Safety, ostensibly the source of the revolt against the constitutional Government of Hawaii, was organized on Saturday, the 14th day of January; that on Monday, the 16th, the United States forces were landed at Honolulu from a naval vessel lying in its harbor; that on the 17th the scheme of a provisional government was perfected, and a proclamation naming its officers was on the same day prepared and read at the Government building; that immediately thereupon the United States Minister recognized the provisional government thus created; that two days afterwards, on the 19th day of January, commissioners representing such government sailed for this country in a steamer especially chartered for the occasion, arriving in San Francisco on the 28th day of January, and in Washington on the 3d day of February; that on the next day they had their first interview with the Secretary of State, and another on the 11th, when the treaty of annexation was practically agreed upon, and that on the 14th it was formally concluded and on the 15th transmitted to the Senate. Thus between the initiation of the scheme for a provisional government in Hawaii on the 14th day of January and the submission to the Senate of the treaty of annexation concluded with such government, the entire interval was thirty-two days, fifteen of which were spent by the Hawaiian Commissioners in their journey to Washington.

In the next place, upon the face of the papers submitted with the treaty, it clearly appeared that there was open and undetermined an issue of fact of the most vital importance. The message of the President accompanying the treaty declared that "the overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this Government," and in a letter to the President from the Secretary of State, also submitted to the Senate with the treaty, the following passage occurs: "At the time the provisional government took possession of the Government buildings no troops or officers of the United States were present or took any part whatever in the proceedings. No public recognition was accorded to the provisional government by the United States Minister until after the Queen's abdication and when they were in effective possession of the Government buildings,

the archives, the treasury, the barracks, the police station, and all the potential machinery of the Government." But a protest also accompanied said treaty, signed by the Queen and her ministers at the time she made way for the provisional government, which explicitly stated that she yielded to the superior force of the United States, whose Minister had caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support such provisional government.

The truth or falsity of this protest was surely of the first importance. If true, nothing but the concealment of its truth could induce our Government to negotiate with the semblance of a government thus created, nor could a treaty resulting from the acts stated in the protest have been knowingly deemed worthy of consideration by the Senate. Yet the truth or falsity of the protest had not been investigated.

I conceived it to be my duty therefore to withdraw the treaty from the Senate for examination, and meanwhile to cause an accurate, full, and impartial investigation to be made of the facts attending the subversion of the constitutional Government of Hawaii, and the installment in its place of the provisional government. I selected for the work of investigation the Hon. James H. Blount, of Georgia, whose service of eighteen years as a member of the House of Representatives, and whose experience as chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs in that body, and his consequent familiarity with international topics, joined with his high character and honorable reputation, seemed to render him peculiarly fitted for the duties entrusted to him. His report detailing his action under the instructions given to him and the conclusions derived from his investigation accompany this message.

These conclusions do not rest for their acceptance entirely upon Mr. Blount's honesty and ability as a man, nor upon his acumen and impartiality as an investigator. They are accompanied by the evidence upon which they are based, which evidence is also herewith transmitted, and from which it seems to me no other deductions could possibly be reached than those arrived at by the Commissioner.

The report with its accompanying proofs, and such other evidence as is now before the Congress or is herewith submitted, justifies in my opinion the statement that when the President was led to submit the treaty to the Senate with the declaration that "the overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this Government", and when the Senate was induced to receive and discuss it on that basis, both President and Senate were misled.

The attempt will not be made in this communication to touch

upon all the facts which throw light upon the progress and consummation of this scheme of annexation. A very brief and imperfect reference to the facts and evidence at hand will exhibit its character and the incidents in which it had its birth.

It is unnecessary to set forth the reasons which in January, 1893, led a considerable proportion of American and other foreign merchants and traders residing at Honolulu to favor the annexation of Hawaii to the United States. It is sufficient to note the fact and to observe that the project was one which was zealously promoted by the Minister representing the United States in that country. He evidently had an ardent desire that it should become a fact accomplished by his agency and during his ministry, and was not inconveniently scrupulous as to the means employed to that end. On the 19th day of November, 1892, nearly two months before the first overt act tending towards the subversion of the Hawaiian Government and the attempted transfer of Hawaiian territory to the United States, he addressed a long letter to the Secretary of State in which the case for annexation was elaborately argued, on moral, political, and economical grounds. He refers to the loss to the Hawaiian sugar interests from the operation of the McKinley bill, and the tendency to still further depreciation of sugar property unless some positive measure of relief is granted. He strongly inveighs against the existing Hawaiian Government and emphatically declares for annexation. He says: "In truth the monarchy here is an absurd anachronism. It has nothing on which it logically or legitimately stands. The feudal basis on which it once stood no longer existing, the monarchy now is only an impediment to good government—an obstruction to the prosperity and progress of the islands."

He further says: "As a crown colony of Great Britain or a Territory of the United States the government modifications could be made readily and good administration of the law secured. Destiny and the vast future interests of the United States in the Pacific clearly indicate who at no distant day must be responsible for the government of these islands. Under a territorial government they could be as easily governed as any of the existing Territories of the United States."

* * * "Hawaii has reached the parting of the ways. She must now take the road which leads to Asia, or the other which outlets her in America, gives her an American civilization, and binds her to the care of American destiny." He also declares: "One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be followed, either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a 'customs union,' an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not ex-

pressly stipulated American protectorate over the islands. I believe the former to be the better, that which will prove much the more advantageous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end to the United States. If it was wise for the United States through Secretary Marcy thirty-eight years ago to offer to expend \$100,000 to secure a treaty of annexation, it certainly can not be chimerical or unwise to expend \$100,000 to secure annexation in the near future. To-day the United States has five times the wealth she possessed in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are much stronger than they were then. I can not refrain from expressing the opinion with emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand."

These declarations certainly show a disposition and condition of mind, which may be usefully recalled when interpreting the significance of the Minister's conceded acts or when considering the probabilities of such conduct on his part as may not be admitted.

In this view it seems proper to also quote from a letter written by the Minister to the Secretary of State on the 8th day of March, 1892, nearly a year prior to the first step taken toward annexation. After stating the possibility that the existing Government of Hawaii might be overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolution, Minister Stevens writes as follows: "Ordinarily in like circumstances, the rule seems to be to limit the landing and movement of United States forces in foreign waters and dominion exclusively to the protection of the United States legation and of the lives and property of American citizens. But as the relations of the United States to Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years the United States officials here took somewhat exceptional action in circumstances of disorder, I desire to know how far the present Minister and naval commander may deviate from established international rules and precedents in the contingencies indicated in the first part of this dispatch."

To a minister of this temper full of zeal for annexation there seemed to arise in January, 1893, the precise opportunity for which he was watchfully waiting—an opportunity which by timely "deviation from established international rules and precedents" might be improved to successfully accomplish the great object in view; and we are quite prepared for the exultant enthusiasm with which in a letter to the State Department dated February 1, 1893, he declares: "The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it."

As a further illustration of the activity of this diplomatic representative, attention is called to the fact that on the day the above letter was written, apparently unable longer to restrain his ardor, he issued a proclamation whereby "in the name of the United

States" he assumed the protection of the Hawaiian Islands and declared that said action was "taken pending and subject to negotiations at Washington." Of course this assumption of a protectorate was promptly disavowed by our Government, but the American flag remained over the Government building at Honolulu and the forces remained on guard until April, and after Mr. Blount's arrival on the scene, when both were removed.

A brief statement of the occurrences that led to the subversion of the constitutional Government of Hawaii in the interests of annexation to the United States will exhibit the true complexion of that transaction.

On Saturday, January 14, 1893, the Queen of Hawaii, who had been contemplating the proclamation of a new constitution, had, in deference to the wishes and remonstrances of her cabinet, renounced the project for the present at least. Taking this relinquished purpose as a basis of action, citizens of Honolulu numbering from fifty to one hundred, mostly resident aliens, met in a private office and selected a so-called Committee of Safety, composed of thirteen persons, seven of whom were foreign subjects, and consisted of five Americans, one Englishman, and one German. This committee, though its designs were not revealed, had in view nothing less than annexation to the United States, and between Saturday, the 14th, and the following Monday, the 16th of January—though exactly what action was taken may not be clearly disclosed—they were certainly in communication with the United States Minister. On Monday morning the Queen and her cabinet made public proclamation, with a notice which was specially served upon the representatives of all foreign governments, that any changes in the constitution would be sought only in the methods provided by that instrument. Nevertheless, at the call and under the auspices of the Committee of Safety, a mass meeting of citizens was held on that day to protest against the Queen's alleged illegal and unlawful proceedings and purposes. Even at this meeting the Committee of Safety continued to disguise their real purpose and contented themselves with procuring the passage of a resolution denouncing the Queen and empowering the committee to devise ways and means "to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii." This meeting adjourned between three and four o'clock in the afternoon. On the same day, and immediately after such adjournment, the committee, unwilling to take further steps without the coöperation of the United States Minister, addressed him a note representing that the public safety was menaced and that lives and property were in danger, and concluded as follows:

“We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces.” Whatever may be thought of the other contents of this note, the absolute truth of this latter statement is incontestable. When the note was written and delivered, the committee, so far as it appears, had neither a man nor a gun at their command, and after its delivery they became so panic-stricken at their position that they sent some of their number to interview the Minister and request him not to land the United States forces till the next morning. But he replied that the troops had been ordered, and whether the committee were ready or not the landing should take place. And so it happened that on the 16th day of January, 1893, between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, a detachment of marines from the United States steamer *Boston*, with two pieces of artillery, landed at Honolulu. The men, upwards of 160 in all, were supplied with double cartridge belts filled with ammunition and with haversacks and canteens, and were accompanied by a hospital corps with stretchers and medical supplies. This military demonstration upon the soil of Honolulu was of itself an act of war, unless made either with the consent of the Government of Hawaii or for the *bona fide* purpose of protecting the imperilled lives and property of citizens of the United States. But there is no pretense of any such consent on the part of the Government of the Queen, which at that time was undisputed and was both the *de facto* and the *de jure* government. In point of fact the existing government instead of requesting the presence of an armed force protested against it. There is as little basis for the pretense that such forces were landed for the security of American life and property. If so, they would have been stationed in the vicinity of such property and so as to protect it, instead of at a distance and so as to command the Hawaiian Government building and palace. Admiral Skerrett, the officer in command of our naval force on the Pacific station, has frankly stated that in his opinion the location of the troops was inadvisable if they were landed for the protection of American citizens whose residences and places of business, as well as the legation and consulate, were in a distant part of the city, but the location selected was a wise one if the forces were landed for the purpose of supporting the provisional government. If any peril to life and property calling for any such martial array had existed, Great Britain and other foreign powers interested would not have been behind the United States in activity to protect their citizens. But they made no sign in that direction. When these armed men were landed, the city of Honolulu was in its customary orderly and peaceful condition. There was no

symptom of riot or disturbance in any quarter. Men, women, and children were about the streets as usual, and nothing varied the ordinary routine or disturbed the ordinary tranquillity, except the landing of the *Boston's* marines and their march through the town to the quarters assigned them. Indeed, the fact that after having called for the landing of the United States forces on the plea of danger to life and property the Committee of Safety themselves requested the Minister to postpone action, exposed the untruthfulness of their representations of present peril to life and property. The peril they saw was an anticipation growing out of guilty intentions on their part and something which, though not then existing, they knew would certainly follow their attempt to overthrow the Government of the Queen without the aid of the United States forces.

Thus it appears that Hawaii was taken possession of by the United States forces without the consent or wish of the government of the islands, or of anybody else so far as shown, except the United States Minister.

Therefore the military occupation of Honolulu by the United States on the day mentioned was wholly without justification, either as an occupation by consent or as an occupation necessitated by dangers threatening American life and property. It must be accounted for in some other way and on some other ground, and its real motive and purpose are neither obscure nor far to seek.

The United States forces being now on the scene and favorably stationed, the committee proceeded to carry out their original scheme. They met the next morning, Tuesday, the 17th, perfected the plan of temporary government, and fixed upon its principal officers, ten of whom were drawn from the thirteen members of the Committee of Safety. Between one and two o'clock, by squads and by different routes to avoid notice, and having first taken the precaution of ascertaining whether there was any one there to oppose them, they proceeded to the Government building to proclaim the new government. No sign of opposition was manifest, and thereupon an American citizen began to read the proclamation from the steps of the Government building almost entirely without auditors. It is said that before the reading was finished quite a concourse of persons, variously estimated at from 50 to 100, some armed and some unarmed, gathered about the committee to give them aid and confidence. This statement is not important, since the one controlling factor in the whole affair was unquestionably the United States marines, who, drawn up under arms and with artillery in readiness only seventy-six yards distant, dominated the situation.

The provisional government thus proclaimed was by the terms of

the proclamation "to exist until terms of union with the United States had been negotiated and agreed upon". The United States Minister, pursuant to prior agreement, recognized this government within an hour after the reading of the proclamation, and before five o'clock, in answer to an inquiry on behalf of the Queen and her cabinet, announced that he had done so.

When our Minister recognized the provisional government the only basis upon which it rested was the fact that the Committee of Safety had in the manner above stated declared it to exist. It was neither a government *de facto* nor *de jure*. That it was not in such possession of the Government property and agencies as entitled it to recognition is conclusively proved by a note found in the files of the Legation at Honolulu, addressed by the declared head of the provisional government to Minister Stevens, dated January 17, 1893, in which he acknowledges with expressions of appreciation the Minister's recognition of the provisional government, and states that it is not yet in the possession of the station house (the place where a large number of the Queen's troops were quartered), though the same had been demanded of the Queen's officers in charge. Nevertheless, this wrongful recognition by our Minister placed the Government of the Queen in a position of most perilous perplexity. On the one hand she had possession of the palace, of the barracks, and of the police station, and had at her command at least five hundred fully armed men and several pieces of artillery. Indeed, the whole military force of her kingdom was on her side and at her disposal, while the Committee of Safety, by actual search, had discovered that there were but very few arms in Honolulu that were not in the service of the Government. In this state of things if the Queen could have dealt with the insurgents alone her course would have been plain and the result unmistakable. But the United States had allied itself with her enemies, had recognized them as the true Government of Hawaii, and had put her and her adherents in the position of opposition against lawful authority. She knew that she could not withstand the power of the United States, but she believed that she might safely trust to its justice. Accordingly, some hours after the recognition of the provisional government by the United States Minister, the palace, the barracks, and the police station, with all the military resources of the country, were delivered up by the Queen upon the representation made to her that her cause would thereafter be reviewed at Washington, and while protesting that she surrendered to the superior force of the United States, whose Minister had caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the provisional government, and that she

yielded her authority to prevent collision of armed forces and loss of life and only until such time as the United States, upon the facts being presented to it, should undo the action of its representative and reinstate her in the authority she claimed as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

This protest was delivered to the chief of the provisional government, who endorsed thereon his acknowledgment of its receipt. The terms of the protest were read without dissent by those assuming to constitute the provisional government, who were certainly charged with the knowledge that the Queen instead of finally abandoning her power had appealed to the justice of the United States for reinstatement in her authority; and yet the provisional government with this unanswered protest in its hand hastened to negotiate with the United States for the permanent banishment of the Queen from power and for a sale of her kingdom.

Our country was in danger of occupying the position of having actually set up a temporary government on foreign soil for the purpose of acquiring through that agency territory which we had wrongfully put in its possession. The control of both sides of a bargain acquired in such a manner is called by a familiar and unpleasant name when found in private transactions. We are not without a precedent showing how scrupulously we avoided such accusations in former days. After the people of Texas had declared their independence of Mexico they resolved that on the acknowledgment of their independence by the United States they would seek admission into the Union. Several months after the battle of San Jacinto, by which Texan independence was practically assured and established, President Jackson declined to recognize it, alleging as one of his reasons that in the circumstances it became us "to beware of a too early movement, as it might subject us, however unjustly, to the imputation of seeking to establish the claim of our neighbors to a territory with a view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves". This is in marked contrast with the hasty recognition of a government openly and concededly set up for the purpose of tendering to us territorial annexation.

I believe that a candid and thorough examination of the facts will force the conviction that the provisional government owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States. Fair-minded people with the evidence before them will hardly claim that the Hawaiian Government was overthrown by the people of the islands or that the provisional government had ever existed with their consent. I do not understand that any member of this government claims that the

people would uphold it by their suffrages if they were allowed to vote on the question.

While naturally sympathizing with every effort to establish a republican form of government, it has been the settled policy of the United States to concede to people of foreign countries the same freedom and independence in the management of their domestic affairs that we have always claimed for ourselves; and it has been our practice to recognize revolutionary governments as soon as it became apparent that they were supported by the people. For illustration of this rule I need only to refer to the revolution in Brazil in 1889, when our Minister was instructed to recognize the Republic "so soon as a majority of the people of Brazil should have signified their assent to its establishment and maintenance"; to the revolution in Chile in 1891, when our Minister was directed to recognize the new government "if it was accepted by the people"; and to the revolution in Venezuela in 1892, when our recognition was accorded on condition that the new government was "fully established, in possession of the power of the nation, and accepted by the people."

As I apprehend the situation, we are brought face to face with the following conditions:

The lawful Government of Hawaii was overthrown without the drawing of a sword or the firing of a shot by a process every step of which, it may safely be asserted, is directly traceable to and dependent for its success upon the agency of the United States acting through its diplomatic and naval representatives.

But for the notorious predilections of the United States Minister for annexation, the Committee of Safety, which should be called the Committee of Annexation, would never have existed.

But for the landing of the United States forces upon false pretexts respecting the danger to life and property the committee would never have exposed themselves to the pains and penalties of treason by undertaking the subversion of the Queen's Government.

But for the presence of the United States forces in the immediate vicinity and in position to afford all needed protection and support the committee would not have proclaimed the provisional government from the steps of the Government building.

And finally, but for the lawless occupation of Honolulu under false pretexts by the United States forces, and but for Minister Stevens's recognition of the provisional government when the United States forces were its sole support and constituted its only military strength, the Queen and her Government would never have yielded to the provisional government, even for a time and for the

sole purpose of submitting her case to the enlightened justice of the United States.

Believing, therefore, that the United States could not, under the circumstances disclosed, annex the islands without justly incurring the imputation of acquiring them by unjustifiable methods, I shall not again submit the treaty of annexation to the Senate for its consideration, and in the instructions to Minister Willis, a copy of which accompanies this message, I have directed him to so inform the provisional government.

But in the present instance our duty does not, in my opinion, end with refusing to consummate this questionable transaction. It has been the boast of our Government that it seeks to do justice in all things without regard to the strength or weakness of those with whom it deals. I mistake the American people if they favor the odious doctrine that there is no such thing as international morality, that there is one law for a strong nation and another for a weak one, and that even by indirection a strong power may with impunity despoil a weak one of its territory.

By an act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic representative of the United States and without authority of Congress, the Government of a feeble but friendly and confiding people has been overthrown. A substantial wrong has thus been done which a due regard for our national character as well as the rights of the injured people requires we should endeavor to repair. The provisional government has not assumed a republican or other constitutional form, but has remained a mere executive council or oligarchy, set up without the assent of the people. It has not sought to find a permanent basis of popular support and has given no evidence of an intention to do so. Indeed, the representatives of that government assert that the people of Hawaii are unfit for popular government and frankly avow that they can be best ruled by arbitrary or despotic power.

The law of nations is founded upon reason and justice, and the rules of conduct governing individual relations between citizens or subjects of a civilized state are equally applicable as between enlightened nations. The considerations that international law is without a court for its enforcement, and that obedience to its commands practically depends upon good faith, instead of upon the mandate of a superior tribunal, only give additional sanction to the law itself and brand any deliberate infraction of it not merely as a wrong but as a disgrace. A man of true honor protects the unwritten word which binds his conscience more scrupulously, if possible, than he does the bond a breach of which subjects him to

legal liabilities ; and the United States in aiming to maintain itself as one of the most enlightened of nations would do its citizens gross injustice if it applied to its international relations any other than a high standard of honor and morality. On that ground the United States can not properly be put in the position of countenancing a wrong after its commission any more than in that of consenting to it in advance. On that ground it can not allow itself to refuse to redress an injury inflicted through an abuse of power by officers clothed with its authority and wearing its uniform; and on the same ground, if a feeble but friendly state is in danger of being robbed of its independence and its sovereignty by a misuse of the name and power of the United States, the United States can not fail to vindicate its honor and its sense of justice by an earnest effort to make all possible reparation.

These principles apply to the present case with irresistible force when the special conditions of the Queen's surrender of her sovereignty are recalled. She surrendered not to the provisional government, but to the United States. She surrendered not absolutely and permanently, but temporarily and conditionally until such time as the facts could be considered by the United States. Furthermore, the provisional government acquiesced in her surrender in that manner and on those terms, not only by tacit consent, but through the positive acts of some members of that government who urged her peaceable submission, not merely to avoid bloodshed, but because she could place implicit reliance upon the justice of the United States, and that the whole subject would be finally considered at Washington.

I have not, however, overlooked an incident of this unfortunate affair which remains to be mentioned. The members of the provisional government and their supporters, though not entitled to extreme sympathy, have been led to their present predicament of revolt against the Government of the Queen by the indefensible encouragement and assistance of our diplomatic representative. This fact may entitle them to claim that in our effort to rectify the wrong committed some regard should be had for their safety. This sentiment is strongly seconded by my anxiety to do nothing which would invite either harsh retaliation on the part of the Queen or violence and bloodshed in any quarter. In the belief that the Queen, as well as her enemies, would be willing to adopt such a course as would meet these conditions, and in view of the fact that both the Queen and the provisional government had at one time apparently acquiesced in a reference of the entire case to the United States Government, and considering the further fact that in any event the provisional

government by its own declared limitation was only "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon," I hoped that after the assurance to the members of that government that such union could not be consummated I might compass a peaceful adjustment of the difficulty.

Actuated by these desires and purposes, and not unmindful of the inherent perplexities of the situation nor of the limitations upon my power, I instructed Minister Willis to advise the Queen and her supporters of my desire to aid in the restoration of the status existing before the lawless landing of the United States forces at Honolulu on the 16th of January last, if such restoration could be effected upon terms providing for clemency as well as justice to all parties concerned. The conditions suggested, as the instructions show, contemplate a general amnesty to those concerned in setting up the provisional government and a recognition of all its *bona fide* acts and obligations. In short, they require that the past should be buried, and that the restored Government should reassume its authority as if its continuity had not been interrupted. These conditions have not proved acceptable to the Queen, and though she has been informed that they will be insisted upon, and that, unless acceded to, the efforts of the President to aid in the restoration of her Government will cease, I have not thus far learned that she is willing to yield them her acquiescence. The check which my plans have thus encountered has prevented their presentation to the members of the provisional government, while unfortunate public misrepresentations of the situation and exaggerated statements of the sentiments of our people have obviously injured the prospects of successful Executive mediation.

I therefore submit this communication with its accompanying exhibits, embracing Mr. Blount's report, the evidence and statements taken by him at Honolulu, the instructions given to both Mr. Blount and Minister Willis, and correspondence connected with the affair in hand.

In commending this subject to the extended powers and wide discretion of the Congress, I desire to add the assurance that I shall be much gratified to cooperate in any legislative plan which may be devised for the solution of the problem before us which is consistent with American honor, integrity, and morality.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

Washington, December 18, 1893.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 18, 1893.

The PRESIDENT:

The full and impartial reports submitted by the Hon. James H. Blount, your special commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands, established the following facts:

Queen Liliuokalani announced her intention on Saturday, January 14, 1893, to proclaim a new constitution, but the opposition of her ministers and others induced her to speedily change her purpose and make public announcement of that fact.

At a meeting in Honolulu, late on the afternoon of that day, a so-called committee of public safety, consisting of thirteen men, being all or nearly all who were present, was appointed "to consider the situation and devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and the protection of life and property," and at a meeting of this committee on the 15th, or the forenoon of the 16th of January, it was resolved amongst other things that a provisional government be created "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon." At a mass meeting which assembled at 2 p. m. on the last-named day, the Queen and her supporters were condemned and denounced, and the committee was continued and all its acts approved.

Later the same afternoon the committee addressed a letter to John L. Stevens, the American minister at Honolulu, stating that the lives and property of the people were in peril and appealing to him and the United States forces at his command for assistance. This communication concluded "we are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore hope for the protection of the United States forces." On receipt of this letter Mr. Stevens requested Capt. Wiltse, commander of the U. S. S. *Boston*, to land a force "for the protection of the United States legation, United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property." The well armed troops, accompanied by two gatling guns, were promptly landed and marched through the quiet streets of Honolulu to a public hall, previously secured by Mr. Stevens for their accommodation. This hall was just across the street from the Government building, and in plain view of the Queen's palace. The reason for thus locating the military will presently appear. The governor of the Island immediately addressed to Mr. Stevens a communication protesting against the act as an unwarranted invasion of Hawaiian soil and reminding him that the proper authorities had never denied permission to the naval forces of the United States to land for drill or any other proper purpose.

About the same time the Queen's minister of foreign affairs sent a note to Mr. Stevens asking why the troops had been landed and informing him that the proper authorities were able and willing to afford full protection to the American legation and all American interests in Honolulu. Only evasive replies were sent to these communications.

While there were no manifestations of excitement or alarm in the city, and the people were ignorant of the contemplated movement, the committee entered the Government building, after first ascertaining that it was unguarded, and read a proclamation declaring that the existing Government was overthrown and a Provisional Government established in its place, "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon." No audience was present when the proclamation was read, but during the reading 40 or 50 men, some of them indifferently armed, entered the room. The executive and advisory councils mentioned in the proclamation at once addressed a communication to Mr. Stevens, informing him that the monarchy had been abrogated and a provisional government established. This communication concluded:

Such Provisional Government has been proclaimed, is now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and is in control of the city. We hereby request that you will, on behalf of the United States, recognize it as the existing *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands and afford to it the moral support of your Government, and, if necessary, the support of American troops to assist in preserving the public peace.

On receipt of this communication, Mr. Stevens immediately recognized the new Government, and, in a letter addressed to Sanford B. Dole, its President, informed him that he had done so. Mr. Dole replied:

GOVERNMENT BUILDING,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

SIR: I acknowledge receipt of your valued communication of this day, recognizing the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and express deep appreciation of the same.

We have conferred with the ministers of the late Government, and have made demand upon the marshal to surrender the station house. We are not actually yet in possession of the station house, but as night is approaching and our forces may be insufficient to maintain order, we request the immediate support of the United States forces, and would request that the commander of the United States forces take command of our military forces, so that they may act together for the protection of the city.

Respectfully, yours,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Chairman Executive Council.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister Resident.

Note of Mr. Stevens at the end of the above communication.

The above request not complied with.

STEVENS.

The station house was occupied by a well-armed force, under the command of a resolute capable, officer. The same afternoon the Queen, her ministers, representatives of the Provisional Government, and others held a conference at the palace. Refusing to recognize the new authority or surrender to it, she was informed that the Provisional Government had the support of the American minister, and, if necessary, would be maintained by the military force of the United States then present; that any demonstration on her part would precipitate a conflict with that force; that she could not, with hope of success, engage

in war with the United States, and that resistance would result in a useless sacrifice of life. Mr. Damon, one of the chief leaders of the movement, and afterwards vice-president of the Provisional Government, informed the Queen that she could surrender under protest and her case would be considered later at Washington. Believing that, under the circumstances, submission was a duty, and that her case would be fairly considered by the President of the United States, the Queen finally yielded and sent to the Provisional Government the paper, which reads:

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the Provisional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representative and reinstate me and the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

When this paper was prepared at the conclusion of the conference, and signed by the Queen and her ministers, a number of persons, including one or more representatives of the Provisional Government, who were still present and understood its contents, by their silence, at least, acquiesced in its statements, and, when it was carried to President Dole, he indorsed upon it, "Received from the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, 1893," without challenging the truth of any of its assertions. Indeed, it was not claimed on the 17th day of January, or for some time thereafter, by any of the designated officers of the Provisional Government or any annexationist that the Queen surrendered otherwise than as stated in her protest.

In his dispatch to Mr. Foster of January 18, describing the so-called revolution, Mr. Stevens says:

The committee of public safety forthwith took possession of the Government building, archives, and treasury, and installed the Provisional Government at the head of the respective departments. This being an accomplished fact, I promptly recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* government of the Hawaiian Islands.

In Secretary Foster's communication of February 15 to the President, laying before him the treaty of annexation, with the view to obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate thereto, he says:

At the time the Provisional Government took possession of the Government building no troops or officers of the United States were present or took any part whatever in the proceedings. No public recognition was accorded to the Provisional Government by the United States minister until after the Queen's abdication, and when they were in effective possession of the Government building, the archives, the treasury, the barracks, the police station, and all the potential machinery of the Government.

Similar language is found in an official letter addressed to Secretary Foster on February 3 by the special commissioners sent to Washington by the Provisional Government to negotiate a treaty of annexation.

These statements are utterly at variance with the evidence, documentary and oral, contained in Mr. Blount's reports. They are contradicted by declarations and letters of President Dole and other annexationists and by Mr. Stevens's own verbal admissions to Mr. Blount.

The Provisional Government was recognized when it had little other than a paper existence, and when the legitimate government was in full possession and control of the palace, the barracks, and the police station. Mr. Stevens's well-known hostility and the threatening presence of the force landed from the *Boston* was all that could then have excited serious apprehension in the minds of the Queen, her officers, and loyal supporters.

It is fair to say that Secretary Foster's statements were based upon information which he had received from Mr. Stevens and the special commissioners, but I am unable to see that they were deceived. The troops were landed, not to protect American life and property, but to aid in overthrowing the existing government. Their very presence implied coercive measures against it.

In a statement given to Mr. Blount, by Admiral Skerrett, the ranking naval officer at Honolulu, he says:

If the troops were landed simply to protect American citizens and interests, they were badly stationed in Arion Hall, but if the intention was to aid the Provisional Government they were wisely stationed.

This hall was so situated that the troops in it easily commanded the Government building, and the proclamation was read under the protection of American guns. At an early stage of the movement, if not at the beginning, Mr. Stevens promised the annexationists that as soon as they obtained possession of the Government building and there read a proclamation of the character above referred to, he would at once recognize them as a *de facto* government, and support them by landing a force from our war ship then in the harbor, and he kept that promise. This assurance was the inspiration of the movement, and without it the annexationists would not have exposed themselves to the consequences of failure. They relied upon no military force of their own, for they had none worthy of the name. The Provisional Government was established by the action of the American minister and the presence of the troops landed from the *Boston*, and its continued existence is due to the belief of the Hawaiians that if they made an effort to overthrow it, they would encounter the armed forces of the United States.

The earnest appeals to the American minister for military protection by the officers of that Government, after it had been recognized, show the utter absurdity of the claim that it was established by a successful revolution of the people of the Islands. Those appeals were a confession by the men who made them of their weakness and timidity. Courageous men, conscious of their strength and the justice of their cause, do not thus act. It is not now claimed that a majority of the people, having the right to vote under the constitution of 1887, ever favored the existing authority or annexation to this or any other country. They earnestly desire that the government of their choice shall be restored and its independence respected.

Mr. Blount states that while at Honolulu he did not meet a single annexationist who expressed willingness to submit the question to a vote of the people, nor did he talk with one on that subject who did not insist that if the Islands were annexed suffrage should be so restricted as to give complete control to foreigners or whites. Representative annexationists have repeatedly made similar statements to the undersigned.

The Government of Hawaii surrendered its authority under a threat of war, until such time only as the Government of the United States, upon the facts being presented to it, should reinstate the constitutional

sovereign, and the Provisional Government was created "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon." A careful consideration of the facts will, I think, convince you that the treaty which was withdrawn from the Senate for further consideration should not be resubmitted for its action thereon.

Should not the great wrong done to a feeble but independent State by an abuse of the authority of the United States be undone by restoring the legitimate government? Anything short of that will not, I respectfully submit, satisfy the demands of justice.

Can the United States consistently insist that other nations shall respect the independence of Hawaii while not respecting it themselves? Our Government was the first to recognize the independence of the Islands and it should be the last to acquire sovereignty over them by force and fraud.

Respectfully submitted.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

[Confidential.]

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

No. 4.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 18, 1893.

SIR: Supplementing the general instructions which you have received with regard to your official duties, it is necessary to communicate to you, in confidence, special instructions for your guidance in so far as concerns the relation of the Government of the United States towards the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

The President deemed it his duty to withdraw from the Senate the treaty of annexation which has been signed by the Secretary of State and the agents of the Provisional Government, and to dispatch a trusted representative to Hawaii to impartially investigate the causes of the so-called revolution and ascertain and report the true situation in those Islands. This information was needed the better to enable the President to discharge a delicate and important public duty.

The instructions given to Mr. Blount, of which you are furnished with a copy, point out a line of conduct to be observed by him in his official and personal relations on the Islands, by which you will be guided so far as they are applicable and not inconsistent with what is herein contained.

It remains to acquaint you with the President's conclusions upon the facts embodied in Mr. Blount's reports and to direct your course in accordance therewith.

The Provisional Government was not established by the Hawaiian people, or with their consent or acquiescence, nor has it since existed with their consent. The Queen refused to surrender her powers to the Provisional Government until convinced that the minister of the United States had recognized it as the *de facto* authority, and would support and defend it with the military force of the United States, and that resistance would precipitate a bloody conflict with that force. She was advised and assured by her ministers and by leaders of the movement for the overthrow of her government, that if she surrendered under protest her case would afterwards be fairly considered by the President of the United States. The Queen finally wisely yielded to the armed forces of the United States then quartered in Honolulu, relying upon the good faith and honor of the President, when informed

of what had occurred, to undo the action of the minister and reinstate her and the authority which she claimed as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

After a patient examination of Mr. Blount's reports the President is satisfied that the movement against the Queen, if not instigated, was encouraged and supported by the representative of this Government at Honolulu; that he promised in advance to aid her enemies in an effort to overthrow the Hawaiian Government and set up by force a new government in its place; and that he kept this promise by causing a detachment of troops to be landed from the *Boston* on the 16th of January, and by recognizing the Provisional Government the next day when it was too feeble to defend itself and the constitutional government was able to successfully maintain its authority against any threatening force other than that of the United States already landed.

The President has therefore determined that he will not send back to the Senate for its action thereon the treaty which he withdrew from that body for further consideration on the 9th day of March last.

On your arrival at Honolulu you will take advantage of an early opportunity to inform the Queen of this determination, making known to her the President's sincere regret that the reprehensible conduct of the American minister and the unauthorized presence on land of a military force of the United States obliged her to surrender her sovereignty, for the time being, and rely on the justice of this Government to undo the flagrant wrong.

You will, however, at the same time inform the Queen that, when reinstated, the President expects that she will pursue a magnanimous course by granting full amnesty to all who participated in the movement against her, including persons who are, or have been, officially or otherwise, connected with the Provisional Government, depriving them of no right or privilege which they enjoyed before the so-called revolution. All obligations created by the Provisional Government in due course of administration should be assumed.

Having secured the Queen's agreement to pursue this wise and humane policy, which it is believed you will speedily obtain, you will then advise the executive of the Provisional Government and his ministers of the President's determination of the question which their action and that of the Queen devolved upon him, and that they are expected to promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority.

Should the Queen decline to pursue the liberal course suggested, or should the Provisional Government refuse to abide by the President's decision, you will report the facts and await further directions.

In carrying out these general instructions you will be guided largely by your own good judgment in dealing with the delicate situation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Telegram sent through dispatch agent at San Francisco.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, November 24, 1893.

The brevity and uncertainty of your telegrams are embarrassing. You will insist upon amnesty and recognition of obligations of the Provisional Government as essential conditions of restoration. All interests will be promoted by prompt action.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 3, 1893.

Your dispatch, which was answered by steamer on the 25th of November, seems to call for additional instructions.

Should the Queen refuse assent to the written conditions, you will at once inform her that the President will cease interposition in her behalf, and that while he deems it his duty to endeavor to restore to the sovereign the constitutional government of the islands, his further efforts in that direction will depend upon the Queen's unqualified agreement that all obligations created by the Provisional Government in a proper course of administration shall be assumed and upon such pledges by her as will prevent the adoption of any measures of proscription or punishment for what has been done in the past by those setting up or supporting the Provisional Government. The President feels that by our original interference and what followed we have incurred responsibilities to the whole Hawaiian community, and it would not be just to put one party at the mercy of the other.

Should the Queen ask whether if she accedes to conditions active steps will be taken by the United States to effect her restoration or to maintain her authority thereafter, you will say that the President can not use force without the authority of Congress.

Should the Queen accept conditions and the Provisional Government refuse to surrender, you will be governed by previous instructions. If the Provisional Government asks whether the United States will hold the Queen to fulfillment of stipulated conditions, you will say, the President, acting under dictates of honor and duty as he has done in endeavoring to effect restoration, will do all in his constitutional power to cause observance of the conditions he has imposed.

GRESHAM.

LIST OF PAPERS—Correspondence.

1. Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount, March 11, 1893.
2. Same to Mr. Stevens, March 11, 1893.
3. Same to Mr. Severance, March 11, 1893.
4. Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham, No. 1, April 6, 1893.
5. Same to same, No. 2, April 8, 1893.
6. Same to same, No. 3, April 26, 1893.
7. Same to same, No. 4, May 4, 1893.
8. Same to same, No. 5, May 6, 1893.
9. Same to same, No. 6, May 9, 1893.
10. Same to same, No. 7, May 24, 1893.
11. Same to same, No. 8, June 1, 1893.
12. Same to same, No. 9, June 6, 1893.
13. Same to same, No. 10, June 17, 1893.
14. Same to same, No. 11, June 28, 1893.
15. Same to same, No. 12, July 7, 1893.
16. Same to same, No. 13, July 17, 1893.
17. Same to same, July 17, 1893.
18. Same to same, No. 14, July 19, 1893.
19. Same to same, No. 15, July 26, 1893.
20. Same to same, July 31, 1893.

PART I.—CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

HON. JAMES H. BLOUNT, *etc.* :

SIR: The situation created in the Hawaiian Islands by the recent deposition of Queen Liliuokalani and the erection of a Provisional Government demands the fullest consideration of the President, and in order to obtain trustworthy information on this subject, as well as for the discharge of other duties herein specified, he has decided to dispatch you to the Hawaiian Islands as his special commissioner, in which capacity you will herewith receive a commission and also a letter, whereby the President accredits you to the president of the executive and advisory councils of the Hawaiian Islands.

The comprehensive, delicate, and confidential character of your mission can now only be briefly outlined, the details of its execution being necessarily left, in great measure, to your good judgment and wise discretion.

You will investigate and fully report to the President all the facts you can learn respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown, the sentiment of the people toward existing authority, and, in

general, all that can fully enlighten the President touching the subjects of your mission.

To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other government of the islands, and the protection of our citizens therein, is paramount, and in you alone, acting in coöperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn.

You are, however, authorized to avail yourself of such aid and information as you may desire from the present minister of the United States at Honolulu, Mr. John L. Stevens, who will continue until further notice to perform the usual functions attaching to his office, not inconsistent with the powers entrusted to you. An instruction will be sent to Mr. Stevens directing him to facilitate your presentation to the head of the Government upon your arrival, and to render you all needed assistance.

The withdrawal from the Senate of the recently signed treaty of annexation, for reëxamination by the President, leaves its subject-matter in abeyance, and you are not charged with any duty in respect thereto. It may be well, however, for you to dispel any possible misapprehension which its withdrawal may have excited touching the entire friendliness of the President and the Government of the United States toward the people of the Hawaiian Islands or the earnest solicitude here felt for their welfare, tranquility, and progress.

Historical precedents and the general course of the United States authorize the employment of its armed force in foreign territory for the security of the lives and property of American citizens and for the repression of lawless and tumultuous acts threatening them; and the powers conferred to that end upon the representatives of the United States are both necessary and proper, subject always to the exercise of a sound discretion in their application.

In the judgment of the President your authority, as well as that of the commander of the naval forces in Hawaiian waters should be, and is, limited in the use of physical force to such measures as are necessary to protect the persons and property of our citizens; and while abstaining from any manner of interference with the domestic concerns of the Islands, you should indicate your willingness to intervene with your friendly offices in the interest of a peaceful settlement of troubles within the limits of sound discretion.

Should it be necessary to land an armed force upon Hawaiian territory on occasions of popular disturbance, when the local authority may be unable to give adequate protection to the life and property of citizens of the United States, the assent of such authority should first be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involved. Your power in this regard should not, however, be claimed to the exclusion of similar measures by the representatives of other powers for the protection of the lives and property of their citizens or subjects residing in the Islands.

While the United States claim no right to interfere in the political or domestic affairs or in the internal conflicts of the Hawaiian Islands otherwise than as herein stated, or for the purpose of maintaining any treaty or other rights which they possess, this Government will adhere to its consistent and established policy in relation to them, and it will not acquiesce in domestic interference by other powers.

The foregoing general exposition of the President's views will indicate the safe courses within which your action should be shaped and

mark the limits of your discretion in calling upon the naval commander for coöperation.

The United States revenue cutter *Rush* is under orders to await you at San Francisco and convey you to Honolulu.

A stenographic clerk will be detailed to accompany you and remain subject to your orders.

It is expected that you will use all convenient despatch for the fulfillment of your mission, as it is the President's desire to have the results before him at the earliest possible day. Besides the connected report you are expected to furnish you will from time to time, as occasion may offer, correspond with the Secretary of State, communicating information or soliciting special instruction on such points as you may deem necessary. In case of urgency you may telegraph, either in plain text or in the cipher of the Navy Department, through the kind offices of the admiral commanding, which may be sent to Mr. W. A. Cooper, United States dispatch agent at San Francisco, to be transmitted thence.

Reposing the amplest confidence in your ability and zeal for the realization of the trust thus confided to you,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

[Inclosure.]

President Cleveland to President Dole.

Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America, to his excellency Sanford B. Dole, President of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: I have made choice of James H. Blount, one of our distinguished citizens, as my special commissioner to visit the Hawaiian Islands and make report to me concerning the present status of affairs in that country. He is well informed of our sincere desire to cultivate and maintain to the fullest extent the friendship which has so long subsisted between the two countries, and in all matters affecting relations with the Government of the Hawaiian Islands his authority is paramount. My knowledge of his high character and ability gives me entire confidence that he will use every endeavor to advance the interest and prosperity of both Governments and so render himself acceptable to your excellency.

I therefore request your excellency to receive him favorably and to give full credence to what he shall say on the part of the United States and to the assurances which I have charged him to convey to you of the best wishes of this Government for the prosperity of the Hawaiian Islands.

May God have your excellency in His wise keeping.

Written at Washington this 11th day of March, in the year 1893.

Your good friend,

GROVER CLEVELAND.

By the President:

W. Q. GRESHAM,
Secretary of State

No. 2.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

SIR: With a view to obtaining the fullest possible information in regard to the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands the President has determined to send to Honolulu, as his Special Commissioner,

the honorable James H. Blount, lately chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Blount bears credential letters in that capacity, addressed to the President of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government, and you are requested to facilitate his presentation.

In all matters pertaining to the existing or other Government of the Islands the authority of Mr. Blount is paramount. As regards the conduct of the usual business of the legation, you are requested to continue until further notice in the performance of your official functions, so far as they may not be inconsistent with the special powers confided to Mr. Blount. You are also requested to aid him in the fulfillment of his important mission by furnishing any desired assistance and information, and the archives of the legation should be freely accessible to him.

Mr. Blount is fully instructed touching his relations to the commanding officer of the United States naval force in Hawaiian waters.

I am, &c.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

No. 3.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Severance.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, March 11, 1893.

SIR: With a view to obtaining the fullest possible information in regard to the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the President sends to Honolulu, as his Special Commissioner, the honorable James H. Blount, lately chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

You are requested to aid Mr. Blount in the fulfillment of his important mission by furnishing any desired assistance and information; and the archives of the consulate-general should be freely accessible to him.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

No. 4.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 1.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, April 6, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that about noon on the 29th ultimo the *Rush* anchored at Honolulu. I was immediately met by the American minister, Mr. Stevens. He informed me that the annexation committee, which came on board with him, had rented one of the most eligible residences in the city for my use; had provided servants, among others an American steward, and a carriage and horses, etc., for my use. I could pay whatever I wanted to for it, from nothing up. He urged me very strongly to accept the proposed arrangement.

I replied to him that I could accept no favors at the hands of any parties in the islands, and that I should immediately go to a hotel.

The annexation committee then came up and insisted that I should take the accommodations which they had seen fit to provide on the terms already indicated by the American minister. I again declined, stating that I should resort to a hotel and make my arrangements there.

At this time there was an immense collection of natives on shore, men, women, and children, evidently in a state of joyous expectation.

One of the annexation committee said to me: "When you reach the shore the natives will desire you to take their carriages and allow them to escort you to your hotel." This was said with anxiety. I replied: "I shall go to my hotel in my own carriage."

Soon after this a Mr. Robertson appeared on the scene as the Queen's ex-chamberlain, to request that I would accept her carriage to convey me to my hotel. I returned thanks to her, but stated that I would use my own conveyance.

On Thursday, March 30, at 4 o'clock in the evening, in company with the American minister, I called on the President of the Provisional Government. I communicated to him the friendly disposition of our Government towards his and towards the Hawaiian people. I assured him of its purpose to avoid any interference with the domestic concerns of the islands unless it became necessary to protect the persons and property of American citizens. I then offered my letters of credence, which were accepted by President Dole, accompanied with expressions of great friendship for my Government and confidence in myself.

The Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser of March 31, 1893, reports the proceedings of the Hawaiian Patriotic League, from which the following is taken: "Mr. Joseph Nawahi, one of the speakers, said that all Hawaiians were in favor of monarchy, and then he asked his hearers if they wanted their queen to be restored. They all answered 'yes,' as a matter of course. He then went on to say that the Commissioner was sent here to feel their pulses, and for all Hawaiians to ask him for a return of the old order of things. He told the people to show by their actions that they did not want annexation, and as a greater power than the Government had arrived among them, a memorial would be read without fear of arrest."

The resolutions adopted by the meeting are as follows:

Whereas His Excellency Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America, has honored the Hawaiian Nation by sending to us the Hon. James H. Blount as a special commissioner, to find out the true wishes of the Hawaiian people as to the proposed annexation of their country to their great friend the United States: Therefore, we, the people of the Hawaiian Islands, in mass meeting assembled, take this mode of submitting our appeal and expression of our unanimous wishes to the people of our great and good friend the Republic of the United States of America, with whom we always entertained the most cordial relation, whom we have learned to look upon as our patrons and most reliable protectors, and in whose honor, integrity, and sense of justice and equity we have ever confidently relied for investigation into the grievous wrongs that have been committed against us as a people, against the person of our sovereign and the independence of our land;

And while we are anxious to promote the closest and most intimate political and commercial relations with the United States, we do not believe that the time has yet come for us to be deprived of our nationality and of our sovereign by annexation to any foreign power;

And, therefore, we do hereby earnestly and sincerely pray that the great wrong committed against us may be righted by the restoration of the independent autonomy and constitutional government of our kindgom under our beloved Queen Liliuokalani, in whom we have the utmost confidence as a conscientious and popular ruler.

Previous to this, accompanied by Mr. Stevens, the American minister, I had called upon the President of the Provisional Government and briefly stated the friendly disposition of our Government towards the Hawaiian people. Care had been taken on this occasion to avoid any reference to the use of the American troops. It had seemed to me up to the action of the aforesaid meeting that it would be wise to take a few days to ascertain the situation of affairs before causing the troops to be removed to the vessels and the ensign hauled down.

A Major Seward called on the morning of March 31, desiring to know when it would be convenient for me to receive a committee from the mass meeting of the preceding evening, which desired to present the resolutions adopted. It was quite clear that in the mind of that assemblage, there were apprehensions that I was here vested with power to reinstate Queen Liliuokalani.

The reception of a committee so avowedly hostile to the existing Government raised a question as to whether this would consist with a recognition of existing authority and the policy of noninterference. The messenger was informed that the subject would be taken into consideration and that he might call at 2 o'clock of the same day for my reply.

Very soon after his departure I called on President Dole, and called his attention to the meeting and resolutions. I said that, under existing circumstances, I deemed it proper at once to say to him that I should cause the ensign of the United States to be hauled down, and the troops ordered on board their respective vessels. I informed him further that they would be used only to protect the persons and property of American citizens, and that our Government would not acquiesce in the interference by any other Government in the establishment or maintenance of any form of Government on the islands. He desired to know when the troops would be removed and the ensign hauled down. I replied, to-day or to-morrow. He expressed a preference that it should be done on the morning of the following day, April 1. To this I agreed. I asked if he was satisfied he could preserve order when our troops were withdrawn. To this he replied that he had no doubt of it. He added that when the troops were first furnished they could not have gotten along without their aid. He was given to understand that this question was not intended as a guide to me in the removal of the troops, but simply to ascertain whether disorders were likely to occur.

Soon afterwards the following order was issued to Admiral Skerrett:

HONOLULU, *March 31, 1893.*

SIR: You are directed to haul down the United States ensign from the Government Building, and to embark the troops now on shore to the ships to which they belong.

This will be executed at 11 o'clock on the 1st day of April.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

Rear Admiral J. S. SKERRETT,
Commanding Pacific Squadron.

On the afternoon of this day (March 31) I informed the messenger of the mass meeting that I would receive them at 4 o'clock on the following day. This was done in order that when the committee called, the ensign would have been hauled down and the troops ordered aboard of their vessels, and I could state freely to the committee that it was not my purpose to interfere in their domestic concerns; that the United States troops would not be used to maintain or restore any form of government, but simply to protect the persons and property of American citizens. This reply I hoped would allay any action on the part of the people based on erroneous impressions as to my future conduct.

On the night before the flag was taken down, the American minister came to me with a Mr. Smith, correspondent of the *San Francisco Chronicle*, whom he introduced as a gentleman of intelligence and high character desiring to make an important communication to me. This gentleman claimed to know that it was the purpose of the Japanese commissioner, who had learned that the American flag was to be hauled

down and the troops sent on board their respective vessels, to enter Honolulu with troops for the purpose of restoring authority to the Queen.

This story was credited by the American minister, who urged that I should not take down the flag until diplomatic intercourse between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan should determine the correctness of this information.

Very little observation had satisfied me that all sorts of rumors arise in this community almost every hour, and are credited without reference to the probabilities.

Conscious of the power and policy of our own Government in these islands, and that of these the Japanese Government was well informed, I maintained my purpose to insist upon the order to Admiral Skerrett.

At 4 o'clock on Saturday, April 1, a committee, consisting of nineteen members, very intelligent, respectable half-castes, called at the headquarters of the commission. The spokesman, Mr. John E. Bush, stated that at the mass meeting of the natives resolutions had been adopted which they desired to present to me to be transmitted to the President of the United States. He declared the high esteem and affection his people had for the people of the United States, and spoke of the friendly disposition our Government had always manifested towards them. He said that up to my arrival the people had borne patiently the existing condition of things, trusting in the disposition of the American Government to do absolute justice by them. I replied that he did not misinterpret the kindly feeling of the Government and people of the United States for all classes of citizens in these islands. I said I would accept their resolutions in no other sense than as I would any other fact to be communicated in the way of information to the President of the United States; that I could not discuss with them the objects of my mission, nor the purposes of my Government. To this, response was made by Mr. Bush, that this was all they could reasonably expect.

I append herewith a copy of a letter, marked Inclosure 1, from Admiral Skerrett, containing a statement of the circumstances attending the hauling down of the ensign and the removal of the troops.

I also append a copy of a letter from Capt. Hooper, of the *Rush* (Inclosure No. 2), a very intelligent gentleman, whom I had asked to be present on the occasion and report the circumstances.

Mr. Parker, the last secretary of state under the late Queen, a half-caste of wealth and intelligence, called on Monday morning, April 3. In his conversation he stated that he and other leaders of the Kanaka population, loyal to the Queen, had been very active in impressing upon their followers that the lowering of the flag and the withdrawal of the troops must be accepted by them without any manifestations of their opinions or feelings.

On Sunday, April 2, I called on the American minister. While there he related that he had had a conversation with the Japanese minister, and satisfied him that our Government would not consent to Japanese interference in these islands. I was glad to find that he himself was not suffering from any apprehensions over the flag incident.

The American minister and consul-general seem to be very intense partisans for annexation. I do not yet see how they will embarrass me in the purposes of my mission. While they seemed to give out the impression that the troops will be brought back here in the event of trouble, my presence discredits the authority of their statements. I have uniformly stated that the troops would only be used for the pur-

pose of protecting the property and persons of American citizens; that I could not tell in advance what specific contingency would justify me in doing so. At this time I think I may pursue all my inquiries in the midst of peaceful surroundings.

Since my arrival visitors are constantly calling upon me and Mrs. Blount. It appears to be a manifestation of regard on the part of all classes of political opinion and of all races towards the Government of the United States. Most of my time has been occupied in this way. I do not know that it could have been employed more usefully. I think I shall cautiously but surely find my way to the political feeling of all classes. I shall commence soon to make inquiry in regard to the various questions naturally arising in connection with the relations of the United States to the Hawaiian Islands from persons whose opinions I shall have decided are of any valuable significance.

I feel assured that I can successfully ascertain much valuable information in this way.

I have, &c.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

Admiral Skerrett to Mr. Blount.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 1.]

No. 110.]

U. S. S. MOHICAN, FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 1, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform Special Commissioner Blount that in obedience to his directions, the United States ensign over the Government building was lowered at 11 a. m. of this date, and the force withdrawn from the building and the place designated as Camp Boston, at the same hour. I learn that quite a number of people congregated about the Government building at the time. The force of marines stationed there were relieved by a force of the Provisional Government. There was no demonstration made by the populace present. No cheering nor any other signs of either joy or grief.

I went on shore this afternoon and saw quite an access in numbers of those who were wearing the Annexation club badge. There has been no evidence shown of unruly or riotous characters. Absolutely there appears to be peace and quiet.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 1.]

Capt. Hooper to Mr. Blount.

U. S. REVENUE STEAMER RUSH, *Honolulu, April 2, 1893.*

MY DEAR SIR: I witnessed the hauling down of the American flag and the raising of the Hawaiian flag over the Government building at this place yesterday, and was surprised not only at the absence of any indication of the violent and partisan feeling which I had been led to expect, but by the apparent apathy and indifference of the native portion of the assembled crowd, and also their politeness and evident good feeling towards Americans. As I passed freely around among them, accompanied by my son, we were kept busy returning their friendly salutes. The greatest good order prevailed throughout. There were no demonstrations of any kind as the American flag came down, and not a single cheer greeted the Hawaiian flag as it was raised aloft. The native men stood around in groups or singly, smoking, and chatting and nodding familiarly to passing friends or leaning idly against the trees and fences, while the women and children, which formed a large proportion of the assemblage, were talking and laughing good-naturedly. As the hour for hauling down the American flag approached, many people, men, women, and children, could be seen approaching the Government square in a most leisurely manner, and show-

ing more interest in the gala day appearance of the crowd than in the restoration of their national flag. The air of good natured indifference and idle curiosity with which the native men regarded the proceedings, and the presence of the women and children in their white or bright colored dresses, was more suggestive of a country "fair" or horse race than the sequel to a "revolution."

Even the presence of the "armed forces" of the Provisional Government, numbering perhaps 200, parading the corridors of the Government house, failed to elicit any sign of a feeling of anger or resentment.

In half an hour after the exchange of flags had been made the crowd had dispersed and only the "force" of the Provisional Government, which I was told was necessary to prevent mob violence, remained to indicate that a "revolution" had recently taken place. While among the crowd I looked carefully for indications of "arms" upon the persons of the natives, but saw none, although with the thin clothing worn by them, the presence of a revolver or such an arm could easily have been detected.

If any danger of mob violence on the part of the natives existed, all outward signs of it were carefully concealed. Only evidences of the greatest good feeling were apparent.

Hoping that this short statement of the facts as they appeared to me may prove of interest to you,

I am, etc.,

C. L. HOOPER,
Captain U. S. Revenue Marine.

No. 5.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 2.] HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, April 8, 1893.

SIR: I send you by the steamship *China* the following documents:

Report of the president of the Bureau of Immigration to the Legislature of 1892;

Constitution of the Hawaiian Islands for 1887;

The Honolulu Almanac and Directory for 1886, containing the Constitution of 1884, and

The Hawaiian Annual for 1892.*

These contain much valuable information, which may be useful in properly understanding the political movements and the disposition of different classes of persons in these islands. I forbear any comment now. It seems to me important to gather all the information I can, in every direction, before permitting myself to reach conclusions or indulge in comments. I am conversing with many persons of all shades of political opinion. Some of these conversations I have in writing. They will cover much space, and, unless especially desired by you, I will not, as a rule, forward them by mail.

I send a conversation between Admiral Skerrett and myself, taken down by my stenographer and approved as correct by Admiral Skerrett. (Inclosure No. 1.)

I inclose a copy of a letter from Mr. Thurston to Mr. Antone Rosa, the original of which I have seen. Also an explanation of Hawaiian words used in Mr. Thurston's letter. (Inclosure No. 2.)

I inclose also a copy of a letter written by Mr. Thurston to Mr. J. T. Colburn, who was in the last ministry of the Queen. (Inclosure No. 3.)

I think the annexation party is endeavoring to impress the Royalists with the belief that, although the American ensign has been hauled down and the American troops ordered to their vessels, under color of protecting the persons and property of American citizens the troops

* Omitted from present publication.

will be returned, if need be, to suppress an outbreak against the existing Government.

As a class, American citizens here have been the most active in dethroning the Queen, and are active in maintaining the existing Government. If they are thus to participate in the affairs of these islands, and when force is used to suppress such movements on their part the forces of the United States are to be called in to protect their persons and property, it does seem that our Government encourages them to lawlessness, and its good faith is impugned.

My present impression is that the existing Government owes its being and its maintenance to this perverted influence. Of course, time and further inquiry may furnish a different and better opinion.

It is not easy for me to impress persons here with the complete idea of our noninterference policy, coupled with exceptions. The protection of the persons and property of American citizens here has come to mean aid to or enforcement of the laws whenever force is used against existing authority. This may be used to create a new Government and *maintain* it.

To meet the situation here may require a clear, defined, and thoroughly advertised announcement of when and how our troops are to be used. I know much must always be left to the sound direction of the representative of the United States here. Any suggestion or instruction to me, additional to what has been already given, would be very helpful.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
United States Commissioner.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 2.]

Interview between Admiral Skerrett and Mr. Blount.

APRIL 8, 1893.

Col. BLOUNT. When did you come to the islands?

Admiral SKERRETT. February the 10th of the present year.

Col. BLOUNT. Were you in Washington prior to that?

Admiral SKERRETT. Yes; I was in Washington on the 31st day of December, or the 30th day of December.

Col. BLOUNT. Did you have any conversation with the Secretary of the Navy about coming down here?

Admiral SKERRETT. Yes.

Col. BLOUNT. Please be kind enough to state it.

Admiral SKERRETT. I called at the Navy Department on the 30th of December to see Mr. Tracy, the Secretary of the Navy, to ask him if he had any final instructions for me, as I was going to leave the next day for San Francisco to assume command of the Pacific squadron. He replied: "Commodore, I have no instructions to give you. You will go there and perform your duty, as I know you will, and everything will be satisfactory." I remarked: "Mr. Tracy, I want to ask you about these Hawaiian affairs. When I was out there twenty years ago I had frequent conversations with the then United States minister, Mr. Pierce, on the subject of the islands. I was told then that the United States Government did not wish to annex the islands of Hawaii."

He replied: "Commodore, the wishes of the Government have changed. They will be very glad to annex Hawaii." He said as a matter of course none but the ordinary legal means can be used to persuade these people to come into the United States.

I said: "All right, sir. I only wanted to know how things were going on as a cue to my action," and I bade him good-bye.

Col. BLOUNT. Admiral, please give me your opinion as to the disposition amongst the opponents of the existing Government to resort to force.

Admiral SKERRETT. The only means I have of knowledge is what I glean from newspapers. I am never in conversation with any of the party; never been brought in contact with them or anybody I knew to be opposed to the annexation movement.

Col. BLOUNT. Do you see any symptoms of any disposition to resort to force of any kind?

Admiral SKERRETT. I have never since my arrival—and I have been on shore many times—seen any indications of such a disposition.

Col. BLOUNT. Up to this time?

Admiral SKERRETT. Up to this time.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 2.]

Mr. Thurston to Mr. Rosa.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 16, 1893.

FRIEND ROSA: Yours of March 1st is duly at hand. I am very sorry that the band boys have taken the course which they have. It is certain that they can not get work enough in Honolulu to support themselves from the receipts of an independent band, as there are not people enough there who could afford to pay for a band of that size to give the boys a living.

With regard to my taking charge of them in Chicago, I thank you for the interest you have taken in the matter, and their confidence in me; but for several reasons I would be unable to do it. In the first place, the expenses of so large a number of men are very heavy, and it is only by a systematic arrangement that the business part of the trip could be made a success. This would require the laying out of a regular series of entertainments, with detail arrangements with theaters, fairs, etc. This time I can not possibly give to them, as my own business at Chicago will necessarily take a great deal of time. In the second place, I should not think of such a thing as undertaking to engineer such a combination as the Hawaiian band without a thoroughly competent musical leader such as Berger. I think they will make a great mistake if they go on there under the leadership of the Manila man that you speak of, or any of their own members. It requires something besides the ability to blow in the end of a trumpet to conduct a band. You yourself know how rapidly the band has always deteriorated when Berger has been away. Of course there are other men in the world just as good as Berger, but the boys are a peculiar lot, and I know of no one who has been able to handle them or get music out of them as he has. I should, therefore, very seriously doubt the advisability of their going at all unless they can get him as a leader.

I hope that something can be done by which their differences with Berger and the Government can be fixed up so that they can go to Chicago, as I think their presence there would be of great benefit to Hawaii. You can tell any of those gentlemen in Honolulu, who you say are interesting themselves to keep the band out of my control, that they need not worry themselves any longer about it. If the band comes to Chicago I will do everything in my power to assist them and forward their interests, and shall be glad to employ them during part of the time to play at the Volcano building. Further than this I have no desire nor intention to have anything to do with, or any control over them, although I presume this will be difficult for some of our peanut-souled friends, who can not imagine anyone doing anything except for private gain, to understand.

I am glad you have succeeded in settling up the Aylett suit with the Bishop estate. I will write to W. O. Smith to represent me in the matter, as the probability is that I will be unable to come back until after the opening of the fair, and after that my movements are uncertain.

You say that you hope that we will do what is fair for all of you here. You ought to know by this time that we desire nothing else. I think, Rosa, that you have got an opportunity now to take a stand that will not only will be beneficial to yourself, but in the highest degree beneficial to your people. I desire to say a few words to you on the subject, knowing that from your superior education and associations you can appreciate the logic of events and what the future is likely to bring forth, as very few of those who look to you for guidance and as a leader can. What is done within the next month or two is going to affect the future of Hawaii for a great many years. A vast number of natives will look to you and Colburn and a few others for their opinions and information, and whether you take a narrow view of matters or a broad one is going to be a radical factor in the settlement of the question at issue. There are several things which are settled and determined, and if we all recognize them and act upon that basis the results will necessarily be very different from what they otherwise will be. One of these certainties is that the monarchy is *pau*. The Queen

and her immediate partisans may not appreciate this, and will probably continue to labor under the delusion that there is a possibility of her restoration. T. H. Davies is over here now maundering about the restoration of Kaulani, but there is no more possibility of it than there is of the restoration of Dom Pedro to Brazil.

It is a simple waste of energy on the part of anybody to spend their time in attempting to restore what has fallen through its own weakness. Neumann recognizes this condition fully here, and is now confining his fight to get as much money as he can out of it for the Queen. The question for you and me and the others of us who expect to continue to live in Hawaii to consider is, what is coming next? If the native leaders hang back in a sullen way and oppose annexation tooth and toe nail, it may very likely have some influence upon the immediate adoption of an annexation treaty. It will only cause delay, however, but can not interfere with ultimate annexation. It will also generate much ill-feeling and perpetuate differences of opinion on race lines, which of all things is the one which we ought to do the most to discourage. As I said, the most that opposition to annexation will succeed in affecting is delay. That is to say, the Provisional Government will remain in power. The United States recognizes it as the Government and will continue to do so until some other understanding is arrived at by mutual agreement.

If through native opposition, annexation does not take place, a protectorate will be the result; as I said before, this will not be a protectorate of the Hawaiian Government under the monarchy, but will be a continuation of the present Government under the protection of the United States. In either case, that of simple delay or of the protectorate, a continuation of the present autocratic system of Government will result, which is a thing which neither you nor those you represent, nor the Provisional Government desire. It means a government of force with the attendant probable conspiracies against it, and general unsettlement of business and degeneration of values which will prevent business enterprise from development and be injurious to us all, while no end of personal and party differences and hard feeling will be generated. If the Provisional Government and its leaders were bent on the rule or ruin policy, with no other object in view but to secure control of the Government, which Peterson and his boodle friends are always harping upon, we would want nothing better than the protectorate proposition which would leave us in control of the Government with Uncle Sam's troops to keep order. We want nothing of the kind, however, and have resisted all propositions from the Government here looking to a government on that basis, although we could secure a treaty of that description without difficulty, as the entire opposition in the United States to annexation advocates freely the execution of a treaty on the line above indicated.

As I have stated above, however, we have no desire to perpetuate any government of this description, nor to secure any laws, terms, or conditions which would operate to establish any differences between the citizens of Hawaii on a color or race line. We do not propose to ask for nor accept any legislation which shall apply to either natives or white men that does not apply equally to the other. If, instead of a protectorate, with its attendant evils, we secure absolute annexation, one thing is certain, the natives and white men equally will have no less liberties as American citizens than they did as Hawaiians; while, as far as their financial condition is concerned, there is no comparison of the two situations. With annexation Hawaii will inaugurate such a condition of commercial development as will put the development of 1876 and succeeding years entirely in the shade; no one class in the community will reap the benefit of it.

It may be said that the treaty which we have proposed does not cover a number of points which ought to be covered, to wit, a removal of duties, prohibition of carpet-baggers, securing American citizenship to Hawaiian citizens, and similar points. In reply, I would say that once we become American territory, there is not the slightest reason to believe that we will be treated in any manner differently from other portions of the United States. All the subjects spoken of are matters of detail legislation, which have to be covered by legislation passing both houses of Congress, and are not covered by the treaty for that reason, as that would have caused delay which we are seeking to avoid. As to the offices being given to Malihinis there is no reason to believe that there would be such difficulty, as it has become an unwritten law in connection with the territories that the offices shall be filled from local residents, and with very few exceptions that rule is now and has been for a number of years carried out. If you and others will take hold and frankly work with us, explaining to the natives the situation, and doing what you can to correct the impressions being given out by the demagogues, I believe that within a year from now we will have a prosperous, contented community, with no more thought of revolution or conspiracy than there is in Washington; but that if the agitation against annexation and the accompanying stirring up of the Kanakas against the Haoles goes on, it will result in a situation disastrous to business interests, if not dangerous to the peace.

I hope you will show this to Colburn, Bob Wilcox, and any others whom you may choose, and that you will take it in the spirit in which it is intended, that is, the

forwarding of the common interests of our country and people. I have got no ax to grind, do not want and will not accept any office, and am actuated by no impulse but to secure the advancement of Hawaii and her people to a freer political and more prosperous commercial condition than she has ever occupied before. I write to you because, although we have been of opposite political parties, I believe you can see through a grindstone when there is a hole in it, and that if you believe that the best interests of the natives lie in the direction of annexation, you will use your influence in that direction, even though it may not be the popular side among them to begin with.

Me ke aloha nui ia oe a me ke one hanau o kaula, Owau no,

L. A. THURSTON.

Definition of Hawaiian words used in Hon. L. A. Thurston's letter to A. Rosa, of March 16, 1893:

"Pau" means "finished," or "over with."

"Malihinis" means strangers.

"Kanakas" means "men," but generally applied to native Hawaiians.

"Haoles" means "white foreigners."

"Me ke aloha nui ia oe a me ke one hanau o kaula, Owau no."

"With much love to you and the land of our (two) birth, I am,"

L. A. THURSTON.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 2.]

Mr. Thurston to Mr. Colburn.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 16, 1893.*

FRIEND COLBURN: I have just written to Antone Rosa on the subject of annexation, and asked him to show you the letter. Please consider that portion of the letter written as much to you as it is to him.

Whatever our political differences may have been in the past, I give you credit, as I believe you do me, for acting as you thought best in the interest of Hawaii and the Hawaiians. I see by the papers that your name is more or less connected with that of Ashford, Peterson, and other political agitators of that stripe. Without any personal animosity against either of those gentlemen, I do feel that their past history, which is known to you as well as it is to me, is indicative of their disinterestedness in the advice which they now give and action which they now take. A tremendous responsibility rests upon you and others who have been identified with the opposition in the recent movement, but who, from their knowledge of the situation, must know the ultimate advantages of annexation to the United States. Your influence thrown against it will, of course, tend to perpetuate the race feeling now existing; if thrown in favor of it, while it may not be immediately popular, will, under the circumstances, have a very strong effect. With annexation there will, of course, come a temporary reconstruction period, during which the necessary legislation is being formulated for the reconstruction of the government, and when the government will not be carried on under representative lines; but, if we are within the United States system, this can be but temporary. In the long run we will receive all the benefits and privileges of American citizens, and it behooves us to look to the future, and not be governed entirely by the immediate present.

With *aloha nui*, I remain, etc.,

L. A. THURSTON.

This is a correct copy of the letter written to me by L. A. Thurston, and received by me Thursday, April 7, 1893.

JOHN F. COLBURN.

No. 6.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 3.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *April 26, 1893.*

SIR: On the 7th instant the *Alameda* reached this place. Among its passengers were Dr. William Shaw Bowen and Mr. Harold M. Sewall. The San Francisco papers announced that they had refused

to say that they were not joint commissioners with myself to Honolulu. The former represented himself to me as a correspondent of the New York World, and said he would be glad to give me any information he could gather here. Thinking it a mere matter of courtesy, I thanked him. On Sunday, the 16th instant, I was out walking and met him on the street, riding in a buggy. He left his buggy in the hands of his friend, Mr. Sewall, and joined me in a walk of some length. Before it was concluded he said to me that he and Paul Neumann were arranging a meeting between President Dole and the Queen, the object being to pay her a sum of money in consideration of her formal abdication of the throne and lending her influence to the Provisional Government with a view to annexation to the United States. He repeated this statement frequently, at intervals, to which I made no response.

Finally he asked me if I did not think it would simplify the situation very much here and facilitate annexation. Suspecting that my answer was designed to be used to induce the Queen to yield to solicitations to abdicate: I replied "I have nothing to say on this subject." Dr. Bowen said: "I did not ask you officially, but simply in a private way." I responded: "I am here as a Commissioner of the United States and must decline to converse with you on this subject."

The next morning early I had an interview with President Dole. I told him that I had seen in the San Francisco newspapers intimations that Dr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall were here as representatives of the President of the United States; that the former told me that he had arranged to bring him and the Queen together on that morning; that I desired to say to him that neither Dr. Bowen nor Mr. Sewall, nor any other person was authorized to act for the Government in that or any other matter relating to the present condition of affairs in the islands save myself; that I did not know absolutely that these two gentlemen had claimed to have such authority. He replied that he had been informed that they were here representing the Government. He did not give his authority.

He said that there had been some approaches from the Queen's side with propositions of settlement; that he had responded: "I will consider any reasonable proposition."

I told him I would not permit the Government of the United States to be represented as having any wish in the matter of any negotiations between the Queen and the Provisional Government. He asked if I would be willing to authorize the statement that I believed it would simplify the situation. I replied that I was not willing to do this, that I was not here to interfere with the opinions of any class of persons.

Since this interview with President Dole I have heard that Dr. Bowen, when asked by newspaper people if he represented the President of the United States, declined to answer, saying that all would be revealed hereafter.

He is representing himself in various quarters as an intimate friend of the President. I can but think that these statements are made to create the impression that he is here authorized to bring about negotiations for a settlement between the Queen and the Provisional Government.

On the day before yesterday Dr. Bowen came over to my table to say that a meeting between the Queen and President Dole had occurred, and terms were agreed upon. I said I did not care for him to talk with me on that subject.

On the 21st instant Mr. Claus Spreckels called to see me. He said

that he suspected there was an effort at negotiation between the Queen and the Provisional Government, and that he had urged the Queen to withdraw her power of attorney from Paul Neumann. I inclose herewith a copy of that power of attorney (Inclosure No. 1) which Mr. Spreckels says was derived through the agency of Mr. Samuel Parker, the last secretary of foreign affairs. He told me that Paul Neumann would leave for Washington by the next steamer, under pretense that he was going to the United States and from there to Japan. How much or how little Mr. Spreckels knows about this matter I am unable to say, as I do not know how to estimate him, never having met him before. He promised to see me again before the mail leaves for the United States on next Wednesday and give me such information as he could acquire in the meantime.

I believe that Dr. Bowen, Mr. Sewall, and Mr. Neumann have pretended that the two former knew the opinions of Mr. Cleveland and assured the Queen that annexation would take place, and that she had better come to terms at once.

Mr. Neumann leaves here on the next steamer, probably with a power to act for the Queen, with authority derived from her out of these circumstances.

The question occurs to my mind whether, if the United States desired the adjustment as probably agreed on, it had better not be accomplished through its representative here, either myself or the successor of Mr. Stevens as minister here, that assurance might be had that the action of the Government was free from any suspicion of indirection in the transaction.

I know the American minister, Mr. Stevens, has said that he had learned that Mr. Blount believed that such a settlement as indicated would simplify the situation. I called on him yesterday and told him that I did not think it was proper for him to speak of my views on the subject; that declarations of that sort coming from him would give rise to the suspicion that the Government of the United States was behind Dr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall in whatever they might see fit to represent in regard to the views of the President. During this interview I called his attention to the following conversation between Mr. Spreckels and myself on the 21st instant:

Mr. BLOUNT. Please state whether or not you have had any message from the American minister, and whether any conversation with him.

A. I have.

Q. Be kind enough to state it.

A. He sent down on Tuesday about 3 o'clock, whether I would be kind enough to come up to his house to see him. I took a carriage and saw him at 4 o'clock that Tuesday afternoon. He told me that Mr. Parker had no influence with the Queen, but that Paul Neumann could control her, and, if I would, I could control Paul Neumann; that Paul Neumann tell the Queen that she be in favor of annexation, and tell the Kanakas, who follow her, to go all for annexation. He said that he expected to be here only thirty or forty days, and he would like for annexation to be before he left. Some words to that effect.

He said he thought Mr. Spreckels misunderstood him as to his declaration that he wanted to finish up annexation before he left. I then told him that I felt assured that it would be displeasing to the Secretary of State and the President if they were informed that he was seeking to mold opinion here on the matter of annexation of these islands; that I was here instructed in part to inquire into that very subject; that it was certainly very unseemly, while I was making the inquiry, for him to be urging annexation; that he must know by the fact of my presence alone that he was not authorized to represent the views of the present administration in relation to any matter growing out of the

proposition to annex these islands to the United States. At first he said that his position had been made known through the publication of his dispatches, and that he never could go back on them.

To this I replied that the proposition of going back on his dispatches was one thing, and that his undertaking to form public opinion here on the subject of annexation at this time for an Administration not of his own political party, and when I was present to represent it especially in such matters, scarcely seemed fair in the light of the courtesy which had been manifested towards him. I said to him that I hoped in future that he would not undertake to advance or retard the cause of annexation or to represent the Government in any way in that connection, and that whenever it was necessary for him to speak on the matter that he would refer persons to me. This he agreed to. All this colloquy was characterized by kindness on my part, and, so far as I could observe, by courtesy on the part of Mr. Stevens. He complained somewhat that I did not confide in him and did not seek his opinion about men and things here. I replied that I was engaged on certain lines of inquiry and might in the future find occasion to seek his opinion.

On Tuesday, the 18th instant, President Dole sent Mr. Frank Hastings, his private secretary, to say that Mr. Stevens had requested, on application from Admiral Skerrett, permission for the United States troops to land for the purpose of drilling, and said that he thought proper, before consenting to it, he should make this fact known to me. I replied that I did not desire the troops to land. I then sent for Admiral Skerrett and told him that there were circumstances of a political character which made the landing of the troops for any purpose at this time inadvisable. This was entirely satisfactory to him.

On the 21st the aforesaid Mr. Hastings called and asked how he should answer Mr. Stevens' note for permission to land the troops. I replied by simply saying that the Commissioner had informed him that he disapproved of it.

The landing of the troops, pending negotiations between the Queen and President Dole, might be used to impress the former with fear that troops were landed to lend force to the Provisional Government in bringing her to an adjustment. I did not think proper to communicate this reason to Mr. Stevens or any other person, save Admiral Skerrett, and to him confidentially.

A great many hearings have been given to persons classed as Reformers or as Royalists. The former justify the dethronement of the Queen, because of her revolutionary attempt to subvert the constitution of 1887, and by proclamation to create a new constitution in lieu thereof, containing provisions restoring to the Crown the right of appointing nobles and of appointing ministers responsible only to it. In speaking of the controversy they refer to one party as whites and the other as natives. They represent the political contests for the last ten or twelve years as running parallel with racial lines. A confidence is sometimes expressed that the revolution of 1887 taught the whites that whenever they desired they could do whatever they willed in determining the form of government for these islands, and had likewise taught the natives that they would be unable to resist the will of the whites.

It is urged that the aid of the Government of the United States was not needed to make the revolution successful. Closer scrutiny reveals the fact that they regarded the revolution as successful when they should be able to proclaim a constitution from some public building, believing that the presence of the United States troops signified their use for the preservation of public order, which latter, in the minds of

the people of Honolulu, means the prevention of hostile combat between opposing parties. Whatever may be the truth, I am unable to discover in all the testimony any apprehension that the troops would be inimical to the revolutionary movement. In all of the examinations of persons thus far this fear has never manifested itself for an instant. The natives, on the other hand, insist that the Queen never contemplated proclaiming a new constitution without the assent of the ministry. They argue that the establishment of a new constitution by the proclamation of the Queen was as justifiable as that of 1887, in which a mass meeting of whites in the city of Honolulu extorted the proclamation of a new constitution from King Kalakaua, which had never been ratified by any vote of the people. They represent that the proclamation of a new constitution by the Queen was founded on the universal wish of the native population, which is in overwhelming majority over other races participating in the affairs of this Government.

They allege that on the day the Queen sought to proclaim a new constitution a committee representing the Hui Kalaiaina were waiting on her by direction of that organization. They represent that various petitions had been presented to the Queen and to the legislature for a series of years, asking for a new constitution similar to that existing prior to the revolution of 1887. Testimony on these two lines of thought has been taken. In addition to this, very much evidence has been given in the form of voluntary statements as to the causes of the revolution and the circumstances attending it, especially as to how far the whites compelled the Queen to acquiesce in their movement on the one side, and on the other as to the entire success of the movement of the whites, depending on the action of the United States troops and the American Minister in support of this movement.

It is not my purpose at this time to enter into an elaborate consideration of the evidence which has been adduced, because many other statements are yet to be made, which will be considered.

I invite your attention to the following copy of a memorial from the Hui Kalaiaina, because of its striking disclosure of the native Hawaiian mind in its aspirations as to the form of government, and, in connection with that, a colloquy between myself and a committee of that organization taken down by a stenographer and approved by them:

Statement of facts made by the Hui Kalaiaina (Hawaiian Political Association) in behalf of the people to J. H. Blount, the United States Commissioner, showing why the people urged the Queen to promulgate a new constitution for the Hawaiian people.

To the Honorable J. H. BLOUNT, the United States Commissioner, greeting:

We, the Hawaiian Political Association, in behalf of the people of the Hawaiian islands—an association organized in the city of Honolulu, with branches organized all over these islands, which association has been in existence since the overthrow of the constitution of Kamehameha IV by the descendants of the sons of missionaries who are seeking to usurp the Kingdom of our Queen for themselves—

And for this reason the people did ask King Kalakaua to revise the constitution of 1887 now in force, and during his reign many petitions were made to him and to the Legislature with thousands of signatures attached, but the desire of the people was never fulfilled.

Therefore, the people petitioned to him for redress according to these statements now submitted to you:

First. This constitution deprived the Crown of Hawaiian Islands of its ancient prerogatives.

Second. This constitution based the principles of government on the forms and spirit of republican governments.

Third. This constitution opens the way to a republican government.

Fourth. This constitution has taken the sovereign power and vested it outside of the King sitting on the throne of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

Fifth. This constitution has limited the franchise of the native Hawaiians.

For these five reasons was King Kalakaua petitioned by his people to revise the constitution, but it never was carried out until the time of his death.

During the reign of Queen Liliuokalani the same thing happened. Numerous petitions were laid before her by and from the people, and from this association to the Legislature and to the Queen. These petitions contain over eight thousand names, and this Hawaiian Political Association did repeatedly petition the Queen to revise and amend or to make a new constitution, to which she finally consented to lay this request from her people before the cabinet, but the wishes of the people were not carried out.

On the 14th of January, 1893, at the time of the prorogation of the Legislature, in the afternoon, this political association came and petitioned Her Majesty Liliuokalani to issue a new constitution for the people, to which she consented, with the intention of listening to the desires of her people, but her cabinet refused.

A short while afterwards the descendants of the missionaries came forward in their second attempt to usurp the Kingdom of our Queen Liliuokalani, and said attempt would not have succeeded had it not been for the support given it by the American Minister Stevens—therefore our Queen yielded the Kingdom into their hands through the superior force presented by the men of the American warships, who had been landed on the Hawaiian soil.

Queen Liliuokalani yielded her Kingdom into their hands, not with good will, but because she could not defend it, and because the Queen did not desire to see the blood of her Hawaiian people shed on this land of peace.

Therefore, we submit to you our humble petition and statements, as you are in possession of vast powers in your mission to do justice to the Hawaiian people, our independence, the throne, and the Hawaiian flag; we beg you to restore our beloved Queen Liliuokalani to the throne with the independence of the Hawaiian people, as you have restored the Hawaiian flag.

Submitting these statements and petitions to you we pray that the Almighty God would assist you in your responsible duties, that the prayers of our people may be granted, that continued friendship may exist between us and the American nation.

We, the undersigned subscribers of the Hawaiian Political Association.

W. L. HOLOKAHIKI,
Chairman.

JOHN KEEUI,
J. ALAPAI,
J. AKAHONEI,
J. B. KURHA,
J. KEAN,
D. W. KANOELIHUA,
T. C. POHIKAPA,
Committee.

In accepting the copy of the resolutions Mr. Blount responded as follows:

GENTLEMEN: Very much of the duties of my mission I cannot communicate to you. I will say, however, that your papers which have been presented I will accept and forward to the President in the nature of information indicating the opinions of your people in these Islands in reference to the inclination on your part to support the existing condition of things—that is to say, whether you are in favor of the Provisional Government and annexation, or whether your preference is for royalty. I am gathering information on these lines for the purpose of submitting it to the President. That is the extent of what I can say to you by way of response. I would like to ask, however, a few questions. Which is the chairman of your committee?

INTERPRETER. W. L. Holokahiki, of Honolulu.

(These questions were given and answered through the interpreter.)

Q. On the day of the prorogation of the Legislature a number of natives are reported to have gone in to see the Queen—about thirty in number—and that their object was to ask for a new constitution. Was that a committee from this organization?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many voters—people who vote for representatives—are there in this order?

A. Some thousands; as we have it in our books about 3,000 of native Hawaiians.

Q. What did the Queen say in response to your request?

A. That she was quite ready to give a new constitution, but her cabinet is opposed to it. Her cabinet refused it so that she could not do otherwise. She told the people that they had to go home quietly and wait for the next session of the Legislature.

Q. When would that be if the Government had not been overthrown?

A. The time, according to our laws, was two years, and that would run us up to 1894.

Q. Then the information was that nothing could be done under two years on account of the disapproval of the cabinet?

A. Yes; the Queen could do nothing.

Q. She said she could do nothing?

A. Yes; because the constitution said she could do nothing without being approved by her Cabinet.

Q. What did the committee do when they went out? Did they give this information to the native people?

A. Yes, sir. This committee shortly after they came out—they told the people they could do nothing now; that they would have to wait until the next session. Also, the Queen came out and told the people she could not give them any constitution now because the law forbids.

A great many petitions were exhibited—sometimes they were to the Queen and sometimes to the Legislature—asking for a new constitution.

A book was also shown containing the names of members of the organization throughout the island, and giving the numbers as follows:

Oahu, 2,320; Maui, 384; Hawaii, 266; Kauai, 222, and Molokai, 263.

Q. (To interpreter.) Why don't other natives join the organization?

A. They sometimes go to meetings. When anything happens they go together.

Q. These are active members of the organization?

A. Yes.

Q. In matters of this sort the natives followed the lead of this organization?

A. Yes, sir.

Prior to the constitution of 1887 the nobles were appointed by the Crown and the representatives were elected by the people, with but little obstruction in the qualification of the elector. The number of nobles was 20 and the number of representatives was 28, and these, constituting one body, enacted the laws. The cabinet was only responsible to the King. The majority of voters was overwhelmingly native. It is easy to understand how completely the native people could, if they desired, control the Government as against the white race. Under the constitution of 1887 the number of nobles and representatives is equal. The qualification of an elector of a noble required him to own property of the value of \$3,000, unincumbered, or an income of \$600. Practically this vested the power of electing nobles in the white population, or, as it is sometimes termed, the reform party. A cabinet could not be removed by the Crown except on a vote of want of confidence by the Legislature. The ability to elect a small number, even one of the representatives, enabled the white race to control legislation and to vote out any ministry not in accord with them. This placed the political power in the hands of the white race. I use the words "white" and "native" as distinguishing the persons in the political contests here, because they are generally used by the people here in communicating their views to me.

I had supposed up to the appearance of this memorial that the real demand of the native was for a just proportion of power in the election of nobles by the reduction of the money qualification of an elector. This I had derived from interviews with some of the intelligent half-castes. This memorial indicates an opposition to the new constitution because it takes away from the Crown the right to appoint nobles and the right to appoint and remove cabinets at will. There is no aspiration in it for the advancement of the right of the masses to participate in the control of public affairs, but an eager, trustful devotion to the Crown as an absolute monarchy. I had wondered whether or not this race of people, which up to 1843 had no rights of property, and over whom the king and chiefs had absolute power of life and death, had fully cast off the old system and conceived the modern ideas in the United States of the control of the government by equal participation by every citizen in the selection of its rulers. Up to the appearance of this memorial I had received but little satisfaction on this line of thought.

In this connection I invite your attention to Inclosure No. 2, being a copy of resolutions presented on the 16th instant by a committee of the "Hui Aloha Aina"—the Hawaiian Patriotic League.

Taken in connection with the foregoing memorial of the Hui Kalaiaina, it is strongly suggestive of blind devotion to arbitrary power vested in the crown worn by a person of native blood. I have forwarded these two documents because they present a phase of thought which had not been so well defined in anything I had seen in publications relating to these islands. They seem to go very far in the matter of the capacity of these people for self-government.

I have received communications from every source when offered, not to support any theory, but simply to see what might be derived from them in the way of information. I have studiously avoided any suggestion that the President contemplated the consideration of the restoration of the Queen, the support of the existing Government, or the question of annexation on any terms. I have intended to invite the freest expression of thought without any indication that it was to be considered with a view of guiding the action of the Government in the determination of any proposition. In all this I find my action most heartily approved by both whites and natives.

In several local papers, beginning with the 13th instant, editorials have appeared advising in terms somewhat indefinite, and yet pointing to the extreme action which should be taken towards the Queen and her adherents, and deploring the want of such action on the part of the Provisional Government. On the night of the 14th instant a prominent half-caste called upon me. He had always assured me hitherto of the quiet intention of the native population. On this latter occasion he said: "We are in trouble. It is said the Queen is to be put out of the way by assassination, and her prominent followers to be prosecuted for treason or deported."

These apprehensions naturally grew out of the editorials alluded to. I said to him I had no idea there was any foundation for his fears in the purposes of the Government. Before he left me he seemed to be relieved.

On the morning of the 15th I called on President Dole, and invited his attention to the newspaper articles above referred to and to the visit of the half-caste, with his expressions of fear and my response. I said to him that perhaps I had gone farther than propriety would suggest in my opinion to the half-caste on the evening before, but that I was impelled solely by that humane feeling which would regret to see disorder and bloodshed inflicted on any portion of the community. I also intimated that if he deemed it desirable, owing to the kindly feeling the native population had manifested towards me, I might, without pretending to represent the Government, allay their anxieties and contribute to the public peace by assuring them that the extreme measures advocated by the press I did not believe were approved by the Government. To this he responded that it would be very gratifying to him and to those in political accord with him for me to act as I had suggested. He furthermore declared that it was the purpose of the Government to confine its action only to the preservation of order, and to take no extreme steps against any parties here unless it should be to meet a forcible attack on the Government.

When the ensign was hauled down and the troops ordered to the vessels there was some comment on the omission to recite in the order or by some public declaration the exact import of this action.

In the above conversation I referred to the subject and said that at the time I believed that any speech or written declaration might be liable to many and false constructions, and that the action of hauling down the ensign and the removal of the troops would in a few hours

tell with more simplicity and accuracy and with better results than any utterances of mine could do.

To this he replied that at first there was some criticism, but that all minds had come to the conclusion that I had taken the wiser course.

He took occasion to say to me that all men everywhere could only think that I was governed by the highest motives in all my actions here.

At 10 o'clock on the morning of the 22d instant Mr. Spreckels called to see me. He assured me that Mr. Neumann was going to San Francisco and then to Japan. I said to him: "But he is going to Washington." He said: "Yes; but in order to take some dispatches from Mr. Stevens to the Washington Government."

On the 21st, in the conversation with Mr. Stevens, to which reference has already been made, he told me for the first time of a letter he had written to you concerning certain matters which had passed between him and the Japanese commissioner at this place. The extent of it was that by representations that the United States was opposed to the presence of a Japanese war vessel here that it was determined that the Japanese Minister should ask his Government to cause the aforesaid vessel to be withdrawn.

In view of my instructions, I felt bound to give assurances to the Japanese commissioner that the present Administration does not view with displeasure or suspicion the presence of one of her war vessels here.

Mr. Paul Neumann is generally regarded here as a bright, plausible, unscrupulous person. Permit me to suggest that if the Administration should entertain any proposition from Mr. Neumann in connection with a contract between the Queen and the Provisional Government in the matter of her abdication, the consummation of it is surrounded by so many circumstances indicating that the Government of the United States has been made to appear to the Queen as favoring such action on her part that it would be far better to decline to entertain anything from Mr. Neumann, but for the Government to accomplish its purpose in a more direct manner. If such an adjustment is desirable, instructions to the American representative here to endeavor to bring about such an arrangement would be a much more honorable course on the part of the United States.

The representatives of the Provisional Government are conscious that the movement inaugurated on the 14th of January last for the dethronement of the Queen and annexation to the United States is a much more desperate one than they then realized.

The white race, or what may be termed the Reform party, constitute the intelligence and own most of the property in these islands and are desperately eager to be a part of the United States on any terms rather than take the chances of being subjected to the control of the natives. With them we can dictate any terms. The feeling of the natives is that while they do not want annexation, if the United States does it will be accomplished, and they will acquiesce. The situation is so completely under our control that I should regret to see Mr. Neumann's agency in the matter of abdication of the Queen, with his connection with Dr. Bowen and others and the attendant circumstances, recognized by the Government. You will readily understand that this is not intended as impertinence, but only as a suggestion.

Since writing the foregoing portion of my letter relating to attempts to represent the views of the President of the United States by unauthorized persons in connection with the subject of an agreement between ex-Queen Liliuokalani and the Provisional Government, I have deemed it proper to have an interview with the former in order to understand,

as far as I might, from her whether any negotiations had been authorized by her, and if so, how far they had gone. Before doing so, I called on President Dole and informed him of my purpose to see her in connection with this subject, stating to him that I was not willing that persons should make fraudulent representations to her as to that matter. I told him that I had abstained from seeing her lest my visit might be construed in a way to produce disorders, but now I felt all danger of this had passed. He concurred in my views as to the propriety of my calling, if I saw fit to do so.

I said to the ex-Queen that I had been informed that certain persons had sought to impress her with the idea that the President desired some such adjustment as indicated to be made; that I wished to say that no person was authorized by the President nor by myself to place the Government of the United States in such an attitude; that, while I would interpose no objection to such negotiation, I wanted her to know that whatever she did in the matter was free from any moral influence from the Government of the United States. I further said to her that I desired to be able to inform my Government whether she had been engaged in such negotiations or contemplated them, or whether anybody was authorized to act for her in any such matter; that I wished the information simply to put the Government at Washington in possession of the true state of facts.

She replied that parties who had represented her in other matters had talked to her on the subject; that she had declined to indicate any disposition to act in the matter; that she had said to some of them that she would wait until President Dole came to see her in person, and had heard what he had to say; that she did not intend to enter into any negotiations until the Government at Washington had taken action on the information derived through my report. She said she had sent Mr. Neumann to Washington to prevent the ratification of the treaty and to have a commission sent out here, and he reported that he had been successful in both. I then asked her what she desired me to say to the Government at Washington as to her purpose in the matter of this negotiation. She expressed a wish that I should say from her that no one was authorized to act in her behalf in this matter and that she should take no action until the Government at Washington had passed upon the information derived through the Commissioner.

Lest she might make improper inferences from my visit or something I had said I told her that one of the objects of my visit was to get all the facts connected with her dethronement and the disposition of the people of the Islands in relation to the present Government; that she could readily see that that was a matter to be hereafter considered by the Government in such manner as it saw fit. Without any apparent connection with what had been said, she remarked that much depended on Mr. Spreckels as to the future; that he and Mr. Bishop had been in the habit of furnishing money to the Government, and that if Mr. Spreckels did not advance to the Government she thought it would go to pieces. To this I made no response. It is evident that she is being impressed with the idea that the present Government could not get money enough to run itself long.

I am not sufficiently informed to express any views on this proposition at this time.

I think the operations of Dr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall have been conducted through Mr. Neumann. I shall, perhaps, know more before closing this communication.

I send you a map, marked Inclosure No. 3. You will find it useful

in considering the location of the various military forces connected with the revolution, to which I may refer in this and especially in subsequent communications.

I send you a written statement from F. Wundenburg (Inclosure No. 4), who says that his information is derived from being personally present in all the conferences of the committee of safety and that his utterances are based on his personal knowledge. He appears to be an intelligent man. He says that he acted with the committee in good faith until the American flag was hoisted, and then he ceased communication with them. He is at this time deputy clerk of the supreme court. I think in my next communication I may be able to give you information strongly corroborating all that Mr. Wundenburg has said.

I may say that the peaceful surroundings of the revolution are confirmed by all persons with whom I have communicated, and that Judge Cooper, who was and is an intense annexationist, let drop, in answer to a question of mine, that when the Government building was entered by the committee of safety and the proclamation dethroning the Queen and establishing the new Government was read by him there was not a soldier of the Provisional Government or of the Queen on the ground.

I send you, in original, a communication from Mr. William H. Cornwell, a member of the Queen's cabinet at the time of her dethronement (Inclosure No. 5).

I also send you, in original, a communication from Mr. John F. Colburn, a member of the Ex-Queen's cabinet and a half-caste (Inclosure No. 6).

These are forwarded in advance of the testimony or voluntary statements in response to interrogatories by himself, because they present the views of these gentlemen as to the circumstances attending the revolution and which do not appear in any of the papers relating to the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands printed by the United States so far as I have been furnished with them.

It is my purpose to examine them in person so as to have an opportunity of thoroughly sifting them.

I inclose you a copy of a communication from the committee of public safety—which conceived and executed the dethronement of the Queen—addressed to the American Minister (Inclosure No. 7). On page 12 of Executive Document No. 76, Fifty-second Congress, second session, this paper is simply referred to in the following language: "A copy of the call of the committee of public safety for aid is inclosed." It appears significant enough to have justified its being printed in full. To be imploring protection from the Government of the United States on the 16th and establishing the provisional government and dethroning the Queen without firing a gun on the next day—without any reference to the presence of United States troops—is quite a draft on my credulity.

This paper may have been overlooked, and hence my calling your attention to it.

I send you a pamphlet, entitled "Papers of the Hawaiian Historical Society No. 3" (Inclosure No. 8),* on the subject of the evolution of the Hawaiian land tenures. To this I will add further information in relation to the tenure of lands in these islands. It appears from all information attainable that the great mass of the natives have at all times had but little interest in real property. This will throw some light on the little development attained by them, and how the real property

* Footnote omitted on account of length.

has, by virtue of the operation of these laws, resulted in the ownership by large landed proprietors, mostly of foreign birth.

I see in the newspapers that the War Department is issuing in a documentary form information of various sorts in relation to the islands. In one of them it is stated that the natives generally speak the English language. This is quite contradictory to my information from intelligent persons here and my own observation. In Honolulu, where the situation is most favorable to development, the groups of children playing along the streets use their native tongue. The natives of mature age whom you meet are generally unable to converse with you in English or to understand what is said to them. They learn in the schools the English text-books as an American child would learn the Latin or Greek languages. This done, their capacity to think or speak English seems very slight.

I am very much impressed with a belief that a large majority of the people of these islands are opposed to annexation and that the proofs being taken will verify this opinion.

I have not indicated any purposes of the United States on the subject of annexation in seeking to ascertain the sentiment of the people towards existing authority. A response to this necessarily involves the question of how the people feel towards annexation. The Provisional Government being avowedly a part of a scheme towards annexation, and the opposition taking the form of opposing it, I have from necessity been compelled to put my inquiries more or less in a form answering to this division of sentiment. I have never claimed to mold the disposition of the administration on that question nor indicated my own.

The condition of the public mind is very peaceful. I think it important to maintain this situation that a representative of the United States should be here before my departure who will maintain the attitude of noninterference in local affairs which I have observed. The contrary course on the part of an American representative would immediately produce much bitterness and discontent in one or the other of the parties now dividing the people. I can see no advantage in my remaining here longer than the month of May. I trust that you will consent to my return at such time during the month of June as I may choose. I prefer to write my report on my return to Washington rather than while here. Interruptions on the part of people who are constantly seeking my attention make this preferable.

It is difficult to get passage from here to the United States on account of the great amount of travel, and arrangements must be made some weeks in advance.

Please be kind enough to telegraph me in response to the subject of my return.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 3.]

Power of attorney for Mr. Neumann.

To all persons and to the Government of the United States of America and to all other Governments whatsoever: To all bodies corporate as well as bodies politic, and more especially to the President and to the Secretary of the Department of State of the United States of America, I, Liliuokalani, of the city of Honolulu, in the Island of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian Islands, send greeting:

Whereas on the seventeenth day of January, A. D. 1893, at the city of Honolulu aforesaid, I did yield to the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands my authority as Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands under protest;

And whereas by so doing I claim to be entitled by international law and in the high forum of conscience and equity to receive consideration and provision both for myself and family and for Kaiulani, who was my legally appointed successor as such Sovereign;

And whereas it is my intention and desire by these presents to authorize, secure, accomplish, and finally complete and to ratify by such arrangements as may conduce to the greatest welfare and benefit of all the people of the Hawaiian Islands and also of myself and family and the said Kaiulani;

And whereas I repose the fullest confidence in the ability, integrity, and fidelity of Paul Neumann, esq., of the city of Honolulu aforesaid, counsellor at law, and have entrusted him with full power and authority to act for me in the premises;

Now, therefore, know ye, that in consideration of the premises, I, Lilioukalani, aforesaid, have made, constituted, and appointed, and by these presents do hereby make, constitute, and appoint the aforesaid Paul Neumann, esq., my true, lawful, and sufficient attorney, for me and in my name, place, and stead, to negotiate, arrange, and agree with the United States of America and the President and the Secretary of the Department of State thereof, and with any other (if any) representative or official thereof having authority in the premises for such official, or the consideration, benefit, and advantage as in the opinion of my said attorney shall, may, or can be obtained from the United States of America as well for myself and family as for the said Kaiulani, in consideration of existing conditions and circumstances. And if no official consideration for myself or said Kaiulani shall in the opinion of my said attorney be attainable from the United States of America, then and thereupon, and in such case to arrange and agree upon such pecuniary considerations, benefits, and advantages as can or may be secured for myself and family, and for said Kaiulani, from the United States of America, and whether the same shall be in the form of payment at one time of a sum of money to myself for or distinct sums of money to myself and said Kaiulani, or in payment of stated sums of money annually, or oftener, for a fixed period or periods of time, and upon ascertaining that such pecuniary considerations, benefits, advantages, or payments of money from and on the part of the said United States can be secured to agree upon, receive, and accept the same, and in my name and behalf to make, execute, and deliver such agreements, releases, and acquittances of all my claims, demands, and pretensions whatsoever upon the throne of the Hawaiian Islands and upon the Government of the United States of America, as well as of the Hawaiian Islands and upon all persons having had anything to do with or having been or being in any way concerned in the said Provisional Government as shall be requisite to accomplish and secure such pecuniary considerations, benefits, advantages, and payments, or which shall be required therefor by the President or the Secretary of the Department of State aforesaid, or by any other (if any) representative or official of the United States authorized to act or agree in the premises, and all that my said attorney shall do or cause to be done in the premises I do hereby for myself and my successors, executors, administrators, and assigns ratify and confirm, and further I do hereby covenant with my said attorney and his executors and administrators and with the President of the United States of America and with any other person and persons representing the said United States of America in the premises, and with each of them, and with their respective successors both jointly and severally that all and whatsoever my said attorney shall in my behalf agree to do or cause to be done or agreed upon by virtue of these presents I will and my successors, heirs, executors, and administrators shall ratify and confirm, and that I will at any time thereafter execute, sign, seal, acknowledge, and deliver such other and further releases, acquittances, assurances and instruments in writing, as shall in the opinion of my said attorney or in the opinion of the President of the United States of America or of any officer or representative thereof having the matter in charge be requisite and proper in order to carry out the full intent and meaning of these presents.

In witness whereof I hereunto and also to two other instruments of the same date and time have set my hands and seals at the city of Honolulu aforesaid this day of _____ in the year A. D. 1893.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 3.]

Hawaiian Patriotic League to Mr. Blount.

We, the women of the Hawaiian Islands, for our families and the happiness of our homes, desire peace and political quiet, and we pray that man's greed for power and spoils shall not be allowed to disturb the otherwise happy life of these islands, and

that the revolutionary agitations and disturbances inaugurated here since 1887, by a few foreigners, may be forever suppressed.

To that effect we believe that, in the light of recent events, the peace, welfare, and honor of both America and Hawaii will be better served, for the present, if the Government of the great American Republic does not countenance the illegal conduct and interference of its representatives here and the rash wish of a minority of foreigners for annexation.

Therefore, we respectfully but earnestly pray that Hawaii may be granted the preservation of its independent autonomy and the restoration of its legitimate native monarchy under our Queen Liliuokalani, in whom we have full confidence.

And we hope that the distinguished citizen, who so wisely presides over the United States, may kindly receive this our petition, for which we shall evermore pray for God's blessing on him and his Government.

MRS. JAMES CAMPBELL, *President.*
 MRS. J. A. CUMMINS, *Vice-President.*
 MRS. AL. FERNANDEZ, *Treasurer.*
 MRS. C. K. STILLMAN, *Secretary.*
 MRS. JOSEPH NAUAHI,
 MRS. JUNIUS KAAE,
 MISS HATTIE HIRAM,
 MRS. M. KAHAI,
 MRS. LULIA AHOLO,
 MRS. L. KEKUPUWOLUI MAHELONA,
 MRS. W. H. ALDRICH,
 MRS. M. A. LEMON,

Executive Committee.

They were evidently persons of intelligence, and refined in their deportment. After reading the papers handed to me I responded that I would forward them to my Government as a matter of information, but that I could not enter into any discussion of the situation; that I would accept and transmit their papers, as I did all other facts, for purposes of information. To this they responded that they did not expect me to communicate anything to them as to my views or the disposition of the Government of the United States.

[Inclosure 4 in No. 3.]

A report from Mr. Wundenburg to Mr. Blount.

The committee of safety met at the office of W. O. Smith in Fort street, Honolulu, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, the 16th day of January, 1893, for the purpose of discussing the necessary steps to be taken in forming a new government.

Shortly after the committee met it was decided that they were not ready for the landing of the American troops, and a committee of three, with Thurston as the chairman, was immediately dispatched to the American legation to prevail upon Mr. Stevens to delay the landing of the *Boston's* men. The committee returned shortly and reported that Mr. Stevens had said to them: "Gentlemen, the troops of the *Boston* land this afternoon at 5 o'clock, whether you are ready or not."

The foregoing report of Mr. Stevens's reply to the committee is as near literal as can be remembered, and gives a correct idea of the meaning conveyed. The committee of safety adjourned to meet the same evening, at 7:30 o'clock, at the house of Henry Waterhouse, in Nuuanu Valley. The American troops landed at 5 o'clock, as Mr. Stevens had told the committee they would, and marched up Fort street to Merchant, and along Merchant street, halting in King street, between the palace and Government building.

At the time the men landed the town was perfectly quiet, business hours were about over, and the people—men, women, and children—were in the streets, and nothing unusual was to be seen except the landing of a formidable armed force with Gatling guns, evidently fully prepared to remain on shore for an indefinite length of time, as the men were supplied with double cartridge belts filled with ammunition, also haversacks and canteens, and were attended by a hospital corps with stretchers and medical supplies. The curiosity of the people on the streets was aroused, and the youngsters more particularly, followed the troops to see what it was all about. Nobody seemed to know, so when the troops found quarters the populace dispersed, the most of them going to the band concert at the hotel, which was very fully attended, as it was a beautiful moonlight evening, all who were not in the secret still wondering at the military demonstration.

The committee met at Mr. Waterhouse's residence, according to adjournment,

at 7:30 o'clock p. m. of the same day, January 16. The formation of some sort of government was under discussion, and it was decided that a commander in chief of the forces supporting the proposed new government should be appointed. The position was offered to Mr. John H. Soper, who demurred, as he did not see any backing whatever to support the movement. Mr. Soper was answered by members of the committee that the American minister would support the move with the troops of the *Boston*. Mr. Soper still doubted, so a couple of the committee escorted him over to the legation, which, by the way, was in the adjoining premises, and the three came back after a time, reporting that Mr. Stevens had given them the full assurance that any proclamation of the Government put forward at the Government building, or any other building in Honolulu for that matter, would receive his immediate recognition and the support of the *Boston's* men. This assurance seemed to satisfy Mr. Soper, and he accepted the position.

On Tuesday afternoon, January 17, the committee of thirteen, or committee of safety, proceeded from the office of W. O. Smith up Merchant street to the Government building and read the proclamation of a new government at 2.40 o'clock, there being practically no audience whatever. As the reading proceeded a dozen or so loungers gathered, and near the close of the ceremony about thirty supporters, variously armed, came running into the side and back entrances of the yard and gathered about the committee.

At this moment the United States troops, in the temporary quarters in the rear of the Music Hall (less than 100 yards from where the committee stood) appeared to be under arms and were evidently prepared for any emergency.

During all the deliberations of the committee, and in fact throughout the whole proceedings connected with plans for the move up to the final issue, the basis of action was the general understanding that Minister Stevens would keep his promise to support the movement with the men from the *Boston*, and the statement is now advisedly made (with a full knowledge of the lack of arms, ammunition, and men, also the utter absence of organization at all adequate to the undertaking), that without the previous assurance of support from the American minister and the actual presence of the United States troops no movement would have been attempted, and if attempted, would have been a dismal failure resulting in the capture or death of the participants in a very short time.

(Having been present at the several meetings referred to in this statement, I hereby certify that the same is correct in every essential particular. F. WUNDENBERG.)

(NOTE.—This person appears to be highly esteemed here. He was tendered the position of collector of customs recently by the Provisional Government and declined it. I send an extract from the Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, showing its esteem of him.):

A PROJECTED APPOINTMENT.

It is stated that the council at its meeting yesterday recommended the appointment of F. W. Wundenberg as collector-general of customs. The appointment would be in all respects a worthy one. Mr. Wundenberg is thoroughly qualified by long business experience for the position. He is a man of great energy and character, and of unimpeachable integrity. If made collector he may be trusted to make no compromise with evil, but to fight it to the bitter end.

Mr. Wundenberg was identified with the revolution from the 14th of January until the danger was over. He was placed in charge of the police station at a time when everything depended on reliable leadership, and if an uprising should occur he would follow the cause into the cannon's mouth to-day. As a recognition of valuable service at a critical moment his appointment would be peculiarly appropriate.

Mr. Wundenberg has an abundant crop of enemies. In this he does not differ from most men of positive traits. The fact will recommend him to all who desire to see a strong and fearless man collector-general.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 3.]

Mr. Cornwell to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, April 24, 1893.

The following statement does not purport to be an exhaustive or full history or report of the resolution of the 17th day of January, but are simply plain facts relating to that political incident as they came within my personal knowledge and observation as a minister in Her Majesty's cabinet.

On the 14th of January Her Majesty prorogued the Legislature, with the usual ceremony pertaining to such occasion. It was noted that the foreign members of

the Legislature absented themselves as an expression of their disapproval and opposition to the cabinet, thereby indicating their threatening attitude against the Government and giving color to the rumors, which already, then, had reached us, that the reform party was conspiring to take some steps to, if possible, recover their lost power. After prorogation Her Majesty informed the cabinet that she wished to see them at the palace, and we responded to her order at about 1:30 p. m. After our arrival the Queen stated to us that, at the request of some 8,000 of her native subjects, she had decided to promulgate a new constitution, in which the grievances of her petitioning subjects would be remedied, and she asked us to sign the document with her. We all declined to become a party to this move and refused to comply with her request, and we earnestly advised her to give up her intention, although we were well aware that more than two-thirds of the electors of the country were in favor of the change, and that nearly all the representatives in the Legislature were elected on a platform in which the main plank was a new constitution. However, after talking with her and explaining the impossibility of taking such a step, she admitted that we were in the right, although calling our attention to the precedent which the Reform party had created by the revolutionary constitution which was promulgated in 1887.

The Queen then told the people's delegates, who were assembled in the throne room, that she could not grant their request at this time, but asked them all to return home quietly and await in peace the time when a proper course could be adopted to carry out the will of the people. The people dispersed quietly, and in a short time there were no Hawaiians in the palace grounds. A few remarks were made by the Hon. William White, the representative for Lahaina, to the effect that, while the people regretted the Queen's inability to grant the wishes of the people, they would accept the assurances of the Queen and await the proper time, which, if they were successful at the next election to be held, would be at the meeting of the Legislature in 1894. The insurgents have falsely reported the remarks of Mr. White, and in their press and otherwise represented him as making an incendiary and threatening speech. The falsehood of such statement, well known to us who were witnesses at the scene, will shortly be proven in the courts of justice, as Mr. White has retained counsel for the purpose of bringing a damage suit for malicious libel against the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, the principal organ of the reform party. Saturday evening and night were as peaceful and quiet as at any other time, but the conspirators were at work.

On Sunday morning, January 15, Mr. Thurston, the head of the revolutionary party, called on my colleagues, Ministers Colburn and Peterson, and asked them to join with himself and others in deposing the Queen, assuring them that such movement would be perfectly safe, as Minister Stevens had promised them the support of the United States forces and also that he would recognize and support a provisional government as soon as such a step could be taken. My colleagues naturally refused to entertain the infamous proposition of Mr. Thurston, and immediately communicated with myself and Minister Parker. The cabinet held several consultations with leading citizens of known loyalty to the Queen, and, knowing the strength of our forces, we felt confident that we easily could cope with any insurrection of the few malcontents.

On Monday, the 16th, we were informed that the conspirators had decided to establish a revolutionary government, giving as a reason that Her Majesty had attempted to violate the constitution, but the cabinet still felt sure that no such attempt could succeed if the insurgents depended on their own forces. The cabinet then advised the Queen to issue a proclamation to the people, in which she explained her reasons for desiring to promulgate a new constitution, and at the same time assured them that she would not make any further attempt or proposition to gain that object. This was done, and at 11 a. m. the proclamation was printed and distributed all over town. Assurances to a similar end were also sent to the foreign representatives and accepted as satisfactory. In the afternoon two mass meetings took place, one at the armory, where the actions so far taken by the so-called safety committee were indorsed, and one on Palace square, where the proclamation of the Queen was accepted and responded to in a resolution.

I will here state that of the large number of citizens who gathered at the armory meeting, perhaps not fifty understood or desired that any further steps should or would be taken. Of this I have been assured by a number of prominent citizens with whom I am on terms of friendship, although differing with them politically, and who went to that meeting simply for the purpose of giving a public expression that the community disapproved of the step which the Queen had desired to take, and who believed that the matter would be dropped right there. The issue of the Queen's proclamation was done after a consultation which the cabinet held Monday morning with the foreign representatives. We stated to the members of the corps diplomatique, who were present, what we intended to do, and were told that it was considered a wise step which they believed would be satisfactory. Present at the consultation were the representatives of England, France, Japan, and Portugal.

Minister Stevens declined to be present, which did not surprise us, knowing his sympathy for the revolutionists. At about 4 p. m. we were informed that the United States forces were landing.

Ministers Parker and Peterson immediately called upon Minister Stevens and gave him to understand that the Government was perfectly able to take care of the situation, and requested him to keep the troops on board. He answered that he had landed the troops for the protection of American life and property and proposed to keep them ashore. The troops then marched up by the palace, passed as far out on King street as the residence of Mr. J. B. Atherton, a distance of about 600 yards, and later on returned and quartered for the night in the Arion hall, a building opposite the government building and the palace. It is noteworthy that the Arion hall and all the buildings in the immediate vicinity are not American property, so if the troops were landed solely for the protection of American property, the placing of them so far away from the center of the property of Americans and so very close to the property of the Hawaiian Government was remarkable and very suggestive.

On Tuesday, the 17th, we were informed that the insurgents would proclaim a provisional government in the afternoon, and the cabinet called upon Minister Stevens, asking him if he would afford any assistance to the legal and lawful Government of the country to which he was accredited in case that such assistance should be required. He refused in unmistakable terms, and made us understand that he should acknowledge and support the revolutionary government as soon as it was established. We then proceeded to the station house, where we held a council of war. Our forces were enthusiastic, and volunteers enrolled so rapidly that it became necessary to close the doors of the station house. A little after 3 o'clock p. m. we were informed that a handful of citizens had entered the government building and that a proclamation had been read claiming that a provisional government had been established and that the Queen was deposed, and also that the United States forces, under command of Capt. Wiltse, were marched up ready for action, with sharp loaded cannon and guns.

The Government had decided not to place forces in the Government building, as the immediate vicinity of the United States troops would endanger the lives of the men from the *Boston* in case of a conflict with the rebels, and the Government desired, at all hazards, to avoid giving Minister Stevens any excuse or pretense for his hostile actions. After the information relating to the establishing of the Provisional Government had been received the cabinet wrote a letter from the station house to Minister Stevens and sent it to him by Mr. Charles Hopkins, a noble of the Legislature. The letter was a request to the American minister to inform the Queen's Government if he intended to recognize or support the lawful Government or the revolutionary government, which it was claimed was in existence. Mr. Stevens received the letter, and, through his daughter, informed Mr. Hopkins that he would answer it in due time. Mr. Hopkins demanded, cautiously but firmly, an immediate answer, and after considerable waiting a letter was handed to him addressed to His Excellency Samuel Parker, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which Mr. Stevens stated that he had recognized the Provisional Government because they were in possession of the Government building, and that he intended to support them.

We realized then that any steps from our side to dislodge and arrest the rebels would unavoidably lead us into a conflict with the United States forces, and we decided to surrender to the Provisional Government with the full understanding that such surrender was under protest, the United States Government to decide if the action of their minister and the use of their forces to destroy a friendly Government was justifiable and according to American principles. The conference between the Provisional Government was carried on by Mr. S. M. Damon on their behalf and the cabinet on behalf of the Queen. Other stipulations were agreed upon, the Provisional Government showing itself ready to promise anything so long as a fight could be avoided, but all such stipulations and promises were totally ignored after the surrender was made. It was after 7 o'clock p. m. when finally the arms and ammunition of the Queen's Government were turned over to the Provisional Government, or about three hours after Minister Stevens had acknowledged that he had recognized the revolutionary government.

As a man who, for years, has taken an active part in Hawaiian politics, and as a practical sugar planter of many years' experience, it is not difficult for me to realize the true cause for the late revolution and for the subsequent desire for annexation. The depression in the sugar business which, since the passage of the McKinley bill, has made havoc with the handsome dividends which we have enjoyed since 1875 and the loss of power by the reform party were the only and true reasons for the revolution. The prospects of the sugar bounty was and is the main motive for the desire to be annexed on the part of the handful of responsible men who still desire such step to be taken. That such plans were fully in accord with the policy of the late American Government, from which Mr. Stevens received his instructions, was the only reason why the scheme became feasible. The very idea of losing their independence as a nation is distasteful to the Hawaiians, and I say unhesitatingly,

although I am an American citizen, to a large contingent of the foreign residents here.

The Queen's attempt to give a new constitution is not the only reason which is given by the insurgents as an excuse for the revolution. The passage of the lottery bill and the opium license bill has also been used both by Mr. Stevens and the insurgents as extenuating circumstances. I opposed and voted against the lottery bill, although it was a measure of my party, because I do not believe in the principle of such a law. But the measure was favored and supported by nearly all the Americans in Honolulu, the very men who revolted and who now claim that the lottery was the cause of the revolution.

On the day of the prorogation of the Legislature Minister Stevens returned to town, after a visit to Hawaii, too late to be present at the ceremony of the prorogation, but he called at the Government building where he saw Minister Parker and myself. After having made his excuses for not attending the prorogation he asked if the Queen had signed the lottery bill. Answered in the affirmative, he became very excited, and striking the table with his clenched fist he exclaimed, over and over again: "Gentlemen, this is a direct attack on the United States Government." I told him that the Queen had signed the bill because the measure seemed to be the wish of the people, and that the petitions favoring the bill from Honolulu contained a large number of names of prominent and responsible men, and although I was personally opposed to the bill I did not consider it justifiable for the cabinet to advise the Queen to veto it.

The opium license act I consider a wise measure, and as an employer of a large number of men I claim that the regular sale of opium is of greater advantage to all classes than the prohibition of it, which no government can enforce owing to the facility for smuggling offered by the large territory of coast on the islands. The opium license law was passed not alone as a revenue measure, but for the purpose of checking the wholesale corruption which the smuggling of the drug carried with it, and was, if anything, a measure in favor of the morality of the country rather than a measure of corruption. The bill was supported by many of the leading men in the present Government and also by many planters, irrespective of political sentiments or party.

In concluding this statement I wish to call attention to the fact that Minister J. L. Stevens, in one of his official dispatches to Secretary Foster, now published, has expressed himself to the effect that I am entertaining feelings of hostility and enmity towards him. I am not aware of ever having given Mr. Stevens any reason for making such an assertion, which is utterly without foundation, and I only call the attention to the matter to avoid a possible impression that anything which I have here stated should be construed as biased or influenced by any private motives or the result of any alleged unfriendly relations with the American minister.

WM. H. CORNWELL.

[Inclosure 6 in No. 3.]

Mr. Colburn to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, April 15, 1893.

SIR: As a member of Her Majesty Liliuokalani's cabinet that was deposed with her by a handful of citizens backed by the troops of the good ship *Boston* of the U. S. Navy, I called on you on the evening of Saturday, April 8, and paid my respects to you. You received me kindly, and during our conversation you asked me to prepare for you a statement of the facts connected with the Hawaiian revolution and all that was incident to it, and other important matters *in re* Hawaii, from my own knowledge and observation.

In response to your request I submit to you the following, trusting that it may be of value to you in summing up your conclusions in all that has happened, and the position of Queen Liliuokalani and the Hawaiian people.

In opening up my statement, I desire first to introduce myself thoroughly to you, so that you will recognize at once that I propose to take the responsibility of all that I write, and will produce to the extent of my ability, all such evidence as you may require, to corroborate what I write should you so desire it.

My name in full is John Francis Colburn. I was born on the 30th day of September, 1859; my father was an American and my mother a Hawaiian. My father died when I was but 2 years of age, and I, with my brother and sister, was brought up by my mother, who labored and toiled for our support with a sewing machine. I have received the whole of my education right here and have never traveled further than beyond San Francisco, Cal., when my presence was called there on business, and I made four different trips to that large city. At the age of 16 years I entered

into employment, receiving such from the firm of Lewers & Cooke, the latter being one of the commissioners of the Provisional Government who went to Washington to secure annexation. At the age of 20 years I was married, and have living to-day five children; for the last seven years I have conducted a large hay, grain, and feed business on my own account, and am still following that pursuit. I omitted to mention that I had a large number of relatives on my father's side residing in different parts of the United States, chief among them being the husband of my father's own sister, J. H. Gans, residing in Red Bud, Ill., a strong Democrat and an applicant to President Cleveland for the position of American minister to this country in place of J. L. Stevens. My great grandfather, Thomas Colburn, was the first man killed at the battle of Bunker Hill in 1775, fighting as a patriotic American.

Liliuokalani was proclaimed Queen of the Hawaiian Islands January 29, 1891; her first cabinet had Mr. Samuel Parker as premier; he and his colleagues were voted out by a resolution of want of confidence, introduced by Mr. W. C. Wilder, one of the commissioners to Washington to seek annexation. After they were voted out the Queen appointed and commissioned a cabinet with E. C. Macfarlane as premier; they reported to the legislature and immediately upon sight L. A. Thurston moved an adjournment for two days. After adjournment, and when the members had taken their seats, W. O. Smith, the present attorney-general of the Provisional Government, introduced a resolution of want of confidence. After a long and heated discussion a vote was taken, and only twenty-four members responded to adopting the resolution; it was only lost to be resurrected again at another day. Time rolled on, and two weeks after another resolution of want of confidence was introduced against this same cabinet, but this time, through the intrigue of Thurston and his party, it was brought in and read by a native member. A vote was taken and a sufficient number of votes were cast to oust them.

They retired and the Queen, appointed another cabinet, of which W. H. Cornwell was premier. This cabinet, as soon as it presented itself to the house, was voted out on sight; the reason of it was, that the intrigue was worked so well on some of the native members of the legislature by paying them bribes and a weekly support, that they agreed with Thurston and his faction to vote out any cabinet the Queen chose to send to the legislature, unless it be a certain four of their own party, who they wanted to get in as the cabinet, and control the affairs of the country. The funds put up for this purpose was partly by S. M. Damon and C. Bolte, also by Mr. H. P. Baldwin, a large sugar plantation owner. When the Cornwell cabinet was voted out the Queen was puzzled as to what to do. She looked upon this reform party, who was doing all this work, as bringing about a conflict with her and the legislature; this reform party wanted to dictate to the Queen who the cabinet should be, and she, on the other hand, did not wish to recognize them to that extent, because the whole of the opposition, who had been voting cabinets out, were a mixture of three different political parties, and she was well informed that bribery was at the bottom of the whole affair.

She stood the Legislature off for a week or ten days; in the meantime she asked several well-to-do conservative business men to consult with her as to what course she should pursue, and considerable advice was given her to make the appointments of the persons whom the reform party was clamoring for, so as to bring about quiet and contentment in the business community, who was worked up to a certain pitch about the fact that the only work the Legislature was doing was to oust cabinets, and it was affecting business. The Queen paid heed to this advice given, and commissioned what was known as the Wilcox or the missionary cabinet. They reported to the Legislature, and to show you that they were not a popular cabinet, twenty-five members were ready to vote them right out, and it was only through the influence of some of us that the resolution was not introduced then, so that this cabinet could have a fair trial. It staid in power two months when, on the 12th day of January, 1893, a resolution was introduced and they were voted out. The reform party or the missionaries, as they are better named and called, were disgruntled and dissatisfied and discouraged at this work, and openly said we will get even with you, meaning the Hawaiians. They knew this vote meant their losing their power and influence in this country for years to come, and they were hostile. However, the majority of the people were satisfied that they were voted out, and looked to the prospects of the Queen appointing a cabinet with at least two Hawaiians in it, so that the race prejudice which had been created for quite a while would wear away and the Hawaiians and foreigners would work together; the Queen also realized this matter as of great importance, and on Friday, January 13, 1893, she summoned and appointed the writer, minister of interior; Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs; W. H. Cornwell, minister of finance, and A. P. Peterson, attorney-general; the first two of us being the Hawaiian representation and the last two the foreign.

We repaired to the Legislature who was waiting for the Queen's new cabinet, and as this cabinet approached the Government building from the palace the former was thronged with people who were anxious to see the new cabinet and extend their

congratulations to us. That was a scene that has never before been witnessed upon the appointment of former cabinets; however, we arrived at the Legislature and amidst great cheering we took our seats. The house went through its work and then adjourned. The next day was the time that had been previously set for proroguing the Legislature. At 10 o'clock of that day, January 14, 1893, Mr Peterson informed me that he had heard it rumored that it was the Queen's intention to promulgate a new constitution. I replied to him that she was making a mistake and I would oppose her if she really intended to do it. I called out to Messrs. Parker and Cornwell, and the four of us consulted over the matter. We all agreed that if the Queen was determined upon doing this work, and pleasing only the native element, we would oppose her. Mr. Parker went over at once to the palace to find out correctly if there was any truth to this rumor, but he was unable to see her, as she was preparing herself to prorogue the Legislature. He returned and informed us that he could not see her, and we decided to wait until the closing of Parliament.

In the meantime, however, I felt as though we should place ourselves in the right light before the foreign element of the community, and to get their view on the matter in case the Queen's intentions were really as rumored and she would make it an issue with us, I left my colleagues at the Government building and repaired at once with all haste to the office of A. S. Hartwell, an old and esteemed friend of mine, and told him about the rumor we had heard, the consultation we had had, and the position we would take if the Queen could not be guided by our advice, and that was to resign. He asked me if he could ask Messrs. Thurston and Smith (the Provisional Government commissioner at Washington and the present attorney-general of the Provisional Government) to be together with him, and we would all consult the matter over together. I consented and he summoned them. When they arrived I went over what I had told Mr. Hartwell a short time previous and when I got through Thurston spoke up and said, "Colburn, don't you resign under any conditions; if the Queen makes this an issue with you, we (meaning the foreign element) will back you up and I feel sure Minister Stevens will." He further asked, "are you alone in your stand?" and I replied, "no, I was positive Peterson took the same view as I did." He spoke up again, "bring Peterson down here; we want to talk to him."

I repaired at once to the Government building, told Peterson what I had done, and asked him to come down to Hartwell's office with me. He consented, and we both came down. Upon arriving there we held a consultation. Thurston submitted in writing a plan for action in case the Queen was going to carry out her desire. We took the document, which was written by Thurston himself, and told him we would await developments. We then left them and went to the Government building. This was now approaching the noon hour. At 12 m., precisely, the Queen arrived at the Government building and prorogued the Legislature. Immediately after the Queen had left to return to the palace, Mr. Parker came up and said to us that the diplomatic corps wanted to have an interview with us at once in the foreign affairs office. We all consented and went directly upstairs to meet them.

After we were all seated, Mr. Wodehouse opened the conversation by asking us if we knew that a new constitution was to be promulgated that afternoon by the Queen? Mr. Parker replied that the cabinet were not aware of it, but they had heard rumors of it; he asked again what position the cabinet would take if the Queen did attempt to promulgate a new constitution, and Mr. Parker replied that the cabinet would oppose it. The conversation then drifted into their inquiring as to what reason could prompt the Queen to do anything like this, if the rumors that they and ourselves had heard were true, and we answered that it must be from the petition the natives had got up, signed, and presented to her. Mr. Wodehouse then said the Queen must not promulgate a new constitution, and if she had any idea of it she must abandon it. We assured him we would do all in our power to avoid anything of this kind happening. During all this conversation Mr. J. L. Stevens, who had kept perfectly quiet, not saying anything, spoke up now and asked if the Queen had signed the lottery bill? Mr. Parker replied in the affirmative; he asked again, did the cabinet advise the Queen to sign it? Mr. Peterson replied that the Queen considered that the bill having passed the Legislature by a majority she should sign it as she had no reason for vetoing it, and the cabinet acquiesced in her action. Mr. Stevens instantly raised his cane and stamped it on the floor and said the passing of the lottery bill and the signing of it by the Queen is a direct attack upon the United States; and he picked up his hat and walked out of the room, but before he was fairly out he spoke up and said, he wanted the cabinet to inform him at once if the Queen was going to attempt what we had a little while before discussed; we replied to him that we would, and we parted company.

The cabinet then went directly from the Government building to the palace where there was in waiting the Queen, members of the legislature, members of several political societies, and a large number of the public. Upon our arrival at the palace we entered the blue room and met the Queen. After seating ourselves she said to us that she had received a petition signed by nine thousand of her native subjects ask-

ing her for a new constitution, and she thought this was an opportune time to grant them their prayer and asked us to countersign her signature that she wanted to place on the document. Each one of us got up, one after the other, and told her that we could not accede to her wishes, and advised her to abandon the idea. She was very determined at first, and said she should promulgate it anyway. We reasoned with her and left her to think the matter over again, and at the same time take rest.

Messrs. Cornwell, Peterson, and myself left the palace and went to the Government building; we held a consultation and sent a message to each of the diplomatic corps; they all arrived and we entered into consultation again. The gentlemen of the diplomatic corps urged us very strongly to return to the palace and inform Her Majesty that she must abandon the idea at once. While this was going on at the Government building, Thurston and others who had heard of this matter were enrolling names down town with the avowed object of supporting the Cabinet in their positions and the stand they had taken. Thurston then came up to me and said to oppose the Queen's intention as the foreign element of the community did not want a new constitution, and we could receive support, all that we wanted, even if it was necessary to depose her. At 3 o'clock, of that day we left the Government building again, and started over to the palace as the Queen had just sent us a message she wanted to see us at once.

As we were hurrying over there, and just before I had got out of the gate at the entrance of the Government building yard, W. O. Smith, the present attorney-general, came rushing in in a hack very much excited, and said, "Colburn, don't be alarmed; buck the Queen all you can; the troops of the *Boston* will assist in supporting you in your stand; make all the haste you can. Mr. Stevens has sent an order to the captain of the *Boston*, and his men with their guns and ammunition are already in the boats of the ship ready to come ashore at once." I made no reply to him except telling him we were then on our way to the palace. He left me and I sung out to my colleagues, and told them what Smith had said to me. We arrived at the palace, and the Queen, who was waiting for us, asked us if we would read the new constitution she wanted to promulgate, and compare it with the one forced upon the late King Kalakaua by the Reform party in the revolution of 1887, and also the one promulgated by Kamehameha V in 1864. We replied that we would, sat down, and after comparing it we found some defects in it and pointed them out to her and advised her again to abandon the idea. After a little while she spoke up, and asked us if we were a unit in our advice, and we all replied yes. She then said she would pay heed to it and would inform her people who were still waiting, that she could not give them what they wanted, and to endure their grievances (this implied to the Constitution of 1887). She did so, and the people departed for their homes.

Mr. Peterson and myself went down town to the office of W. O. Smith, where there was a large gathering of the foreigners, and they asked me to speak to them. I did so and told them all that happened; some of them asked if we did not think the Queen would promulgate it at some other time, and I assured them we would never allow her to do it as long as the people who lived here were not a unit on such a subject. A little later about 4:30 p. m. of that day, Mr. Thurston came to me with a document written out by him and said, "Colburn, this is a request on Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse to land the troops from the *Boston* and render you support; you and Peterson and Cornwell must sign it and place it in my hands so that in case you are imprisoned by the Queen's orders that she can put this project of hers through, then this letter can be delivered." I replied to him that I did not think it was necessary, as I felt sure the Queen had abandoned the idea altogether; he insisted on my taking it, and I took it and handed it to Peterson; where it now is I do not know, but we never signed it, as there was no reason for it.

The next morning, Sunday, January 15, 1893 at 6 a. m., Thurston came to my house and asked me to go with him to Peterson's house. I asked him what he wanted with us at such an early hour, and his reply was, pressing business. I consented and accompanied him to Peterson's house. Upon our arriving there we entered the room, and when we were seated, the three of us, he said that he represented a committee of safety who had had a meeting at his house on Saturday evening and decided to send him to us with a proposition, and that was that we, Peterson and Colburn, should depose the Queen. We asked him who this committee of safety was, and he replied thirteen gentlemen picked out from all those that had enrolled to support the cabinet in opposing the Queen against her desires *in re* new constitution. We asked him to furnish their names and he did so. He then said, it is the desire of this committee you two should depose the Queen and declare a provisional government. Don't say a word about it to Parker and Cornwell, as Parker is a treacherous liar, and Cornwell is not fit for anything, and simply does what Parker tells him to do. He went on to say that it was their desire to get a division in the cabinet, and the deposing of the Queen should appear to be done by a part of her own cabinet, or a portion of the Government itself; and he went on to say that he could inform us that

Mr. Stevens had given this committee the assurance that if we two signed a request to him to land the troops of the *Boston* he would immediately comply with the request and have them landed to assist in carrying out this work; and further, that if we did not agree to the proposition that we could not receive aid and support from them in the future if we needed it. We told him that we would have to take the matter under advisement and would inform him as to our conclusions later on. He pressed for an answer then, but we refused to give it to him.

After his departure we sent for Parker and Cornwell, and imparted to them what Thurston had proposed to us, and we entered into consultation. We decided to summon at least six responsible and conservative business men of the community to consult with us, and to get their views. We did so, and, at 1:30 p. m. of that Sunday, the following gentlemen met us: Messrs. F. A. Schaeffer, J. O. Carter, S. M. Damon, W. M. Giffard, S. C. Allen, and E. C. Macfarlane. We told them what Thurston, on behalf of the committee of thirteen, had proposed, and asked them for their views. Each one asked if the Queen had given up the idea of promulgating a new constitution altogether, and we replied in the affirmative. They said, in that case the Queen and cabinet should issue a proclamation, giving the community the assurance that this matter was at an end.

We asked them to dictate a proclamation and they did so; they one and all decided that we should inform this committee that we could not consider their proposition, and ask them to accept the assurances that were to be given in the proclamation. They also asked if the Government was in a position to suppress any uprising, and we told these gentlemen that the Government was ready and able to cope with any emergency that might happen, and to suppress any revolt. Mr. S. M. Damon spoke up and said the troops of the "*Boston*" are going to be landed. Before proceeding further, I may say right here that Mr. Damon's remark seemed insignificant at the time, but as things turned out he was in with the revolutionists and knew perfectly well the attitude of Mr. Stevens, and when he made the remark at our meeting it signified a good deal; it meant that those forces were going to depose Queen Liliuokalani and place the situation of the country in the position that it is in to-day.

The next day (Monday) the proclamation dictated by these gentlemen was printed and posted and distributed all over town. Later on in the day two mass meetings were held, one by the native element and the other by the foreign element. At the former the natives accepted the proclamation, although it was directly contrary to what they wanted (a new constitution), and the latter denounced the Queen and left everything in the hands of the committee of safety spoken about. At 5 p. m. of that day the troops of the *Boston* were landed. Immediately upon the information being conveyed to the cabinet that such was the case, Mr. Parker and myself drove with all haste to the residence of J. L. Stevens. When we arrived there, we asked him the reason the troops were being landed, and his reply was that he had received a request from a committee of safety, and he had consulted with Capt. Wiltse. He went on to say that there were a number of women and old men in the town besides children that were alarmed with the rumors of a revolution, and he wanted to offer protection. Mr. Parker replied that the Government was in a position to offer everyone protection, was able to suppress any rebellion, and would offer protection to him (Stevens) and noted his protest. Mr. Stevens replied that he was informed that the Government was in a strong position to suppress any revolt, but he could not help the matter of landing, and as the troops were ashore they would stay ashore. I asked him if he intended to annex the country and he replied "No," and further said those troops are ashore to preserve the Queen on her throne, you gentlemen in your offices, and to offer protection to the community at large. We told him again we did not want the troops ashore, and we could preserve law and order ourselves. He replied by saying make your protest in writing, and if you make it in a friendly spirit I will answer in the same tone.

On Tuesday information was conveyed to us that the Queen was to be deposed and a Provisional Government declared; we got everything in readiness to suppress the revolt expected; we had under arms 600 men with rifles, and 30,000 rounds of ammunition, 8 brass Austrian field cannon, and 2 Gatling guns. A little before 2 p. m. of that day the cabinet drove up to Mr. Stevens's residence to inquire of him as to the position he was going to take in this matter, as we were informed and suspected from all that Thurston and his followers had said that the American troops were going to assist these usurpers, who everyone knew would not attempt to bring about any such change as they were going to if they were not assured of support by the American forces. We arrived at Stevens's house and after talking quite awhile with him he gave us no definite answer and we left him and returned to the police station to make our headquarters there and to write to Mr. Stevens about his position. While the letter to Stevens was being dictated by Mr. Peterson, information was brought to us that about 30 unarmed men had taken possession of the Government Building, had read their proclamation, and had committed acts of treason.

We paid no attention to them but sent our letter with all haste at a few minutes before 3 p. m., by Mr. C. L. Hopkins to Mr. Stevens. After Stevens read the letter,

he told Hopkins to go away and come back again in an hour. Hopkins replied that the cabinet had instructed him to bring a reply forthwith, so that they would know how to act, and Stevens refused. He kept Hopkins waiting on his veranda one hour and then handed him a reply to us. While Stevens was keeping Hopkins waiting, the usurpers were preparing to resist the Government in case of attack, and we did nothing, but kept our men ready for action. The letter from Stevens carried by Hopkins to us reached us 5 minutes of 4 p. m., and after reading its contents, we concluded to surrender and yield to America.

I want to impress upon you that we never surrendered the palace, police station, and barracks till after we had received Stevens's letter, and not until we had filed our protest with the Provisional Government. The surrender was a little after 6 in the evening; these usurpers could never have overthrown the Government, as they did not have sufficient arms and ammunition; and on the other hand, it will be admitted by themselves, I think, that the munitions of war that we had would have annihilated them were it not for the United States troops and Minister Stevens.

I remain, etc.,

JOHN F. COLBURN.

[Inclosure 7 in No. 3.]

Citizens' committee of safety to Mr. Stevens.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

SIR: We, the undersigned citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Lilioukalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced, and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force, and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution; and, while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces.

HENRY E. COOPER,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
C. BOLTE,
A. BROWN,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
THEO. F. LANSING,
ED. SUHR,
L. A. THURSTON,
JOHN EMMELUTH,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,

Citizens' Committee of Safety.

No. 7.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 4.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, May 4, 1893.

SIR: Up to the period of the hauling down of the United States ensign from the Government building there had been inaction on the part of those opposed to annexation. Since then, inspired by that fact, the natives have seemed to act with freedom in expressing their views on the subject of annexation and of the revolution dethroning Lilioukalani. Annexationists and antiannexationists have been active

in procuring subscribers to declarations in favor of and against annexation.

I have abstained from any indication of my opinion or wishes concerning the question. When memorials and petitions have been presented, I have made it a rule to state substantially that I would accept the papers simply as a fact in the situation in the Islands, but could not enter into any expression of views thereon.

At this time the indications are unmistakable that a large majority of the people of the Islands are utterly opposed to annexation. I do not look for any change from this situation through future information. I shall be careful, however, to keep myself free to entertain any and all facts in relation thereto, that I may report with accuracy to you.

There is a strong disposition on the part of the annexation element to suppress expressions against annexation by social and business hostility.

I inclose you herewith a newspaper extract containing proceedings of the executive and advisory councils on the subject of the restoration of the monarchy (Inclosure No. 1).

The morning following, delegations from all the Islands were to assemble for the purpose of presenting resolutions to the United States Commissioner indicating their opinion on the present political situation. The reform party are in favor of annexation. The opponents of this party are generally in favor of the restoration of Liliuokalani, but a small minority are inclined to an independent Republic.

I send you a memorial presented to me by a committee of delegates of all the branch associations of the Hawaiian Patriotic League (Inclosure No. 2). It was presented by a committee composed of John Richardson, J. A. Akina, Ben. Nankana, J. R. Kaihiopulani, and S. H. K. Ne.

To this memorial I made response, taken down by our stenographer, Mr. Mills, in the language following:

I will accept it, as I have all memorials, as a matter of information. I can not enter into a discussion of it with you. I am glad to meet you, gentlemen.

It was this body which incited Mr. Emmeluth to offer his resolution, I presume.

I have five petitions signed by natives in favor of annexation, but always coupled with a condition that the right to vote is to be preserved to them. This is the feeling of all the natives who have signed petitions for annexation. It is by assurances that the right of suffrage will be preserved to them that some are induced to sign the petitions. In the future all petitions presenting the views of the people will be fully reported.

I send you an interview with Mr. S. A. Damon, president of the advisory council (Inclosure No. 3); also one with Mr. Henry Waterhouse, a member of the advisory council (Inclosure No. 4); also a letter, in original, from Mr. J. O. Carter; also a copy of a letter from Lieut. Swinburne, and affidavits from Messrs. Charles L. Hopkins, I. F. Colburn, and A. B. Peterson.

These are sent simply as indicating something of the elements which brought about the dethronement of Liliuokalani. I will endeavor to dissipate all the mists connected with this subject before a great while.

I think it will be shown that the American minister recognized the Provisional Government when the chief points of defense of the Queen, to wit: the station house and barracks, had not surrendered, and would not have surrendered but for that recognition. It is unquestionably the fact that Liliuokalani was induced to sign the protest already com-

municated to the State Department by Mr. Stevens and to surrender her forces by the belief that she could not successfully contest with the United States, which appeared to her mind to be a party in the impending conflict of arms. She was induced to believe that she would have a hearing on the merits of the interference by the American minister, and gave to it doubtless the fullest faith.

The mail leaves in two and a half hours from now, and this makes it necessary for me to avoid any attempt to elaborate on the condition of affairs at this time.

I am, etc.,

J. H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

Since closing the foregoing dispatch I have received an affidavit from Charles B. Wilson, which I send as Inclosure 10. I shall gather all the evidence on this subject which I can obtain from both sides touching the question as to whether the recognition came before or after the surrender of the forces of Liliuokalani. This Wilson is the man described in Minister Stevens's dispatches as the paramour of the Queen. Whatever there may be in these charges (concerning which I have little information), I am very much inclined to think his affidavit is substantially true.

J. H. B.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 4.]

HAWAIIAN DAILY STAR, MAY 1, 1893.—PROVISIONAL LEGISLATURE.

* * * * *

Mr. Emmeluth moved a resolution that agitation in favor of the restoration of the monarchy be declared as coming under the terms of the sedition act.

Mr. Waterhouse moved that the resolution pass. It was high time to take action when treason was being conducted under their noses. Here were natives coming from the other islands to agitate for restoration, and receiving encouragement from the Queen, who told them to have hope and courage.

Mr. Emmeluth held that as annexation was the object for which this Provisional Government was formed, it should be regarded as treason for anybody to discuss restoration or an independent republic. It would be only justice to the ignorant Hawaiians to give a clear expression of the Government on this matter. He related an instance of superstition among the natives. A Hawaiian neighbor of his died after four days' illness, and his widow asked the speaker what her late husband had done that the Government people should have done that to him?

Mr. Young was one who would go the farthest towards toleration, but he believed Mr. Emmeluth was right in the main. It was time they knew whether they were to have a government or not.

Minister Smith said the question had come before him in requests for advice from sheriffs. The Government should deal with the matter cautiously, as there was danger of going too far. Peaceful discussion of the situation he did not think came within the category of sedition. It was certainly lawful under the constitution.

Mr. Brown counseled going slow. Mr. Blount was sent here, it was understood, to ascertain the sentiment of the Hawaiian people, and nothing should be done to obstruct his investigation. Hawaiians loved their flag above everything else. They were like children. If they could retain their flag they would not think much about the loss of the monarchy. Were the monarch of the Kamehameha line it might be different. As it was he thought only a few in Honolulu were wanting restoration, and these because they believed in that event they should come on top.

Mr. Emmeluth was not for suppressing those who were misled, but those who were misleading the Hawaiians.

Mr. Damon thought if the Government was weak it ought to jump on any movement looking toward restoration. The freedom of speech and the freedom of the press was favorable to safety. The Government surely had sufficient standing by this time to be past the necessity for extreme measures.

Mr. Young withdrew his motion to pass, and the resolution was referred to the executive council.

The council went into executive session at 3:35.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 4.]

Petition of natives.

Whereas His Excellency, Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America, has honored the Hawaiian nation by sending to us the Hon. James H. Blount as a Special Commissioner to find out the true wishes of the Hawaiian people as to the proposed annexation of their country to their great friend the United States; therefore,

We, the people of the Hawaiian Islands, through the delegates of the branches of the Hawaiian Patriotic League of all the districts throughout the kingdom, in convention assembled, take this mode of submitting our appeal and expression of our unanimous wishes to the people of our great and good friend, the Republic of the United States of America, with whom we always entertained the most cordial relations, whom we have learned to look upon as our patrons and most reliable protectors, and whose honor, integrity, and sense of justice and equity we have ever confidently relied for investigation into the grievous wrongs that have been committed against us as a people, against the person of our sovereign, and the independence of our land.

And while we are anxious to promote the closest and most intimate political and commercial relations with the United States, we do not believe that the time has yet come for us to be deprived of our nationality and of our sovereign by annexation to any foreign power.

And therefore we do hereby earnestly and sincerely pray that the great wrongs committed against us may be righted by the restoration of the independent autonomy and constitutional government of our Kingdom under our beloved Queen Liliuokalani, in whom we have the utmost confidence as a conscientious and popular ruler.

DELEGATES ISLAND OF HAWAII.

S. T. Pūhōnua.
Henry West.
K. M. Koahou.
D. Hoakimaa.
T. P. Kaaeae.
J. H. Halawale.
S. H. K. Ne.
W. E. N. Kaneali'i.
C. G. Naope.

ISLAND OF MAUI.

R. H. Makekan.
J. K. Kealoali'i
D. Kanaha.
John Richardson.
Thomas Clark.
Thos. Benj. Lyons.
John Kaluna.
J. Kamakele.
S. D. Kapers.
S. W. Kaai.

ISLAND OF MOLOKAI.

J. N. Uahinui.
J. K. Kaipeopulani.

Approved:

HONOLULU, *March 2, 1893.*

ISLAND OF MOLOKAI—Continued.

D. Himeni.
J. P. Kapoohaale.
Kekoo'wai.
S. K. Kahalehulu.
S. K. Piiapoo.

ISLAND OF OAHU.

F. S. Keike.
C. Keawe.
John Kapamawaho Prendergast.
Enoch Johnson.
Sam K. Pua.
S. K. Kaupu.
D. W. Keliokamoku.
S. W. Kaiieha.
Benj. Naukana.
Kimo.

ISLAND OF KAUAI.

Chas. Kahee.
Geo. W. Mahikoa.
J. A. Akina.
D. N. Kamaliikaue.
Sam P. Kaleikini.
J. Molokui.

JOSEPH NAWAHO,
President Patriotic League.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 4.]

Interview between Mr. Damon and Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, April 29, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. How long have you lived here?

Mr. DAMON. I was born here in 1845. I have been away several times—perhaps to the extent of three or four years in that time.

Q. Where were you on the 14th of January, 1893, at the time the proclamation dethroning the Queen and establishing the Provisional Government was read?

A. I was at Honolulu. I was one of the members of that body who went up.

Q. The paper was read by Mr. Cooper?

A. By Judge Cooper.

Q. How many of you were there in that body which went up—about?

A. The whole body. There would be four of the executive and fourteen of the advisory.

Q. Please look at this paper and see if they are the persons (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 76, Fifty-second Congress, second session).

A. Thurston was not present, and I do not think Wilhelm was there.

Q. Where did you start from?

A. From W. O. Smith's office on Fort street.

Q. And what street did you take going from there?

A. We walked up directly to the Government house on Merchant street. It was suggested that a part should go by the way of Queen street, but a majority of us went by way of Merchant street.

Q. What was the idea for dividing the committee?

A. So that it should not attract so much attention, and it would be safer perhaps to have it divided than going in mass.

Q. Was it because it occurred to them that it might invite attack if they went in mass?

A. That was partly the idea—that it was more prudent. I think we, most of us, walked together—not compactly, but together.

Q. Any crowd following you?

A. No; the crowd was attracted to the corner of Fort and King streets, owing to the shot that was fired by Mr. Good at a policeman. In fact, the crowd cleared from the Government house and was attracted there. From all directions they centered at the corner of Hall's store.

Q. You found, then, scarcely anyone at the Government house when the committee arrived?

A. Scarcely anyone there except porters. After Mr. Cooper began to read the proclamation—then different ones came out of the offices—clerks and officials—while the proclamation was being read.

Q. Some of the Provisional Government troops, or rather troops raised at the direction of the Committee of Safety, came on the ground before the reading of the proclamation was finished?

A. When we arrived there was but one man with a rifle on the premises, Mr. Oscar White; but some little time later they commenced to come in from the armory, troops that were under the supervision of Col. Soper.

Q. Was that before or during the reading of the proclamation?

A. During the reading. Toward the end of it.

Q. How many troops came in? Do you have any knowledge of the number you had enlisted?

A. There were enough came in to make us feel more decidedly at ease than before they arrived.

Q. You could not say how many there were?

A. No; they kept coming in right along. They got to be quite a body.

Q. After the reading of the proclamation the late ministers were sent for?

A. After the reading of the proclamation we adjourned to the office of the Minister of the Interior, and then we commenced to formulate our plans and get ourselves into working order. Mr. Dole was at the head. While we were there in consultation Mr. Cornwell and Mr. Parker came up there from the Station House and held a conference with us.

Q. What was the purport of that conference?

A. The result of that conference was that Mr. Bolte and myself were requested to return with Mr. Cornwell and Mr. Parker to the Station House and recommend and urge upon the parties in power at the Police Station to surrender to the Provisional Government. We had a conference with the ministers in the room occupied generally by the deputy marshal. There were present Messrs. Peterson, Colburn, Parker, Cornwell, Bolte, and later Mr. Neumann, who was asked to come in. After consultation of the matter of their yielding up their power to the Provisional Government they asked to be let alone for a few moments, and I went into one of the rear cells in

the corridor with Marshal Wilson and urged him very strongly to give up any hope or any thought of making any attack, or resistance, more properly.

Q. What reason did you give him?

A. I can not remember at the present moment giving him a reason, but I remember distinctly saying to him: "Now, if you will coöperate with us, if in future I can be of service to you I will do so.

Q. Was there any suggestion of sympathy on the part of the United States Minister in your movement?

A. While I was in the Station House a man by the name of Bowler said to me: "We are all prepared, but I will never fight against the American flag."

Q. Was there anything in the conversation between you and him in which any intimation direct or indirect that the United States Minister was in sympathy with you or the United States troops and officers?

A. I can not remember any definite thing, but from Mr. Bowler's remark they must have thought that the United States troops were here for some purpose.

Q. Was Mr. Bowler with the Queen's party?

A. He was. He was part of the force in the Station House.

Q. Did you say anything at all indicating an opinion that there was any sympathy on the part of Mr. Stevens or Capt. Wiltse with the movement for the new government?

A. I can not remember. I may possibly have said so.

Q. Did you think so at that time?

A. I may have had an impression, but I know nothing about it.

Q. What was your impression?

A. My impression was, seeing the troops landed here in this time of excitement and turmoil, that—well, I suppose I might say that they could not stand it any longer—the Americans could not stand it any longer.

Q. Your impression, then, was that the American Minister and Captain Wiltse and the troops were in sympathy with the movement of the white residents here in the pending controversy between them and the Queen?

A. While we were in the Government building and during the reading of the proclamation and while we were all extremely nervous as to our personal safety, I asked one of the men with me there: "Will not the American troops support us?" Finally I asked one of the men to go over and ask Lieut. Swinburne if he was not going to send someone over to protect us? The man returned and said to me, "Capt. Wiltse's orders are 'I remain passive.'" That is all I know of what passed between us.

Q. You speak of your impression. That relates to a particular conversation between two or three persons; but what was your impression as to the matter of whether or not the American Minister and the American naval officers were in sympathy with the movement?

A. I was perfectly nonplussed by not receiving any support. I could not imagine why we were there without being supported by American troops, prior to the troops coming from the armory. We were not supported in any way.

Q. You had not been in council with the Committee of Public Safety up to that time?

A. No.

Q. Well, the troops were—how far off from the reading of the proclamation?

A. They were over in that yard known as Gilson yard in the rear of the music hall. They were quartered there.

Q. Any artillery?

A. I think they had a small gun—Gatling gun and howitzer.

Q. Where were they pointed—in what direction?

A. I can not tell you.

Q. You were surprised that they did not come into the grounds while the proclamation was being read. Is that what you mean by not supporting you?

A. I had no definite information what the movement was, as I told you before in a private interview, but knowing that they were on shore I supposed that they would support us, and when they did not support us, and we were there for fifteen or twenty minutes I was perfectly astonished that we were in that position without any support.

Q. How far would you say, in yards, it was from where the proclamation was being read to where the nearest troops were?

A. I think about 75 yards.

Q. Was there a piece of artillery in the street between the building the troops were stationed in and the Government building?

A. The only piece of firearms of any kind in that street was Oscar White's rifle. We met him as we came around the corner.

Q. Did you have occasion to look there to see?

A. We stopped before turning into the side gate to converse with Oscar White, before proceeding into the Government building.

Q. Are you sure there was not a piece of artillery in that street before the reading of the proclamation?

A. I can not tell you; but the only gun I could see was Oscar White's. I remarked: "Oscar, this is not so very prudent for you to be here with only one rifle in this street."

Q. Where did you see the troops first?

A. I came up from Monolalua by a back street and turned into Nuuana street, one house above Mr. Stevens', and as I turned the corner I saw the American troops marching up towards Mr. Stevens' house, and directly in front of his house.

Q. Did you meet Mr. Henry Waterhouse?

A. I met him there at that time.

Q. What conversation passed between you?

A. I think I said: "Henry, what does all this mean?" If I remember rightly now, he said: "It is all up."

Q. And what did you understand by the expression, "It is all up?"

A. I understand from that that the American troops had taken possession of the island. That was my impression.

Q. And was that favorable to the Queen or favorable to the other side, as you understood it?

A. That was distinctly favorable to the foreign element here.

Q. You mean the movement for a Provisional Government?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see Mr. Stevens that day?

A. No; I did not see him that day.

Q. What is Mr. Waterhouse doing now?

A. Henry? He is a member of the council.

Q. Was he a member of the Committee of Public Safety?

A. If I remember right, he was.

Q. Is that his signature [exhibiting letter of Committee of Public Safety to Mr. Stevens]?

The letter is as follows:

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Honolulu, January 16, 1893.*

SIR: We, the undersigned, citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Liliuokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced, and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and to the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution, and while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces.

HENRY E. COOPER,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
C. BOLTE,
A. BROWN,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
THEO. F. LANSING,
ED. SUHR,
L. A. THURSTON,
JOHN EMMELUTH,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,
Citizens' Committee of Safety.

His Excellency, JOHN L. STEPHENS,
American Minister Resident.

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Did he seem then pleased or alarmed?

A. He was very much strained and excited. There was no pleasure in it, but still there was a feeling of security. That was it. He evinced a feeling of security. He was not smiling or joking.

Q. It was not a joking time. Well, you say there was nothing in the first visit of yours to the Station House to indicate any impression on your part that you

believed the United States Minister or the United States troops, or both, were in sympathy with the movement of the committee of safety?

A. I was nonplussed. I did suppose they were going to support us.

Q. You did not say anything to the people in the Station House to lead them to suppose you were hopeful of aid?

A. I can not remember saying it now; I might have done so.

Q. Did you say it at any place?

A. I do not remember; I may have said it.

Q. Was there an effort on the part of those who were moving for a change of government to make that impression?

A. I think there was.

Q. Was that impression among the whites generally.

A. That I can not say. I know there was that impression. Some of the members tried to convey that impression.

Q. On what occasion?

A. Many occasions. One particular occasion was while we were in the Government building the day the proclamation was read.

Q. What was said, and who said it?

A. Charles Carter said to me: "After you are in possession of the Government building the troops will support you." I think that was his remark.

Q. Was he on the committee of public safety?

A. I think so.

Q. Was he in the party that went up to read the proclamation?

A. He was present there during the time it was read. Whether he went up with us or not I do not remember.

Q. It was during that time he made that remark?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he an active promoter of the movement?

A. I think he was.

Q. Has he any connection with the Government to-day?

A. No, except he is one of the Commissioners in Washington.

Q. You have been in previous revolutions here?

A. I have been in the Wilcox revolution. I took quite a prominent part in its suppression. I was one of the ministers at the time.

Q. You had a conversation with Mr. Carter about the time the proclamation was being read?

A. Yes.

Q. You were somewhat anxious as to whether or not you would be supported by United States troops?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you express any fear in the presence of Mr. Carter?

A. Well, no man likes to tell he was afraid.

Q. I do not mean in a cowardly sense.

A. Well, with others, I was convinced that we were in a position of danger.

Q. What did Mr. Carter say?

A. He gave me to understand that we would be protected.

Q. By United States troops?

A. Yes; and when we were not protected by them I wanted to know the reason why.

Q. Do you mean by that that you expected them to march over?

A. I was under the impression that they would.

Q. What did you accomplish by that first visit to the Station House—any agreement?

A. We accomplished this—that it was a virtual giving up.

Q. What was said? What did the ministers say?

A. This is my impression of it to-day: That if they had only to contend with the Provisional Government and the forces of the Provisional Government that they would not give up. That was the impression that I gathered from them; that they felt themselves equal to the occasion so far as the Provisional Government went.

Q. Then having that sort of feeling, what did they propose to do?

A. They proposed to immediately deliver up. Then they went up, four of them, and had a parley with Mr. Dole and the Provisional Government. They agreed to desist, but said they must go to the Queen and get her to confer with them.

Q. So far as they were concerned they were willing to yield, provided the Queen was?

A. Yes. Then I went along with them to the palace. We all met in the Blue Room. There were present the Queen, two young princes, the four ministers, Judge Widdeman, Paul Neumann, J. O. Carter, E. C. McFarland and myself. We went over between 4 and 5 and remained until 6 discussing the situation.

Q. In that conversation you asked for a surrender of the forces, and the ministers advised it?

A. The different ones spoke and they all recommended it. Each one spoke. At

first, Judge Widdeman was opposed to it, but he finally changed his mind on the advice of Mr. Neumann. Mr. Neumann advised yielding. Each one advised it.

Q. Was this advice of Neumann and the cabinet based on the idea that the Queen would have to contend with the United States forces as well as the forces of the Provisional Government?

A. It was the Queen's idea that she could surrender pending a settlement at Washington, and it was on that condition that she gave up. If I remember right I spoke to her also. I said she could surrender or abdicate under protest.

Q. And that the protest would be considered at a later period at Washington?

A. At a later period.

Q. Did the cabinet in recommending her to yield to the Provisional Government give her to understand that they supposed that the American minister and the United States troops were in sympathy with the Provisional Government or with the Committee of Public Safety?

A. I know it was the Queen's idea that Mr. Stevens was in sympathy with this movement.

Q. But I am asking now as to what reasons the ministers gave for her acquiescence.

A. It was their idea that it was useless to carry on—that it would be provocative of bloodshed and trouble if she persisted in this matter longer; that it was wiser for her to abdicate under protest and have a hearing at a later time. That the forces against her were too strong.

Q. Did they indicate the United States forces at all in any way?

A. I do not remember their doing so.

Q. Do you know whether or not at that time they were under the impression that the United States forces were in sympathy with the revolution?

A. Beyond an impression I know nothing definite.

Q. What was the result of this conference with the Queen? What was agreed on?

A. She signed a document surrendering her rights to the Provisional Government under protest.

Q. Is this the protest on page 22, Ex. Doc. No. 76, 52d Cong., 2d Sess?

A. Yes. This was written out by Mr. Neumann and J. O. Carter while we were present. She was reluctant to agree to this, but was advised that the whole subject would come up for final consideration at Washington.

Q. Did you at the time consent to recommend this proposition or not?

A. I was there as a member of the Provisional Government, but I did not advise as to the wording of it. I did tell her that she would have a perfect right to be heard at a later period.

Q. By the United States Government?

A. Yes.

Q. You, yourself, at that time, before consulting with your colleagues, were favorably impressed with that settlement?

A. Well, it was the only settlement that could be brought about. Personally I was satisfied with it.

Q. And you took that back to the Provisional Government?

A. Yes.

Q. And they rejected it?

A. It was received and indorsed by Mr. Dole.

Q. Now, was there any message sent to the Queen after that?

A. No.

Q. No message declaring that they would not accept it?

A. No.

Q. The surrender was then made on that proposition?

A. Yes; well, then she sent down word through Mr. Peterson to Mr. Wilson to deliver up the Station House. That wound up the whole affair. We immediately took possession of it. It was not delivered up until after this conference.

Q. Now how long after that was it before the Provisional Government was recognized?

A. Mr. Stevens sent Cadet Pringle, his aid, and Capt. Wiltse sent one of his officers to personally examine the building and report if the Provisional Government was in actual possession of the Government building. That was done that afternoon.

Q. What time?

A. Between 4 and 5.

Q. What time was the interview with the Queen?

A. After 4, and ended at 6.

Q. You took reply?

A. Mr. Neumann took the reply to Mr. Dole.

Q. Now, when this interview was going on between you, the cabinet ministers, and the Queen, it was known then that the Government had been recognized?

A. That the Queen knew it? I do not think she was told. I do not remember of it being spoken of.

Q. Didn't you know it?

A. I think I knew it.

Q. Didn't these ministers know it then?

A. They may have been present. I can not say. The Provisional Government were all present when Mr. Stevens recognized it as the *de facto* government.

Q. What I mean is this: Before you took the message of the Queen back this protest—the Provisional Government had been recognized?

A. Yes; that is my impression.

Q. Had that been done at the time you left the Government house to go with the cabinet ministers to talk with the Queen?

A. If my memory serves me right, it had.

Q. Did not the cabinet officers know of it at this time?

A. I can not say.

Q. What do you know about the contents of the constitution she wanted to proclaim?

A. It is too long to write down. I can tell you my connection with it.

Q. Have you seen it?

A. No.

Q. What is the aspiration of the native mind as to the form of government?

A. I think that their ambition is to obtain the power through the vote. They have tasted what it is to hold the control by the vote, and they are very tenacious of that right. They are to a certain extent clanish in that idea; but the trouble comes in that they have not used that power wisely, and it is the fact of the Polynesians combining in their votes to retain the power—and forgetting the intelligent power of the Anglo-Saxons, even when in a minority—that has caused the trouble. The real break in the Hawaiian system of government commenced at the time of Kamehameha V, when he took away their old constitution and gave them a constitution of his own making. That started revolutions in this country. There is the starting point where the roads diverged which has brought about the succession of unrest in different governments from that day to this. Now, the Hawaiians from that date, or within close proximity to it, commenced to feel what it was to have the vote, and what influence they could exert, and naturally the Hawaiian, as the weaker race, have attempted in every succeeding Legislature to work together, but there has always been a disintegration in every Legislature. They could not hold themselves together compactly as a body. Whenever they have had the opportunity to exercise this power it has not been at the level of the intelligent Anglo-Saxon idea of making laws or carrying out a system of government. It has chafed the Anglo-Saxon. He would not tolerate it. He has found that he could control it indirectly, if he could not directly, by his superior education and intelligence. The Hawaiians had grown to a feeling of independence, and in company with the Queen they wanted to throw off that Anglo-Saxon domination which has been with them and controlled them all these years. When it came to that point that they felt that they could do it, then the clash came. Of course there are other reasons which brought it about. But it is the clashing of two nationalities for supremacy.

Q. That was the great underlying cause? The financial questions were incidental questions?

A. That was the underlying cause—the Hawaiian thinking, because he had a majority of votes, that it gave him power. He didn't recognize that the intelligence and strong will of the Anglo-Saxon would beat him every time.

Q. The Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1891 states that in the general election for 1890 the total vote for nobles throughout the islands was 3,187, and that the total vote for representatives was 11,671. That is about correct?

A. I should judge so—that is a very correct source of information.

Q. That would make 8,484 more for representatives than for nobles?

A. Yes.

Q. Does that difference grow out of the fact that there is no moneyed qualification to vote for representatives, but for nobles there is required a property qualification of \$3,000 (unincumbered) or an income of \$600?

A. Unquestionably. That disparity of numbers, if it had been carried to a fine point, would have been very much larger, but there was and is a laxity in the admittance of many people to vote for nobles.

Q. Now, that 3,187 votes for nobles was generally a white vote, was it not?

A. There was a good many Hawaiians in that vote for nobles.

Q. What proportion would you say as between whites and natives?

A. I think those statistics could be got for you. It would not be wise for me to say. I should think about 25 per cent.

Q. Native vote?

A. Yes.

Q. The balance was a white vote?

A. Yes.

Q. It was in the power, then, of the whites united to elect the body of nobles, was it not?

A. The whites as a rule used all their influence to control the noble vote.

Q. Why did the whites use all their influence to control the noble vote?

A. Because it was their only hope of controlling or influencing legislation.

Q. How many nobles and how many representatives were there under the constitution?

A. Equal—about 24 each.

Q. If the whites could get the 24 votes of the nobles, then they had an absolute bar to any action by the representatives or the King?

A. That was the intention.

Q. If they got two or three representatives they had control of legislation so far as that legislative body was concerned?

A. If it had been carried out to its logical conclusion it would have been so, but as the result proved, they were not able to entirely control the noble vote.

Q. Now, if they had been able to entirely control the noble vote, and to get some of the representatives, they could have determined the question of the cabinet?

A. Yes.

Q. They could have removed any cabinet that did not suit them?

A. Yes; provided all the whites had banded together.

Q. I suppose sometimes the whites didn't keep banded together—and the natives in all things?

A. Yes.

Q. You had within yourselves those sources of power?

A. Yes.

Q. That was the principal cause of agitation for many years in elections?

A. Yes. Where the Hawaiian felt that his cause was weak, and it was to that point that, so far as they were able, they were striving so as to maintain the control.

Q. Now, Mr. Damon, do you think that you could have good government here on the basis of an educational qualification for voters, so as to allow everybody who could read and write to vote?

A. Yes; provided there was some strong power, as one might say it—as in an unruly school—to preserve order.

Q. Do you think that you could maintain a state government like the states of the American Union with that sort of suffrage?

A. My personal opinion is that we could grow up into that by a period of trial, until the voter appreciated what a vote really meant.

Q. How long do you think that would take to get the native population up to the high standard of the whites on that question? Can you see any time definitely or clearly?

A. I am of this opinion—that they have had so much given to them in this country—everything has been so free to them, that they have not appreciated the advantages that they have; but when they get to be deprived of the franchise for a period of, say, five years, until they have wrestled for it and waited for it, that when it is given to them eventually they will appreciate it.

Q. Do you think that in five years after annexation you could give to every native who could read and write the right to vote?

A. Yes; provided the franchise was extended to other nationalities here.

Q. What other nationalities here?

A. There is a growing Portuguese element here. There is a growing intelligent Japanese element here of the better classes, and those Chinese who are born in the country and have interests here.

Q. What sort of interests?

A. Either commercial, agricultural, or professional.

Q. You make the same qualification as to votes for all of them?

A. Yes.

Q. Suppose the Chinese were not allowed to vote—then what?

A. They have not the same desire except in isolated cases for voting that the Hawaiians, Portuguese, and Japanese have. They have not been accustomed to it.

Q. Do you allow any Japanese to vote here now?

A. No; not at present.

Q. I mean before the revolution?

A. No.

Q. Any Chinese allowed to vote?

A. No.

Q. Is there anything you desire to say Mr. Damon other than what you have said?

A. I would say that I was born here, brought up here, and have a sincere regard for the Hawaiian people, because they have many good traits. They have shown a desire, especially the generation which is now and that which is coming on, to put themselves forward if they knew how, and though they may be a diminishing race

they are a hopeful race that have not given up the struggle to keep up the Hawaiian name. If we are going to educate them it is just so much thrown away unless they can have some hope held before them that they will be recognized as men in future, and if there is anything I could do to assist them, especially the young and upright Hawaiians, I would like to do it, because they have invariably treated me—whether sovereign, chief, or common Hawaiian—with such invariable kindness that I should be lacking in manhood if I did not want to help them up if possible.

Q. As to integrity in business matters, how do they compare with people in their condition in life generally?

A. I think the mistake has been made that you take a Hawaiian and compare him with the Anglo-Saxon standard and expect him to be up even with him when he has not had time and opportunity to fit himself for that standard. You should compare the Hawaiian with what he is to-day and what he was fifty years ago.

Q. It is better to compare him with some race that exists to-day.

A. He does lack what is called backbone to carry out to a finish any project that he has.

Q. Business or otherwise?

A. Yes.

Q. But would you say that generally he was an honest man?

A. I should say so; yes.

Q. Is there any fear of violence to the persons of women on the part of the natives?

A. I think he is in advance of what is called the ordinary white man in that respect.

Q. That is a striking feature in his make up, and that is always appreciated by the best elements here?

A. Yes; and why it is so is that it is only a few years since he looked to the white men as a superior race, and he at heart feels that they are a superior race to-day.

Q. Now is that entirely correct?

A. A more powerful race, perhaps.

Q. Well now, as to another point let me ask you: Wilson lived in the bungalow with his wife and children?

A. His son is in California. He has no other child.

Q. He lived with his wife then?

A. Yes. I have heard that he had a strong influence over the Queen for many years, because Dominis, her husband, was a weak man. Wilson is a strong-willed, powerful man, and she has looked to him as a protector.

Q. He was in command of the police forces?

A. Yes; at the time, and ever since she was Queen.

Q. The Palace gates have been guarded?

A. Always.

Q. Who commanded the guards?

A. Nowlein and Wilson commanded the police force. Both were intimate friends of the Queen.

Q. He lived in the Palace?

A. He lived in the bungalow—report said so. He has his own dwelling about a mile from here.

Q. You do not understand that he and his family lived in the Palace proper, with the Queen?

A. No; they had a house in the yard.

Q. If the question of annexation was submitted to the people of these islands, with no property qualification, but only the qualification that the elector should read and write, and conducted on what is sometimes termed the Australian-ballot law, what do you think would be the result of a free expression of the people in the matter of annexation at this time?

A. The sentiment is a growing sentiment, but at this time I think a majority would not vote in favor of it, but, given time to realize it, they would.

Q. How much time do you think would be necessary to bring about such a condition of things in these islands?

A. I think if the Provisional Government is kept in very long they will home to it very quick. They do not like the Provisional Government, for the reason that it is a government that has not been placed there by their votes. I am quite sure I have given you a correct answer.

Q. At the time of the dethronement of the Queen was it known in the other islands?

A. No.

Q. They knew nothing of it until after it was accomplished?

A. They did not.

Q. Then it was accomplished by the Honolulu movement?

A. Yes.

Q. What is your condition here as to the matter of acquiescence of the natives with existing authority—their observing order?

A. If they had a real, able leader, in whom they had perfect confidence, he could collect quite a force to follow him.

Q. To attack the existing Government?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not apprehend any such movement?

A. No, unless that in a period of excitement it should spring up; and, therefore, I have advised a strong force being retained, because we did not know but in some moment of excitement somebody would take advantage of it and make trouble.

Q. What number of troops have you under pay?

A. One hundred and seventy in all.

Q. The artillery is hardly to be spoken of—but one company?

Q. How many pieces?

A. They have some eight or ten pieces, but, from motives of prudence, they have locked up the intricate parts in vaults.

Q. So far as you know, the natives have no artillery?

A. No.

Q. No arms?

A. No great quantity. They have scattered rifles and pistols.

Q. Do they amount to anything in case of contest?

A. We have no means of telling at this time.

TUESDAY, *May 2, 1893.*

Q. Mr. Damon, at the time of the writing of the protest of the Queen on the 17th day of January, 1893, signed by herself and Ministers, had the Provisional Government been recognized by the American Minister, Mr. Stevens?

A. It is my impression that it had been, but I can not say positively.

Q. Would the conversation you had with the Queen on that day aid you in determining that fact?

A. I do not think it would.

Q. In referring to Mrs. Wilson living with the Queen, in a previous part of this statement, did you mean to say that she stayed with her at night.

A. I meant to say that she was with the Queen a great deal of the time—both day and night.

Q. As a companion?

A. Yes; as a personal friend and companion.

Q. But where do you suppose she slept—at the bungalow or palace?

A. My impression is that her quarters were with her husband in the bungalow.

I have carefully read through the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of the two interviews between Mr. Blount and myself.

S. M. DAMON.

[Inclosure 4 in No. 4.]

Interview between Mr. Waterhouse and Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, *May 2, 1893.*

MR. BLOUNT. How long have you lived in Honolulu?

A. I came here in 1851.

Q. Born where?

A. In Tasmania.

Q. What nationality were your ancestors?

A. My father and mother were from the old country—from England.

Q. How old were you when you came here?

A. Six years old.

Q. You have lived here ever since?

A. Yes.

Q. In this city?

A. Yes, in Honolulu.

Q. Where were you on January 14, 15, 16, and 17, 1893?

A. I was in Honolulu.

Q. What was the cause of the revolution that resulted in the dethronement of Liliuokalani?

A. It started from the lottery bill and the opium bill and the bribery and corruption we had heard of. It came to me first through minister of finance John F. Colburn. That was the first intimation I had. There was no idea of the dethronement of the Queen at that time. That did not come until after the committee of safety was formed on Saturday. That was the first time we anticipated anything of the kind, but before that, on Tuesday, we called upon Mr. P. C. Jones, minister of finance. I told him what was going to happen. This information came from Mr. Colburn, the

last minister of finance. I do not know that I ought to mention it. It came from Marcus Colburn, brother of John F. Colburn. He was feeling troubled. He said, "I want to tell you, Henry, that it is of importance that the ministry should understand what John, my brother, is up to. Do not give me away. If you do I will be discharged from the office." He said in substance that Mr. P. C. Jones was to receive an anonymous letter from his brother, and he wished me to say to Mr. Jones not to be alarmed, but at the same time not to tell who it was that gave him this information; also that the Queen was going to promulgate a new constitution, and in case she was not able to get out the Wilcox ministry the plan was, after the prorogation of the legislature, to invite the four ministers over there—that is, the Wilcox ministry—and lay before them a constitution that she had prepared and in case they didn't sign they would be held prisoners. That was the information I gave to Mr. Jones. Of course he acted upon it.

The ministry after that was put out by a vote of the legislature. I can state right here that the vote was carried by bribery. The money was placed in Mr. Sam Parker's hands, some \$7 000, to assist in voting them out. Quite a number of members of the legislature—Hawaiians—came down to talk to me, those who were against putting out the ministry, and also those who were in favor of doing so. One in particular—Hoapoli—told me what he wanted was good, stable government, and he felt sure if we kept the Wilcox ministry in we would have it. He was sent for by the ex-Queen and she persuaded him. She said if he had any love for her that he would vote against the ministry. Quite a number of the other members came and asked if I would assist them in money; said that they were getting short; had been down here so long. I told them no; that was not my business. I did not propose to advance them any money. A few days after they all seemed to be quite flush, and after the legislature was prorogued they went home. They had new furniture and seemed to be well provided for in every way.

On Saturday, about 10 o'clock, John Colburn, minister of finance, came down to the office.

Q. What office?

A. My office on Queen street. He was very anxious to talk with me. I was out. When I came back I went over to his office. He had left word with his brother to say that the Queen was going to promulgate a new constitution immediately after the prorogation of the legislature, and wanted me to know. Between 1 and 2 o'clock I was up near W. O. Smith's office. That seemed to be the center then to get the news. News came down that the ex-Queen was attempting to force the ministry to sign the new constitution.

Q. Who did this news come by?

A. It was sent by Mr. Colburn to the office of W. O. Smith.

Q. By whom?

A. I can not state. There were so many there at the time. They met in the back office of W. O. Smith. There were a great many in front of the office at the time to talk over the situation. I sat beside Paul Neumann. We were all very much excited, feeling that our rights were being taken away from us, and we decided then and there we would not submit to it. After a short time we heard that the ministers had gone back to the Government house. The way they put it—they ran away. The parties who came from the Government house put it in that way. I remember stating to Mr. Neumann that I was glad we were at last of one opinion. He said this was a thing we ought not to tolerate. After discussing the matter for some time John F. Colburn and the attorney-general, Mr. Peterson, both came down. Mr. Colburn made a statement that the ex-Queen had got them into the room and had requested them to sign this new constitution, and, after talking with her sometime he said they had asked her for half an hour's time to think over it. In the meantime the natives were talking quite loud and as Mr. Colburn expressed it, he thought it was about time for him to get out of it. So they went out the back way back to the Government house.

Q. The back way was the direct way to the Government house?

A. No; but if they had gone out the front way the natives were all in front, and they were afraid. He wanted to know if the merchants would support them in their position. After discussing the matter there was a committee of safety appointed. They considered it very important that such a committee should be appointed. There was a great deal of talk that came to the ears of certain parties in regard to the way in which the natives had been talked up—inflammatory talk—and we all felt that it was very important we should keep a strict watch on their movements.

Q. Did you think they were in sympathy with the Queen?

A. There was what they called the Hui Kalaiaina, a lot of old men. They formerly met right opposite our office, on Queen street. They were in sympathy with her principally. After the committee of safety had been appointed we met and talked over the situation and decided to call a mass meeting.

During the meeting on Monday we were threatened that if we held any more meetings we would be arrested. Marshal Wilson came right up and said to Mr. Thurston that we would be arrested. Mr. Thurston answered right up and said if he wished to arrest us we were ready. We were not doing anything against the Government, that it was for the interest of the country that we had been appointed as a committee of safety. All that we were doing was talking in regard to a mass meeting. We had not decided when it was to be held. We decided afterwards to call a public meeting on Monday afternoon at 2 o'clock—that was the 16th.

Q. You mean you decided that on Saturday?

A. No; we decided that on Sunday after talking it over. It was to talk up the situation and to make a report from the committee of safety. The meeting was held at 2 o'clock Monday. In the meantime Marshal Wilson had sent around to all Government employes to muster in the station house, and after the meeting they all seemed to be quite demoralized on account of the number that turned out and was in sympathy with the committee of safety. The question that was uppermost in their minds was stable government. They had fully made up their minds not to allow their rights to be trampled on. After the meeting the committee of safety met again to consider what should be next done, as power had been given them by the meeting which had been held that afternoon. After discussing the matter we decided that the only course to do was to call out those who were in sympathy with us and take possession.

Q. Of what?

A. Of the Government house and take possession of the Government. That was on Monday afternoon. Monday evening we met again at my house on Neumann avenue. We there planned what should be done on Tuesday, the 17th. We met again on Tuesday morning, when the proclamation was discussed for the first time. That was the first time we had it before us. I do not remember having it before. Of course we had a committee to frame the proclamation. We met again on Tuesday morning and decided to take possession at 2 o'clock that afternoon. At 2 o'clock we marched up to the Government house, expecting to have them resist us, as we had heard the report that there was to be a hundred men up there under Mr. McCarty. We arrived up there and took possession. While we were going into the door the various volunteers kept coming into the yard with their rifles. That is as far as I know of that. Where do you want me to go from there?

Q. Just go on and tell the whole story.

A. Then the council met, after we had taken possession of the Government house, and decided to take the station house. We had only possession of the Government house and had to take the station house, where all the arms were. They had taken all arms there from various houses, so as to have them on hand. After discussing it we sent word. I think Mr. Damon went down and had an interview with the four ministers in the station house.

Q. You were not present?

A. No, I was not present. I know nothing in regard to that. Afterwards part of the ministers came up to the Government house to talk with the council.

Q. You were a member of the council?

A. I am. I was then. I was a member of the committee of safety also. They agreed to give up the station house. We took possession.

Q. Do you mean that that happened just that way? That they agreed to give it up and you took it? Do you mean that those things followed right after one another just as quick as you relate them?

A. No. Mr. Damon had to go down to the station house and Hopkins came up. The ministers were afraid to come up. They thought that it was a trap to get them up there. When they came up they said: "It does not seem to us that we need be afraid. You seem to be acting in a square, friendly manner in regard to treating us as men." They spoke of that at the time. The first thing that was done we declared martial law. That was one of the first acts.

Q. Do you know what hour the station house was given up?

A. I can not say. I was very much excited that day. I think it was somewhere near 5 o'clock.

Q. Have you anything to help you fix 5 o'clock in your mind?

A. I know we were afraid of its getting dark, and it would be much harder for us to take the building after dark, and were we planning what to do in case of darkness. That is what makes me think it was somewhere near that time.

Q. You spoke of the causes of the revolution being lottery and opium legislation and bribery. Now, as to the lottery bill, do you know of money being used there?

A. Of course I could not go on the stand and say that there was, but men who ran it were very flush.

Q. Is that what you judge from?

A. Yes.

Q. The same as to the opium bill?

A. Well, that was supposed to be a measure from the outside, as some of those in the Legislature expected to get money from the Chinese.

Q. Was that a supposition, or did you have any evidence of the fact of the use of money to pass the opium bill in the way of bribing members?

A. That is just a supposition.

Q. You spoke of money being used for purposes of bribery. Did you mean in the sense that you just stated—that it was supposition that it was done?

A. I stated it from what a party said, who could substantiate what he said.

Q. Who was he?

A. Cecil Brown.

Q. Did he tell you he would be able to prove that money was used for the purpose of getting out the ministry?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he tell you who furnished the money?

A. From the ex-Queen.

Q. He told you it came from her?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you had any knowledge of any money being used by the other side—by the reform party—in controlling votes at any time on any of these questions or any question?

A. Only what I saw in opposition papers. I do not know anything of my own knowledge.

Q. Do you know it on any information you had from others?

A. John Colburn told me that he had used money.

Q. Who did he say he got it from?

A. It was from his own money. He was trying to get the McFarland cabinet out.

Q. He was acting as a liberal?

A. Yes.

Q. And the liberal and reform party were acting together in the matter of getting out this cabinet?

A. I do not know about the reform so much. I dropped out from the reform party when they joined with the liberal. We were all split up then.

Q. Could you have voted out that cabinet unless you had had the reform party and the liberal party combined?

A. We could not. It took both parties to vote them out.

Q. Did Colburn tell you he was using his own money?

A. He claimed that he had promises from other parties.

Q. Who did he say they were?

A. He did not give me names. I was going away to the States at the time.

Q. You say on Monday Wilson came and notified the committee of safety through Mr. Thurston that he intended to arrest them?

A. He did, and Mr. Thurston replied—told him to go ahead if he saw fit to arrest us.

Q. Your statement was that he could arrest you if he wanted to—that you were doing nothing against the Government?

A. Yes; I said that. We were only discussing the meeting.

Q. Were you discussing the question of the dethronement of the Queen?

A. We were not then. We were discussing in regard to the meeting to be held.

Q. Had you in your Saturday's meeting or any time in your meetings debated the matter of the dethronement of the Queen?

A. I think we had spoken of it. We all felt we could not stand the monarchy. We had made up our minds to that.

Q. Then the expression that you were doing nothing against the Government was a strategic expression?

A. Yes. Wilson, of course, wanted very much to declare martial law then, but Cleghorn declined to sign the declaration.

Q. Who was Cleghorn?

A. He was governor.

Q. You held a mass meeting at 2 o'clock?

A. Yes; 2 o'clock on the 16th.

Q. There was no declaration for dethronement in that meeting?

A. I do not know if it came out. You could understand by expressions that they were all there for good government. Of course, they did not come right flat-footed out.

Q. How many troops had you then organized and armed; can you state accurately?

A. I can not.

Q. About how many; have you any information?

A. I have not. We were backed up by the mass meeting. Nearly all were ready at a moment's notice. Those who backed up the committee of safety were willing to back them up in everything they did.

Q. Did you poll the meeting to see how many would support you?

A. I think so. I think that they got the signatures of quite a number.

Q. How many?

A. I can not tell you.

Q. You could not say that the whole of the mass meeting signed?

A. I could not.

Q. Could you say that as many as half the mass meeting signed?

A. I should think so.

Q. Have you examined the signatures?

A. No. There were various committees. I was a committee for a portion of the rally and went around to their residences to see what arms they had and if they were prepared in case of trouble.

Q. In case of any trouble, did you tell them that you were going to dethrone the Queen and ask if they would be ready in case of resistance? Did you say that when you got signatures?

A. When I went around I didn't get signatures. I got it verbally from them to find out if they had arms and were ready to support the committee of safety.

Q. Did you mention to them the purpose to dethrone the Queen?

A. That was understood.

Q. Did you communicate to them in reference to arms?

A. The fact of the case is I did not know exactly what we were going to do.

Q. So that when you went around, you simply wanted to know if they had arms, in the event of trouble?

A. Yes.

Q. It was in that way that you judged of their sentiments in the matter of supporting the committee of safety in the effort to dethrone the Queen?

A. Yes.

Q. After the mass meeting what did the committee do?

A. The committee of safety met that afternoon shortly after the mass meeting.

Q. What did you do in that afternoon meeting?

A. We discussed the matter. We did not have a very long session in the afternoon. In the afternoon, at first, we were all going right up then and there, but afterwards considered it. The fact is, we hadn't our papers all ready. It was getting dark. We thought it was better to have daylight on our side. We decided to meet again on Monday evening and get everything in shape. It was after the mass meeting that we fully decided to take the step.

Q. What hour of Monday did you determine to take the step?

A. It was immediately after the mass meeting.

Q. Did anybody communicate the determination to the American minister?

A. I cannot say. He must have seen by the way the people were excited that day, and the incendiary talk among certain of the other side in regard to their setting fire to buildings.

Q. How many times did you hear it?

A. A great many times.

Q. How many?

A. People would keep coming into the office and meet me and say: "We are going to have trouble."

Q. Did you hear any persons say they proposed to fire the town?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many; I mean the people opposed to you?

A. No; I didn't hear the people actually say it. It was rumors from outside. It was not direct from them or they would have been locked up.

Q. You do not know anything at all of anybody having talked to Mr. Stevens about the situation on Monday in regard to the movement that you were all making or contemplated making. Was there anybody who said in the meeting that Mr. Stevens knew anything of what was going on?

A. I guess he must have kept posted.

Q. I want to know whether there was anything said by Thurston or anybody else of Mr. Stevens's knowledge of the movement?

A. I can not say positively.

Q. What is your impression?

A. My impression is that there was. I can not remember what it was that was said.

Q. Was it to the effect that he had knowledge of the movement of the reform party?

A. I do not remember. It just comes upon me as a flash.

Q. What is the impression you say you have?

A. I do not see how he could have helped it.

Q. I will ask you again. In the meeting of the committee of safety in the afternoon of Monday, after the mass meeting had adjourned, was there anything said on

the part of Mr. Thurston, or any other member of the committee of safety, indicating that the American minister knew anything of the movement of the reform party?

A. Yes; I should say that there was.

Q. By whom?

A. Either Carter or Thurston.

Q. What did they say?

A. I can not state. There was something said. It does not come to my mind now.

Q. Was the purport of it that he knew of the movement?

A. Yes, it was; that is, after the meeting.

Q. How did they know that he knew of the movement?

A. I suppose they had had an interview with him. I can not say for certain.

Q. Did they say as much?

A. That is what I understood at the time.

Q. Well, now, in that meeting was the subject discussed of asking him to land the American troops?

A. I think that was done by the committee of safety before.

Q. Were you present when they asked for the troops to be landed?

A. I was.

Q. The troops were ordered here on Monday and this mass meeting was on Tuesday?

A. No; the mass meeting was on Monday; the troops came on shore Monday evening just about dark. I might say that it was a surprise to us to hear that the troops were coming on shore.

Q. You expected them to come ashore later?

A. No; I didn't know when they were coming ashore.

Q. But you expected them to come ashore?

A. Yes; I expected they would come.

Q. By reason of any communication with the American minister?

A. No; I think it was by request of the committee of safety.

Q. I have a copy of the communication from the committee of safety of January 16, 1893—Monday.

A. Yes; Monday afternoon.

Q. What time Monday afternoon?

A. After the mass meeting.

Q. How long after?

A. I think about 5.

Q. It was after the adjournment of the mass meeting you say the request to land troops was made?

A. I think it was about 4 o'clock.

Q. What time did the mass meeting adjourn?

A. A little after 3.

Q. And then the committee of safety met?

A. We met immediately; walked down from the meeting to Smith's office.

Q. And then you took up the subject of calling on the American minister to land troops?

A. Yes.

Q. Who took that communication to him?

A. I think it was Charlie Carter. I can not be positive.

Q. Is he one of the present commissioners?

A. Yes.

Q. How long was he gone?

A. Not long.

Q. What did he say when he came back?

A. He said the marines would be landed.

Q. Did he say whether they would support the Provisional Government movement if they took the public buildings?

A. He came back and said the troops were coming ashore. That was as far as I could remember now.

Q. He brought no response in writing?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Did the committee of safety want the troops brought on shore?

A. They felt that it would be for the welfare of the town to have them ashore. We felt as a committee of safety that we had this matter in our hands and would be held responsible.

Q. Did you expect that the presence of the troops on shore would have a quieting effect on the natives and prevent any demonstration?

A. It was thought so.

Q. That was your idea?

A. Yes.

Q. You expected that when they got on shore that any hostile movement would be brought to a standstill by their presence?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Suppose they had not come on shore, would you have been able to have protected yourselves?

A. I think so; but I think there would have been a great deal of bloodshed.

Q. Did not you always expect that American troops would be landed in case of conflict or threatened conflict?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore you did not much expect a conflict after they landed?

A. No; I thought that naturally Wilson would try to do something. I expected there would be bloodshed before we got through.

Q. Unless American troops were landed?

A. Yes, sir. Of course I didn't know whether they would attempt it then.

Q. You had a meeting you say on Monday night at your house. Who was present?

A. There were the committee of safety.

Q. Who were they?

A. Cooper was there. I think Wilder was not there. There was Brown, Smith, and Lansing. I do not think Suhr was there. Dole was there. We sent for Dole. Carter and Loper were there.

Q. What was the object in sending for Mr. Dole?

A. To ask him if he would accept the position he now holds.

Q. What did he say?

A. He debated in his mind. He wanted to think over it until morning.

Q. What was Loper doing there?

A. Loper was invited there. He was to take charge of the forces.

Q. Was that agreed upon that night?

A. That was agreed upon.

Q. Did you and Mr. Loper and Mr. Carter go to the American minister that night?

A. I didn't.

Q. Did anybody go from your meeting?

A. Nobody that I know of. If anyone went I know nothing about it.

Q. Was there any hesitation on the part of Loper to take command that night?

A. Yes; he did hesitate.

Q. What reason did he give?

A. That he would rather be with the marshal.

Q. Was there anything said as to the probability of a conflict the next day?

A. We talked over the matter with Loper; discussed what could be done. He started out to get the men together.

Q. After he left the committee of safety?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were they to be placed?

A. They were to meet at the old armory here, and from there go right down to the Government house.

Q. Didn't you think the impression that these marines would have on the natives would be that they would not be in sympathy with them, and that they would be in sympathy with the white people?

A. That is what I think.

Q. You were amongst the committee of safety that went up to take charge of the Government house?

A. Yes.

Q. How many of you were there?

A. I think there was fourteen, but we did not all go up.

Q. Where did you start from?

A. We started from W. O. Smith's office, on Fort street.

Q. Which street did you go up going to the Government building?

A. We went up Queen street and up to the Government house—Mr. Wilder and myself.

Q. What street did the others go on?

A. They went on Merchant street.

Q. When you got to the Government building who was the first person you saw?

A. Hassinger.

Q. Is he a porter?

A. He is first clerk of the interior department.

Q. When you got there was the proclamation read immediately?

A. The proclamation was read by Mr. Cooper.

Q. Were there any troops there during the reading of the proclamation?

A. I could see one or two coming in.

Q. By the time it was concluded how many men did you have?

A. It would be impossible for me to say how many. I was so excited at the time.

Q. Do you remember the bringing of a paper to the Provisional Government, dated

January 17, 1893, signed by Liliuokalani and her several ministers, and printed in this document (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 56, Fifty-second Congress, second session)?

A. I do.

Q. You were then in possession of the Government building?

A. We were.

Q. Any other buildings at that time?

A. Only the Government building at that time.

Q. How long after that before you got Mr. Stevens's letter of recognition?

A. It was shortly after the station house was given over.

Q. Are you not mistaken about that?

A. No; I believe I am not. I do not think I am.

Q. What about the barracks; had they been given up?

A. They had.

Q. Who were at the barracks?

A. Nowlein.

Q. Where was Wilson?

A. He was at the station house.

Q. And he gave that up before you had notice of the recognition?

A. According to my best knowledge and belief.

Q. Was there any communication, by writing or by word, from any member of the committee of safety, or any other person by their authority, to Mr. Stevens that you planned taking the Government building?

A. Not as far as I know. It is from hearsay.

Q. Who did you hear say it?

A. It would be impossible for me to answer that.

Q. Was it understood in the committee of safety on Monday night, by anybody, that he knew you intended to take the Government building?

A. Not unless somebody left the meeting afterwards and told him.

Q. Was there anything said by any person at the meeting at your house the night before the building was taken indicating that Mr. Stevens knew of the move to take the Government building the next day?

A. I do not remember.

Q. What was your impression—did you think that he knew of your movement?

A. I did; I was in hopes that he did.

Q. Why did you think he knew of your movement?

A. It was common talk.

Q. Common talk Monday, as well as Tuesday?

A. Yes.

Q. It was common talk before the troops were landed on Monday?

A. It was common talk that we were going to make a move—that the committee of safety were urged upon to make a move.

Q. Did you all understand that Mr. Stevens's sympathies were with you?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you get the idea that his sympathies were with you?

A. From remarks made by different persons in regard to certain matters that had come up; and we felt that we had been wronged.

Q. What matters do you refer to?

A. All during the last few days and also during the session of the Legislature.

Q. He would manifest his approval and disapproval of acts of the Queen and her adherents in matters of legislation?

A. Whenever it was against the interests of the American people. Of course, a few days before that, up to Saturday, he was not here. We had a great deal of talking during that time. He lost all that.

Q. He participated freely in political discussions without exciting comment?

A. I do not know that he discussed it. People would naturally come and talk to him and open their hearts to him.

Q. And in that way they got to feel that he was in sympathy with them?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there ever any suggestion on his part to the committee of safety to desist from their movement against the Queen?

A. I have never heard of any.

Q. Was there any expectation when the troops landed that they were to enforce the authority of the Queen in bringing order in the city on the part of the committee of safety?

A. I did not hear any rumor that led me to think that. The way I understood it was that they were here to preserve order.

Q. Now, in the matter of preserving order, if the Queen's forces and the Provisional Government forces got to fighting, would that mean that he was to interfere and stop the fighting?

A. I thought he was only to protect American interests here

Q. How would he go about it?

A. I suppose that most of the Americans would naturally go for protection on American ground, and I suppose that would be up at his place or around the consulate.

Q. You expected he would protect them in those places?

A. Yes; I might say, after the meeting on Monday, there was a falling off in the ranks of the Queen's party and they felt that the stronger elements were against them. The mass meeting brought things to an issue.

Q. You anticipated that the American troops expected to protect at the consulate and American legation American citizens who resorted there for protection?

A. That is what I expected they would do, but I did not know how far they would have gone in case there was bloodshed.

Q. Did you expect them to confine themselves to operations around the legation and consulate?

A. No; I would have expected if the Queen's people overpowered us that they would, of course, have to protect her. If we came out on the top and asked for protection we would get the protection, and we felt we would be strong enough.

Q. You expected him to land his troops and protect American people at the legation and consulate until you whipped the Queen or the Queen whipped you?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Did you expect him to do more than protect American citizens who resorted to the consulate or legation for protection?

A. That in case there was any bloodshed that they would, if called upon, protect the party in power, and I expected we were going to be in power forthwith.

Q. How did you expect to get into power without a little bloodshed?

A. We knew the feeling of those who were in power then—that they were cowards; that by going up with a bold front, and they supposing that the American troops would assist us, that would help us out.

Q. Assist whom?

A. The committee of safety.

Q. That was the general calculation?

A. Yes.

Q. In the conference?

A. Yes. They felt that their being there would be a great help to them. Even their presence ashore would have done that.

Q. When did you first determine to take the building?

A. Monday.

Q. Did you talk over it at Monday afternoon session?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you then determine to do it?

A. That afternoon. We were on the point of going up that afternoon, but things were not ready and it would take until dark and we thought we had better wait until the next day.

Q. Was that the purpose you had, to get the influence of the troops for the purpose of preventing resistance on the part of the Queen's Government?

A. That was not in my mind at all.

Q. What did you want troops for? What was in your mind?

A. In my mind it was going to stop bloodshed. The very presence of them here.

Q. You expected, then, if you got them on shore that you could go on with the plan of taking possession of the Government building and other properties without bloodshed? That was your idea?

A. That was my idea.

Q. Was that the impression of the committee of safety?

A. I think that they felt just the same as I did in regard to it.

(Before leaving Mr. Waterhouse was shown the letter of January 16, from the committee of safety to Mr. Stevens, and identified it.) The letter is as follows:

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, HONOLULU, *January 16, 1893.*

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
American Minister Resident:

SIR: We, the undersigned, citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Liliuokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force, and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution; and while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid and, therefore, pray for the protection of the United States forces.

HENRY E. COOPER,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
C. BOLTE,
A. BROWN,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
THEO. F. LANSING,
ED. SUHR,
L. A. THURSTON,
JOHN EMMELUTH,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,
Citizens' Committee of Safety.

I have read the foregoing carefully, and pronounce it a correct report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

HENRY WATERHOUSE.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 4.]

Mr. Carter to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *May 3, 1893.*

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT,

Commissioner of the United States of America:

SIR: At your request the following statement is made of incidents of the 17th day of January last, as they came under my observation:

After dining that day (dinner hour being 5:30 o'clock, say between 6:30 and 6:40 o'clock) Officer Mehrten, of the police force, drove up to my residence in a hack, and said to me that my presence was required at the Government building, and that he would give me a seat in his carriage if I was ready. I was at once driven to the building and taken to the room of the minister of finance, where I met quite a concourse of men, among which I now recall Judge S. B. Dole, Charles L. Carter, Capt. James King, Rev. S. G. Beckwith, Hon. S. M. Damon, and some twenty or thirty other leading members of our community.

There was a deal of excitement and earnest discussion going on among groups of persons, and while standing among them I overheard among other things that Minister Stevens had recognized the new government and that a steamer was to be made ready at once to carry to San Francisco, en route to Washington, commissioners of the new government. I asked what was required of me, and was told that a committee was to be sent to the palace to inform Her Majesty the Queen that she was deposed, and to assist her in making any protest she desired to make, and that I was to be of the committee. I joined the party headed by Mr. Damon, and proceeded to the palace, where, in the blue room, was Her Majesty, one or both of the young princes, the Hon. H. A. Widerman, and Paul Neumann, Her Majesty's ministers, E. C. Macfarlane, and others. Mr. Damon informed Her Majesty of the establishment of a provisional government, and of her being deposed, and that she might prepare a protest if she wished to. An awkward pause followed, which I broke by addressing Her Majesty, expressing sympathy, and advised her that any demonstration on the part of her forces would precipitate a conflict with the forces of the United States; that it was desirable that such a conflict be avoided; that her case would be considered at Washington, and a peaceful submission to force on her part would greatly help her case; that the persons in command of her forces at the barracks and police station should be ordered to surrender. The Hon. H. A. Widerman then addressed Her Majesty, fully indorsing my advice, and adding that he believed that the result would be a repetition of the scenes of 1843, when the sovereign and flag were restored to Hawaii by Great Britain.

I was moved to advise Her Majesty as I did because it was reported on the street that Minister Stevens had said if the revolutionists obtained possession of a government building that he would recognize them as a government. I saw that the building was in possession of armed men, and knew that the forces of the U. S. S. *Boston* were near at hand, and heard that recognition was a fact.

The Hon. Paul Neumann was requested to prepare the protest for Her Majesty's signature, and I was also requested to assist in preparing the document. While the protest was in course of preparation word was sent to Marshal Wilson to disband the force at the station house and surrender the building, arms, and ammunition.

After the protest had been signed by Her Majesty and the ministers word was brought that Marshal Wilson refused to give up the station house except upon the written command of Her Majesty. The order was prepared, signed by the Queen, and sent to the marshal. The protest of the Queen was placed in the hands of President Dole, and I saw that he indorsed the document as received in due form.

Very respectfully, yours,

J. O. CARTER.

[Inclosure 6 in No. 4.]

Mr. Swinburne to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *May 3, 1893.*

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of United States:

SIR: In response to your verbal request for a written communication from me regarding certain facts connected with the recognition of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States minister to that country on the afternoon of January 17, 1893, I have to state as follows:

On the afternoon in question I was present at an interview between Capt. Wiltse, commanding the *Boston*, who was at that time present in his official capacity with the battalion then landed in Honolulu, and Mr. Dole and other gentlemen representing the present Provisional Government, in the executive chamber of the Government building. During the interview we were informed that the party represented by the men there present was in complete possession of the Government building, the archives, and the treasury, and that a Provisional Government had been established by them.

In answer Capt. Wiltse asked if their Government had possession of the police station and barracks. To this the reply was made that they had not possession then, but expected to hear of it in a few minutes, or very soon. To this Capt. Wiltse replied, "Very well, gentlemen, I can not recognize you as a *de facto* Government until you have possession of the police station and are prepared to guarantee protection to life and property," or words to that effect. Here our interview was interrupted by other visitors, and we withdrew and returned to the camp at Arion Hall. As far as I can recollect, this must have been about 5 o'clock p. m. About half-past 6 Capt. Wiltse left the camp, and as he did so he informed me that the United States minister to the Hawaiian Islands had recognized the Provisional Government established by the party in charge of the Government building as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands. About half-past 7 p. m. I was informed by telephone by Lieut. Draper, who was then in charge of a squad of marines at the United States consulate, that the citizen troops had taken possession of the police station, and that everything was quiet.

Very respectfully,

WM. SWINBURNE,
Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. Navy.

[Inclosure 7 in No. 4.]

Affidavit of Mr. Hopkins.

HONOLULU OAHU, *Hawaiian Islands. ss:*

And now comes Charles L. Hopkins, of Honolulu, aforesaid, and upon oath deposes and says:

That on the 17th day of January, A.D. 1893, he arrived at the police station in Honolulu aforesaid about 2:30 p. m. o'clock and saw Mr. Antone Rosa writing a letter addressed to John L. Stevens, United States minister, and said letter was afterwards signed by Her Majesty's ministers and handed to your affiant to be delivered to the said American minister with instructions to wait for an answer. Your affiant left said police station at about 2:40 p. m. of said day in a carriage, arriving at the legation about 2:45 p. m. He saw on the verandah Miss Stevens, to whom the letter

of Her Majesty's ministers was handed. She asked if an answer was required; your affiant said "Yes."

Miss Stevens then went into the house and about ten minutes afterwards returned saying, "My father is too unwell to write an answer now, but if you will go and return in about an hour's time he will have the answer ready." Your affiant replied that his instructions were to wait for an answer, upon which she went in the house again and then came out and said, "My father will try and answer the letter." She disappeared again, and in about ten minutes came out and handed me a letter addressed to Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs. Your affiant then left the legation, arriving at the police station about 3:10 p. m., and handed Mr. Stevens's letter to Mr. Samuel Parker, who went into the deputy marshal's office with it. Later in the afternoon your affiant read the letter of Minister Stevens in which he stated that he recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

CHARLES L. HOPKINS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3d day of May, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,

Notary Public, First Judicial District.

[Inclosure 8 in No. 4.]

Affidavit of Peterson and Colburn.

HONOLULU OAHU, ss:

We, John F. Colburn and A. P. Peterson, being duly sworn, on oath depose and say that on the afternoon of Tuesday, January 17, 1893, we held portfolios in the cabinet of Queen Liliuokalani and were at the station house in Honolulu; that at 2:30 o'clock the Queen's cabinet addressed a letter to his excellency J. L. Stevens, asking if the report then current that he had recognized the Provisional Government was true. This letter was sent to Mr. Stevens through Hon. C. L. Hopkins. Shortly after 3 o'clock Mr. Hopkins returned with an answer from Mr. Stevens to the Queen's cabinet, stating that he, Mr. Stevens, had recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands. Shortly after, Mr. S. M. Damon and Mr. C. Bolte, members of the advisory council, came to the station house to consult with the Queen's cabinet as to the situation. Mr. Damon stated that Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government and that the United States forces would assist them and that it was useless for us to resist, but asked us in the interest of peace and to save bloodshed not to do so. Mr. Damon handed us a copy of the proclamation of the committee of safety, which was read aloud by A. P. Peterson.

Shortly after 4 o'clock, nothing definite having been arrived at, the Queen's cabinet, at the request of the Provisional Government, went with Mr. Damon and Mr. Bolte to the Government building to consult with the executive council. We were in the Government building fifteen or twenty minutes, during which time Mr. S. B. Dole, President of the Provisional Government, said that he desired us to give up the station house and other Government property under our control, in the interests of law and order. We answered that it would be necessary for us to consult first with Queen Liliuokalani. We then left the Government building and together with Mr. S. M. Damon went direct to the palace. At the palace, after some consultation the Queen's cabinet came to the conclusion that it was not advisable to oppose the United States forces, Mr. Stevens having already recognized the Provisional Government, and so advised the Queen to surrender to the superior force of the United States, because of the course of Mr. Stevens, American minister, and of such recognition. At this time, 5:30 o'clock, the Queen's Government had possession of the station house, barracks, and palace, nine-tenths of the arms and ammunition on the island except that in the possession of foreign governments, and a large body of men under arms. The Queen accepted the advice and her protest was immediately drawn up and signed, and she instructed her cabinet to attend to all necessary matters, which was then done.

The reply of Mr. Stevens, stating that he had recognized the Provisional Government, was placed in the hands of Hon. Paul Neumann, who carried it with his other documents on his mission to Washington, and although we have made every effort to procure the same have been unable to do so and do not know its whereabouts at the present time.

JOHN F. COLBURN.

A. P. PETERSON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3d day of May, 1893.

[SEAL.]

J. H. THOMPSON,

Notary Public, Island of Oahu.

[Inclosure 9 in No. 4.]

Interview between Hawaiian Patriotic League and Mr. Blount.

MAY 2, 1893.

[Committee of delegates of all the branch associations of the Hawaiian Patriotic League: John Richardson, chairman; J. A. Akins, Ben. Naukana, J. K. Kaihiopulani, S. H. K. Ne.

Q. Mr. Richardson, are you chairman of this delegation?

A. Yes.

Q. How are delegates from these Islands selected?

A. They are selected by meetings in different districts held by people who have become members of local clubs.

Q. Organized for what purpose?

A. Organized for the purpose of beseeching the maintenance of their independence, and also the perpetuation of a monarchical form of government and against annexation.

Q. How many persons are in these several clubs.

A. The number varies in each club, but the approximate total of the various clubs represented here is to the tune of about 7,000 voters.

Q. How do you get at that number?

A. We have had rolls from the different clubs, and as the Central Club wishes to get time to have the names recorded in the register of the Central Club in Honolulu we have been unable to bring with us the original document holding the list of the names.

Q. How do you get the figures 7,000?

A. By taking the total from each club.

Q. Have you had the totals from each club?

A. Yes.

Q. And putting them together makes an aggregate of 7,000?

A. Yes.

Q. Are they all voters?

A. They are all voters.

MR. BLOUNT. I will accept it as I have all memorials as a matter of information. I can not enter into a discussion of it with you. I am glad to meet you, gentlemen.

[Inclosure 10 in No. 4.]

Affidavit of Mr. Wilson.

HONOLULU, OAHU, *Hawaiian Islands*, ss:

And now comes Charles B. Wilson, of Honolulu aforesaid, and upon oath deposes and says:

That on the 17th day of January, A. D. 1893, between 3:30 and 4 p. m., of that day, while he was in charge of the police station as marshal of the Kingdom, he saw and read a letter from the American Minister Stevens addressed to Her Majesty's ministers, wherein Minister Stevens stated that he had recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

CHAS. B. WILSON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of May, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,

Notary Public, *First Judicial Circuit.*

No. 8.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 5.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

May 6, 1893.

SIR: Since my last dispatch I examined Mr. Bolte, a member of the advisory council. He and Mr. Waterhouse, whose evidence I forwarded to you, stated positively that the station house and barracks were

delivered up before Mr. Stevens recognized the Provisional Government. The manner of their testimony caused me to suspect their truthfulness. I had learned from members of the cabinet of the ex-Queen of correspondence with Mr. Stevens which contradicted these assertions. Some weeks ago I had called upon him for the legation records, and was furnished with a book containing correspondence with the State Department. This threw no light on the question of fact I was seeking to settle.

On the 5th instant I went to the legation, feeling that such papers must be there in some form.

In the conversation he spoke of a paper from the Queen which was in his files; said that these files were put in a volume when there were enough to make up one. I said I would like to have the volume for January. He said it had not been made up. I then asked him if he had a paper which the ministry had addressed to him inquiring if he had recognized the Provisional Government. He went out to look for it and returned with a book entitled "Correspondence with Hawaiian Government." In this he showed me a memorandum he had made of a reply to a communication from the ministers, a copy of which I send (Inclosure No. 1).

Believing that he must have the communication itself, this morning I sent my secretary, Mr. Mills, to ask for it. He returned with the paper saying that before giving it to him Mr. Stevens seemed to be at a loss as to whether he had such a paper. This same difficulty occurred when I called upon him for the communication from the committee of safety asking for the landing of the troops of the *Boston*.

I inclose herewith a copy of the letter in question (Inclosure No. 2).

You will see that in the memorandum referred to he says the letter was received about 4 or 5 p. m. on January 17 and that he informed them that he had already recognized the Provisional Government.

In the conversation I had with him when he turned over the record of the correspondence with the Hawaiian Government he said he had recognized the Provisional Government before the barracks and station house had been surrendered; that he did not consider their surrender of any importance.

In my last dispatch Lieut. Swinburne fixes the surrender of the station house at about half-past 7 o'clock. This morning he called and informed me that Lieut. Draper had said to him yesterday that the station house was not surrendered until after dark. I sent for Lieut. Draper and obtained from him a statement, which I inclose (Inclosure No. 3).

I consider that it is now established beyond controversy that Mr. Stevens recognized the Provisional Government before the barracks and station house had been surrendered or agreed to be surrendered.

Before the committee of thirteen went up to proclaim the Provisional Government they sent a gentleman to see if there were any troops in the Government building. On learning the fact that there were none, the committee quietly went up in two or more squads and, uniting at the Government building, read their proclamation.

Without making any demand for the surrender of the palace, in which were the Queen and her friends, with some 50 soldiers; the barracks, a little beyond the palace, with about 80 men, well equipped with small arms and artillery, and with the station house, some 600 yards off, occupied by some 200 men, well armed and equipped, they asked and obtained from the American minister recognition as a Government *de facto*. On this basis the minds of the cabinet and Queen were operated upon to give up the barracks and station house

and to have her surrender to the Provisional Government. In this way the revolution reached its solution.

I invite your attention to a letter, dated on the 16th of January, 1893, from Mr. Stevens to Mr. W. M. Giffard, as follows:

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

Mr. W. M. GIFFARD:

SIR: Please allow Capt. Wiltse and his men the use of the opera house hall for a fair compensation for the same.

Yours, truly,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

This letter was obtained from Mr. Giffard, who had charge of the building as agent for Spreckels & Co. He declined to let Mr. Stevens have it, because, he said, if any damage occurred while the American troops occupied it it would affect the insurance, as the building was liable to be damaged; that in the insurrection of 1889, when Wilcox and his followers had obtained possession of the palace, the Government forces had used the upper portion of this building to fire on the insurrectionists and that more than \$1,000 worth of damage was then done to it by the cannon used by Wilcox and his followers.

This building, Lieut. Swinburne informs me, was agreed upon on board the *Boston* before the troops were landed as the best place for the location of the *Boston's* men. He suggested on shipboard that the troops be quartered near the wharf, so as to be near to their base of supply, the same having been so done when Admiral Skerrett landed troops in 1874. Capt. Wiltse and Mr. Stevens thought it was better that they should be located in the opera house. Failing to get this building, Arion hall, which is on a line with it and adjoins it, and is across the street from the Government building, was obtained for the location of the troops. The men were placed in the rear of Arion hall, but in full view of the palace. A street intervened between the Government building and the palace. It was about 350 yards from one of these buildings to the other.

The American troops were on the same side of the latter street with the Provisional Government troops, which did not probably number 100 men. You will see from the map prepared by Mr. Loevenstein, which I have previously forwarded to you, the location of Arion hall, the Government building, the palace, the barracks, the station house, and the armory. If the Queen's troops should have attacked the Provisional Government troops our men were in danger of being injured, which might have brought them into collision with the Queen's troops. The same is true if the Provisional Government troops had advanced on the palace. If the American troops were landed to protect American property and the persons of American citizens, their location at this place, unfortunately, signified a different purpose.

The Queen, her cabinet, and her followers undoubtedly believed, from the location of the American troops and the quick recognition of the Provisional Government by Mr. Stevens, that the United States forces would aid the Provisional Government forces in the event of a conflict.

The request of the committee of safety, on which the landing of the troops was made, did not ask for the protection of the property and persons of American citizens. This paper you have already in your possession. It was signed by Germans, Americans, and natives. Mr. W. O. Smith and Mr. L. A. Thurston, the leading men signing this paper, are natives of these islands, and seemed to be concerned to have

the troops protect themselves and all others in the islands from the operation of the Queen's forces.

In one of the local papers, yesterday morning, there appeared an alleged interview with Mr. Loud, a member of Congress from California, in which he is reported as criticising the authorities for not having arrested and sent Liliuokalani out of the island. In view of your telegraphic instruction of the 25th ultimo (which was received by me on the 4th instant) and the possibility that Mr. Loud's alleged advice might be pursued and that hostile collision between the friends of the Queen and the Provisional Government might grow out of it, I had an interview this morning with the attorney-general, Mr. W. O. Smith, in which I invited his attention to the reported interview with Mr. Loud. I asked him if he felt free to say to me whether or not the arrest of the Queen was contemplated; that I desired the information because such action on the part of the Provisional Government might produce a condition of affairs which required action on my part. He said that this action was not contemplated by the Provisional Government, but that they were prepared, in the event of hostilities, to take care of certain prominent persons amongst the Royalists. I asked him if those included the Queen. He answered, "confidentially, Yes."

The feeling of the annexationists is very intense, and doubtless the Provisional Government is very much pressed to take action against the person of the Queen by confinement or deportation. Should this occur I believe that it will produce a bloody conflict.

It is my purpose soon to announce to American citizens that if they participate in any conflict in behalf of either party I shall direct that the American troops shall not be used for their protection. This, I think, to be in line with your views. I believe that it will tend to prevent extreme action on the part of the Provisional Government.

I have not and shall not intimate any desire to the Provisional Government as to what they should do with the Queen or with any other person connected with the royal cause.

I do not see any occasion for my remaining longer here for the purpose of making further inquiry as to the condition of affairs in the islands. I believe, however, that my departure prior to your sending out a successor to Mr. Stevens would result in serious trouble. The attorney-general said to me this morning there would be no trouble while I remained here, but he had some apprehensions if I should leave.

The native population seem to have great respect for me, growing out of the idea that I represent the President of the United States in an effort to get at the causes of the revolution and a hope that out of that investigation they will regain the political power they have lost.

I have been careful every moment to avoid making an impression on either party that I was here to interfere in their domestic affairs or for any purpose other than that of inquiry, or to indicate what disposition you or the President might make of any information I should report.

Do not infer from these observations that I have any desire to remain here any longer.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

P. S.—Since closing the foregoing dispatch the affidavits marked 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 have been handed to me.

(Filed with other affidavits.)*

[Inclosure 1 in No. 5.]

Extract from records of the United States legation.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH HAWAIIAN GOVERNMENT.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

About 4 to 5 p. m. of this date—am not certain of the precise time—the note on file from the four ministers of the deposed Queen, inquiring if I had recognized the Provisional Government came to my hands, while I was lying sick on the couch. Not far from 5 p. m.—I did not think to look at the watch—I addressed a short note to Hon. Samuel Parker, Hon. Wm. H. Cornwell, Hon. John F. Colburn, and Hon. A. P. Peterson—no longer regarding them ministers—informing them that I had recognized the Provisional Government.

JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 5.]

*Queen's ministers to Mr. Stevens.*DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
*Honolulu, January 17, 1893.*His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary:

SIR: Her Hawaiian Majesty's Government having been informed that certain persons to them unknown have issued proclamation declaring a Provisional Government to exist in opposition to Her Majesty's Government, and having pretended to depose the Queen, her cabinet and marshal, and that certain treasonable persons at present occupy the Government building in Honolulu with an armed force, and pretending that your excellency, in behalf of the United States of America, has recognized such Provisional Government, Her Majesty's cabinet asks respectfully: Has your excellency recognized said Provisional Government? and if not, Her Majesty's Government, under the above existing circumstances, respectfully requests the assistance of your Government in preserving the peace of the country.

We have the honor to be your excellency's obedient servants,

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 5.]

Statement of Lieut. Draper.

May 5, 1893. Herbert L. Draper, Lieutenant Marine Corps, attached to Boston:

I was at the United States consulate-general at the time the Provisional Government troops went to the station house and it was turned over to them by Marshal Wilson. It was about half past 7 o'clock. The station house is near the consulate-general on the same street. As soon as it happened I telephoned it to the ship. I wanted my commanding officer to know, as I regarded it as an especially important thing.

I was the commanding officer at the consulate-general. There was no other United States officer there at the time excepting myself.

The above is a correct statement.

HERBERT L. DRAPER,
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps.

No. 9.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 6.]

HONOLULU, H. I., *May 9, 1893.*

SIR: There has appeared in annexation papers on several occasions innuendoes of an offensive character relating to myself. It has been my custom to give no attention to them, because of the greatness of our own Government and the weakness of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

On my arrival here—the opinion obtaining through the newspapers, especially of American origin, that I was to investigate, amongst other things, the disposition of the people of the Islands towards annexation—a campaign in the form of signatures to petitions for and against annexation commenced, and has been continuing until this hour.

Manifestation of the native element soon became very pronounced against annexation, whereupon the papers of the annexationists began to charge the ex-Queen with treason and to insist upon her arrest and trial for treason or her deportation. With this I had nothing to do.

This state of opinion of a majority of the people against annexation has become so well defined as to renew the cry for her arrest in more ardent temper.

Yesterday afternoon the Hawaiian Star, the organ of the annexation club, contained an article, a copy of which is inclosed herewith. (Inclosure No. 1.)

I felt aggrieved at the dishonorable implication as to my own conduct with the Queen contained therein. I immediately addressed a letter to President Dole, a copy of which is inclosed. (Inclosure No. 2.)

Four hours afterward I received a reply from Mr. Dole, a copy of which I send. (Inclosure No. 3.)

The language used is not only objectionable in its offensive reference to myself, but was designed to intimidate antiannexationists in communicating their views to me, and so prevent any successful acquisition of the true state of the public mind in these Islands in its relation to the Provisional Government.

This latter criticism I did not communicate to the Provisional Government, regarding it as inconsistent with my instructions not to interfere in domestic controversies here.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 6.]

Extract from the Hawaiian Star, Monday, May 8, 1893.

WHAT OF THE QUEEN?

The ex-Queen professed to have yielded her throne to the "superior force of the United States," and has kept up that pretense since. Her present attitude is one of waiting. Before doing anything further she desires to know whether or not the United States means to take the islands. From such an attitude it follows that if President Cleveland and Congress should decide to keep their hands off Hawaii, then Liliuokalani will deem herself absolved from her obligation to stay quiet. It must be noted that she has never yet surrendered directly to the Government, or even entered into an armistice with it. She calls herself Queen, and rarely signs her name to a letter without the royal R. It is her hope, that if annexation is defeated, to be

restored, and she is now the center and nucleus of all the royal politics in the islands which look to that end.

So long as things remain in their present shape the ex-Queen is not particularly dangerous; but if the Hawaiian question should be left to stew in its own juice, then she might become an unpleasant quantity to deal with. The United States would have formally refused to accept her surrender. She would have yielded to one else, and would be at liberty to negotiate with, say, the Japanese for a protectorate. Certainly, her right to treat with a foreign envoy has not been denied, as witness her unhindered interviews with Commissioner Blount. Out of such a conjunction of affairs as this might come a vast amount of political trouble and expense. Even if Liliuokalani did not seek foreign help—as she was quick to do at the beginning of her troubles in a letter to Queen Victoria—her presence here would continually breed mischief, provoke unrest, alarm capital, excite the emotions of her old party, harass the existing Government, require a large military force to be sustained, and cause an impression to go out that if the new régime should at any time be caught napping the old order of things might be restored.

It is pretty generally admitted now that it was a mistake not to have shipped the ex-Queen abroad when she was deprived of her throne. That was one of the errors of a hurried time which, if it had been avoided, would have left the annexationist cause in much better shape than it is. But what is past can not be mended. Only that which is to come may be kept from the need of mending.

The Star believes it to be the duty of the Government to protect itself and the people from the danger that Liliuokalani's presence here might breed by sending her out of the country under the act—which may be enlarged if necessary—that deals with "undesirable residents." This course might, it is true, work a certain hardship, but compared with the hardship that the ex-Queen's continuance on this soil would visit upon property and business interests, it would hardly be worth noting. Its severity might, of course, be modified by some provision for the expenses of travel abroad, but this is a matter of detail. The main thing is to have the disturbing influence of the royal pretender out of the way when the time comes to tranquilize the country and get it ready for the responsibilities of its future. No better preliminary to that status could be had than the deportation of the woman at once. This would afford ample time, before the American decision could be had, to get the country perfectly in hand and to meet anything that might happen.

There need be no fear that such an act would make a bad impression in the United States or elsewhere, as it is one of the unwritten laws of popular uprisings that when the people overthrow the throne, the occupant of it must leave the country. So far as Hawaii is concerned every sensible politician in America would justify deportation under the existing circumstances.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 6.]

Mr. Blount to Mr. Dole.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, May 9, 1893.

His Excellency SANFORD B. DOLE,

*President of the executive and advisory councils
of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.*

SIR: In the Hawaiian Star of May 8, an editorial headed "What of the Queen?" to which I invite your attention, uses this language:

"Certainly her right to treat with a foreign envoy has not been denied, as witness her unhindered interviews with Commissioner Blount."

It has been my purpose to studiously avoid any word or act calculated to produce on the mind of any individual an impression of a disposition on my part to interfere with the political affairs of these islands. In this article I am made to hold unhindered interviews with the ex-Queen Liliuokalani. These alleged interviews with me are treated as treasonable on her part. This can not be true without an implication of dishonorable conduct on my part. As such, it is insulting to the Government of the United States.

I have held one interview with the ex-Queen, of which you had knowledge before and afterwards. This is the only one. I can not believe that the editorial, in so far as it relates to myself, can be approved by the Provisional Government. I respectfully request a reply.

With assurances of the highest consideration, I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 6.]

*Mr. Dole to Mr. Blount.*DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 9, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of even date calling my attention to an editorial in last evening's issue of the Hawaiian Star touching on your interviews with the ex-Queen.

The Government sincerely regrets the publication referred to in your communication, and I hasten to assure you that it is in no way responsible for the expressions of that or any other paper, and thoroughly disapproves of anything that may be published that can be taken as implying any action on your part that is not entirely consistent with your mission.

The management of the Star have promised to make the *amende honorable* in this evening's issue.

With the sincere hope that nothing may arise that will in any way disturb the cordial and amicable relations that exist between the authorities of the Provisional Government and yourself as the honored representative of a nation that is our nearest and greatest friend, I have the honor to be with the highest respect and consideration,

Your most, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
*Minister of Foreign Affairs.*Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States, Honolulu.

No. 10.

*Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.*No. 7.] HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *May 24, 1893.*

SIR: Recurring to the correspondence between President Dole and myself in relation to the article in the Hawaiian Star, I inclose herewith a copy of an additional letter which I wrote to him. (Inclosure No. 1.)

Subsequently Vice-President Damon called to see me in relation to the matter, and I said I should not ask the attention of the Government hereafter to any articles of an offensive character in that paper; that I would forward any offensive matter contained therein to the State Department, with the statement that it was the organ of the annexation club, and that the Government was unable to control its conduct. A similar statement was made by me to the Attorney-General, Mr. Smith. In the conversation with me he deplored the article and added that the editor had told the cabinet some days before that he had positive proof of two long interviews between myself and the Queen.

Since this correspondence with President Dole this paper has changed its tone into one of frequent compliment to myself. I presume the Annexation Club found that my reporting their offensive articles was not likely to advance their cause, and changed what had been the uniform course of the paper theretofore. The demeanor of this paper was doubtless intended to impress the native population with the idea that they could not only dominate them, but could insult the representative of the United States with impunity. I shall probably have no more trouble in this direction.

More than 8,000 names have been signed to memorials by the Women's Hawaiian Patriotic League, asking for the restoration of Queen Liliuokalani.

Memorials have been signed against annexation by 7,500 native voters. The delegates of the latter organization report that the request for the restoration of the Queen was omitted because they feared that if inserted in their memorial they would be arrested for treason.

The Annexation Club inform me that they have on their books 5,180 names for annexation. This is signed generally by American citizens whether they have registered here as voters or not. Some natives have signed this last document, who are on the police force and occupy other government positions—doubtless in order to hold their places. Other natives who have signed are the hired laborers of sugar planters, having been systematically worked upon to do so, and, feeling largely dependent upon the planters for employment, fear discharge.

I have put this question to several leading annexationists, whose statements have been taken in writing and certified to by them: "If the question of annexation were submitted to the people of these Islands, who were qualified to vote for representatives under the Constitution of 1887, under the Australian ballot system, which has been adopted by your legislature, what would be the result?" They have almost without exception declared that annexation would certainly be defeated.

Threats to arrest the Queen and deport leading natives have been repeatedly urged in the annexation organs, and have caused the native people uneasiness and alarm. It has restrained outward manifestations of interest on their part. These threats were founded on charges that the Queen and these natives were engaged in treasonable conduct in urging the natives to vote against annexation.

There is not an annexationist in the islands, so far as I have been able to observe, who would be willing to submit the question of annexation to a popular vote. They have men at work in all of the islands urging the natives to sign petitions for annexation. They seek to impress them with the opinion that if annexed they will be allowed the right to vote. Quite a number of petitions have been signed by natives asking for annexation, provided they were allowed the right to vote. In other instances delegations made up of white men and natives have brought in small petitions signed by natives, and on being asked if the natives were in favor of annexation without the right to vote have always answered that they were not. While this is done I have never yet found an annexationist who did not insist that stable government could not be had without so large a restriction of the native vote as would leave political power in the hands of the whites.

I have had ample opportunity to observe the feeling of the native population on the question of annexation. There is no doubt that the whole race—men and women—are deeply concerned about the independence of their native land. Their mind is not turning to England or to any other country for protection. Their devotion to the United States is continually asserted. If the question of annexation by the United States should be made to depend upon the popular will in these islands the proposition had as well be abandoned at once. There are a great many whites here in addition to the natives who are opposed to annexation, and who are now preparing to sign memorials of this character to the President of the United States.

While I have presented these observations I wish here to assert that I have abstained from expressing any wish for or against annexation

to any person in these islands. I have by no act of mine sought to influence opinion on this subject, either one way or the other.

Hereafter I shall discuss this matter from official data, and from the evidence of persons who have filed certified statements with me.

There frequently occurs in Mr. Stevens' correspondence with the State Department the allegation that the Queen has for a paramour ex-Marshal Wilson. Ordinarily such scandalous statements would be unworthy of attention. Its use to prejudice the minds of the American people against her in connection with the question of annexation has caused me to make some inquiry into the subject. A number of reputable gentlemen have stated in writing their utter disbelief in this allegation. She has been received with apparent admiration through all the years of her reign in the most refined circles in this city. The white population have resorted eagerly to the palace to participate in its social enjoyments without any reserve on account of the Queen's character.

On April 19, 1892, the American minister gave her a breakfast, to which a number of prominent persons were invited.

Wilson is ten years the junior of the ex-Queen. He married a girl who was reared by her and lived with her at the time of his marriage.

He has never lived in the palace. He lived in the palace grounds with his wife, in a building 75 yards from the palace, where the Queen resided. They were moved into this building after the death of the Queen's husband at the instance of the Queen. Wilson is universally recognized as a brave man and loyal to the Queen. The frequent revolutions here on the part of the whites doubtless caused her to make him marshal, and put him at the head of the police force, which was the real military force of the Kingdom. Because of his marriage with a native woman, and her connection with the Queen, and her confidence in his courage and fidelity, she trusted him rather than any of the whites in this position.

I forbear any further statement on this subject at this time. Evidently this charge against the Queen has for its foundation the looseness which comes from passionate and vindictive partisan struggles in Honolulu.

On the 16th instant I published my instructions in full, accompanied by the following statement:

While I shall abstain from interference between conflicting forces of whatever nationality for supremacy, I will protect American citizens not participating in such conflict.

I send you newspaper comments on the instructions and the foregoing declaration, in the nature of an interpretation of my instructions. (Inclosure No. 2).

From what I can learn many American citizens intensely active in the late revolution in these islands, and promoters of the cause of annexation, and supporters of the Provisional Government, took offense at the latter language. It seems very difficult for that class of persons to understand why they can not be permitted to participate in political and military movements on these islands with a guarantee of protection from opposing forces by the troops of the United States.

On the 19th instant I published your dispatch of May 9 in relation to my appointment as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States. I believed it calculated to produce an impression on the minds of the people claiming to be American citizens that under no false pretense of preserving order or protecting American

citizens could they be allowed to command the services of American troops to promote political schemes here.

I invite your attention to a communication and plat from Admiral Skerrett, which I inclose herewith. (Inclosure No. 3.)

The plat should have shown Music Hall immediately on the corner of the block, and the side of Arion Hall next to the Music Hall nearly on a line with the front line of the Government building.

It is easy to see that any attack on the Government building by the Queen's troops from the east would have exposed our men to their fire. Any attempt to occupy Music Hall and Arion Hall by the Queen's troops for the purpose of taking the Government building would have encountered the American troops. Any attempt by the Queen's troops from the direction of the palace would have exposed our troops to their fire.

In the insurrection of 1889, Music Hall was occupied by sharpshooters of the Government, who contributed more to the suppression of the insurrection than any other forces. This place Mr. Stevens sought to obtain for the United States troops on the 16th of January last, and failing in this, selected Arion Hall.

Admiral Skerrett well says that the place was well chosen if the design of Mr. Stevens and Capt. Wiltse was the support of the Provisional Government troops. It was certainly suggestive of this design to the Queen and her adherents.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 7.]

Mr. Blount to Mr. Dole.

HONOLULU, H. I., May 10, 1893.

HON. SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Honolulu, H. I.

SIR: Your communication of the 9th instant, in reply to my letter of the same date, concerning a reflection upon myself as Commissioner of the United States, is acknowledged.

It gives me pleasure to be assured, of what I had previously believed, that a most cordial feeling on the part of your Government existed toward myself as the representative of the Government of the United States, and that the article referred to would not be approved of by your Government.

The disavowal in the Star of yesterday did not at all meet the situation. I shall not ask any further action in relation thereto, preferring to content myself with your communication rather than to expose my Government to the charge of ungenerous action in the present condition of affairs in these Islands, by insisting on further and fuller apology on the part of the managers of the Star.

With assurances of the highest consideration,

I am, etc.

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 7.—Hawaiian Star, May 16, 1893.]

Blount's instructions.

Three mooted points were settled as follows by the text of the instructions given Commissioner Blount by Secretary Gresham:

I. The Commissioner brought with him no authority to restore the ex-Queen, nor to interfere in any way with the domestic policy of the Provisional Government.

II. The power of the United States will be exercised against foreign aggrandizement upon these islands.

III. The settlement of annexation does not fall within the scope of the Commissioner's duty, but is especially reserved to the President and Congress.

As to the announcement made by Commissioner Blount that he will not interfere in any struggle that may arise locally for the possession of this Government, except to protect American citizens not participating in the conflict, and to keep foreign powers from taking a hand in it, we do not see why it should excite either surprise or indignation. It is not the business of the United States, except where the Monroe doctrine is threatened, to concern itself in the internal quarrels of any foreign country. Neither is it considered the right or privilege of any nation to shield its citizens who may be in the military or civil service or in the political activities of a foreign state from the legal consequences of their acts. America gave no protection to Americans who aided the Cuban revolutionists; and during the civil war Great Britain never raised a protest if an English-built blockade runner, commanded by a subject of the Queen, manned by British sailors, and loaded with Birmingham consignments, was shelled and sunk by the United States blockading fleets. By these examples it is easy to see that Mr. Blount merely expresses a principle of international law in the appendix to his instructions; and that the statement of his exact position, far from being a superfluous hint to the "abhorrent and forbidden forces" in Hawaiian politics to do their worst, was a proper recognition of his duty to his own Government and countrymen, serving a useful purpose here, in that it showed the annexation party its exact bearings and forewarned it that it might be forearmed.

By way of side comment, it may be well enough to say that in the remote event of a political *émeute* on these Islands, there will be no necessity for Commissioner Blount to land forces to protect any American's property. No citizen of the United States worthy of the name will need to appeal to him for such assistance here. The Government is in American hands, and so long as the United States is pledged by its "consistent and established policy" to keep foreign powers from interfering with it, the existing administration may be relied upon to maintain its place against any and all comers, and to see that the homes and families of its citizens are held inviolate.

[Extract Hawaiian Daily Bulletin, May 16, 1893.]

Mr. Blount's instructions.

"Hon. James H. Blount's instructions from the Secretary of State of the United States, which the Bulletin had the honor of presenting for the first time to the public, contain nothing contrary to the opinions held, from the first until now, by the opponents of the revolutionary scheme of annexation regarding the Special Commissioner's mission to these Islands. It was from the opposition side that the intimation came, in advance of any mention in the United States press, that a commission of investigation was to be sent here by President Cleveland. This news was contemptuously denied by the press of the party of violence, but next mail steamer brought its definite confirmation. Among other things to be investigated the instructions denominate "the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown." This certainly includes the question of whether or not the United States diplomatic representative and the naval commander acting with him contributed aid to that revolution. An answer in the affirmative to this question returned by the Commissioner as a result of his investigation would lead inevitably to possibilities of the nature of those that the revolutionary press is in unwise haste to declare are beyond the scope of the Commissioner's power.

"The instructions published are only the original ones, and they inform the Commissioner that he is expected to correspond with the Secretary of State, "communicating information or soliciting special instruction on such points as" he "may deem necessary." As there will by to-morrow's expected mail have been ample time for a reply to voluminous information communicated to Washington, doubtless coupled with the solicitation of special instructions based on the facts as reported, it is only the usual rashness of the revolutionary press from the beginning which seeks to impress its readers with the view that this, that, or the other thing is absurd and impossible. The fact stands out, more prominent than almost anything else, that the United States Government, contrary to the desires and in spite of the strenuous efforts of the Provisional Government and its agents, has with all respect received the protest of the deposed Queen, and will adjudicate thereupon strictly on the merits as well as in accordance with the traditional policy of fairness and friendliness toward weak and friendly neighbors which has hitherto been among the glories of the great Republic.

"Mr. Blount's instructions bring out in high relief the policy of his Government in regard to the occasions when the landing of troops on Hawaiian territory is justi-

flable. There is small comfort in them for those who have been laboring to justify the fact and the manner of the investment of Honolulu by United States naval troops on the 16th of January. Until the facts on this point, as ascertained by the impartial investigation of Mr. Blount, see the light, however, assertion and comment, beyond what has been given already, would only be in the line of the example set by the Government organs, which have tiresomely asserted from the first that the Commissioner could find out nothing which had not been reported at Washington by the Provisional Government's commissioners, supplemented by the prejudiced and well-stuffed communications of newspaper correspondents. More interesting, if not more important, than the contents of his instructions from the Secretary of State is the terse prescription given by the Commissioner himself, in his communication to the Hawaiian people, of the status of American citizens participating in any conflict between parties for supremacy on these Islands. This is in conformity with the law of nations in similar cases provided, with which citizens and subjects of different powers, who desire to know, were made acquainted at the crisis of 1887.

"To what extent American citizens who took up arms for overthrowing the Government of this country, friendly to their own, were encouraged to rely on the support of their nation's strong arm, and by whom any such encouragement might have been proffered, are other questions that may as well be left to Mr. Blount's inquiry for solution. In this, as in other respects, the opposition can afford to maintain its unvarying coolness and patience, joined with confidence that the United States will not uphold wrong committed in her name, and the subsidized and mercenary press might, with advantage to its feelings at a later stage, try to imitate the same condition of equanimity. Americans who are opposed to filibustering and violence will be prouder of their great nation than ever as they read the words in which President Cleveland's representative assures the law-abiding and peace-loving of his fellow-citizens on this foreign strand that they will be protected in any emergency.

"While I shall refrain from interference between conflicting forces, of whatever nationality, for supremacy, I will protect American citizens not participating in such conflict."

[Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Tuesday, May 16, 1893.]

Political developments.

"At present it would be useless to speculate as to the causes which have determined Commissioner Blount to publish his instructions from the State Department at Washington under which he is acting. That he has reached a point in his investigations which justifies his action none will doubt. That there is more or less significance in the publication at the present state of affairs must be admitted by all accustomed to studying the course of international diplomacy. In any event the publication will serve to throw light upon many points doubtful heretofore and will dash some of the baseless hopes and wilder theories regarding Commissioner Blount's intentions and alleged instructions which have passed current in royalist circles from the moment the United States steamer *Rush* entered the harbor.

"It is not our purpose to attempt an analysis of Commissioner Blount's instructions. They are certainly plain enough to need no commentary, as they are full enough to exclude all doubts as to his future action. The fullest inquiry here and report to the United States Government will be made. In the meantime the existing treaty of annexation will be held in abeyance; but the United States will, pending investigation and settlement, give adequate protection to the life and property of citizens of the United States, and, if necessary, will repress any lawless and tumultuous acts threatening them.

"Commissioner Blount's note at the end of his instructions corresponds fully with what he stated on his arrival to the Provisional Government, and seems to us the act of a wise and cautious diplomat, such as he is reported to be.

"There is one point deserving of notice in the document, and that is while the inquiry into Hawaiian affairs in detail is left to the wisdom and sound discretion of Commissioner Blount, final decision on the merits of the case is tacitly if not directly reserved. The instructions, in fact, throw no special light upon the subject of annexation. Pending the settlement of the question, however, the document is decisive and outspoken. The United States will adhere to its consistent and established policy and will not acquiesce in domestic interference by foreign powers.

As to the effect which will be produced by the publication of the instructions there can be little or no doubt. Both the Provisional Government and Americans generally have fully and freely intrusted the annexation cause to Mr. Blount, subject to any investigations he might see fit to make under his instructions. At no time

have they attempted to anticipate his action or lead him to prejudge the case. They have at all times rigidly adhered to the argument of facts and figures, coupled with evident national conditions and tendencies backed by the moral and political forces of the community, which they believe to be irresistible for the establishment of stable government and the future welfare of the Islands. They hopefully retain this stand, and the text of Commissioner Blount's instructions now gives them surer hope in doing so.

The publication of Commissioner Blount's instructions is a severe blow to the political tactics of the ex-Queen's following. For some time it has been known that the royalist cause has been bolstered principally by allegations made upon the Commissioner's power and instructions to restore the monarchy. The whole mainstay of the royalist cause consequently falls to the ground with the publication of the document itself. Within the last fortnight the ex-Queen actually told a prominent native citizen of Maui to go home and continue to support her cause, as she would be restored to the throne by the middle of July. Just so long as the contents of the Commissioner's instructions remained unknown the royalists were enabled to hold the natives to their cause with hopes and promises which they knew had no foundation in fact.

An incident of the raising of the American flag in California, similar to the raising of the flag in Honolulu, has been recalled by the early settlers there. In 1842 Commodore Jones of the U. S. Navy, under the impression that the United States were at war with Mexico, took forcible possession of Monterey, hoisted the Stars and Stripes, and proclaimed California a Territory of the United States. Discerning his mistake the following day he hauled down the flag and made such apology as the circumstances would admit. A few years later, however, the flag was raised again and remained up."

[Inclosure 3 in No. 7.]

Admiral Skerrett to Mr. Blount.

No. 167.]

U. S. S. BOSTON, FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *May 20, 1893.*

SIR: I have examined with a view of inspection the premises first occupied by the force landed from the U. S. S. *Boston*, and known as Arion Hall, situated on the west side of the Government building. The position of this location is in the rear of a large brick building known as Music Hall. The street it faces is comparatively a narrow one, the building itself facing the Government building. In my opinion it was unadvisable to locate the troops there, if they were landed for the protection of the United States citizens, being distantly removed from the business portion of the town, and generally far away from the United States legation and consulate-general, as well as being distant from the houses and residences of United States citizens. It will be seen from the accompanying sketch that had the Provisional Government troops been attacked from the east, such attack would have placed them in the line of fire.

Had Music Hall been seized by the Queen's troops, they would have been under their fire, had such been their desire. It is for these reasons that I consider the position occupied as illy selected. Naturally, if they were landed with a view to support the Provisional Government troops, then occupying the Government building, it was a wise choice, as they could enfilade any troops attacking them from the palace grounds in front. There is nothing further for me to state with reference to this matter, and as has been called by you to my attention—all of which is submitted for your consideration.


Very respectfully,

J. S. SKERRETT,

Rear Admiral U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Col. J. H. BLOUNT,

*U. S. Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.*



No. 11.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 8.] HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *June 1, 1893.*

SIR: The population of the Hawaiian Islands can but be studied by one unfamiliar with the native tongue from its several census reports. A census is taken every six years. The last report is for the year 1890. From this it appears that the whole population numbers 89,990. This number includes natives, or, to use another designation, Kanakas, half-castes (persons containing an admixture of other than native blood in any proportion with it), Hawaiian-born foreigners of all races or nationalities other than natives, Americans, British, Germans, French, Portuguese, Norwegians, Chinese, Polynesians, and other nationalities.

Americans number 1,928, natives and half-castes, 40,612; Chinese,

15,301; Japanese, 12,360; Portuguese, 8,602; British, 1,344; Germans, 1,034; French, 70; Norwegians, 227; Polynesians, 588; and other foreigners 419.

It is well at this point to say that of the 7,495 Hawaiian-born foreigners 4,117 are Portuguese, 1,701 Chinese and Japanese, 1,617 other white foreigners, and 60 of other nationalities.

There are 58,714 males. Of these 18,364 are pure natives, and 3,085 are half-castes, making together 21,449. Fourteen thousand five hundred and twenty-two are Chinese. The Japanese number 10,079. The Portuguese contribute 4,770. These four nationalities furnish 50,820 of the male population.

	Males.
The Americans furnish.....	1,298
The British.....	982
The Germans.....	729
The French.....	46
The Norwegians.....	135

These five nationalities combined furnish 3,170 of the total male population.

The first four nationalities, when compared with the last five in male population, are nearly sixteenfold the largest in number.

The Americans are to those of the four aforementioned group of nationalities as 39 to 1—nearly as 40 to 1.

It is as convenient here as at any other place to give some facts in relation to the Portuguese. They have been brought here from time to time from the Madeira and Cape Verde Islands by the Hawaiian Government as laborers on plantations, just as has been done in relation to Chinese, Japanese, Polynesians, etc. They are the most ignorant of all imported laborers and reported to be very thievish. They are not pure Europeans, but a commingling of many races, especially the negro. They intermarry with the natives and belong to the laboring classes. Very few of them can read and write. Their children are being taught in the public schools, as all races are. It is wrong to class them as Europeans.

The character of the people of these islands is and must be overwhelmingly Asiatic. Let it not be imagined that the Chinese, Japanese, and Portuguese disappear at the end of their contract term. From the report of the inspector in chief of Japanese immigrants on March 31, 1892, it appears that twenty "lots" of Japanese immigrants have been brought here by the Hawaiian Government, numbering 21,110. Of these 2,517 have returned to Japan; 8,592, having worked out their contract term, remain, and 9,626 are still working out their contract term. More than 75 per cent may be said to locate here permanently.

There are 13,067 Chinamen engaged in various occupations, to wit: 8,763 laborers, 1,479 farmers, 133 fishermen, 74 drivers and teamsters, 564 mechanics, 42 planters and ranchers, 776 merchants and traders, 164 clerks and salesmen, 12 professional men and teachers, and 1,056 in various other occupations.

The number of merchants and traders in the entire country is 1,238. Of this number 776 are Chinamen and 81 are Americans.

The largest part of the retail trade seems to be conducted by Chinamen.

Of 20,536 laborers on sugar plantations only 2,617 are Chinese. Of this latter number only 396 are contract laborers.

The Portuguese population in 1884 amounted to 9,377 and in 1890 to 8,602—a loss of 775. These have been leaving in considerable numbers for the past eighteen months, making their way generally to the United

States. In 1890 the males were classified as to occupation thus: Laborers, 2,653, farmers, 136, fishermen, 3, mariners, 10, drivers and teamsters, 63, mechanics, 167, planters and ranchers, 17, merchants and traders, 56, clerks and salesmen, 13, professional men and teachers, 11, other occupations, 123; total, 3,266. On the cane plantations there are of male Portuguese, 277 under contract and 1,651 day laborers.

Of the population in 1892, 20,536 were laborers on sugar-cane plantations, 16,723 being Portuguese, Japanese, and Chinese. Of the whole number 10,991 are contract laborers. The remainder are designated as day laborers. The total number of laborers in the islands by the census of 1890 was 25,466.

In 1890 there were 23,863 male laborers. Of this number 18,728 were Chinese and Japanese. At this period there were 41,073 persons of all occupations. Of this number 24,432 were Chinese and Japanese.

Of the total number of persons in the various avocations, of European and American origin, it appears that 1,106 were Americans, 819 British, 518 Germans, 45 French, and 200 Norwegians, making a total of 2,688 persons.

The natives furnished 8,871 persons and the half-castes 884.

The Hawaiians, therefore, may be said to have furnished 9,755.

There are 196 persons designated as planters and ranchers. Of this number 18 are Americans, 30 are British, and 6 are Germans. The remainder are principally Japanese, Portuguese, Chinese, and Hawaiians.

There are 5,181 persons designated as farmers. Of these, 3,392 are natives and half-castes, and 1,500 are Chinese. These two furnish 4,779, leaving a residue of 402 taken from all other nationalities. Of these, 26 are Americans.

For a more minute examination of the avocation of the people, I append a tabular statement from the last census year, 1890. (Inclosure No. 1.)

It will be interesting, if not pleasing, to examine the number of the various sexes by nationalities.

The grand total of the population is 89,990. The male population is 58,714; the females are 31,276.

The natives and half-castes furnish 21,449 males and 19,174 females.

The Chinese furnish 14,522 males and 779 females.

The Japanese furnish 10,079 males and 2,281 females.

The Portuguese furnish 4,770 males and 3,832 females.

The American males are 1,298, females 630.

The British males are 982, females 362.

The German males are 729, females 305.

This disparity of the sexes applies to all nationalities, save the native race.

The most striking feature is that the Chinese men outnumber the women by more than 18 to 1.

The Japanese men outnumber their women by nearly 5 to 1. In all foreign nationalities the males largely exceed the females in numbers.

The natives and half-castes furnish nearly two-thirds of the women.

For a moment let us see how far this disparity of sexes in 1884 compares with that of 1890:

In 1884 there were 51,539 males, 29,039 females, and a total population of 80,578.

In 1890 the males numbered 58,714, the females 31,276, and the total number was 89,990.

The males increased from 1884 to 1890, 7,175. The females increased from 1884 to 1890, 2,237.

During this period there appears to have been the following gains and losses by nationalities:

Gains: Half-castes, 1,968; Hawaiian-born foreigners (mostly Portuguese), 5,455; British, 62; Japanese, 12, 244.

Losses: Natives, 5,578; Americans, 138; Germans, 566; French, 122; Portuguese, 775; Norwegians, 135; Chinese, 2,638; Polynesians, 368.

The net gain is 9,412. Had it not been for the large importation of Japanese for plantation laborers there would have been a net loss of 2,832.

There was a net loss of Europeans and Americans combined numbering 899.

While the population is increasing in numbers the per cent of females is largely decreasing.

In 1866 the percentage of females was 45.25 per cent; in 1872 it was 44.37; in 1878 41.19; in 1884 36.04; in 1890 34.75.

This condition has been reached by the importation of contract labor by the Hawaiian Government for the sugar plantations.

In 1890 there was in the island of Oahu a population of 31,194. Of this number 1,239 were Americans.

There was in the island of Hawaii a population of 26,754. Of this number 289 were Americans.

In the islands of Molokai and Lanai there was a population of 2,826. Of this number 23 were Americans.

In the island of Maui there was a population of 17,357. Of this number 211 were Americans.

In the islands of Kanai and Niihau there was a population of 11,859. Of this number 112 were Americans.

The total population was 89,990. Of this number 1,928 were Americans.

It appears that in 1890, the period of the last census, that in a population of 89,990 persons 51,610 were unable to read and write. The natives and half-castes, numbering 40,622, had 27,901 able to read and write.

The Chinese, with a population of 15,301 persons, had 13,277 unable to read and write.

The Japanese, with a population of 12,360, had 12,053 persons unable to read and write.

The Portuguese, with a population of 8,602, had 6,276 unable to read and write. These are mostly children.

For more minute examination reference is made to the table inclosed herewith, from the census report of 1890. (Inclosure No. 2.)

The total number of registered voters at this period was 13,593. Of these 9,554 were natives and half-castes; 146 Hawaiian-born foreigners, 637 Americans, 505 British, 382 Germans, 22 French, 2,091 Portuguese, 78 Norwegians, 42 Polynesians, and other nationalities 136.

From this it appears that the Hawaiians exceeded all other nationalities of voters 4,039.

The Portuguese of an age to vote generally can not read and write. The natives alone had this restriction. Place this upon the Portuguese and other nationalities and the natives would have nine-tenths of the votes.

The minister of finance informs me that the taxes paid by Americans and Europeans amount to \$274,516.74; those by natives, \$71,386.82; half-castes, \$26,868.68; Chinese, \$87,266.10; Japanese, \$67,326.07; other nationalities, \$729.82.

A very large proportion of the Americans and Europeans paying these taxes are antiannexationists.

He also informs me that the acreage on which taxes are paid by various nationalities is: Europeans and Americans, 1,052,492 acres; natives, 257,457 acres; half-castes, 531,545 acres; Chinese, 12,324 acres; Japanese, 200 acres; other nationalities, none.

The surveyor-general reports the crown lands for 1893 as containing 915,288 acres. Of these he reports 94,116 acres available for lease. Of this latter number only 47,000 acres are reported to be good, arable land. He likewise reports the Government land as containing 828,370 acres. He reports these, estimated in 1890, to be worth \$2,128,850. The annual income from them is \$67,636. Of this income \$19,500 is from wharfage and \$7,800 from rent of land with buildings thereon.

The cane and arable land is estimated at 35,150 acres.

It is important here to recall his statement made to the Legislature in 1891 in the following language: "Most Government lands at the present time consist of mere remnants left here and there and of the worthless and unsaleable portions remaining after the rest had been sold." And in the same communication he declares that between the years 1850 and 1860 nearly all of the desirable Government land was sold, generally to natives.

In 1890 the census report discloses that only 4,695 persons owned real estate in these Islands. With a population estimated at this time at 95,000 the vast number of landless people here is discouraging to the idea of immigrants from the United States being able to find encouragement in the matter of obtaining homes in these Islands.

I shall in a future report endeavor to inform you of the legislation in relation to the lands—the distribution of them and such other matters as would be interesting in connection therewith in the event they should figure in the consideration of future political relations with the United States.

It may be proper here to say that the landless condition of the native population grows out of the original distribution thereof by the laws of the country and does not come from its shiftlessness.

On the 30th ultimo the attorney-general and marshal called to see me. They informed me that the order of the community was threatened, according to the reports of their detectives, with a movement on the part of the antiannexation whites to take possession of the Government and restore the Queen. After some considerable presentation of details I was informed that part of the scheme was to drug me.

It so happened that during the afternoon of the preceding day a white man called to ask my opinion as to the propriety of a contemplated meeting on that evening to protest against a movement believed to be on foot by the Provisional Government to propose a new form of treaty with the United States. He said that certain white men were movers in it and he was debating whether he should advise the natives to attend; that he could see no reason for it; that they were awaiting the action of the Government of the United States on the various questions connected with the formation of the present Government, and believed that was the attitude for them to occupy. Of course I declined to express any opinion. He left me saying that he would see the natives did not attend. There was no meeting.

I said to the attorney-general that I was satisfied from communications made by the natives that they would not cooperate in any disorderly action, preferring, as they say, to submit their cause to the decision of the Government of the United States.

A meeting of half-castes, which seemed to be a part of the cause of alarm to the attorney-general and marshal, I said to them was, I believed, nothing more than an effort to prevent the aforesaid meeting.

This they accepted as the probable solution of it, and finally assented to the idea that there was no ground for a belief that there would be any disturbance such as was indicated.

On the 31st ultimo President Dole called on me and informed me that there was a petition signed by fifty persons—British subjects—requesting the British minister to prevent the sailing of the English war vessel *Hyacinth*, which has orders to leave here to-morrow. This seemed to occasion him some uneasiness. He finally said that the petition was being carried around by a man who had been in the military service of the Provisional Government, and had left it on account of inability to get an office which he desired.

I informed him that two nights ago the British minister had expressed to me his gratification that the vessel was going to leave; that its presence here simply furnished the opportunity for some persons to avow some unfriendly intention of his Government.

I further said that I was assured by the British minister on his own motion, in a desire to manifest his friendly disposition, that in no event would the British troops be used to advance the interests of any political movement here. He seemed to accept this as a relief from any apprehension.

The Provisional Government officials are excited by many groundless rumors, and communicate them very freely to me. I have not indicated any line of conduct which I should pursue in the event of a conflict other than that I have communicated to you.

A great deal of testimony in relation to the causes of the revolution and the circumstances attending it has been taken.

The physical inability of the stenographer up to the present time to transcribe the whole of the mass of notes which has accumulated has prevented me from fully considering them and presenting my opinions thereon.

I hope to be able to furnish you with much of interest as soon as this difficulty has been overcome.

I think the condition of the public mind here is just as formerly reported.

The universal feeling towards me so far as I can gather is one of kindness and respect. This is due in largest measure to my abstention from expressing my views on political questions.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

P. S.—Since closing the foregoing communication the inclosure (marked No. 3) has been handed to me by Mr. Samuel Parker, the genuineness of which I do not question.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 8]

TABLE 6.—Classification of each nationality and sex by occupation.

	Laborers.	Farmers.	Fishermen.	Mariners.	Drivers and teamsters.	Mechanics.	Planters and ranchers.	Merchants and traders.	Clerks and salesmen.	Professional men and teachers.	Other occupations.	Total returning occupations.
Native males	2,213	3,211	656	332	237	663	51	129	58	173	831	8,554
Native females	40	68	12	103	2	3	1	12	76	317
Total	2,253	3,279	668	332	237	766	53	132	59	185	907	8,871
Half-caste males	115	108	25	14	32	230	14	32	78	26	170	844
Half-caste females	1	5	1	25	8	40
Total	116	113	25	14	32	230	14	32	79	51	178	844
Hawaiian-born foreign males	20	16	2	7	39	9	19	70	26	33	241
Hawaiian-born foreign females	1	3	23	1	28
Total	21	16	2	7	39	9	19	73	49	34	269
American males	36	26	2	36	59	369	17	81	127	114	161	1,028
American females	1	5	57	15	78
Total	36	26	2	36	59	369	18	81	132	171	176	1,106
British males	24	15	28	34	328	30	42	85	60	139	785
British females	3	6	3	14	8	34
Total	27	15	28	34	334	30	42	88	74	147	819
German males	52	11	2	10	26	176	6	47	54	20	100	504
German females	1	5	8	14
Total	52	11	2	10	26	177	6	47	54	25	108	518
French males	2	2	2	8	1	1	9	5	30
French females	15	15
Total	2	2	2	8	1	1	24	5	45
Portuguese males	2,653	136	3	10	63	165	17	56	35	10	118	3,266
Portuguese females	3	2	1	5	11
Total	2,656	136	3	10	63	167	17	56	35	11	123	3,277
Norwegian males	79	25	7	9	31	2	8	2	37	200
Norwegian females
Total	79	25	7	9	31	2	8	2	37	200
Chinese males	8,763	1,476	133	74	564	42	776	164	16	1,056	13,067
Chinese females	64	21	1	2	10	98
Total	8,827	1,500	133	74	564	42	777	164	18	1,066	13,165
Japanese males	9,565	36	3	2	4	42	27	20	23	115	9,837
Japanese females	1,404	14	1,418
Total	10,969	36	3	2	4	42	27	20	23	129	11,255
Polynesian males	269	5	2	3	2	9	1	9	300
Polynesian females	85	1	86
Total	354	5	2	3	2	9	1	10	386
Other nationalities:												
Males	72	17	3	18	8	66	5	14	9	6	56	274
Females	2	1	1	4
Total	74	17	3	18	8	66	5	15	9	7	56	278
Total males	23,863	5,087	829	464	555	2,690	193	1,233	703	483	2,830	38,930
Total females	1,603	94	12	112	3	5	13	155	146	2,143
Grand total	25,466	5,181	841	464	555	2,802	196	1,238	716	638	2,976	41,073

[Inclosure No. 2 in No. 8.]

TABLE 7.—Classification of each nationality and sex by social condition, education, school attendance, possession of electoral franchise, and ownership of real estate.

	Married.	Unmarried.	Widows.	Widowers.	Divorced.	Total.	Attending school.	Able to read and write.	Owning real estate.	Registered voters.
Native males	6,836	9,578	1,829	121	18,364	2,980	13,756	2,504	8,777
Native females	7,556	6,806	1,616	94	16,072	2,322	10,311	767
Total	14,392	16,384	1,616	1,829	215	34,436	5,302	24,067	3,271	8,777
Half-caste male	669	2,341	66	9	3,085	883	1,914	240	777
Half-caste females	754	2,219	105	23	3,101	875	1,920	155
Total	1,423	4,560	105	66	32	6,186	1,758	3,834	395	777
Hawaiian-born males	219	3,689	1	3,909	605	692	67	146
Hawaiian-born foreign females	157	3,416	11	2	3,586	489	599	38
Total	376	7,105	11	1	2	7,495	1,094	1,291	105	146
American males	528	699	64	7	1,298	62	1,197	147	637
American females	324	251	55	630	59	527	30
Total	852	950	55	64	7	1,928	121	1,724	177	637
British males	433	498	44	7	982	30	897	143	505
British females	193	116	53	362	33	308	26
Total	626	614	53	44	7	1,344	63	1,205	169	505
German males	304	398	22	5	729	74	655	53	382
German females	184	113	8	305	44	260	4
Total	488	511	8	22	5	1,034	118	915	57	382
French males	17	18	10	1	46	38	8	22
French females	5	17	2	24	24
Total	22	35	2	10	1	70	62	8	22
Portuguese males	2,455	2,238	76	1	4,770	720	1,513	224	2,091
Portuguese females	2,443	1,322	65	2	3,832	550	913	10
Total	4,898	3,560	65	76	3	8,602	1,270	2,426	234	2,091
Norwegian males	69	80	4	2	155	19	132	10	78
Norwegian females	55	16	1	72	6	60
Total	124	96	1	4	2	227	25	192	10	78
Chinese males	2,369	12,049	96	8	14,522	51	1,971	224
Chinese females	559	201	19	779	20	51	2
Total	2,928	12,250	19	96	8	15,301	71	2,022	226
Japanese, males	2,964	7,059	50	6	10,079	21	270	4
Japanese, females	2,101	148	29	3	2,281	12	37
Total	5,065	7,207	29	50	9	12,360	33	307	4
Polynesian, males	150	235	19	404	9	61	6	42
Polynesian, females	133	45	6	184	5	24
Total	283	280	6	19	588	14	85	6	42
Other nationalities:										
Males	162	181	26	2	371	2	217	28	136
Females	33	11	4	48	1	33	5
Total	195	192	4	26	2	419	3	250	33	136
Total males	17,175	39,063	2,307	169	58,714	5,456	23,313	3,658	13,593
Total females	14,497	14,681	1,974	124	31,276	4,416	15,067	1,037
Grand total	31,672	53,744	1,974	2,307	293	89,990	9,872	38,380	4,695	13,593

[Inclosure 3 in No. 8.]

Queen's ministers to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, May 31, 1893.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT,

Special Commissioner of the United States to Hawaii:

SIR: On Friday afternoon, January 13, about 2 o'clock, we, Samuel Parker, W. H. Cornwell, J. F. Colburn, and A. P. Peterson were called by Her Majesty to the palace and asked to accept positions in a new cabinet, the Wilcox cabinet having tendered their resignations the day previous. We accepted and were handed our commissions, and took the oath of office before Chief Justice Judd in the blue room. It was then thought advisable that the announcement be made to the Legislature, which was accordingly done, after which the cabinet went again to the palace to consult with Her Majesty as to what bills, having passed the Legislature, should be signed by her. Her Majesty asked the advice of the cabinet as to whether she should sign the lottery bill, the opium bill, and the registration act, which laws were then before her. At the same time she expressed a desire to satisfy her lady friends by vetoing the opium bill, and also expressed doubts as to the advisability of signing the registration act. The cabinet advised that as a majority of the Legislature and the mass of the people were in favor of the lottery and opium bills it was the duty of the Sovereign to sign them, and also that as the registration act was deemed important to the planting interests, although opposed very strenuously by a large number of people, it would be advisable to sign that also, as no bill of importance had been vetoed during the session and it was not advisable to do so.

The next day, Saturday, the Legislature met at the usual hour and transacted the business which remained, and adjourned until 12 o'clock the same day for prorogation. Both at the morning session and at the ceremonies attending the prorogation the members of the Reform party in the Legislature, to a man, were conspicuous by their absence, although occasionally one of their number would show himself and then report proceedings down town. Immediately after the ceremonies the cabinet were notified that the foreign representatives desired to meet them, and accordingly a meeting was held in the foreign office, all of the foreign representatives being present. Mr. Wodehouse, the English commissioner, stated that they were informed that Her Majesty intended to promulgate a new constitution upon that day, and asked what the cabinet intended to do about the matter, if this proved correct. Mr. Parker replied for the cabinet, and stated that he had heard of the matter and that the cabinet had decided to advise Her Majesty against such a course.

This reply was satisfactory to all the representatives except to Mr. Stevens, the American minister, who became excited, and dropping the subject under discussion, pounded his cane upon the floor and stated in a loud voice that the United States had been insulted, and that the passage of the lottery bill was a direct attack upon his Government. The other representatives tried to change the subject, and, finally succeeding, the meeting broke up after several of them had disclaimed any approbation of Mr. Stevens's remarks. The cabinet then went to the palace and met the Queen in the blue room, where she stated that at the desire of a large number of her subjects she wished to promulgate a new constitution. The cabinet then spoke of the meeting just held with the foreign representatives and advised Her Majesty not to do it, as they considered the time inopportune and the action inadvisable. The Queen, after considerable hesitation, finally yielded to the advice of her ministers, and so notified the people who were assembled in the palace and throughout the grounds. Early Sunday morning the cabinet met at Mr. Cornwell's residence to consider the situation. Mr. W. M. Giffard, manager of W. G. Irwin & Co., and of Mr. Spreckels's business in Honolulu at that time, notified them that it had been agreed between their bank and the bank of Bishop & Co. that they would render such financial assistance as the Government might need.

It was also reported by Mr. Colburn and Mr. Peterson that an organization known as the "Committee of Safety" had been formed the night before at the house of Mr. L. A. Thurston, and had made overtures to them as members of the cabinet to assist them in dethroning the Queen. That they intended to go ahead and that Mr. Stevens assistance, together with that of his Government, had been guaranteed them. This statement was from Mr. Thurston himself. It was finally decided to ask a number of the most influential merchants and citizens to meet the cabinet and discuss the situation. The meeting was set for 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the meantime the cabinet repaired to the station house to consult with the marshal as to the best means of keeping the peace. Everthing was found to be in readiness for any disturbance that might arise. At the appointed time the cabinet met in the foreign office with Mr. W. M. Giffard, representing Claus Spreckels; Mr. S. M. Damon representing Bishop & Co.; Mr. J. O. Carter, representing C. Brewer & Co.; Mr. S. C. Allen, representing Allen & Robinson and the Robinson estate; Mr. F. A. Schaefer,

of F. A. Schaefer & Co., and E. C. Macfarlane. The situation was then discussed by all present and methods proposed which would relieve it.

During this discussion Mr. S. M. Damon remarked, the subject having been brought up by the information as to the intentions of the committee of safety, that the *Boston's* troops would land whether the Government liked it or not. It was finally decided that the best course to allay public feeling, and one which must be satisfactory to the people at large and the business interests generally, was for the cabinet to procure from Her Majesty a statement that no further attempt would be made to promulgate a new constitution. This was accordingly done, and the next day, Monday, such statement was sent to the different members of the diplomatic corps, as well as printed and circulated throughout the town. Sunday evening Mr. Parker and Mr. Peterson reported to the cabinet the result of an interview between Mr. Stevens and themselves in which Mr. Stevens had stated that he would not assist the Government as long as Mr. C. B. Wilson remained marshal, and a number of other statements made by him showing his hostility toward the Government and bearing out the information which had previously been received as to his friendly attitude toward the committee of safety. On Monday morning, after the assurance of Her Majesty that no new attempt would be made to promulgate a new constitution was made public, a feeling of satisfaction was generally manifested and an attempt was made by a number of leading citizens to postpone the mass meeting, which had been called for that afternoon, as being unnecessary; but Mr. Thurston protested and thought the meeting should go ahead and at least express their disapprobation of the course pursued by the Queen.

After the people attending the two mass meetings had quietly dispersed to their homes, and the city was as quiet as Sunday, the cabinet were informed, late Monday afternoon, that troops, armed with rifles and bringing Gatling guns, were being landed from the U. S. S. *Boston*. They immediately asked Mr. Stevens what this landing of troops meant, he not having asked the usual permission from the Government, and he, although sending a written reply, did not answer the question, but evaded it. The *Boston* troops took up a position commanding the Government building and the palace, and a position which commanded no American property. Monday evening was exceedingly quiet, the only disquietness being caused by the landing of foreign troops, which was generally disapproved of. On Tuesday information was received that the committee of safety were recruiting troops for the purpose of forming a provisional government, and were inducing men to enlist with them on the promise that the *Boston's* troops would interfere and assist them without it being necessary for them to fire a shot or incur any risk. Shortly after noon Mr. Parker and Mr. Peterson returned from an interview with Mr. Stevens, and reported that he (Mr. Stevens) had said that if any number of what he called responsible citizens should take possession of any building in town and form a provisional government he should recognize them and assist them to the extent of his power, and that he should refuse any assistance to the Queen's Government. The cabinet then made the station house their headquarters, as has always been the custom in any troublous times, the Government building always having been considered untenable. They then sent for a number of prominent citizens to consult with them.

Although being satisfied as to Mr. Stevens's position it was deemed best by the cabinet to get something from him in writing, and accordingly they sent a letter to him between 2 and 3 o'clock, asking whether the report was true that he had recognized the Provisional Government. In a little over half an hour his reply was received which stated that he had done so. Shortly after this Mr. S. M. Damon and Mr. C. Bolte came to the station house as messengers from the Provisional Government to consult with the Queen's cabinet as to an amicable settlement of the difficulty without resort to arms. Mr. Damon during the interview said it would merely be a waste of blood to resist, as the *Boston* and the *Boston's* troops stood ready to assist the Provisional Government. The cabinet gave them no reply but agreed to go with them and consult with the executive council of the Provisional Government at the Government building, which they accordingly did. At this meeting President Dole stated that it was their desire to have the matter settled without any resort to arms, and asked the Queen's cabinet to deliver up to them what Government property was in their possession. The cabinet replied that before any answer could be given it would be necessary to consult with Her Majesty. This was agreed upon, and the cabinet, accompanied by Mr. S. M. Damon, proceeded to the palace and met the Queen. There were present at that time, besides Her Majesty and her ministers, H. A. Widemann, Paul Neumann, E. C. Macfarlane, J. O. Carter, and S. M. Damon.

The question as to the surrender of the Queen was discussed by nearly all present, and Mr. Stevens's attitude and letter recognizing the Provisional Government were also spoken of, and the unanimous opinion of those present was, that although the Queen's Government had possession of the station house, the barracks, and the palace, together with the greater part of the arms and ammunition in the Kingdom,

and all the Gatling guns and field pieces except those under the control of foreign nations, and men enough, both foreign and native, to make them absolutely impregnable so far as any force which could be brought against them from people resident within the Kingdom was concerned, and with force enough to put down any disturbance and to keep the peace of the country, unless such disturbance was assisted by foreign troops. Considering the position taken by the representative of the United States it was useless to make war against that country, which any resistance on the part of the Queen's Government plainly meant, and that the wiser course to pursue was to surrender the Government property under a protest to the United States, the superior force of that country having brought about the situation. The protest was immediately drawn and signed by Her Majesty and her ministers and taken to President Dole, who indorsed the receipt of it. At a little after 7 o'clock that evening the Provisional Government took possession of the station house and other Government buildings and of the arms and ammunition then in possession of the Queen's Government.

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

In view of the facts stated above, which can not be controverted, and in view of the fact that your investigations concerning the matter are shortly likely to terminate, we, Liliuokalani and her cabinet, who formed the Government of the Hawaiian Islands on the 17th of January last, having surrendered that Government to the superior force of the United States of America, now most respectfully ask that you use your good offices in undoing the acts of a representative of your great country and place the Government of the Hawaiian Islands as Mr. Stevens found them. Believing that the principle of justice which has ever dominated American action will prevail in this instance, we remain,

Yours, respectfully,

LILIUOKALANI, R.
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

No. 12.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 9.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *June 6, 1893.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that the political conditions of the Islands do not import any conflict of arms. The Government is very alert in watching every movement which threatens it. Almost any trifling assemblage of natives at night is the occasion of alarm.

The natives are favoring public order, and looking for some action on my part favorable to them. Notwithstanding the publication of my instructions, and my previous declaration that I had no power to restore the Queen, there remains in the native mind a strong faith that, owing to the interference of the American minister and the American marines, resulting in the surrender to the Provisional Government by the Queen of her forces, the United States will ultimately restore her to power.

The action of Admiral Thomas, in 1843, in restoring the Hawaiian flag is written deeply in the minds of the native people. A public

square has been set apart and beautified in honor of his memory and action. This, and the friendly relations between our Government and that of these Islands, seems to be the inspiration of buoyant hope in their final independence.

Should this fail them, and they be left free from interference by foreign powers, the peace of to-day may change into warlike action against the existing order of things.

It can not be truthfully stated that the present peace is the result of the power of the Provisional Government.

I deem it proper at this time to indulge in some observations in relation to landed property here.

To understand the present distribution it is necessary to understand the ancient system of land tenure as well as the modern.

And now as to the first:

Each island was divided into several districts. The next subdivision is the Ahupuaa. Typically this is a long narrow strip extending from the sea to the mountain, so that its chief may have his share of all the various products of the mountain region, the cultivated land, and the sea. It was generally, though not always, subdivided into ilis, each with its own name and carefully defined boundary.

There were two kinds of ilis. The first was a mere subdivision of the Ahupuaa for the convenience of the chief holding the same, who received its revenues from his agent. The other class did not pay tribute to a chief.

The ilis were again subdivided, and many of the larger patches had individual names.

The patches cultivated exclusively for the chief were called *koele* or *hakuone*. The tenants were obliged to work for him on Fridays. In the "principles adopted by the land commission to quiet land titles," approved by the legislative council October 26, 1846, it is stated that—

When the islands were conquered by Kamehameha I, he followed the example of his predecessors, and divided out the lands among his principal warrior chiefs, retaining, however, a portion in his own hands to be cultivated or managed by his own immediate servants or attendants. Each principal chief divided his lands anew and gave them out to an inferior order of chiefs, by whom they were subdivided again and again, often passing through the hands of four, five, or six persons from the King down to the lowest class of tenants. All these persons were considered to have rights in these lands, or the productions of them, the proportions of which rights were not clearly defined, although universally acknowledged. All persons possessing landed property, whether superior landlords, tenants, or subtenants, owed and paid to the King not only a land tax, which he assessed at pleasure, but also service, which was called for at discretion, on all the grades, from the highest down. They also owed and paid some portion of the productions of the land, in addition to the yearly taxes. A failure to render any of these was always considered a just cause for which to forfeit the lands. The same rights which the King possessed over the superior landlords and all under them, the various grades of landlords possessed over their inferiors, so that there was a joint ownership of the land, the King really owning the *allodium*, and the persons in whose hands he placed the land, holding it *in trust*.

The land taxes were really rents and went to the King as his private income. The idea of a nation or government as distinguished from the person of the King first began to be recognized in the Constitution of 1840. When the labor tax first began to be regulated by law, every tenant was required to work one day in every week (Tuesday) for the King, and one day (Friday) for the landlord.

The long reign of Kamehameha evolved greater permanency and security in the possession of the lands.

On the accession of his son Liholiho no general redistribution of lands took place.

The common people were merely tenants at will, liable to be dispossessed at any time, and even to be stripped of their personal property at the will of their chiefs.

Laws were passed in 1839 and 1840 to prevent evictions without cause and the wanton seizure of the property of tenants.

The King and chiefs resolved to divide and define the shares which each held in undivided shares of the lands of the Kingdom. The following rules were noted by the privy council December 18, 1847:

Whereas it has become necessary to the prosperity of our Kingdom and the proper physical, mental, and moral improvement of our people that the undivided rights at present existing in the lands of our Kingdom shall be separated and distinctly defined;

Therefore, We, Kamehameha III, King of the Hawaiian Islands, and his chiefs, in privy council assembled, do solemnly resolve that we will be guided in such division by the following rules:

1. His Majesty, our most Gracious Lord and King, shall, in accordance with the constitution and laws of the land, retain all his private lands as his own individual property, subject only to the rights of the tenants, to have and hold to him, his heirs and successors forever.

2. One-third of the remaining lands of the Kingdom shall be set aside as the property of the Hawaiian Government, subject to the direction and control of His Majesty as pointed out by the constitution and laws, one-third to the chiefs and konohikis in proportion to their possessions to have and to hold, to them, their heirs and successors forever, and the remaining third to the tenants, the actual possessors and cultivators of the soil, to have and to hold, to them, their heirs and successors forever.

3. The division between the chiefs or the konohikis and their tenants, prescribed by rule 2d, shall take place whenever any chief, konohiki, or tenant shall desire such division, subject only to confirmation by the King in privy council.

4. The tenants of His Majesty's private lands shall be entitled to a fee-simple title to one-third of the lands possessed and cultivated by them; which shall be set off to the said tenants in fee simple whenever His Majesty or any of said tenants shall desire such division.

5. The division prescribed in the foregoing rules shall in no wise interfere with any lands that may have been granted by His Majesty or his predecessors in fee simple to any Hawaiian subject or foreigner, nor in any way operate to the injury of the holders of the unexpired leases.

6. It shall be optional with any chief or konohiki, holding lands in which the Government has a share, in the place of setting aside one-third of the said lands as Government property, to pay into the treasury one-third of the unimproved value of said lands, which payment shall operate as a total extinguishment of the Government right in said lands.

7. All the lands of His Majesty shall be recorded in a book entitled "Register of the lands belonging to Kamehameha III, King of the Hawaiian Islands," and deposited with the registry of land titles in the office of the minister of the interior; and all lands set aside as the lands of the Hawaiian Government shall be recorded in a book entitled "Register of the lands belonging to the Hawaiian Government," and fee-simple titles shall be granted to all other allottees upon the award of the board of commissioners to quiet land titles.

The division between the King and his chiefs was settled by a committee March 7, 1848. The book containing a record of this division also contains releases signed by the several chiefs to the King, of the lands they surrendered, and releases by the King to the several chiefs of his feudal rights in the land remaining to them as their shares.

These formal awards were made, after evidence of title, which could be converted into allodial title by payment of the consideration provided for in rules 6 and 7, above cited.

On the 8th of March, 1848, the King set apart for the use of the Government the larger part of his royal domain, specified by name, and reserved the residue for himself, his heirs, and successors. On June 7, 1848, the legislative council passed an act confirming and ratifying what had been done by the King.

In 1850 most of the chiefs ceded a third part of their lands to the Government to obtain an allodial title. This was accepted by the privy council the same year.

The Crown lands received their designation from the cession by the King of his share, founded on rule 1, above cited, to the Government.

The Government lands were derived under rule 2 and from cession from the chiefs in 1850.

In all awards of ahupuaas and ilis the rights of tenants are reserved. The acts of August 6, 1850, and July 11, 1851, protect the common people in the right to take wood, thatch, kileaf, etc. They were also guaranteed the right to water and the right of way, but not the right of pasturage on the land of the konohiki, or chief. The right of fishing in the sea appurtenant to the land and to sell the fish caught by him was secured to every bona fide resident on land. The fee-simple title, free of all commutation, to all native tenants was secured finally by the act of August 6, 1850. The right of lords over tenants was thus ended.

Mr. W. D. Alexander, superintendent of Government surveys, defines Government lands in this language:

The great mass of the Government lands consists of those lands which were surrendered and made over to the Government by the King, Kamehameha III, and which are enumerated by name in the act of June 7, 1848. To these must be added the lands ceded by the several chiefs in lieu of commutation, those lands purchased by the Government at different times, and also all lands forfeited to the Government by the neglect of their claimants to present their claims within the period fixed by law. By virtue of various statutes, from time to time sales of these lands have taken place.

The same authority says that between the years 1850 and 1860 nearly all the desirable Government lands was sold, generally to natives. The total number of grants issued before April 1, 1890, was 3,475.

In 1850 one-twentieth part of all the lands belonging to the Government was set apart for the purposes of education. Most of these have been sold.

Mr. Alexander says: "The term 'Crown lands' is applied to those lands reserved by Kamehameha III, March 8, 1848, for himself, his heirs, and successors forever, as his private property."

Kamehameha III and his successors dealt with these as with their private property, selling, leasing, and mortgaging the same, and conveying good titles.

The supreme court held that the inheritance to the Crown lands was limited to the successors to the throne, and at the same time that the possessor might regulate and dispose of the same as his private property. Subsequently an act of the legislature made them inalienable and declared that they should not be leased for a period to exceed thirty years.

When the division of lands was determined upon the chiefs and tenants alike were required to make proofs of the lands they occupied. Failing in this, their rights were barred.

In view of the principles laid down for a division of the land, the inference is that the common people received their share of one-third. Now, what are the facts? Before this division many natives lived with chiefs and occupied no land. Others occupied small parcels for taro patches, and took fish from the waters, and thus obtained their food. These patches did not generally exceed 1 acre, and were designated as kuleanas in the native tongue. Proof of this occupation of land had to be made before the land commission, involving such forms and proofs that the ignorant native failed in many instances to comply with the regulations, and so lost his property. These little holdings were all that they ever obtained.

The historian of land titles (quoted here as the highest authority) omits this great fact. In examining his work with him, he admits what

I have asserted in relation to the lands assigned to the common people. This is also confirmed to me by the present minister of finance, Mr. Damon (formerly vice-president of the advisory council).

Much is said here of the natives being wasteful, and in consequence becoming landless. To my mind, when Japanese, Chinese, and Portuguese cheap labor was substituted for his own and he sought employment in other avocations more remunerative and turned from these insignificant possessions, he followed only the suggestions which would have come to any person of any race.

Subsequently natives purchased Government land under a law providing for the sale of portions of them to residents in lots from 1 to 50 acres. To this I shall recur hereafter.

The lands here are designated as Crown lands, Government lands, the Bishop lands, and those owned by private parties.

The Government lands contain 828,370 acres; the Crown lands, 915,288 acres; the Bishop lands (a gift from a native, Mrs. C. R. Bishop) are devoted to educational purposes and contain 406,829 acres. The private lands amount to 1,854,018 acres. Of these Europeans and Americans now own 1,052,492; natives, 257,457; half-castes, 531,545; Chinese, 12,324 acres; Japanese 200 acres; other nationalities, none.

The Bishop lands mentioned above are included in the 531,545 acres taxed as belonging to half-castes.

Mr. Albert Loebenstein, of Hilo, Hawaii, in a conversation with me, written out and certified by him, says:

The Crown lands generally are leased to corporations for cane culture and grazing, at a very low price for a long term of years. Most of the Government lands are in the hands of sugar-planters.

He estimates the award of kuleanas to natives at about 11,000 acres. He estimates that the Government has sold 290,000 acres of land to residents, and that two-thirds of this was sold to natives, and is now owned by corporations for cane culture. He thinks the natives sold on account of their improvidence in encumbering themselves with debt.

It appears to me that, with small holdings and no right of pasturage, they could find but little opportunity for a good living on them. They are certainly engaged in labor in various employments offering a life of more comfort.

If American laborers can not compete with Chinese and Japanese contract labor it is not a sign of indolence that the Kanaka should fly from its crushing competition. It is still less so when he sees his own Government seeking cheap labor for cane-growers and enforcing its efficiency by laws intended to compel them to fulfill their contracts.

Mr. C. R. Bishop tells in his statement the simple story of the land division on which the real property of the country rests. He says a land commission was created for the purpose of giving title to all the people who had claim to lands. The King and chiefs made this division in 1847. It was agreed that the people should have their small holdings, which they occupied and cultivated since 1839. That year was fixed because it was the year in which the first draft of the constitution defining the rights of the people was made.

The principle upon which the lands were divided he states thus:

The chiefs had been given lands by former kings, by Kamehameha I, especially. They could not sell or lease them without the consent of the King and premier. There were other lands supposed to be the King's private lands. When the division was made these lands, which he claimed were his own, were set apart and called crown lands. That was his private estate really, and the others belonged to the Government, the chiefs, and the people. The people got theirs out of the Government land,

the King's land, and the chiefs' land. These were called kuleanas. The King's lands were called Crown lands, from which he derived his support. The Government lands were for the support of the Government. The King had a right to and did sell Crown lands at his pleasure until 1864.

In the division of lands the Crown lands were large in amount, the Government received a large share, and the largest part of the remainder went to the chiefs. The Government lands are nearly sold out. The kuleanas would not average more than 2 or 3 acres. A great many natives were seamen, mechanics, fishermen, teachers, and followers of chiefs, who received no land. The children of these awardees of kuleanas generally have no land. The sugar planters derive their titles from the Government and the chiefs.

The King and the chiefs were extravagant; got into debt, and then had to pay. When they got the title to their lands these debts were paid by many of the chiefs with lands. During their lifetime they got rid of a great deal of land. The plantations have come nearly altogether from the Government and the chiefs, and considerable of the land is leased from Crown lands.

Mr. Bishop's statement, which will be duly reported, though freed from the technicalities and formalities of a trained lawyer, brings out all that is practical and vital in the origin and progress of the land system of the Hawaiian Islands.

Attention is here invited to the character of the early surveys and surveys of grants from a report made by the Surveyor-General to the legislature in 1891:

CHARACTER OF THE EARLY SURVEYS.

First in order are the old surveys made under the direction of the land commission, and commonly known as "kuleana" surveys. These had the same defects as the first surveys in most new countries. These defects were, in great part, owing to the want of any proper supervision. There was no bureau of surveying, and the president of the land commission was so overwhelmed with work that he had no time to spare for the superintendence of the surveying. As has been truly said, there was little money to pay out and little time to wait for the work. Political reasons also added to the haste with which the work was pushed through, and barely completed before the death of Kamehameha III.

No uniform rules or instructions were given to the surveyors employed, who were practically irresponsible. Few of them could be regarded as thoroughly competent surveyors, while some were not only incompetent, but careless and unscrupulous. The result was that almost every possible method of measurement was adopted. Some used 50-foot chains, and others the 4-pole chain divided into links; some attempted to survey by the true meridian, others by the average magnetic meridian, while most made no allowance for local variations of the needle. There are some surveys recorded which were made with a ship's compass, or even a pocket compass. Few of them took much pains to mark corners or to note the topographical features of the country. Rarely was one section or district assigned to one man. It is said that over a dozen were employed in surveying Waikiki, for instance, not one of whom knew what the other surveyors had done or tried to make his surveys agree with theirs where they adjoined one another. As might be expected, overlaps and gaps are the rule rather than the exception, so that it is generally impossible to put these old surveys together correctly on paper without ascertaining their true relative positions by actual measurements on the ground.

The board of commissioners to quiet land titles were empowered by the law of August 6, 1850, not only to "define and separate the portions of land belonging to different individuals," but "to provide for an equitable exchange of such different portions where it can be done, so that each man's land may be by itself." This, however, was rarely done, and the kuleanas very often consist of several sections or "apanas" apiece, scattered here and there in the most irregular manner imaginable. No general rules were laid down in regard to the size of kuleanas, though mere *house lots* were limited to one-quarter of an acre by the act just cited, section 5. The consequence was that the responsibility was mainly thrown upon the surveyors, and there was the greatest variety of practice among them in different districts. The act above mentioned provided that fee-simple titles should "be granted to native tenants for the lands they occupy and improve." This was differently interpreted by different surveyors, so that in fact the "kuleanas" vary from 1 to 40 acres in extent. General maps of whole districts, or even ahupuaas, exhibiting the exact location of all the different claims contained within them, were scarcely thought of, and hardly could have been made with the inferior instruments and defective methods used by most of the kuleana surveyors of that time.

Surveys of grants were of a similar character to those of kuleanas. Formerly it was not the policy of the Government to have Government lands surveyed as wholes, or to have their boundaries settled. Portions of Government land sold to private persons were surveyed at the expense of the purchaser. It was seldom the case that an entire "ahupuaa" was sold at once. The pieces sold were of all sizes and shapes, sometimes cutting across half a dozen ahupuaas, and were generally surveyed without reference to the surveys of adjoining land sales or awards. Hence most Government lands at the present time consist of mere remnants left here and there, and of the worthless and unsalable portions remaining after the rest had been sold. It follows that, even supposing all the outside boundaries of a Government land to have been surveyed and duly settled by the commissioner of boundaries, it would still be necessary to locate on the ground all the grants and awards contained within the land in question in order to ascertain how much of it is left. Nothing short of a general survey of the country will bring to light all these facts, will exhibit the Government lands in their true position in relation to other lands, and enable the minister of the interior as well as applicants for land to judge of their actual value. It was considerations like these which induced the then minister of the interior, Dr. Hutchinson, to institute the Government survey in 1871. An account of that survey, its objects, methods, and results, was published in pamphlet form in 1889.

W. D. ALEXANDER,
Superintendent of Government Survey.

In view of the foregoing observations it appears to me that if a humane feeling towards the native population of these islands is to have place in American thought there will arise a conviction that instead of inviting immigrants from the United States or other countries to these islands in the hope of obtaining homes, whatever of lands may be used in this way are more than needed by the native population. They seem moreover, to suggest that if the native has not advanced in mental and moral culture up to the highest standard it can not be denied that the policy of the Hawaiian Government in the distribution of its lands has been a great hindrance to him.

His advancement in the future under the conditions now surrounding him are by no means encouraging. If his advancement should reach the most desirable stage there will in all probability arise a discontent well calculated to unsettle any social fabric which sought to give it permanency.

It has been made to appear in official reports of the Hawaiian Government, and in magazine and newspaper articles, that the native population was dying out and would in a few years become extinct. The best opinion I can obtain here is that the death rate no longer exceeds the birth rate, but that there is a gradual increase in the native population. The extinction of the native, therefore, can no longer afford any excuse for any distribution of the land of the country on that account.

Out of a population of 40,622 natives and half-casts, 23,473 are officially reported as able to read and write. They are generally allied in their religious affiliations with the Protestant and Catholic churches.

Mr. Sereno E. Bishop, an ardent annexationist, and with an eye quick to discern all their faults, in 1888 uses the following language:

The Hawaiian race is one that is well worth saving. With all their sad frailties, they are a noble race of men, physically and morally. They are manly, courageous, enterprising, cordial, generous, unselfish. They are highly receptive of good. They love to look forward and upward, though very facile to temptations to slide backward and downward. In an unusual degree they possess a capacity for fine and ardent enthusiasm for noble ends.

Can a Christian civilization doom such a people to annihilation by any policy of legislation?

I see in the letters from here to the New York World and Sun statements that I had expressed my own opinions in reference to political

questions in these islands, and declaring the opinion of the President on the subject of annexation.

I send you herewith the statement of Mr. Fred. Wundenberg. He is a gentleman of excellent sense and character. It touches upon several questions with so much aptness that I have thought it perhaps might interest you.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 9.]

Interview of Mr. Wundenberg.

MAY 15, 1893.

Q. Where were you born?

A. On the island of Kauai.

Q. How long have you lived in the Islands?

A. I was born in 1850 and have lived here ever since.

Q. What are you engaged in?

A. At present I am deputy clerk of the supreme court.

Q. Have you been recently offered the position of collector-general of customs?

A. I have.

Q. Did you decline it?

A. I did.

Q. I see in the correspondence between the American minister at this point and the State Department the allegation that Mr. Wilson is the paramour of the Queen. What knowledge have you of the relations between these parties?

A. Queen Liliuokalani, before she was Queen was in the habit of providing for a number of Hawaiian girls—in some cases educating them at her own expense; bringing them into society, and teaching them manners, dancing and all that sort of business and providing them with suitable husbands. Miss Townsend, the present wife of Wilson, is one of her beneficiaries, and her marriage with Wilson was brought about in the same way. Mrs. Wilson was Emmeline Townsend. She was a particular personal friend of Liliuokalani—always attended her—acted as a sort of maid of honor, and that relation has existed right up to the present time.

Wilson, in that way became the intimate acquaintance and friend of Liliuokalani, and he also was the personal friend of Dominis. Wilson was fond of horse racing and fond of shooting and rowing—and the old governor was a great sportsman. He was fond of boats; he had the best boats. He tried to have the best horses; prided himself on the best guns. Wilson was an admirer of all that sort of thing, and they naturally drifted together in that way. That was prior to Liliuokalani being Queen. After she became Queen, Dominis was in ill health, and the revolution of 1887 had taken place; the Wilcox riot had taken place, and the woman was in constant dread of something of the kind, and Wilson, being near to her person, and a reliable friend of hers, and a man of known courage, it was the most natural thing in the world that she would want him to be marshal. She insisted upon it. Loper at that time was marshal. Loper, as well as most of us, had taken a hand in the affair of 1887. She wanted things in shape that she could feel she had control of things. The station house was an arsenal. They kept arms there, and ordnance; cannon, Gatling guns, etc., had been removed in 1887 down there and placed under the charge of Marshal Loper, who was in sympathy and connection with the 1887 party. So when she came in power it was one of the first demands she made, that some of her friends should be placed in charge of that institution. I was postmaster then, and one of the demands made was that I should be removed, and I was removed on account of my affiliation with the 1887 party.

Q. The change from Loper to Wilson gave offense to the other side—the Reform party?

A. There was a little interregnum in which another man named Hopkins, was put in temporary charge before Wilson formally took office, but practically Wilson followed Loper. This little administration of Hopkins did not amount to anything.

Q. Wilson going in there gave offence to the Reform party?

A. No; nothing seemed to be said about it. After they began to find things were going against them, and the results of the elections of 1890—the National Reform party swept the field—then they began their old games of attacking through the press. They attacked everybody and everything—not only Wilson, but everybody.

If a chicken thief was caught, Wilson was held up for ridicule. For every drunk, robbery, etc., Wilson was blamed. They attacked him broadcast through the press.

Q. Any efforts made to impeach him?

A. I do not think so; not to my knowledge.

Q. Where was he born?

A. Wilson is the son of the English consul at Tahiti, by a Tahitian chieftess.

Q. Did he come here as a boy?

A. Yes. He is about the same age I am. I am rather better informed than anybody else regarding Wilson. My mother, the daughter of missionaries, was born in Tahiti and was well acquainted with the Wilson family.

Q. How old was he when he came here?

A. His father was interested in shipping ventures, and among other places of trade, I think either owned totally, or in connection with other parties, Fannings Island. He had interests there, and it was in one of these trading voyages that he was lost. Old Capt. English, who is here now, took the two boys—the brothers—and carried them to Fannings Island. They lived there, and when they were old enough, the old man brought them here and put them to school. That was in the early fifties. I think they went to school with Captain Smith.

Q. How old would that make him.

A. About 43 years old. As was usually the case with half-whites of that class, they did not have the best opportunities for education. After they got the ordinary rudiments they would be put to a trade. He was put to a trade. He learned the blacksmith's trade. He was a man of strong character and ability. He dropped that and went into Government employ. He was made superintendent of waterworks and made a good one.

Q. What sort of marshal did he make?

A. An exceptionally good one.

Q. Was that generally the opinion?

A. I do not think they have ever had a marshal here at any time who could equal him, and I think it would be a hard matter to get anyone—with this one exception—like most of the natives Wilson was careless in money matters. I have to admit that Wilson was careless.

Q. Behind in his accounts?

A. In his business arrangements he has been careless. When he was superintendent of waterworks he got behind considerably. I saw his difficulties. There was a shortage of something like nine or ten thousand dollars. We advanced the money for him, myself and the present Queen. That transaction was open to explanation. I think Wilson was made the residuary legatee of a long series of old fossils. It had been considered a place of no importance. They kept accounts very badly. They kept a system of receipt books with stubs. The investigation was held by Gulick. These stubs were added up and Wilson was made to account for it. I can not say whether he was responsible for it.

Q. Did he ever live in the palace with the Queen?

A. I do not think Wilson ever lived in the palace. Wilson and his wife occupied the bungalow.

Q. How far is that from the palace?

A. It is located in the corner of Richard and Palace Walk, in the palace yard. I know that Wilson and his wife occupied some of the apartments. The other apartments were occupied by others of her household, servants and retainers. She occupied the palace herself, or lived in her own place, at Washington Place.

Q. How far is the bungalow from the palace?

A. Sixty or 100 yards. I used to visit him at times. The palace stands in the middle of the square.

Q. Have you ever heard it stated from any reliable source that Mr. Wilson was lodged in the palace?

A. Never.

Q. How was the Queen received here in society?

A. She was always received with the greatest respect.

Q. Please illustrate what you mean by that?

A. No entertainment of any importance—reception, ball—was considered complete without the presence of the Queen. The chief justice on one occasion gave a ball or entertainment of some kind; I think it was a reception to Armstrong. I was present. The Queen was there. The chief justice was very attentive to the Queen. W. R. Castle gave an entertainment not a great while ago at his residence to some children, which the Queen attended. Castle was extremely attentive to her. In fact, whenever the so-called missionary party gave any entertainment they were always desirous of having the Queen. She received the most marked attention from them.

Q. Were these ladies active in social life about the palace?

A. Yes; whenever the Queen would give entertainments these people always attended.

Q. With as much freedom as other classes of people?

A. I think so.

Q. You spoke of the Queen educating Hawaiian girls. At what school?

A. At a number of schools. The school I am most acquainted with is Kawaiahae Seminary.

Q. Who were the teachers there?

A. Miss Bingham was the principal. Latterly they have been compelled to send abroad to get assistance. The management was always in the hands of the missionaries. It is a missionary institution.

Q. Did she generally prefer that institution for these girls?

A. I think most of the girls have been educated there. I think she has had several educated at Maui, at Makawao Seminary, another institution.

Q. Are you a man of family?

A. No, sir; I am not a married man. We are a very large family. I have a number of sisters living here.

Q. Did they associate with the Queen without reserve, as other people here?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you feel like they were with a reputable person?

A. Yes; I never felt anything out of the way. In fact, I know that a great many people at times would feel slighted if they did not receive invitations to attend entertainments there.

Q. Were you one of the active participants in the revolution of 1887?

A. I was an active participator in the events of 1887. I was not a leader.

Q. Please tell me the cause of that revolution.

A. I want to say that the reasons and causes that actuated different participants were no doubt numerous. The mainspring was this same Missionary party. They were smarting under defeats they had sustained repeatedly from Gibson. They had used large amounts of money in attempting to control the elections, but Gibson seemed to have a strong influence on the King and defeated them and held his power, I think, over a period of six years, and the King, under his direction, was allowed to go into all kinds of follies. This "Kaimiloa" escapade was one. The King had the idea in his head for some time previous of causing a confederation of the Pacific Islands. I have never heard him say he was ambitious of becoming Emperor of the Pacific, as has been attributed to him. Gibson, who was too astute and far-seeing to believe in anything of the kind, still felt it was necessary to humor him in a number of these projects, of which this was one. That escapade is familiar with everybody. They sent Bush down there and it resulted in disaster. That was made one of the ostensible reasons. Also the opium scandal. There had always been a great deal said regarding the opium business; some thought it should be entirely prohibited others thought it was impossible to do so. They favored licensing the business. A bill passed the Legislature authorizing licenses. Then the Chinese began to bid for these licenses and that resulted in what is known as the Ah Ki scandal, in which it is claimed that the King received sixty or seventy thousand dollars to let a certain Chinese firm have the license. That was another cause put forward.

Q. Did they make him pay that back?

A. Yes; his estate paid that back, eventually.

Q. Was it generally believed that he acted corruptly in that matter?

A. Yes; those are the ostensible reasons put forward, and general extravagance and mismanagement of finances. That led up to this business.

Q. What do you mean by ostensible reasons; were there any other reasons behind these?

A. I do not know that I would have any right to put forward convictions and beliefs which lead from way back. I do not think that these reasons, though they were powerful agents at the time, were the only cause. I think it was the persistent determination of a clique here to get the power again which Gibson had wrested from it.

Q. They had been directing public affairs up to Gibson's time?

A. Yes.

Q. And during that time lost control?

A. Yes. To go back a little farther: The same party had held power in various forms and degrees up to about 1853. I think then that the decline of Dr. Judd's power began. He held despotic sway under Kamehameha III. In 1853 a committee of thirteen, representing people who had become tired of this arbitrary rule of Dr. Judd, waited on the King and demanded his removal from power. From that time, over a period of twenty years, is where the country received the very best administration it ever got, from men like Robert C. Wiley, Judge Lee, and, in later days, Harris and Hutchinson—men of that style. That carried through the reigns of Kamehameha IV and V. The missionaries were out of power. These men would not tolerate them at all.

Q. Was there extravagance then?

A. That was the very best period of Hawaiian history. That was the foundation of the Hawaiian Islands being received into the family of nations. She took her standing under the guidance of Wiley and Harris. At the death of Kamehameha V, Lunalilo came in and the missionaries regained their power through him. He was the highest chief living, but an intemperate fellow. He was as good a fellow as ever lived. He was a drunkard. Missionaries went into power under him. He lived a year, then came Kalakaua. They continued their hold on affairs during the early part of Kalakaua's reign, until Gibson came in. He overthrew them, I think, in 1880. Gibson reigned supreme in 1880. He was returned to the Legislature in 1880 and held power to 1887. Kalakaua was extravagant, and Gibson, in order to hold his power, had to yield to a good many of the King's foibles in that way. If Gibson had received generous support from outside he would have been able to hold the King in check, but in order to hold his power he had to yield to the King in order to hold his position against opposition. The chamber of commerce, the Planters' Labor and Supply Company—everything combined against him. It is a marvel how he managed to hold his own against the tremendous odds that were used against him.

While the natives had, as a rule, generally yielded the Government into the hands of the whites, still they always felt that they should have some sort of representation in the Government, and a native Hawaiian usually occupied one of the cabinet positions. In addition to the native Hawaiian there was a new element coming on the field, which consisted of native born of foreign parents, and somewhere around about 1884 we began to feel that we should have representation as well as the foreigners, and placed the proposition before Kalakaua. He recognized the justice of this, and C. T. Gulick was made minister of the interior in compliance with the wishes of this element. This cabinet was overthrown in 1886 by Mr. Spreckels' influence. Mr. Spreckels had advanced large sums of money to the Government, and demanded the deeding over of the wharfage, the city front from the Pacific Mail to the Oceanic docks, the Honolulu waterworks, and other governmental property in town. This proposition was acceded to by Gibson, but resisted by Gulick, who succeeded in frustrating the whole scheme, but which resulted in the overthrow of the cabinet finally through Spreckels' influence. Spreckels was instrumental in forming a new cabinet composed of Gibson, John T. Dare (a lawyer he brought from San Francisco), and, I think, Robert Creighton, and they put one Hawaiian in—some old dummy, I forget now who he was. This was naturally offensive to the Hawaiian element previously alluded to, and we reproached Gibson for his action in the matter, and when the events of 1887 turned up, a large majority of the element alluded to joined the movement to overthrow Gibson, and of course the other party were only too glad to have additions to the strength of their party. I think that answers the question why I joined the movement of 1887.

Q. What was the demand made upon Kalakaua as far as a new constitution went?

A. They made a demand that he should grant them a new constitution, which he agreed to immediately.

Q. And that is the present constitution?

A. Yes; that is the present constitution.

Q. What sort of cabinet did he appoint then?

A. He appointed a cabinet to their dictation: L. A. Thurston, W. L. Green, C. W. Ashford, and Jonathan Austin.

Q. Is Mr. Thurston native-born?

A. Yes.

Q. Educated here?

A. Yes; most of his education. He went abroad to study law.

Q. His life has been spent here?

A. Yes; he is identified with this community.

Q. Has he been an active member of the Planters' Labor and Supply Company?

A. He has always been invited to their meetings. He never was a planter.

Q. Might he not have owned stock?

A. He may have owned some little stock.

Q. He is not an American citizen?

A. No, sir; he is a Hawaiian.

Q. Where is Mr. Green from?

A. He is an Englishman. He came here in early days. He is head of the firm of Janior, Green & Company.

Q. Where is Mr. Ashford from?

A. Ashford is a Canadian. He arrived here in the early part of 1880.

Q. Was he especially active then in military movements?

A. Yes; very active in 1887.

Q. He commanded troops?

A. His brother, Volney V. Ashford; he was the man who put it through.

Q. What do you mean when you say that he was the man who put it through?

A. V. V. Ashford was the organizer and guide of the whole of the movement, which was expected to have operated in the event of any open resistance having occurred. Of course, the Missionary party—Thurston, Smith, Dole, and others—were organizers of the movement, but when it came down to actual working V. V. Ashford was one. He was colonel of the existing forces—four or five companies of Hawaiian rifles, and this riffraff that you find around the Provisional Government to-day—that was the crowd that flocked in around them. They were the ones that would have been used. Whenever danger was in the way they were scarce, but when it came to asking positions, they were there.

Q. Who was Jonathan Austin?

A. He was an American—a New Yorker, I think. He was a brother of H. L. Austin, of Hawaii. He was a comparatively newcomer.

Q. None of these were of native blood?

A. None of them.

Q. They continued in power how long?

A. From immediately after the 30th of June, 1887, up to the Legislature of 1890. The elections were in February. The house met in April or May, 1890. Shortly after the house went into session they passed a vote of want of confidence.

Q. The reform element had been beaten in elections?

A. Yes.

Q. And that brought about an antireform cabinet?

A. Yes.

Q. Now in the Legislature of 1892 there was a continual turning out of cabinets; was that a struggle for power?

A. It was a struggle for power. This same reform or missionary element was fighting to regain the reins of government. They united with a faction known as Liberals. These two elements put together could vote out the other crowd, and they voted them out until the G. N. Wilcox cabinet was formed.

Q. With this cabinet the Reform party was content?

A. Yes.

Q. How did the Liberals take it—did they get offended?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they make a combination with the National Reform party?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the Wilcox cabinet voted out as a result of that combination?

A. Yes.

Q. The Wilcox cabinet was voted out on the 13th of January, 1893?

A. Yes.

Q. The Legislature was prorogued on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. If this cabinet had not been voted out before the prorogation of the Legislature the Reform element through this cabinet would have had control of the Government for two years?

A. Yes.

Q. How did they receive the voting out of the Wilcox cabinet?

A. It was not liked.

Q. Did they feel like they had lost power?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you at Mr. W. O. Smith's office at the meeting on Saturday, January 14, 1893?

A. Yes; I was there in the afternoon.

Q. Was the subject of the dethronement of the Queen discussed?

A. No.

Q. Was the subject of annexation discussed?

A. No.

Q. What was in the mind of that meeting; anything definite?

A. No; nothing definite. The idea was that this attempted proclaiming of a new constitution was the cause of unsettling affairs, and that there was danger for the public safety. This committee of public safety was organized for that purpose.

Q. Anything said about landing troops?

A. No.

Q. There were subsequent meetings of the committee of safety. Did you attend any of them? Were you invited?

A. I attended one that was held at Henry Waterhouse's on Monday evening, the 16th.

Q. Did you attend any of any earlier date?

A. I attended one at Thurston's house on Saturday evening.

Q. Was the subject of the dethronement of the Queen discussed there?

A. I would not like to give any information regarding anything that took place

at Thurston's house that night, as I considered it as confidential. Thurston reposed confidence in me, and I should not like to betray it.

Q. Where was the other meeting?

A. The only other meeting I attended was the meeting at Waterhouse's.

Q. Who was present? Any members of the present Provisional Government?

A. Most of the members of the committee of safety were there.

Q. Please give the names of such as you can remember.

A. H. E. Cooper, I think, was there; Andrew Brown was there; J. A. McCandless was there; T. F. Lansing was there; I think John Emmeluth was there; C. Bolte was there; Henry Waterhouse was there; F. W. McChesney was there; W. O. Smith was there; C. L. Carter was also present.

Q. Any others connected with the Government?

A. Mr. Dole was sent for and invited to be present and he attended.

Q. Was there anything said at that meeting on the subject of aid by the troops of the United States and the American minister?

A. Yes; the general impression and the general talk all through the business was the fact that they would obtain or receive both moral and material assistance from the United States minister and from the troops from the *Boston*.

Q. Did they expect to fight?

A. No; I do not think they did.

Q. Their idea was that the sympathy of the American minister and troops was with them?

A. Yes; the people knew if the United States minister, or any vessel in port, moved in the matter that would be the end of the matter. If they sent one marine ashore it would end the matter.

Q. Was that the drift of the meeting?

A. Yes; everybody knew that and felt that.

Q. Was there any portion of that meeting that went to see the American minister?

A. Yes. Mr. Loper was offered the position of commander in chief of what forces they might get together. He did not see his way clear; he did not want to assume any position which was not tangible, and the arguments put to him were about this support we would receive.

Q. What sort of support?

A. The support from the United States minister and from the *Boston*. Loper still hesitated. He did not feel satisfied with the assurances. It was suggested that he go over and see the minister himself, which he did in company with some of the others. I think C. L. Carter was one—I do not know for certain.

Q. Henry Waterhouse was one?

A. I think so, but I do not know. I have an impression that Waterhouse and Carter went there.

Q. Did they come back?

A. Yes.

Q. What did they report?

A. I understood them to say that Mr. Stevens had told them that if they would take possession of the Government building and read their proclamation he would immediately recognize them and support them, or, failing to get the Government building, any building in Honolulu. They deny that, but I understood *any building in Honolulu*. Anyway, from what Mr. Loper heard he was satisfied and accepted the office.

Q. Was the city quiet when the troops came in?

A. Yes; quiet as Sunday.

Q. Women and children on the streets?

A. Yes; the public at large did not know what was going on. The band played at the hotel. I do not think anyone knew what was going on except the politicians and those who were behind the scenes, as you might say.

Q. How long after the proclamation was read before Mr. Stevens recognized the Provisional Government?

A. That I do not know. The current report around there was that it was between 3 and 4 o'clock. I understood the United States minister had recognized the Government.

Q. Who said that?

A. It is impossible for me to say. It was common talk.

Q. How long after that before the station house and barracks were surrendered?

A. Somewhere, I should judge, between 6 and 7 o'clock. The lamps were lighted. Loper said Wilson had agreed to turn over the station house. He said: "Will you go down and take possession?" I said: "No; I have nothing to do with this concern." He said: "We must have someone to go down there." I said: "Take some of your own folks; take McCandless down." He did. He had not been gone long before he telephoned up, "I want you; you must come down; McCandless won't stop." I think before I started I met McCandless. He said: "Loper wants you

down there." I don't want to stop there. I considered the matter. A number of friends of mine wanted me to go. They said: "It is a critical moment. We want a Hawaiian who can talk to the natives and prevent any friction between the natives and foreigners." I said: "In the interest of law and order I will go down." I went down. Most of the force that Wilson had was retiring. This guard of 20 men that Loper had taken down of this "German 500," had marched in. I went in and was placed in charge. The street lamps were lighted.

Q. What was the occasion of your separating from the people who were at the meeting at Mr. Waterhouse's?

A. The first proposition was made by Thurston himself. He asked me if I was willing to stay in the movement for maintaining law and order, and try to preserve the fundamental law of the land? I told him I would. We went over to the attorney-general's office and met the cabinet, who had come over from the polls. I heard the statements of Parker, Peterson, and Colburn. It was then proposed by Thurston and others that we should support the cabinet against the overt acts of the Queen, and that meeting at Smith's office was for that purpose. Peterson went there.

Q. You separated from them, then, when it was developed that they meant to overthrow the Queen?

A. Yes. I stopped on Wednesday, when I found it began to develop. I began to be suspicious. I simply went to this meeting at Waterhouse's and was a listener. I was interested in affairs of the country.

Q. You took no part in the organization of the Provisional Government?

A. None whatever.

Q. How many troops did they have there at the time the proclamation was read?

A. When the proclamation was read there were two policemen taken off an ammunition wagon and put at the front door.

Q. How many troops did they have at the close of the reading of the proclamation?

A. None, excepting those two.

Q. How long after that before other troops arrived?

A. Just about 3 o'clock. This Capt. Zeigler, with about 30 men, marched in the back way, indifferently armed.

Q. Then other troops came in afterwards?

A. After that another body of similar number—25 to 30—made up of young fellows from around various offices, marched in. That was all there were. It was not until it was generally known that the United States minister had recognized the Government that the crowd came flocking in—mostly men discharged from the station house by Wilson. They jumped in there with a view of being paid. They enlisted after being discharged by Wilson.

Q. Are those fellows in the service now?

A. Yes.

Q. Making part of the Provisional forces at this time?

A. Yes; and a great many of the citizens, those who compose the Annexation Club, when they saw the thing was sure, the United States forces within pistol shot, and that Wilson had given up the station house, and that the barracks would be surrendered, then they wanted to be on the top side. They came in.

Q. Before that they had been quiet?

A. Yes; then they rushed in.

Q. Were you at the mass meeting on Monday?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people were there?

A. I should judge about 700 or 800, possibly 900.

Q. What nationalities?

A. Heterogeneous.

Q. Many Portuguese?

A. A great many.

Q. How is the white population in this city on the subject of annexation?

A. It is very hard to arrive at an exact statement. You can only get it by making your own views known. You will find out that men who are pretending to be in with a party are really at heart opposed to it.

Q. How many people are not pretending to be with the party in power and are opposed to annexation?

A. I should judge about half and half.

Q. People who are frank about their views?

A. Yes. You take the independent Americans who are not under the influence of the Missionary faction, they are as a rule opposed to it, as are most of the English people and some Germans, and almost all foreigners outside of the particular American class who are under the influence of the missionaries and planters.

Q. What part of the United States is this American element who favor annexation from?

A. The New England States, generally.

Q. Are they in point of numbers in a majority of the Americans here?

A. I do not know. I do not think that they are, but their influence is the largest in account of wealth.

Q. And intelligence?

A. I won't add intelligence; I beg to be excused from that.

Q. Do you know whether or not the committee that went up and organized the Provisional Government sent anybody to the Government building to see if there were any soldiers there or not?

A. I can not say that. I remained in my office until I felt something was going on, and then I walked out on the street. What they did after leaving Waterhouse's I don't know.

Q. Was everything quiet at the Government building at the time the proclamation was read?

A. Oh, yes. All the offices were running right along very quietly; nobody knew anything.

Q. None of the officers knew of the movement?

A. I do not think they did. Everything was going on just the same as usual. They knew there were rumors, but I do not think much attention was paid to it. The presence of the United States troops was a matter of curiosity and comment.

Q. Well, then, so far as the reading of that proclamation dethroning the Queen was concerned it was known to very few people that it was to be done?

A. I do not think it was known to anybody except themselves. The whole thing was a surprise to everyone. Wilson might have had some inkling of it. He was trying his best to keep posted, but of course his actions would have been guided entirely by what information he got regarding the attitude of the United States troops.

JUNE 5, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. Mr. Wundenberg, I omitted to ask you as to the feeling of the natives on the subject of annexation at the former interview. Please tell me now.

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief—and I am well acquainted with the natives—I do not think there is a native in favor of annexation. Many may have declared themselves so, but it is my belief that they have done so under pressure—that is, their interests were controlled by those who desire annexation; they are afraid of offending them and of being deprived of privileges they now possess.

Q. What sort of privileges?

A. In a number of cases they have stock running on lands of large landowners who would make them remove them, and that would deprive them of their means of livelihood. Some of them hold positions under planters and others.

Q. Any of them in Government employ?

A. A good many of them are in Government employ. There is only one that I know of who openly comes out and advocates annexation—a young man by the name of Notley, who is employed in the waterworks. Others do it in a subdued manner. If they advocate the matter at all they do it as a matter of policy. The natives have the same love of country as you will find anywhere. The term they use is *Aloha aina*.

Q. Are there any whites in the islands against annexation?

A. A great many.

Q. What proportion of them—I mean Americans and Europeans?

A. I think if a fair canvass was made that you would find fully one-half opposed to it.

Q. Suppose the question of annexation was submitted to the people of these islands, or such of them as were qualified to vote for representatives under the constitution just abrogated, and with the Australian ballot system which you had adopted, what would be the result of the vote?

A. It would be overwhelmingly defeated—almost to a man by the native Hawaiians, and I think a great many of the foreigners who now are supposed to be in favor of annexation would vote against it.

Q. What would be the proportion of annexationists to anti-annexationists?

A. All the native voters, with very few exceptions, would vote against it. I think most of the native-born of Hawaiian parents would vote against it, with the exception possibly of those few that are mixed up in the annexation movement here. I think most of the foreign element that are independent and outside of what is known as the Missionary party would vote against it, and I think a great many of those who are now on the rolls of the Annexation Club would vote against it. Their names appear there simply for policy.

I have carefully read the foregoing and find it to be an accurate report of my interviews with Mr. Blount.

F. WUNDENBERG.

HONOLULU, June 5, 1893.

No. 13.

*Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.*No. 10.] HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *June 17, 1893.*SIR: To-morrow, June 18, the *China* leaves here for San Francisco.

Your letter of the 26th ultimo, informing me of a desire for my final report, was received. Up to this time I have devoted myself to the study of various questions here and the taking of testimony. The latter has been necessarily slow, because Mr. Mills had no aid in transcribing notes, which occupied a great deal of time.

I had supposed it was your wish that I should not undertake to prepare a report until the lapse of two or three months, in order that I might assure myself of a correct comprehension of the situation here. So little had been said in your correspondence with me that I feared to commence too early lest you should suppose I was acting hastily.

Some recent information has made it well that this delay has taken place. I will immediately commence my report and devote myself to it continuously until it is completed.

There is nothing of special importance occurring here now. There is no indication of any movement against the Provisional Government. There seems to be a universal acquiescence on the part of all parties in the idea of awaiting the action of the Government of the United States.

It may be of interest to you to know that in an examination this afternoon of Col. Soper, commanding the military forces of the Provisional Government since the 17th of January last, he stated that at a meeting at the house of Henry Waterhouse, on the night of the 16th of January, composed of members of the committee of safety, and some persons called in, he was offered the command of the military forces; that he declined to accept it until the next day; that in this meeting it was accepted by all as true that Mr. Stevens had agreed that if the persons seeking to dethrone the Queen got possession of the Government building and proclaimed a new government he would recognize it as a *de facto* government, that he (Soper) never accepted the command until after he had knowledge of this fact; that he is a citizen of the United States and claims allegiance thereto.

I send you a copy of the oath Col. Soper and other foreigners take in order to participate in public affairs in these islands.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

No. —.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Island of* ———, *District of* ———, *ss:*

I, ———, aged —, a native of —, residing at —, in said district, do solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, promulgated and proclaimed on the 7th day of July, 1887, and the laws of said Kingdom, not hereby renouncing but expressly reserving all allegiance and citizenship now owing or held by me.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this — day of —, A. D. 18—.

Inspector of Election.

No —.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Island of*——, *District of*——, ss:

I, the undersigned, inspector of election, duly appointed and commissioned, do hereby certify that ——, aged ——, a native of ——, residing at ——, in said district, has this day taken, before me, the oath to support the Constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, promulgated and proclaimed on the 7th day of July, 1887, and the laws of said Kingdom.

_____,
Inspector of Election.

_____, 18—.

No. 14.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 11.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
June 28, 1893.

SIR: On yesterday I found amongst the unfiled papers of the legation a document, of which the inclosure sent herewith is a true copy.

My final report will be completed within the next ten days, probably much earlier. It will be forwarded by the first opportunity.

In my dispatch to the Department of April 26 I said: "Mr. Paul Neumann is generally regarded here as a bright, plausible, unscrupulous person." I desire now to say that so far as the expression "unscrupulous" is concerned a better knowledge of public opinion satisfies me that I was not justified in its use. I deem it my duty to place this on the records of the Department.

Three persons have been arrested for conspiracy to overthrow the Government. They are whites of the laboring class.

I see no reason to think that there is likely to be any movement against the Provisional Government or the peace of society at this time.

On the 18th of this month 1,757 Japanese contract laborers were landed here for the sugar plantations. Of this number 1,410 were men and 347 women.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure in No. 11.]

Mr. Dole to Mr. Stevens.

GOVERNMENT BUILDING,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister Resident:

SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of your valued communication of this day, recognizing the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and express deep appreciation of the same.

We have conferred with the ministers of the late government and have made demand upon the marshal to surrender the station house. We are not actually yet in possession of the station house, but as night is approaching and our forces may be insufficient to maintain order, we request the immediate support of the United States forces, and would request that the commander of the United States forces take command of our military forces so that they may act together for the protection of the city.

Respectfully, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Chairman Executive Council.

(Note of Mr. Stevens at the end of the above communication: "The above request not complied with.—Stevens.")

No. 15.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 12.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
July 7, 1893.

SIR: The steamer *Peru* leaves Honolulu for San Francisco to-morrow. It will take me three or four days longer to complete my report, which will be forwarded to you by the first steamer leaving here after that time.

Recalling to your mind the letter from Mr. Dole to Mr. Stevens (a copy of which was sent with my last dispatch) I ask you to examine a statement made by the commissioners of the Hawaiian Provisional Government on page 41 of Senate Executive Document, No. 76, Fifty-second Congress, second session, designated as the "sixth" in the statement of facts by them.

I wrote President Dole a communication asking for a copy of Mr. Stevens's reply to this letter, omitting therefrom its reference to his recognition.

Verbally he says he does not recollect writing the letter and has not been able to find the reply. I have asked him for his reply in writing, which he has promised to give me after making a more thorough search.

The annexation element have endeavored to utilize the celebration of the Fourth of July in the advancement of their cause.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

No. 16.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 13.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
July 17, 1893.

SIR: The report which is forwarded herewith has been delayed by the slowness of movements of persons interested in either party; by the difficulty of communication with the several islands, and by a desire to assure myself of the true import of the facts testified to from time to time by a great number of persons.

Public documents had to be examined, as well as the testimony of a great number of witnesses, which was delayed in being transcribed from the stenographic notes from lack of clerical aid. This testimony will be promptly forwarded.

Few quotations have been indulged in lest this paper should attain inconvenient length.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

No. 17.

*Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.*HONOLULU, H. I., *July 17, 1893.*

SIR: On the 11th of March, 1893, I was appointed by the President of the United States as special commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands. At the same time the following instructions were given to me by you:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

SIR: The situation created in the Hawaiian Islands by the recent deposition of Queen Liliuokalani and the erection of a Provisional Government demands the fullest consideration of the President, and in order to obtain trustworthy information on the subject, as well as for the discharge of other duties herein specified, he has decided to dispatch you to the Hawaiian Islands as his special commissioner, in which capacity you will herewith receive a commission and also a letter whereby the President accredits you to the president of the executive and advisory councils of the Hawaiian Islands.

The comprehensive, delicate, and confidential character of your mission can now only be briefly outlined, the details of its execution being necessarily left, in great measure, to your good judgment and wise discretion.

You will investigate and fully report to the President all the facts you can learn respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown, the sentiment of the people towards existing authority, and, in general, all that can fully enlighten the President touching the subjects of your mission.

To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other government of the islands, and the protection of our citizens therein, is paramount, and in you alone, acting in coöperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn.

You are, however, authorized to avail yourself of such aid and information as you may desire from the present minister of the United States at Honolulu, Mr. John L. Stevens, who will continue until further notice to perform the usual functions attaching to his office not inconsistent with the powers entrusted to you. An instruction will be sent to Mr. Stevens directing him to facilitate your presentation to the head of the Government upon your arrival, and to render you all needed assistance.

The withdrawal from the Senate of the recently signed treaty of annexation for reëxamination by the President leaves its subject-matter in abeyance, and you are not charged with any duty in respect thereto. It may be well, however, for you to dispel any possible misapprehension which its withdrawal may have excited touching the entire friendliness of the President and the Government of the United States towards the people of the Hawaiian Islands, or the earnest solicitude here felt for their welfare, tranquility, and progress.

Historical precedents, and the general course of the United States, authorize the employment of its armed force in foreign territory for the security of the lives and property of American citizens and for the repression of lawless and tumultuous acts threatening them; and the powers conferred to that end upon the representatives of the United States are both necessary and proper, subject always to the exercise of a sound discretion in their application.

In the judgment of the President, your authority as well as that of the commander of the naval forces in Hawaiian waters should be and is limited in the use of physical force to such measures as are necessary to protect the persons and property of our citizens, and while abstaining from any manner of interference with the domestic concerns of the islands, you should indicate your willingness to intervene with your friendly offices in the interests of a peaceful settlement of troubles within the limits of sound discretion.

Should it be necessary to land an armed force upon Hawaiian territory on occasions of popular disturbance, when the local authority may be unable to give adequate protection to the life and property of citizens of the United States, the assent of such authority should first be obtained if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involved.

Your power in this regard should not, however, be claimed to the exclusion of similar measures by the representatives of other powers for the protection of the lives and property of their citizens or subjects residing in the islands.

While the United States claim no right to interfere in the political or domestic affairs or in the internal conflicts of the Hawaiian Islands otherwise than as herein stated, or for the purpose of maintaining any treaty or other rights which they possess, this Government will adhere to its consistent and established policy in relation to them, and it will not acquiesce in domestic interference by other powers.

The foregoing general exposition of the President's views will indicate the safe courses within which your action should be shaped and mark the limits of your discretion in calling upon the naval commander for cooperation.

The United States revenue cutter *Rush* is under orders to await you at San Francisco and convey you to Honolulu.

A stenographic clerk will be detailed to accompany you and remain subject to your orders.

It is expected that you will use all convenient dispatch for the fulfillment of your mission, as it is the President's desire to have the results before him at the earliest possible day. Besides the connected report you are expected to furnish, you will from time to time, as occasion may offer, correspond with the Secretary of State, communicating information or soliciting special instruction on such points as you may deem necessary. In case of urgency you may telegraph either in plain text or in the cipher of the Navy Department through the kind offices of the admiral commanding, which may be sent to Mr. W. A. Cooper, United States dispatch agent at San Francisco, to be transmitted thence.

Reposing the amplest confidence in your ability and zeal for the realization of the trust confided to you,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT, etc.

On the 29th of the same month I reached the city of Honolulu. The American minister, Hon. John L. Stevens, accompanied by a committee from the Annexation Club, came on board the vessel which had brought me. He informed me that this club had rented an elegant house, well furnished, and provided servants and a carriage and horses for my use; that I could pay for this accommodation just what I chose, from nothing up. He urged me very earnestly to accept the offer. I declined it, and informed him that I should go to a hotel.

The committee soon after this renewed the offer, which I again declined.

Soon afterwards the ex-Queen, through her chamberlain, tendered her carriage to convey me to my hotel. This I courteously declined.

I located myself at the Hawaiian Hotel. For several days I was engaged receiving calls from persons of all classes and of various political views. I soon became conscious of the fact that all minds were quietly and anxiously looking to see what action the Government of the United States would take.

The troops from the *Boston* were doing military duty for the Provisional Government. The American flag was floating over the government building. Within it the Provisional Government conducted its business under an American protectorate, to be continued, according to the avowed purpose of the American minister, during negotiations with the United States for annexation.

My instructions directed me to make inquiries which in the interest of candor and truth could not be done when the minds of thousands of Hawaiian citizens were full of uncertainty as to what the presence of American troops, the American flag, and the American protectorate implied. It seemed necessary that all these influences must be withdrawn before those inquiries could be prosecuted in a manner befitting the dignity and power of the United States.

Inspired with such feelings and confident no disorder would ensue, I directed the removal of the flag of the United States from the government building and the return of the American troops to their ves-

sels. This was accomplished without any demonstration of joy or grief on the part of the populace.

The afternoon before, in an interview with President Dole, in response to my inquiry, he said that the Provisional Government was now able to preserve order, although it could not have done so for several weeks after the proclamation establishing it.

In the evening of this same day the American minister called on me with a Mr. Walter G. Smith, who, he said, desired to make an important communication to me, and whom he knew to be very intelligent and reliable. Thereupon Mr. Smith, with intense gravity, informed me that he knew beyond doubt that it had been arranged between the Queen and the Japanese commissioner that if the American flag and troops were removed the troops from the Japanese man of war *Naniwa* would land and reinstate the Queen.

Mr. Smith was the editor of the *Hawaiian Star*, established by the Annexation Club for the purpose of advocating annexation.

The American minister expressed his belief in the statement of Mr. Smith and urged the importance of the American troops remaining on shore until I could communicate with you and you could have the opportunity to communicate with the Japanese Government and obtain from it assurances that Japanese troops would not be landed to enforce any policy on the Government or people of the Hawaiian Islands.

I was not impressed much with these statements.

When the Japanese commissioner learned that the presence of the Japanese man of war was giving currency to suggestions that his Government intended to interfere with domestic affairs here, he wrote to his Government asking that the vessel be ordered away, which was done. He expressed to me his deep regret that any one should charge that the Empire of Japan, having so many reasons to value the friendship of the Government of the United States, would consent to offend that Government by interfering in the political conflicts in these islands, to which it was averse.

In the light of subsequent events, I trust the correctness of my action will be the more fully justified.

The Provisional Government left to its own preservation, the people freed from any fear of free intercourse with me in so far as my action could accomplish it, the disposition of the minds of all people to peace pending the consideration by the Government of the United States as to what should be its action in connection with affairs here, cleared the way for me to commence the investigation with which I was charged.

The causes of the revolution culminating in the dethronement of the Queen and the establishment of the Provisional Government, January 17, 1893, are remote and proximate. A brief presentation of the former will aid in a fuller apprehension of the latter.

On June 14, 1852, a constitution was granted by Kamehameha III, by and with the advice and consent of the nobles and representatives in legislative council. This instrument provided for a house of nobles, holding their seats for life, and that the number should not exceed thirty, and a house of representatives composed of not less than twenty-four nor more than forty members. Every male subject, whether native or naturalized, and every denizen of the Kingdom who had paid his taxes, attained the age of twenty-one years, and had resided in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the time of election was entitled to vote for the representative or representatives of the district in which he may have resided three months next preceding the day of election.

For convenience the following extracts from that instrument are inserted here:

ART. 32. He has the power, by and with the advice of his cabinet, and the approval of his privy council, to appoint and remove at his pleasure any of the several heads of the executive departments, and he may require information in writing from any of the officers in the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.

ART. 35. The person of the King is inviolable and sacred; his ministers are responsible; to the King belongs the executive power; all laws that have passed both houses of the legislature, for their validity, shall be signed by His Majesty and the Kuhina Nui; all his other official acts shall be approved by the privy council, countersigned by the Kuhina Nui, and by the minister to whose department such act may belong.

ART. 51. The ministers of the King are appointed and commissioned by him, and hold their offices during His Majesty's pleasure, subject to impeachment.

ART. 72. The King appoints the members of the house of nobles, who hold their seats during life, subject to the provision of article 67; but their number shall not exceed thirty.

ART. 75. The house of representatives shall be composed of not less than twenty-four nor more than forty members, who shall be elected annually.

ART. 78. Every male subject of His Majesty, whether native or naturalized, and every denizen of the Kingdom who shall have paid his taxes who shall have attained the full age of 20 years, and who shall have resided in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the time of election, shall be entitled to one vote for the representative or representatives of the district in which he may have resided three months next preceding the day of election; provided that no insane person, nor any person who shall at any time have been convicted of any infamous crime within the Kingdom, unless he shall have been pardoned by the King, and by the terms of such pardon be restored to all the rights of a subject, shall be allowed to vote.

ART. 105. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either branch of the legislature, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members of each house such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on their journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the next legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the election of the next house of representatives. And if, in the next legislature, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of each house, and be approved by the King, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the Constitution of this Kingdom.

In November, 1863, Kamehameha V was proclaimed King, on the death of Kamehameha IV. He issued a proclamation for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention to be held June 13, 1864. The convention was composed of sixteen nobles and twenty-seven elected delegates, presided over by the King in person. That body decided it had a right to proceed to make a new constitution. Not being in accord with the King on the question of a property qualification for voters, on the 13th day of August, 1864, he declared the constitution of 1852 abrogated and prorogued the convention. On the 20th of August following he proclaimed a new constitution upon his own authority, which continued in force twenty-three years.

From this the following extracts are made:

ART. 45. The legislative power of the three estates of this Kingdom is vested in the King and the legislative assembly, which assembly shall consist of the nobles appointed by the King and of the representatives of the people, sitting together.

ART. 57. The King appoints the nobles, who shall hold their appointments during life, subject to the provisions of article 53; but their number shall not exceed twenty.

ART. 61. No person shall be eligible for a representative of the people who is insane or an idiot; nor unless he be a male subject of the Kingdom, who shall have arrived at the full age of twenty-one years, who shall know how to read and write, who shall understand accounts, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for at least three years, the last of which shall be the year immediately preceding his election, and who shall own real estate within the Kingdom of a clear value, over and above all incumbrances, of at least five hundred dollars, or who shall have an annual income of at least two hundred and fifty dollars derived from any property or some lawful employment.

ART. 62. Every male subject of the Kingdom, who shall have paid his taxes, who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and shall be possessed of real property in this Kingdom to the value over and above all incumbrances of one hundred and fifty dollars*—or of a leasehold property on which the rent is twenty-five dollars per year—or of an income of not less than seventy-five dollars per year, derived from any property or some lawful employment and shall know how to read and write, if born since the year 1840 and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters of his district as may be provided by law, shall be entitled to one vote for the representative or representatives of that district; provided, however, that no insane or idiotic person, nor any person who shall have been convicted of any infamous crime within this Kingdom, unless he shall have been pardoned by the King, and by the terms of such pardon have been restored to all the rights of a subject, shall be allowed to vote.

ART. 80. Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the legislative assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members thereof, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on its journal, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the next legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the next election of representatives; and if in the next legislature such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of the legislative assembly, and be approved by the King, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the constitution of this country.

On the 18th of February, 1874, David Kalakaua was proclaimed King. In 1875 a treaty of commercial reciprocity between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands was ratified, and the laws necessary to carry it into operation were enacted in 1876. It provided, as you are aware, for the free importation into the United States of several articles, amongst which was muscavado, brown, and all other unrefined sugars, sirups of sugar cane, melada, and molasses, produced in the Hawaiian Islands.

From it there came to the islands an intoxicating increase of wealth, a new labor system, an Asiatic population, an alienation between the native and white races, an impoverishment of the former, an enrichment of the latter, and the many so-called revolutions, which are the foundation for the opinion that stable government can not be maintained.

(The deaths in all these revolutions were seven. There were also seven wounded.)

The sugar export in 1876 was 26,072,429 pounds; in 1887 it was 212,763,647. The total value of all domestic exports was in 1876, \$1,994,833.55, and in 1887, \$9,435,204. The bounty paid on sugar by the United States to the sugar planters in the remission of customs on sugar before the McKinley bill was passed, is estimated by competent persons as reaching \$5,000,000 annually.

The government and crown lands were bought and leased and operated by whites of American, English, and German origin, and the sugar industry went into the hands of corporations.

From 1852 to 1876 there had been imported 2,625 Chinese, 148 Japanese, and 7 South Sea Islanders, making a total of 2,780. From 1876 to 1887 there were imported 23,268 Chinese, 2,777 Japanese, 10,216 Portuguese, 615 Norwegians, 1,052 Germans, 1,998 South Sea Islanders, making a total for this one decade of 39,926 immigrants. The Government expended from 1876 to 1887 \$1,026,212.30 in aid of the importation of labor for the planters, who for the same period expended \$565,547.74. It negotiated with various governments treaties under which labor was imported for a term of years to work at a very low figure, and under which the laborer was to be compelled by fines

* The property qualification was removed by an amendment.

and imprisonment to labor faithfully and to remain with his employer to the end of the contract term.

Of 14,439 laborers on plantations in 1885, 2,136 were natives and the remainder imported labor. Generally, the rule has obtained of bringing twenty-five women for every one hundred men. The immigrants were of the poor and ignorant classes. The Portuguese especially, as a rule, could not read or write and were remarkably thievish. The women of Japanese and Chinese origin were grossly unchaste.

The price of all property advanced. The price of labor was depressed by enormous importations and by the efficiency accruing from compulsory performance of the contract by the Government.

In the year 1845, under the influence of white residents, the lands were so distributed between the crown, the Government, the chiefs, and the people as to leave the latter with an insignificant interest in lands—27,830 acres.

The story of this division is discreditable to King, chiefs, and white residents, but would be tedious here. The chiefs became largely indebted to the whites, and thus the foundation for the large holdings of the latter was laid.

Prior to 1876 the kings were controlled largely by such men as Dr. Judd, Mr. Wyllie, and other leading white citizens holding positions in their cabinets.

A king rarely changed his cabinet. The important offices were held by white men. A feeling of amity existed between the native and foreign races unmarred by hostile conflict. It should be noted that at this period the native generally knew how to read and write his native tongue, into which the Bible and a few English works were translated. To this, native newspapers of extensive circulation contributed to the awakening of his intellect. He also generally read and wrote English.

From 1820 to 1866 missionaries of various nationalities, especially American, with unselfishness, toil, patience, and piety, had devoted themselves to the improvement of the native. They gave them a language, a religion, and an immense movement on the lines of civilization. In process of time the descendants of these good men grew up in secular pursuits. Superior by nature, education, and other opportunities, they acquired wealth. They sought to succeed to the political control exercised by their fathers. The revered missionary disappeared. In his stead there came the Anglo-Saxon in the person of his son, ambitious to acquire wealth and to continue that political control reverently conceded to his pious ancestor. Hence, in satire, the native designated him a "missionary," which has become a campaign phrase of wonderful potency. Other white foreigners came into the country, especially Americans, English, and Germans. These, as a rule, did not become naturalized and participate in the voting franchise. Business and race affiliation occasioned sympathy and coöperation between these two classes of persons of foreign extraction.

Does this narration of facts portray a situation in a government in whole or in part representative favorable to the ambition of a leader who will espouse the native cause? Would it be strange for him to stir the native heart by picturing a system of political control under which the foreigner had wickedly become possessed of the soil, degraded free labor by an uncivilized system of coolie labor, prostituted society by injecting into it a people hostile to Christianity and the civilization of the nineteenth century, exposed their own daughters to the evil influences of an overwhelming male population of a degraded type, implanted Japanese and Chinese women almost insensible to feelings of chastity, and then loudly boasted of their Christianity?

On the other hand, was it not natural for the white race to vaunt their wealth and intelligence, their Christian success in rescuing the native from barbarism, their gift of a Government regal in name but containing many of the principles of freedom; to find in the natives defective intelligence, tendencies to idolatry, to race prejudice, and a disposition under the influence of white and half-white leaders to exercise political domination; to speak of their thriftlessness in private life and susceptibility to bribes in legislative action; to proclaim the unchasteness of native women, and to take at all hazards the direction of public affairs from the native?

With such a powerful tendency to divergence and political strife, with its attendant bitterness and exaggerations, we must enter upon the field of inquiry pointed out in your instructions.

It is not my purpose to take up this racial controversy at its birth, but when it had reached striking proportions and powerfully acted in the evolution of grave political events culminating in the present status. Nor shall I relate all the minute details of political controversy at any given period, but only such and to such extent as may illustrate the purpose just indicated.

It has already appeared that under the constitution of 1852 the legislature consisted of two bodies—one elected by the people and the other chosen by the King—and that no property qualifications hindered the right of suffrage. The King and people through the two bodies held a check on each other. It has also been shown that in 1864 by a royal proclamation a new constitution, sanctioned by a cabinet of prominent white men, was established, restricting the right of suffrage and combining the representative and nobles into one body. This latter provision was designed to strengthen the power of the Crown by removing a body distinctly representative. This instrument remained in force twenty-three years. The Crown appointed the nobles generally from white men of property and intelligence. In like manner the King selected his cabinet. These remained in office for a long series of years and directed the general conduct of public affairs.

Chief Justice Judd, of the supreme court of the Hawaiian Islands, in a formal statement uses this language:

Under every constitution prior to 1887 the ministers were appointed by the King and removed by him; but until Kalakaua's reign it was a very rare thing that any King changed his ministry. They had a pretty long lease of political life. My father was minister for seven or ten years and Mr. Wyllie for a longer period. It was a very rare political occurrence and made a great sensation when a change was made. Under Kalakaua things were different. I think we had twenty-six different cabinets during his reign.

The record discloses thirteen cabinets. Two of these were directly forced on him by the reformers. Of the others, six were in sympathy with the reformers and eminent in their confidence. The great stir in cabinet changes commenced with the Gibson cabinet in 1882. He was a man of large information, free from all suspicion of bribery, politically ambitious, and led the natives and some whites.

It may not be amiss to present some of the criticisms against Kalakaua and his party formally filed with me by Prof. W. D. Alexander, a representative reformer.

On the 12th of February, 1874, Kalakaua was elected King by the legislature. The popular choice lay between him and the Queen Dowager.

In regard to this, Mr. Alexander says that "the cabinet and the American party used all their influence in favor of the former, while the English favored Queen Emma, who was devoted to their interest."

Notwithstanding there were objections to Kalakaua's character, he says: "It was believed, however, that if Queen Emma should be elected there would be no hope of our obtaining a reciprocity treaty with the United States."

He gives an account of various obnoxious measures advocated by the King which were defeated.

In 1882 he says the race issue was raised by Mr. Gibson, and only two white men were elected to the legislature on the islands.

A bill prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors to natives was repealed at this session.

A \$10,000,000-loan bill was again introduced, but was shelved in committee. The appropriation bill was swelled to double the estimated receipts of the Government, including \$30,000 for coronation expenses, besides large sums for military expenses, foreign embassies, etc.

A bill was reported giving the King power to appoint district justices, which had formerly been done by the justices of the supreme court.

A million of dollars of silver was coined by the King, worth 84 cents to the dollar, which was intended to be exchanged for gold bonds at par, under the loan act of 1882. This proceeding was enjoined by the court. The privy council declared the coin to be of the legal value expressed on their face, subject to the legal-tender act, and they were gradually put into circulation. A profit of \$150,000 is said to have been made on this transaction.

In 1884 a reform legislature was elected. A lottery bill, an opium license bill, and an \$8,000,000 loan bill were defeated.

In the election for the legislature of 1886 it is alleged that by the use of gin, chiefly furnished by the King, and by the use of his patronage, it was carried against the reform party; that out of twenty-eight candidates, twenty-six were office-holders—one a tax assessor and one the Queen's secretary. There was only one white man on the Government ticket—Gibson's son-in-law. Only ten reform candidates were elected. In this legislature an opium bill was passed providing for a license for four years, to be granted by the minister of the interior with the consent of the King, for \$30,000 per annum.

Another act was passed to create a Hawaiian board of health, consisting of five native doctors, appointed by the King, with power to issue certificates to native *kahunas* (doctors) to practice medicine.

A \$2,000,000-loan bill was passed, which was used largely in taking up bonds on a former loan.

It is claimed that in granting the lottery franchise the King fraudulently obtained \$75,000 for the franchise and then sold it to another person, and that subsequently the King was compelled to refund the same.

These are the principal allegations on which the revolution of 1887 is justified.

None of the legislation complained of would have been considered a cause for revolution in any one of the United States, but would have been used in the elections to expel the authors from power. The alleged corrupt action of the King could have been avoided by more careful legislation and would have been a complete remedy for the future.

The rate of taxation on real or personal property never exceeded 1 per cent.

To all this the answer comes from the reformers: "The native is unfit for government and his power must be curtailed."

The general belief that the King had accepted what is termed the

opium bribe and the failure of his efforts to unite the Samoan Islands with his own Kingdom had a depressing influence on his friends, and his opponents used it with all the effect they could.

The last cabinet prior to the revolution of 1887 was anti-reform. Three of its members were half castes; two of them were and are recognized as lawyers of ability by all.

At this point I invite attention to the following extract from a formal colloquy between Chief Justice Judd and myself touching the means adopted to extort the constitution of 1887, and the fundamental changes wrought through that instrument:

Q. Will you be kind enough to state how this new constitution was established?

A. The two events which brought this matter to a culminating point were (1) the opium steal of \$71,000 by which a Chinaman named Aki was made by the King to pay him a bribe of \$71,000 of hard coin in order to obtain the exclusive franchise for selling opium, and (2) the expense of the expedition to Samoa in the "Kaimilea." A secret league was formed all over the islands, the result of which was the King was asked to promulgate a new constitution containing those provisions that I have before alluded to. It was very adroitly managed by the Ashfords, and more especially by V. V. Ashford, who obtained the confidence of the King and Mr. Gibson. He was the colonel of the Rifles, and he assured them that if he was paid a certain sum of money and made minister to Canada that he would arrange it so that the movement would be futile.

Q. How was he to do that?

A. By preventing the use of the military, I suppose; and he arranged with the military authorities and Capt. Haley that they should be called out to preserve public order, although it was this large and well-drilled force which made the King fear that if he didn't yield things would be very critical for him.

Q. Was that a Government force?

A. It was organized under the laws.

Q. A volunteer organization?

A. Yes.

Q. So that the men in sympathy with the movement of this secret league went into it and constituted it under form of law.

A. Of course I do not know what was told the King privately, but I knew that he felt it would be very dangerous to refuse to promulgate the new constitution. I have no doubt that a great many things were circulated which came to his ears in the way of threats that was unfounded.

Q. What was the outside manifestation?

A. One great feature of it was its secrecy. The King was frightened at this secrecy. It was very well managed. The judges of the supreme court were not told of it until just before the event took place. I think it was the 2d or 3d of July, 1887.

Q. Was there then a mass meeting?

A. There was a large mass meeting held and a set of resolutions was presented to the King requiring that a new ministry be formed by Mr. W. L. Green and one other person, whose name I have forgotten.

Q. Was there any display of force?

A. The Honolulu Rifles were in detachments marched about in different portions of the town, having been called out by the legal military authorities.

Q. Who were the legal military authorities?

A. The governor of the island, Dominis, and Capt. H. Burrill Haley, the adjutant-general.

Q. Were they in sympathy with the movement?

A. No, sir; the officers of the corps were in sympathy with the movement.

Q. Who were they?

A. Ashford and Hebbard. I do not remember all.

Q. Did the governor order them out, not knowing of this state of things?

A. I think he did. I think he knew it, but it was to prevent, as I believe, something worse happening. As I said, there were threats made.

Q. Of what sort?

A. I understood that at one time there was a very strong feeling that the King should be forced to abdicate altogether, and it was only the more conservative men born here who said that the King and the Hawaiians should have another opportunity.

Q. Were there not two elements in that movement, one for a republic and the other for restraining the power of the King?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there not two forces in this movement coöperating together up to a certain point, to wit, those who were in favor of restraining the King by virtue of the provisions of the constitution of 1887 and those who were in favor of dethroning the King and establishing a republic?

A. I understand that there were, and that the more conservative view prevailed.

Q. And the men who were in favor of a republic were discontented at the outcome?

A. They were, and they didn't want the Hawaiians to vote at all; and the reason that the Portuguese were allowed to vote was to balance the native vote.

Q. Whose idea was that—was that the idea of the men who made the new constitution?

A. Of the men who made the new constitution.

Q. It was to balance the native vote with the Portuguese vote?

A. That was the idea.

Q. And that would throw the political power into the hands of the intelligence and wealth of the country?

A. That was the aim.

Q. How was this military used?

A. It was put about in squads over the city.

Q. The officers of the corps were really in favor of the movement for the new constitution and were called out by Governor Dominis to preserve order?

A. Yes. After the affair was over he was thanked by a military order from headquarters.

Q. Do you suppose that he was gratified with thanks under the circumstances?

A. Haley said to me when he showed me the order: "It is a little funny to thank a man who kicked you out, but I suppose I've got to do it."

Q. The King acceded to the demand for a new constitution and of a cabinet of given character?

A. In the first place he acceded to the proposition to make a new cabinet named by Mr. Green. The former cabinet, consisting of Mr. Gibson and three Hawaiians, had just resigned a day or two before. In three or four days the cabinet waited upon him with the constitution.

Q. What cabinet?

A. The cabinet consisting of Mr. Green, minister of foreign affairs; Mr. Thurston, minister of the interior; Mr. C. W. Ashford, attorney-general; and Mr. Godfrey Brown, minister of finance. I was sent for in the afternoon of July 5 to swear the King to the constitution. When I reached the palace they were all there, and the King asked me in Hawaiian whether he had better sign it or not. I said, "You must follow the advice of your responsible ministers." He signed it.

Q. This ministry had been appointed as the result of the demand of the mass meeting?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then having been appointed, they presented him with the constitution of 1887?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And he signed it?

A. He did.

Q. Was that constitution ever submitted to a popular vote for ratification?

A. No; it was not. There was no direct vote ratifying the constitution, but its provisions requiring that no one should vote unless he had taken an oath to support it, and a large number voted at that first election, was considered a virtual ratification of the constitution.

Q. If they voted at all they were considered as accepting it?

A. Yes, sir. I do not think any large number refused to take the oath to it.

Q. It was not contemplated by the mass meeting, nor the cabinet, nor anybody in power to submit the matter of ratification at all?

A. No, it was not. It was considered a revolution. It was a successful revolutionary act.

Q. And, therefore, was not submitted to a popular vote for ratification?

A. Yes, sir. It had mischievous effects in encouraging the Wilcox revolution of 1889, which was unsuccessful. I think it was a bad precedent, only the exigencies of the occasion seemed to demand it.

Without adding other testimony on the mode of extorting the new constitution or accepting this statement as full and unbiased, it is enough that it brings me to a point at which I may present important changes in the Hawaiian constitution and their application to the social and political conditions of the time. Your attention is now invited to the following amendments in the constitution of 1887:

ARR. 41. The cabinet shall consist of the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior, the minister of finance, and the attorney-general, and they shall

be His Majesty's special advisers in the executive affairs of the Kingdom; and they shall be *ex officio* members of His Majesty's privy council of state. They shall be appointed and commissioned by the King, and shall be removed by him only upon a vote of want of confidence passed by a majority of all the elective members of the legislature, or upon conviction of felony, and shall be subject to impeachment. No act of the King shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a member of the cabinet, who, by that signature, makes himself responsible.

ART. 42. Each member of the cabinet shall keep an office at the seat of Government, and shall be accountable for the conduct of his deputies and clerks. The cabinet hold seats *ex officio* in the legislature, with the right to vote, except on a question of want of confidence in them.

ART. 47. The legislature has full power and authority to amend the constitution as hereinafter provided, and from time to time to make all manner of wholesome laws, not repugnant to the constitution.

ART. 56. A noble shall be a subject of the Kingdom, who shall have attained the age of twenty-five years, and resided in the Kingdom three years, and shall be the owner of taxable property in this Kingdom of the value of three thousand dollars over and above all encumbrances, or in receipt of an income of not less than \$600 per annum.

ART. 58. Twenty-four nobles shall be elected as follows: Six from the Island of Hawaii; six from the Islands of Maui, Molokai, and Lanai; nine from the Island of Oahu; and three from the islands of Kauai and Niihau. At the first election held under this Constitution, the nobles shall be elected to serve until the general election to the legislature for the year of our Lord 1890, at which election, and thereafter, the nobles shall be elected at the same time and places as the representatives. At the election for the year of our Lord 1890, one-third of the nobles from each of the divisions aforesaid shall be elected for two years, and one-third for four years, and one-third for six years, and the electors shall ballot for them for such terms, respectively; and at all subsequent general elections they shall be elected for six years. The nobles shall serve without pay.

ART. 59. Every male resident of the Hawaiian Islands, of Hawaiian, American, or European birth or descent, who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have paid his taxes, and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters for nobles of his district, shall be an elector of nobles, and shall be entitled to vote at any election of nobles, provided:

First. That he shall have resided in the country not less than three years, and in the district in which he offers to vote not less than three months immediately preceding the election at which he offers to vote;

Second. That he shall own and be possessed, in his own right, of taxable property in this country of the value of not less than \$3,000 over and above all incumbrances, or shall have actually received an income of not less than \$600 during the year next preceding his registration for such election;

Third. That he shall be able to read and comprehend an ordinary newspaper printed in either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language;

Fourth. That he shall have taken an oath to support the constitution and laws, such oath to be administered by any person authorized to administer oaths, or by any inspector of elections;

Provided, however, That the requirements of a three years' residence and of ability to read and comprehend an ordinary newspaper, printed either in the Hawaiian, English, or some European language, shall not apply to persons residing in the Kingdom at the time of the promulgation of this constitution, if they shall register and vote at the first election which shall be held under this constitution.

ART. 60. There shall be twenty-four representatives of the people elected biennially, except those first elected under this constitution, who shall serve until the general election for the year of our Lord 1890. The representation shall be based upon the principles of equality and shall be regulated and apportioned by the legislature according to the population to be ascertained from time to time by the official census. But until such apportionment by the legislature, the apportionment now established by law shall remain in force, with the following exceptions, namely: There shall be but two representatives for the districts of Hilo and Puna on the island of Hawaii, but one for the districts of Lahaina and Kaanapali on the island of Maui, and but one for the districts of Koolauloa and Waiialua on the island of Oahu.

ART. 61. No person shall be eligible as a representative of the people unless he be a male subject of the Kingdom, who shall have arrived at the full age of twenty-one years; who shall know how to read and write either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language; who shall understand accounts; who shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for at least three years, the last of which shall be the year immediately preceding his election; and who shall own real estate within the Kingdom of a clear value, over and above all encumbrances, of at least \$500; or who shall have an annual income of at least \$250, derived from any property or some lawful employment.